


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**THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF
CAVOUR**

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME I

Riverside Popular Biographies

THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF
CAVOUR

BY
WILLIAM ROSCOE THAYER

VOLUME I

"I am the son of Liberty; to her I owe
all that I am."

CAVOUR TO MADAME DE CIR COURT.
December 29, 1860.

BOSTON AND NEW YORK
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SIXTH IMPRESSION

TO MY WIFE

PREFACE

THE sources for a biography of Cavour are exceptionally rich. Besides eleven volumes of his parliamentary speeches, there are some dozen others containing collections of his letters, his early diary and autobiographical notes, and three volumes of his leaders, essays, and reviews. In addition, many of his contemporaries have left memoirs in which they describe their relations with him. A considerable number of his diplomatic papers have been published: for the new Kingdom of Italy was well-advised, immediately on its creation, in permitting many documents to be edited, which, in the ordinary course, would have been locked up for half a century or more. The overturn of the Second French Empire also caused the release of testimony which would otherwise still be withheld. Nicomede Bianchi, in his *Storia Documentata*, had the great advantage, in chronicling the period from 1850 to 1861, of knowing not merely the sources which he printed, but how to interpret them in the light of documents which he kept back. He knew, also, Cavour's purposes. Still more illuminating to the biographer of Cavour are the voluminous introductions which Luigi Chiala prefixed to the six volumes of Letters. Senator Chiala's unrivaled familiarity with the written evidence was supplemented by an inexhaustible store of personal recollections and of anecdote, and by acquaintance, in many cases most intimate, with Cavour's colleagues and followers.

Among the supporters of the Monarchy who worked with Cavour, Ricasoli is most amply represented: but the biographies of Arese and Lanza contain much vital material; the volumes of Massimo d'Azeglio's correspondence and of Minghetti's Memoirs, though incomplete, are indispensable; and there are lives, more or less useful, of many of the lesser men. We still lack, however, Rattazzi's and Farini's Papers, as well as adequate biographies of those important politicians.

The writings of Mazzini, on the other hand, are being published in an edition which promises to exceed in vastness all the printed

documents of Napoleon the Great. Every scrap from Garibaldi's pen has been piously garnered. Nor have the lieutenants of these two chiefs been left without a memorial. Saffi, Bertani, Cattaneo, Mario, Nicotera, Pianciani, Mordini, Quadrio, Pisacane, to mention only a few, have either left records of their own or have had their deeds chronicled by sympathetic biographers. Only recently, Crispi's account of his connection with the Sicilian Expedition has appeared. Pallavicino's *Memoirs* and *La Farina's Letters* serve to throw light on the relations between the Monarchists and the Party of Action.

On the whole, therefore, even in the absence of certain official papers, which probably exist, and of private letters, which are still guarded from the public, the material for a biography of Cavour is very abundant. Gaps in the evidence there are, and gaps there will always be; but only novices in historical study imagine that the makers of history — statesmen, sovereigns and soldiers — work pen in hand. Much that is important is never written; motives, the dynamics of history, are not always clear to the actors themselves. In the absence of written testimony, the explanation by word of mouth of the surviving participants in an historic achievement becomes invaluable. After a long lapse of time, they may not always remember minute details accurately, but their general recollection of purposes and opinions, and their attitude towards men and issues, are likely to be more definite; and they make up, at any rate, an important historical source. During the quarter of a century since this biography was planned, I have had the good fortune to know many of the survivors of the Cavourian period, representative men and women of all parties, witnesses from whom I have had clues to hitherto unpublished records or light on obscure events.

Nor would I forget to acknowledge great obligations to the earlier biographers of Cavour: to William de La Rive, the first, who gives the intimate, friend's portrait; to Treitschke, whose solid treatise, though tinctured with Prussian spirit, is both penetrating and comprehensive; to Massari, frankly eulogistic, yet in the main life-like; to Mazade, who analyzes, selects and narrates with characteristic Gallic clarity and charm; to Chiala, whose introductions, if they be not biography, are the stuff of which biography is made; to Countess Martinengo Cesaresco, whose

precious little volume is a model of crystalline interpretation; to Zanichelli, who studies his subject from the stand-point of an expert in the science of government. Each of these biographers has added something to our knowledge of Cavour. The publication during the past decade of much new material, and the longer perspective, which shows events in their true proportions, seem to justify another life of Cavour now.

I have made the notes and references as brief as possible, and I have omitted an exhaustive bibliography, because the time has passed when that rather specious credential of erudition should be allowed to cumber general histories. Most of the important historical periods have now each a catalogue of its own, to which the student can refer. It has been my privilege to use freely Mr. Nelson Gay's monumental bibliography of the Risorgimento, which, in his striving for absolute completeness, he withholds too long from publication. My plan has been, in the main, simply to refer to those passages from which a conclusion in the text has been reached or a citation has been drawn. It must be taken for granted that the principal sources and commentators, Chiala, Bianchi, Zini, Mazzini, Tivaroni, Balan, Mario, British Blue Books, *Livres Jaunes*, Martin, La Gorce, etc. — even when not mentioned — have been constantly in hand; and usually a bundle of pamphlets has been ransacked where only one has been cited.

The translation of many passages has presented difficulties: for while Cavour wrote with notable precision, he often paid little regard to syntax. To dress his unliterary, downright language in starched, academic English, would be indeed not to translate but to traduce him. I have tried to attain a happy mean. So, too, with Garibaldi's rhapsodies, and with other quotations, including some of Cavour's earlier letters, which are embellished with the flowers of rhetoric of the Romanticist era. They were living flowers to their writers, though to us they seem artificial, and are faded beyond revival; but I have kept their quality, so far as possible, because it is an authentic reminder of that time. In like fashion I have given the colloquial expressions, as reported, of men who were too genuine and too much in earnest to strive after the Ciceronian magniloquence which used to be regarded as indispensable to the dignity of history.

Various subjects which would require detailed treatment in a

history of the Risorgimento from 1849 to 1870, I have either merely sketched or alluded to briefly. Such, for instance, are finance, popular education, commerce and legal codes and procedure. In many cases, the measures which Cavour introduced were literally war measures, to be judged as such and not as the final forms which he would have adopted. As he died before the work of unification was achieved, he could not be responsible for the later application or results of his legislation.

The purpose of this biography is political in a large sense, not economic or sociological. For this reason also, the military episodes have been subordinated to the political. It is hardly necessary to recommend readers who hunger for more details, to Mr. Trevelyan's brilliant volumes on Garibaldi's Expedition. Those who wish to follow the political evolution between 1814 and 1849, may be referred to my "Dawn of Italian Independence." For the sake of uniformity I have used the terms "Piedmont" and "Piedmontese," instead of "Sardinia" and "Sardinian," and "Austrians" instead of "Germans," and I have distinguished, whenever possible, "Papacy" and "Papal" — as referring to the political, temporal institution — from "Roman Catholic" and similar terms, which are properly applied to the religious institution. It has been impossible to keep a uniform spelling of proper names, because there is no uniformity in the documents quoted. La Marmora, Boncompagni, Desambrois, Margherita and many others employed variant forms at different times, and Cavour himself frequently omitted the *de* from his own signature.

It is impossible for me to name all the persons to whom I have been indebted, in various ways, during the preparation of this work: but I may mention the following as having placed me under special obligation. The late Luigi Chiala; Professor Pasquale Villari; the late Marquis Carlo Alfieri di Sostegno; Marquis Emilio Visconti Venosta; Emile Ollivier; Dr. Heinrich Friedjung, whose recent works on Austrian affairs have filled an important gap in the later history of the Risorgimento; Count Pier Desiderio Pasolini; the late Giuseppe Biancheri, long President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies; Cavaliere Azzolini, who placed his precious collection of Cavour autograph material at my service; Baron Mayor des Planches, editor of an important volume of Cavour's Letters, and for nearly ten years Italian Ambassador at Washing-

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who has furnished me advance sheets of his forthcoming work
on Cavour's early manhood; the late Professor Ernesto Masi;
Baron Antonio Manno; Commendatore Primo Levi; Senator
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Angelo De Gubernatis; Professor Vittorio Fiorini; Dr. Alessan-
dro Luzio, whose studies of the Risorgimento and criticisms of its
historical material have earned for him peculiar distinction;
Dr. Guglielmo Ferrero; the late Jessie White Mario; Benedetto
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dian of Mazzini's Papers; the Hon. Robert Bacon, former Secre-
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To three friends — Countess Evelyn Martinengo Cesaresco,
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Needless to say, the opinions expressed in this book, whatever they may owe to consultation with these and other helpers, are my own.

Mr. George B. Ives has made, with expert skill, the index, and has assisted with many valuable suggestions in reading the proofs.

W. R. T.

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS,
June 6, 1911,

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**THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF
CAVOUR**

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CAVOUR

CHAPTER I

CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH. 1810-1831

CAMILLO BENSO DI CAVOUR was born in the Palazzo Cavour, No. 13 Jena Street,¹ Turin, August 10, 1810, and was baptized in the Church of San Carlo, his sponsors being Prince Borghese and his wife, Pauline Bonaparte. From his godfather, the child received his first name, Camillo.² The Bensos were an ancient and distinguished family. Their earliest recorded ancestor, Hubert, a German crusading pilgrim, followed Frederick Barbarossa to the Holy Land, stopped in Piedmont on his return, and married the heiress of the Bensos, whose name he took. The Bensos dwelt in the little republic of Chieri, not far from Turin, a sturdy stock, which contributed in almost every generation efficient leaders in the affairs of the republic, or in the larger concerns of Piedmont and Italy.³ In later times one branch of the family held the fief of Santena, the other had the castle of Cavour at the foot of the Alps near Pignerolo; and it was upon Michele Antonio Benso, of this line, that Duke Charles Emanuel II conferred the title of marquis in 1649. A century later, on the extinction of the Santena Bensos, the Santena fief reverted to Antonio Benso di Cavour. His son, Filippo, married

¹ The street now called Via Cavour.

² He never used the names Julius, Philip, Paul which were also given to him at baptism.

³ Among the famous "B's" of Chieri were the families Benso, Balbo, Balbiani, Bertone, Bescaretti, and Broglie. In 1309, Arduino Benso was ambassador from Chieri in the suite of Emperor Henry VII. In 1598, Ascanio Benso was minister to the Duke of Parma. Antonio Benso served the Venetians in Cyprus against the Turks.

Philippine de Sales (1761–1849), whose son, Don Michele, was the father of Camillo.

Thus on the paternal side the future statesman counted twenty generations of Piedmontese ancestors, from whom he inherited whatever a man can inherit of clan loyalty and focal aptitudes and patriotism. Through his mother and grandmother came an outlook beyond the Piedmontese enclosure into France and Switzerland. Philippine de Sales, a woman of quick wit, courage, poise, and tact, was a Savoyard, descended from a brother of St. Francis de Sales. When the Revolution broke, she was the rock round which the family rallied. She sold the heirlooms, the rich tapestries, even the silver holy-water stoup which had belonged to the sainted forerunner, in order to meet the exactions of the French invaders and to provide her son with pocket-money when he was ordered into the French army. Herself a great lady of the Old Régime, she acquiesced in the Napoleonic triumph, took her place at the Emperor's court, and so commended herself to him by her charm and shrewdness that he appointed her lady of honor to his sister, Princess Pauline. During the Borghese governorship at Turin, Marchioness Philippine proved a discreet companion to that flighty princess.

Michele di Cavour served under General Berthier, was wounded, and while recovering his health at Geneva he made the acquaintance of Count Jean de Sellon, who had three attractive daughters. The young marquis wished to marry the eldest, Victoria, but she preferred the Baron della Turbia. The following year, however, he revisited Geneva, and won the heart of the second sister, Adèle. They were married in 1805, and took up their residence in the Cavour mansion at Turin, where, in 1806, Gustavo, their first son, was born. Don Michele found favor under the French, holding the post of Chamberlain to Prince Borghese.

The De Sellons were a substantial Genevan family, Protestants, descended from Huguenot refugees. Jean de Sellon, Camillo's grandfather, received the title of Count of the Holy Roman Empire from Joseph II. He had the Genevan ideals of integrity and education, but without Calvinist bigotry. His only son, John James, the "Swiss Wilberforce," welcomed all the humane projects then being broached, founded the Peace Society, and

was the friend and associate of reformers in France and England. Victoria de Sellon, after an unhappy marriage with Della Turbia, became the wife of the Duke de Clermont-Tonnerre, a peer of France, with patrician background. Henrietta, the youngest sister, married Count d'Auzers, a noble from Auvergne.

Into this world of heredity and circumstance came the little Camillo. In the palace in Jena Street dwelt not only Don Michele and his family, but the dowager Marchioness, two bachelor uncles, and, at different times, the Clermont-Tonnerres and the D'Auzers, with their separate establishments. Strong family affection bound together the members of this large circle, and if there was friction, the tactful and commanding grandmother smoothed it over. Marina, as the children and grandchildren called her, had their affection and their obedience. The two boys, among so many elders, could not fail to mature early. They seem to have run small risk of being spoiled: aunts and uncles did not spare criticism, and the Cavours had a high sense of duty in bringing up children.

The record of Camillo's childhood is happily free from any signs of abnormal precocity. The first mention of him, at the age of three, describes "a good romping little fellow, strong, noisy, and always ready to amuse himself." The next year his mother teaches him to read, but he has a horror of study, and "his sighs are heart-rending." Still, she perseveres, and although the passion for study lingered until much later, he soon learned to read and write with ease.

One anecdote has been preserved, of his coming to Geneva when six years old, to visit his mother's relatives, the De La Rives. "He was an arch little fellow," writes William de La Rive, "with a face at once lively and indicating decision, with very attractive manners, and an endless flow of childish spirits. He wore a red suit, which gave him both a droll and resolute air. On arriving, he was much wrought up, and explained to my grandfather that the postmaster at Geneva, having furnished execrable horses, ought to be dismissed. 'I demand that he be dismissed,' he kept repeating. 'But,' replied my grandfather, 'I cannot dismiss the postmaster; only the first syndic has this power.' 'Very well, I wish an audience of the first syndic.' 'You shall have it to-morrow,' replied my grandfather; and, on the

instant he wrote to his friend, M. Schmidtmeier, the first syndic, to warn him that he was going to send him a very amusing 'little man.' Accordingly the next day the child goes to M. Schmidtmeier; is received with great ceremony; quite unembarrassed, he makes three low bows; and then, in a clear voice, he makes known his complaint and request. On coming home, from the moment he saw my grandfather in the distance, he shouted, 'Well! he is going to be dismissed!'"⁴ So early did the instinct for getting rid of the incompetent show itself in him!

Another fragment, from the same period, discloses another characteristic. He had fallen in love with a five-year-old playmate, who had been remiss in her letters. "My dear Fanchonette," he writes, "why have you abandoned me? What a crime you are committing! I love you always and call you *my* Fanchonette; but now I have made the acquaintance of a charming, young and touching lady, whom I call 'Sweetheart,' but her name is Juliet Barolo. My little friend has come twice to take me to drive in her most beautiful gilded carriage."⁵ Did Fanchonette grow jealous over her rival, — the "little friend," who was, in fact, Marchioness Barolo, one of the younger married ladies of Turin, who had taken a fancy to the lively boy?

Camillo's mother and grandmother gave him his earliest lessons. Then he and Gustavo had a tutor, Abbé Frézet, a man of more than average capacity for that position. We hear also of a M. Maréchal, a Bohemian, who taught the boys German and botany, and was nicknamed by them "Maréchal d'Encre," on account of the quantities of ink he used. Gustavo was serious, bookish, not very strong in health, and enough older than Camillo to have a different set of companions. Camillo, usually merry, would sometimes fly into a violent passion, — once even, he seized a knife and threatened to stab himself, — but these rages soon passed, and could probably be matched in the experience of most high-spirited boys. A wholesome discipline prevailed in the Cavour household; old-fashioned standards, which did not allow children to forget that it was their duty to love and obey their parents, and to respect their elders.

The greater part of the year was passed in the town house at Turin, but in the summer and autumn the family would move

⁴ La Rive, 42.

⁵ Berti, i, 50.

out to the country-place at Santena, ten miles to the southeast of the capital. The château, built early in the eighteenth century, is of patriarchal dimensions: in front of it nestle the cottages of the peasants, the village church, and an old tower, the only remains of the medieval castle; on the other side stretches an "English Garden" some forty acres in extent, bounded on its farther edge by a swift narrow stream, the Banna. Here Camillo learned country life as only a boy can learn it. Of even greater importance in his intellectual growth were the frequent visits to his Swiss relatives. Ah! the excitement of travel by stage-coach over the Alps, of seeing strange places and people, and of finding at the journey's end, a welcome from aunts, uncles, and cousins! The child could not be aware, of course, that those holidays were affording scope for his innate toleration and open-mindedness to spring up; nor could he foresee how the flight into Switzerland should be for him, in the terrific days to come, a source of salvation. As he lay upon his deathbed he said, "Perhaps this summer I may be able to go and rest in Switzerland among my friends."

On May 1, 1820, Camillo entered the Military Academy of Turin, an institution founded a few years earlier for the sons of the nobility and of the upper bourgeoisie. As the law of primogeniture still ruled in Piedmont, eldest sons had reserved for them high positions in the administrative or diplomatic branch, while the younger looked to the army for a career. So Camillo, as a matter of course, put on the blue uniform of the Academy, where during the next six years he fitted himself to become a soldier. The principal, General Cesare Saluzzo, seems to have been more than a martinet, and although the instruction given was mediocre, except in mathematics and the purely military studies, the pupils learned to be manly, prompt, and honorable. Young Cavour proved himself a normal boy in his fondness for pranks and in his chafing at the studies which he did not like. If he chose to apply himself, he easily led his class: but like other boys who know their ability, he did not always choose. In the register of the Academy we find him placed under arrest on bread and water for three days for "arrogance to a teacher," and again for eleven days for having books without permission. The boys gave private theatricals, and on one occasion Camillo

impersonated The Genius of Italy in a farce called *The Poets in the Elysian Fields*, he appearing from heaven with wings on his shoulders and the plump pink cheeks and blond hair of a typical cherub. Besides the regular drill exercises, the boys fenced and rode, and once a year they went on excursions, which lasted a fortnight or longer, and gave them a taste of real life in the field. Sometimes they bivouacked under the stars: sometimes they were entertained at a château. These excursions gave them good health and endurance, as well as a first-hand acquaintance with Piedmont and many of its defenses.

Life at a military school often makes a boy coarse and rough: Cavour became neither. He was not above being homesick, although his family saw him frequently and he was allowed, at stated times, to go home for the day. Visitors at the Academy were received in the parlor, where an iron grating shut them off from the boys. At this grating, Gustavo used to read the newspapers to his younger brother, hungry for news of the world of politics; and it was doubtless Gustavo who smuggled in the books that cost Camillo eleven days of freedom.

The letters of the "young academist" are more interesting in the light of what he became than for their intrinsic merits: knowing the man, we see in them his beginnings. Their most striking quality is their grasp on fact; they reveal, besides deep affection, frankness and a budding irony. "Be sure," he writes his mother, "that I am cheerful, especially when I am not told to be." "Father has led me to hope that I shall see you next week; I count so strongly on maternal affection that I expect you Tuesday." "M. Dho says that ladies' society softens manners: I don't much believe it, but after all, let us quit this subject." "I have received your kind letter," he tells Gustavo, "and am very much obliged for it. I perceive by your biting touches that you are a disciple of Juvenal, and that one can't prick you with impunity. Have you so little knowledge that you must make an effort to show it off? or else are you one of those old pedants who quote Virgil and Cicero to us at every instant? You would do much better to cross your *t*'s and put the accents on the *a*'s and *e*'s where they need it, than to cudgel your brains to hunt for verses that fit."⁶ Good advice, surely, from a boy of fourteen to

⁶ Berti, I, 352, 353, 354.

his brother four years older. One of his schoolmates recalls that he eulogized Franklin and Santorre di Santa Rosa, who had lately died fighting for the independence of Greece. One day, the eminent Professor Plana, in explaining a very hard lesson, advised Camillo to become a celebrated mathematician like Lagrange. Cavour replied: "It is no longer the time for mathematics; we must busy ourselves with political economy; the world progresses. I hope some day to see our country governed by a Constitution, and who knows but that I may be its minister." ⁷

Stray quotations from juvenile letters may mislead — so many of the allusions have grown dim, so much depends on the mood of the moment — but all the evidence concerning Cavour's life at the Academy tells the same story. A boy's remarks on politics would ordinarily pass unnoticed: but that a Piedmontese boy at the Turin Military Academy in 1825 should extol constitutional government was too remarkable to be forgotten. Camillo's habit of speaking out soon got him into trouble. The Prince of Carignano, Charles Albert, appointed him one of his pages, a post which most of the young nobles hankered after, as it not only gave them distinction, but a stipend of 1200 francs a year. Moreover, serving the heir presumptive to the throne might lead to lifelong honors. Since the Restoration, Marquis Cavour had been out of favor at Court ⁸ because he had accepted the Napoleonic régime: but Charles Albert's personal friendliness partly compensated for the eclipse of royal good will, and the pageship gratified him. Camillo, however, already burning with the ideals of liberty and independence, regarded the page's office as menial. The red-cloth uniform he called "a lobster livery," and himself a "lackey." As he made no pretense of hiding his disgust, the Prince heard of it, and, according to one rumor, he would have dismissed the impertinent lad but for the earnest entreaties of the Cavours.

Camillo rejoiced when, just before his 16th birthday (July 30, 1826), having passed his final examinations at the Academy, he

⁷ *Lettere*, v, 22; letter of Major Carlo Cappia, July 4, 1883.

⁸ When Marquis Cavour was suggested to King Charles Felix for minister of finance, the King replied: "No, no! he is a trader, and would sell out my kingdom." *Lettere*, i, 5.

received his commission as sub-lieutenant of engineers, and got rid of his lackey's livery. He led his class at the finish,⁹ an honor which entitled him to choose which branch of the service he would enter. His unusual proficiency in the mathematical sciences naturally led him to the Engineer Corps. A man's recollections of his schooldays are not always exact. Cavour regretted that the Military Academy neglected to teach him to write, not realizing that he was, fortunately, one of those youths whom the peddlers of rhetoric could not impress, and, therefore, could not spoil. He gave full credit to the training in mathematics which he received from Plana. But much that was to be of formative influence in his career, — his knowledge of history and political economy, — he had begun to teach himself by reading outside of the prescribed work. He had also taken up English, which opened for him the door of the Temple of Progress. He read Lingard's history. In literature, La Harpe, who still shone as a star of the first magnitude among French critics, "pleased him greatly."

Cavour was first assigned to duty in the Department of the Engineer Corps at Turin, where he spent the next two years, living at home. He matured rapidly. The life of a young officer, who has much leisure, means, social position, and great personal charm, is one of the worst preparations for a masterful career. Cavour, with a relish for everything, took this life as he found it, but with a clear understanding of its perils and insipidity.

"You are wholly right," he tells his Uncle Sellon (April 14, 1828). "The passion for gambling is terrible, and can harm ■ young man more than any other. I know it, because I have played a little, without, however, abandoning myself to it with frenzy, and I have observed that gambling excites and produces in us ■ nervous excitement that does mischief to our ordinary employment and to our peace of mind: but, without differing from you in the least as to the dangers of gambling, let me tell you that neither dancing nor any other social amusement is a remedy without danger. First, I will remark that at 18 one does nothing in moderation. Therefore, if I were to give myself up to dancing and conversation, it would be difficult in a country like

⁹ In his last year he received 50, the highest mark, in eleven studies, and 49, 48, and 46 in the three others.

ours, where the ladies are extremely gallant, for me not to fall in love with some one of the beauties who are rivals for the adoration of the young fellows. In this case, it would be harder for me to be moderate than in a game of cards. If I were at Geneva, where social conduct is so praiseworthy, and where one meets on all sides enlightened and cultivated persons with whom one can discuss solid topics and get information, there you would see me frequent conversations and enjoy them. But at Turin, where you have to be perpetually on your guard against falling, where you meet no other persons except those who talk about the theatres and the city's chronicle of scandals, I know nothing in the world more boresome than our evening parties — unless one flirts with a lady. So it seems to me that there is no better plan than to hold one's self aloof, so far as one can with propriety.”¹⁰

Two months later he writes to his sympathetic uncle: “If I found myself in other circumstances, and believed that in a day even remote I might, *without betraying my convictions*, be usefully employed in government offices, I would abandon the dry and laborious study of calculus and devote myself with ardor to some other kind of work. But I neither can nor ought to flatter myself with illusions; and therefore, unless I mean to let the faculties God has given me become unproductive or enfeebled, I must turn with all my might to the exact sciences, which, at least, I can cultivate and apply in all times and in all places.”¹¹ Cavour already saw clearly that Piedmontese conditions offered no play to his ambition. The opinions with which as a boy he had startled or amused his elders, had become convictions, ideals, which for a man to avow was dangerous. For several years he went through a painful conflict at home, where his people tried to detach him from his subversive doctrines. The Cavours, root and branch, except Camillo, held with more or less zeal to the principles of the Old Régime. They might, indeed, welcome a loosening of the shackles which did not involve an upheaval of society; but they would never be leaders in even surface reforms. Neither would they actively persecute their opponents. But inertia may have the force of persecution.

Glowing with his holy truths, Camillo did not doubt that they needed only to be properly stated in order to convince

¹⁰ Berti, I, 70.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, I, 68; June 16, 1828.

everybody as they had convinced him. Hence arguments and heated debates at home. His father could not fail to regret this inconvenient enthusiasm, which not only threatened to darken Camillo's future, but cast suspicion on the family orthodoxy. Marina listened with pride to her pet grandchild's display of talents, but she met his theories with the sobering lessons of experience. Uncle D'Auzers, who had slipped back after the Napoleonic interlude into the ranks of the Absolutists, was a good arguer, or at least he had skill in presenting his views forcibly. Uncle Tonnerre, says De La Rive, "in politics had more range than aim, and no ambition, no taste for propaganda or for combat. He wore his convictions as he wore his name, with the ease of a grand seigneur, without thinking much about it."¹² Aunt Tonnerre, who loved Camillo like a son, was fascinated by his brilliance, his sound judgment, his sallies of irony, his courage: although she, too, in spite of arguments, clung tenaciously to the side of the Conservatives. Gustavo, recently married, with greater capacity for philosophy than for politics, joined the majority against his brother, or at least evinced only a theoretical respect for freedom.

If Camillo, in his youthful enthusiasm, hoped to convert them, he was of course disappointed; and they were equally powerless to dissuade him from his "errors," which proved to be part of his very nature. Recognizing the futility of further discussion, they all reached in time a state of friendly neutrality on political subjects. The habit of free speech seems never to have been lost in the Cavour household; only in cases of irreconcilable differences such as divided the young Liberal and his family, there had to come the agreement to differ amicably, unless there were to be open war. The remarkable and noble fact about the Cavour family is that family affection finally prevailed over every reason for quarrel.

"What matters it," says De La Rive, "that, among Cavour's relatives, some from simple inclination, others with passion, all by situation, were attached to the cause which he was destined to overthrow! What does matter is that their pious devotion and political fervor were tempered by wit, by breeding, and above all by heart. What does matter is that Camillo di Cavour saw his

¹² La Rive, 35.

mother and his aunts full of affection for friends, relatives, a brother, belonging to a faith other than that which he himself preferred. . . . What does matter is the intelligence, the sincerity, the instruction of those under whose care the child grew up. The opinion passes, the man remains. And thus it is that Camillo di Cavour and his brother understood and loved liberty better, and at twenty were riper for it, than so many Liberals lulled from the cradle with Béranger's refrains, having for types and for heroes some old fashioners of intrigues and conspiracies, who, having taken liberty in tow behind their rancors, their prejudices, their mean passions, have ended, and with reason, in regarding themselves as only too happy to be delivered from the need of looking after her." ¹³

Outside of the home circle, Camillo found little opportunity even to discuss his views. Reaction prevailed; Turin was a prison, Piedmont was a prison. The Liberals had recently striven through revolution to achieve a constitutional government, and had failed. Liberalism was equivalent to treason. Those who professed it in private, held their peace in public. They resorted to secret meetings, encouraged each other in desperate or hot-headed resolves, and hoped to pluck freedom out of conspiracy. Cavour would have nothing to do with them or their plots: first, because, as an officer in the army, he had sworn to serve the King; next, because he already regarded conspiracy as an ineffectual and stupid means to political regeneration. So he chafed, but not always in silence, for he had too outspoken a nature to be discreet, and among his companions there were two or three congenial spirits — notably Severino Cassio — with whom he railed at the existing order.

Absolutism as practised by ■ Catherine or a Napoleon, on an imperial scale, may dazzle the imagination. It is a system which has corresponded, historically, to a well-defined stage in popular advance toward self-government. But as soon as even an imperfect form of constitution has been established, the defects of Absolutism appear colossal by contrast. Above all, when Absolutism in its decadence holds a small state, it loses that appearance of concentrated power which is one of its chief justifications, and looks petty and mean. It seems to be actuated by fear, not by

¹³ La Rive, 37.

strength. Such was Piedmont after the Restoration. During the eighteenth century, it had been the seat of a rigid paternalism. The kings took a genuine interest in the welfare of their people, who felt for them the peasant reverence akin to worship. The upper classes rallied to the throne with the loyalty of a medieval baron to his liege. There was little intellectual stir, no political unrest. A fiery, independent spirit, like Vittorio Alfieri, went voluntarily into exile in order to breathe. Then came the French Revolution and swept king, noblesse, and clergy away. During twenty years, the Piedmontese lived under a new system. Their little Subalpine corner became a part of the empire which extended from Cadiz to Königsberg. The new ideas dropped into their minds and germinated.

The Restoration in 1814 proved as abnormal as a revolution. Victor Emanuel I, a well-meaning but narrow-minded old gentleman, with a peevish wife, and a bevy of sallow daughters, thought, by ignoring the past, to blot out its effects. Calling for the Court Almanack of 1798, he reappointed the survivors to their old positions. The Jesuits, whom he restored to full control over the already meagre education, soon regained their ascendancy over the royal circle. He found the nobles almost solid for reaction: and with reason; for the French domination had meant to most of them confiscation, or heavy taxes, or the conscription, or exile. They harbored no more illusions. Had not experience taught them that Constitutionalism must lead to Democracy, — Democracy to the abolition of the privileged classes? The Rights of Man, about which their fathers had theorized so genially, meant anarchy. At the mere mention of the word *Liberty* they heard the click of the guillotine. Their enemies taunted them with having learned nothing and forgotten nothing; but this was hardly true. They had learned that at the watchwords "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," the Beast in Man broke forth, seeking to devour: that the only mitigation of the horrors of revolution was the rise of a Titanic despot. They had not forgotten that order is Heaven's first law. The instinct of self-preservation drove them to regard reaction as the only hope of saving society. Doubtless, self-interest colored their views; but not all nobles were selfish. Some there were who honestly believed that absolute monarchy and a privileged aristocracy were divinely

appointed, and felt their obligation to govern the masses, whom God manifestly never intended to govern themselves. So there were benevolent American slaveholders, who, having proved from the Scriptures that slavery was a divine institution, regarded slaveholding as a duty from which they could not escape. In Piedmont, as elsewhere, the reaction adopted the rôle of resisting so-called progress in every field; for concession, no matter how trivial, might dislodge the pebble in whose track would plunge another avalanche of revolution.

The revival of the Old Régime at Turin created at first some amusement. The antiquated laws, like the old-fashioned perukes and faded brocades, could hardly be taken seriously. But when there could be no more doubt that the Government intended to maintain them permanently, some of the more intelligent members of the middle and upper classes began to murmur. Under the French they had acquired the habit of thinking, and there are few habits, not even the most vicious, so hard to break off as that. All through Italy the Liberals were secretly plotting to overthrow the Absolutist rulers and to set up a constitution, which had no terrors for them. They recognized that neither the orgies of the Jacobins nor the tyranny of Napoleon should be charged up against Liberty, and nothing could dissuade them from the belief that, if the reign of Liberty, unpolluted and untrammelled, should ever be established on earth, it would put an end to those ills which spring from all other political systems. The Piedmontese Liberals, among whose leaders were several distinguished military officers, began to conspire almost openly, and early in 1821 they launched their revolution. For a week or so it appeared that they had enough of the army with them to ensure success; but Victor Emanuel, instead of facing the danger, abdicated; Charles Albert, who served as regent for a few weeks, and whom the plotters believed to be on their side, ordered the sedition to be suppressed; and an Austrian army hurried out of Lombardy and quickly routed the Liberal forces.

Then followed the day of retribution. Most of the leaders, however, had taken refuge in flight: some to wear their hearts out in the garrets of Paris; Santa Rosa, their leader, to die in Greece in behalf of Greek independence. The new ruler, Charles Felix, played the part of despot unwillingly; not because he had

scruples, but because it bothered him. "I am not king to be bored," he insisted. Unlike most of his line, he had no soldierly qualities. "The Emperor of Austria keeps 500,000 troops at my service," he said, when urged to augment the army. Nor had he a personal fondness for Jesuits and churchmen; although he did nothing to check their encroachments. He detested the hand-kissings, the ceremonial, the etiquette of state, which he recognized, however, must be kept up; to be rid of them, he lived usually away from the capital, or went on pleasure-trips abroad. He had a passion for the theatre, where he never allowed a tragedy to be performed; but sat in the royal box, now ogling ballet-dancers, now munching crisp breadsticks, and now dozing. In him, indolence reached to the verge of torpor, and most of his few downright acts seemed to spring from pig-headedness rather than resolution. Under him it was that the government of Piedmont became what no government can afford to be — petty and mean.

Even the aristocracy murmured privately at the banal restrictions which hedged them round. Whoever wished to read a foreign newspaper must get a special permit from the King; and as at Turin the sole political sheet, the *Gazzetta Piemontese*, appeared only three times a week and was carefully sterilized, those who relied on it got little recent or vital news. University students were compelled to attend mass regularly and to go to confession once a month; professors likewise had to present from time to time certificates that they had performed the prescribed religious rites. Priests visited the kitchens on Fridays and other fast-days to make sure that no meat was cooked. In a hundred ways, Charles Felix's despotism disgusted or annoyed his subjects, of whom only a small minority had any political motives. But they all resented the petty persecutions, — the clumsy administration of the business departments, the slow and antiquated legal procedure, the press censorship, the police espionage. They remembered with regret the French occupation, when the Code Napoleon made life easier, by simplifying its relations; and even the reactionist King and his ministers deigned to consider suggestions of reform in the law courts. The collapse of the movement of 1821 chilled active political conspiracy. Sects there were, remnants of the old Carbonaro and Federatist organiza-

tions, which plotted underground: but the leaders, both in caste and in intelligence, avoided them. The ubiquity of spies and eavesdroppers put a gag in every mouth.

In such an environment Camillo Cavour would have suffocated if he had lacked that sure attribute of genius — the ability to live within himself. Instead of discouraging him, opposition served, like blows on steel, to shape and harden. The stupidity of the Absolutist régime excited his contempt; its injustice roused his indignation. Without practical experience, perhaps he underestimated the difficulty of carrying on any sort of government. He enjoyed the privilege common to noble-minded youths of believing that his ideals were self-evident. Finding his own way barred, instead of moping, he plunged into studies which strengthened his intellect, and kept him from being a mere idle young aristocrat. His one safety-valve was the intercourse with his Genevan relatives. To Uncle Sellon he wrote freely on all subjects. They discussed together politics, education, capital punishment, dueling, universal peace, arbitration, comparative government, gambling. The fragments of the correspondence that have been preserved show the ripeness of Cavour's mind, ■ ripeness which can be matched in the case of few lads of seventeen or eighteen. To the sympathizing uncle he also bared his heart and confided his ambitions. Meanwhile, he frequented the drawing-rooms of Turin, where gallantry was the only resource; he performed the light duties at the Department, and mingled with a few companions of his own age. His wit, and the play of raillery with which he criticized persons and things, fascinated even those who did not share his opinions. His intimates knew the earnestness that underlay his sparkling surface.

In October, 1828, Cavour was ordered to Ventimiglia to conduct, under two superior officers, the construction, on what was then the French frontier, of some fortifications, and the completion of the Cornice high-road along the craggy Riviera. His first taste of active engineering confirmed in him his preference for the political career which fate had denied him. While the technical work interested him, he found the life narrow and dull. After four months, he was transferred to Exilles, another frontier post, near the present eastern entrance to the Mt. Cenis Tunnel. Here and at Lesseillon, a neighboring hamlet, he passed nearly

a year. If Ventimiglia was dull, Exilles was dead. Fort-building took but a part of his time; the rest he devoted to reading and correspondence, but the want of human intercourse in these bleak gorges depressed him. We hear complaints of melancholy. He missed even the stimulus of opposition, from which at Turin he had healthily reacted. Still, solitude gave him the opportunity he needed to review his principles and to test himself, and when he emerged from it, he was a man who had chosen his part.

In a letter to his brother, with whom he was most intimate, Camillo describes in glowing words the ordeal of his youth.

"I held my tongue," he says, "when my father, in a fit of anger, threatened to let me starve to death in America, and when he said that I wished to make him die of displeasure: I knew his condition, and it was my duty not to aggravate it by imprudent replies. But when my mother, and an uncle who loves me so much, cast reproofs on me, I must believe that grave motives of complaint have roused them against me. From the Academy days, I was charged with being the cause of my mother's illness — by my follies and by my repugnance to humble myself in order to have punishments stop. . . . The excuses they wished me to make — and I have made them too often, and it was the greatest burden laid upon me — were highly repugnant to me; whether because they degraded me in my own eyes and in the eyes of the person to whom I made them, or because they indicated nothing else than a base fear of punishment. . . .

"I had a friend at the Academy, a friend in whom I had found a fervent and lofty soul; who, dejected by the weight of smarting displeasure caused him by his family, was brought almost to the verge of the grave. He had placed entire trust in me, he loved me passionately, and they forced me, in the name of sentiment, to have nothing to do with him so as not to lay myself under suspicion.

"Was it necessary from the age of fifteen to sacrifice the tenderest affections to the mean interest of ambition? Was it necessary to render me despicable in the eyes of those who had always esteemed me? No, it was not! However, either through weakness or boyish thoughtlessness, I half yielded. For me such a state could not last, and at the end of a year I begged my friend's

forgiveness; I repaired and wish to repair wrongs that are evidently real. . . . Cassio is my friend and will be as long as I live and as every sense of honor is not quenched in me. Nothing shall make me commit a new baseness and induce me to leave him. If anybody thinks this sentiment contrary to nature, I am very sorry: but nothing can make me change. . . . Royer Collard proved victoriously that there was no right against Right; so there can be no affection against Affection. However great my sentiments for my relatives may be, they cannot destroy bonds of friendship as holy as those of blood.

"My opinions have brought upon me the bloodiest reproofs; I have been called a degenerate, unworthy of my ancestors, a traitor to my country and to my caste. But heaven is my witness that I would end my days in a dungeon sooner than commit a blamable act, one not worthy of my name and of the dignity of a free man, a dignity that transcends everything; that I would die a thousand times for my country or for the good of the human race, if I believed it would truly benefit it. Is it my fault that I see things differently from them? Am I master of my own convictions? It is as impossible for me to admit the larger part of their doctrines, as to believe that two and two are five. If I err, therefore, they ought to pity me rather than to censure.

"If a mad ambition, if a cruel hate, if low or vile passions had led me astray, and caused me to deny the doctrines of my fathers, no word could suffice to reprove such conduct. Certainly, every personal consideration, and probable advantages in political and material welfare, invite me to fight under the banners of Absolutism. But an innate sentiment of moral dignity, which I have always guarded jealously, has turned me from a course in which I was required, as a first condition, to unsay my own convictions, and to see and believe no more, except with the eyes and lights of others. . . . Meanwhile I am sure that my family would blush with shame if personal motives drove me to dissemble, to deceive everybody, to parade opinions contrary to my way of thinking, and thus to render myself despicable to persons of honor whatever be their party. . . .

"Apathy alarms me, above all in my condition. Your lot is assured, you know what to hold to in the future. . . . Judge now what would become of me, who do not know what I may be,

who live amid the most antagonistic elements and am nearly always in opposition with all that surrounds me. If I were to allow myself to fall into apathy, the least false step may ruin me all my life; and energy of spirit is indispensable to me. So I must struggle with all my might against everything that could bend the mainspring of my character, which I need every day.”¹⁴

There speaks a spirit worthy to liberate a nation. Cut to the quick, Camillo unbosoms himself to his brother, of whose affection and sympathy he has full knowledge. His was another instance of the tragedy of incompatibles. And while honoring him, we cannot withhold our pity from his parents and kinsfolk who earnestly labored to save him from his errors. We may speculate whether, if Cavour had been brought up in a family that harmonized with his views, he would have been better or worse fitted for his life-work. Fate sees to it that the supreme men master themselves by what is called overcoming difficulties, before they pass on to achieve their world-task. While Camillo Cavour, at odds with his family, his caste, his country's misrule, and the reaction which prevailed throughout Europe, was manfully coming to terms with himself in the solitudes of the Alps, Abraham Lincoln, a youth a year and a half his elder, was splitting rails on a pioneer clearing in Indiana. The Piedmontese inherited whatever an ancient and privileged family could bequeath; he had enjoyed the best instruction permitted to his kind, and had secretly added to it by his own studies. The American, knowing hardships only, snatched his smattering of education from the four or five books he read by the light of the pine-knot fire, and the rough backwoodsmen with whom he mixed. Before Cavour and before Abraham Lincoln the future in 1830 seemed to be barred by an adamant wall.

One lifelong benefit that came to Cavour from these years of exile was a knowledge of English. Attracted by English thought and government since boyhood, he now went to English works in the original. In the Alps he met William Brockedon, a painter of repute, who fed him with reports of British liberty. In the summer of 1829 Cavour secured a furlough for three months, which he spent among the mountains, and at Geneva. There he

¹⁴ Berti, I, 81-83; Camillo to Gustavo, dated, Ventimiglia, Nov. 30, 1828. Printed unabridged in *La Rive: Ital. Ver.*, 353-57.

found, as usual, a congenial atmosphere, which made Turin, whither he returned for the winter, all the more intolerable by contrast. The following March he was ordered to Genoa. That city, unwillingly annexed to Piedmont in 1814, still retained some of those qualities which kept it during the Middle Age a hot-bed of revolution. Its people were restless, unruly, and vigorous; its nobles were haughty and not easy to propitiate. All classes resented the Piedmontese domination. Foreigners abounded. The great seaport, thriving according to the standard of the time, promoted activity of many kinds. Secret societies flourished.

Cavour responded quickly to the livelier conditions. He was soon on friendly relations with persons of different interests and social layers — with the De la Rues, Swiss bankers who introduced him to the world of affairs — with the Pallavicini, Giustiniani, and other nobles, at whose palaces he saw Genoese high life — with fellow officers and civilians who debated openly the political questions forbidden at Turin. "It was at Genoa," says De La Rive, "that he really made his entrance into the world." Especially in the fashionable salon of Countess Giustiniani he found a sympathetic group, some of whom upheld views more advanced than he approved of, and some were probably affiliated with the secret societies from which he held aloof. Since boyhood, he had a disgust for conspiracy, because he regarded it as stupid. To heighten his exaltation, he fell in love with Countess Nina Giustiniani, who loved him in return with unbounded passion. She was four years his senior, a woman of rare intelligence, whose intellectual processes were suffused with spirituality, whose convictions had the sacredness of ideals. To this Egeria and Heloise in one, Cavour poured out his dreams of progress; from her, he heard descriptions of Utopias more iridescent than his own.

The news of the July Revolution, which had unseated Charles X and enthroned Louis Philippe and a constitutional monarchy in France, thrilled Cavour and his Countess Nina and every Liberal heart in Genoa. He hoped that the purging flames would sweep over the Alps, and what he hoped, the King's Government feared. But Louis Philippe announced to Europe that France, innocent of any schemes of foreign conquest, merely wished to substitute a progressive for a reactionary ruler; and as soon as this became clear, despots in Italy and elsewhere took courage.

By the early autumn Charles Felix gave orders to check the exuberance of his Liberal subjects. He aimed particularly at Genoa. "The city is full of spies," Cavour wrote to his Uncle Sellon; "lists of suspects are drawn up, and, by what fatal coincidence I cannot say, almost the entire worshipful corps of Engineers is inscribed in these lists. Through which proceeding, for about a month all our words, and I think all our thoughts, have been taken down." "This behavior," he writes, "may be excused in persons who do not know that the elastic force of gases increases in direct ratio to the pressure they are subjected to — but probably our government is ignorant of physics." ¹⁵ For Cavour, to practise caution tried him sorely. He had already spoken out so unguardedly, however, that eavesdroppers had plenty of evidence against him. And now, the likelihood of relief had passed. Writing in December to his friend Brockedon, he congratulated England on the entrance of Earl Grey and the Whig ministry into office. He called Wellington and the Tories an "audacious faction," who were trampling under foot the rights of peoples and propping up the rotten edifice of the Holy Alliance. "The regenerative system is beginning for you," he says, "and I trust that after a not long lapse of time, you will have wholly shaken off the yoke of an avid aristocracy. While Europe is advancing with sure step on the path of progress, unhappy Italy is ever bowed under the same system of civil and religious oppression. Sympathize with those who, having a soul made to develop the generous principles of civilization, are reduced to behold their country [] by Austrian bayonets. Tell your countrymen that we are not unworthy of Liberty, that, if we have some rotten members, there are also persons worthy of enjoying the benefit of enlightenment. Forgive me if I digress, but my soul is weighed down under the weight of indignation and grief, and I find a very sweet relief in unbosoming myself to one who understands the cause of my complaints and assuredly sympathizes with them." ¹⁶

On December 15, 1830, Cavour and his friend Cassio were recalled to Turin. Only a fortnight earlier (November 27)

¹⁵ Berti, I, 114; C. to De Sellon, Oct. 23, 1830.

¹⁶ *Lettere*, v, 8-9; C. to Brockedon, Dec. 2, 1830. The blank space represents a tear in the MS.

Cavour had been promoted lieutenant of the first class — a fact which hardly implies that the Government was seriously displeased with him. He had not been long in the capital, however, before the storm burst. The Ultras showered accusations. Rumors and the testimony of the spies flew about. One said that Cavour had shouted “Long live the Republic!” in the Pavilion of Porta d’Arco at Genoa; others declared that he had hurrahed for Louis Philippe; others hinted that he had joined the Carbonari. We may suppose that he disdained to notice random charges. And after all, he writes Uncle Sellon, “*I am Liberal, and very Liberal, desiring a complete change of system.*”¹⁷ There was no disguising that fact, and his was not the nature to seek a disguise. His contempt for the Ultras, who imagined that their system of persecution could in the end strangle progress, equaled his indignation at the results of their system. “Whatever may be my horror of bloodshed,” he writes Uncle Sellon, “it is not possible for me to desire a peace which should prolong the marasmus in which we live. Italians need to be regenerated; their morals, utterly corrupted under the ignoble domination of Spanish and Austrians, have regained a little spirit under the French régime; the ardent youth sigh for a national life; but to break utterly with the past, to be born again into a better state, great efforts are necessary; sacrifices of all kinds must put new vigor into the Italian character. An Italian war would be a sure pledge that we are going to become a nation again, that we are going to emerge from the slough where we have vainly floundered for so many centuries.”¹⁸

On March 5 he was ordered to the fortress of Bard in the Val d’Aosta — a billet equivalent to an arrest. The police had made it so hot for him and he was so pestered by cruel suspicions and vile accusations, that his father, at least, regarded the exile at Bard as an escape from something much worse. Eight months in a remote fort, with no distractions, gave ample time for reflection. He bore the punishment with characteristic resilience. “I am happy in my solitude,” he wrote to his mother; “I wish it might last all summer. But I am sorry that in a few days I shall no longer be alone and shall have to endure companionship little to my taste. Nevertheless, my nature is so facile, that I shall end

¹⁷ Berti, I, 116–17.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, I, 118–19; C. to De Sellon, Feb. 5, 1831.

by adapting myself to trivial talk, just as I have learned to get along with solitude.”¹⁹ But during these months, although his natural buoyancy and pride kept back any outward sign of discouragement, he was very seriously revolving in his mind how he could cut loose from an intolerable position. Ever since the Ventimiglia days he had recognized that the career in the army was too narrow to suit his talents. Had he been free, he would have resigned at once: but he felt a proper obligation to serve his country which had trained him in the Military Academy. Above all, if he abandoned the army, he would be thrown on his father for support — a situation which at the time neither cared to contemplate. After his recall from Genoa, however, Camillo came to an understanding with his father, assuring him that, since his own convictions were immutable and he did not regard it as honorable to hide or dissemble them, he ought to be permitted to retire to private life as soon as a favorable moment arrived.

In the autumn, he renewed his request, pointing out that there were no longer objections to it. He had submitted to sharp discipline at Bard; the fear of a French invasion had passed; and the new King, Charles Albert, had been so long on the throne that Cavour's resignation could not be interpreted as a slight. In a letter²⁰ remarkable alike for dignity and conciliativeness Camillo laid the matter before his father, who consented to the application for an honorable discharge. This the Government granted (November 12, 1831), and Cavour returned to Turin. Many years later, in reviewing his youth, and the conduct at Genoa which brought him to the brink of destruction, he wrote to an intimate friend: “Appointed a page when very young, I was the object of marked favor from the Prince of Carignano. I responded very ill to this high predilection; led on by the heat of youth and by the exaltation of sentiments which, so far as substance goes, I do not disavow today, I broke with the Court, thanks to some imprudent words uttered on leaving the Academy. The Prince treated me with excessive rigor; he denounced me to Charles Felix, who, to my great astonishment, showed

¹⁹ Berti, I, 120. The late Prof. D. Zanichelli gave me plausible reasons for believing that C.'s father, unknown to Camillo, instigated the rustication to Bard.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 124-27.

himself very tolerant towards me. Far from the Court, I gave a free rein to my opinions, which were, I confess, very exaggerated. I spent five years in the Engineers, . . . hiding from nobody my way of thinking; but without ever committing the smallest act or making the least engagement contrary to the oath I had taken. When the Prince mounted the throne, one of his first acts was an act of severity towards me. He sent me to the fortress of Bard, at a time when there was neither work to be done nor workmen to be overseen. I bore this exile, but at the end of eight months, I got permission from my father to leave the army and return to private life. . . . Age and study have much modified my opinions, without in the least changing them. I am at bottom as Liberal as I was at eighteen, — in this sense, that I ever desire what can bring about the greatest good for humanity and the development of civilization. I am just as persuaded as on leaving college that the world is drawn by a fatal tendency towards a new goal.”²¹

Except for the inaccuracy of attributing to Charles Albert his sequestration at Bard, — whereas he was sent there six weeks before Charles Albert became king, — this reminiscence doubtless gives a true account of Cavour's career in the army; and it is not impossible that Charles Albert, though not yet king, may have suggested his removal to Bard. The vital fact is that Cavour held through life the belief that during those years the hostility of the Prince of Carignano pursued him. There may have been circumstances which have never come out: but we know enough now to find no mystery in the displeasure of a prince, who had recanted from Liberalism, at the Liberal utterances and dubious tendencies of an indiscreet youth.

Camillo's home-coming could not have been cheerful, since the family and public looked upon it as a disgrace. The world saw only a young noble — a second son, too — who had thrown up his chances in life by his foolish talk. Not all talk, either, Gossip might add: no doubt there had been acts which deserved the gibbet or a dungeon, and which would have been duly punished if the Cavours had not had special influence with the King. While breathing more freely to have their black sheep out of the army, Cavour's family must have felt that he had been a failure,

²¹ *Lettere*, I, 113; C. to Costa de Beauregard, Oct., 1847.

and they knew that he would be an embarrassment: for they despaired of converting him from his political heresies, or even of checking his habit of speaking out. He was no longer a boy to be commanded; indeed, as we have seen, there never was a time from his earliest childhood when he could be coerced into giving up or hiding his convictions.

To be regarded as a black sheep, and at twenty-one to find the future closed, were galling to Camillo Cavour. Although he had sacrificed everything to his principles, he had none of the martyr's satisfactions. He was too sensible to think of himself as a martyr, too practical to approve of throwing away life or energies to no purpose. And he saw so clearly that social and political reform, in order to be permanent, must come by growth and not by revolution, that he despised the violent methods of the very plotters with whom he was accused of being in league. At Genoa, under the spur of impatience and the spell of Egeria and her fellow enthusiasts, he may have thought that perhaps a revolution would be, after all, the short cut to Liberty: but he never meant that a republic should issue from it. He recoiled with equal loathing from Absolutists and Jacobins: for he deemed both stupid, partial, and unjust.

What strikes us from the first is the maturity which guided Camillo's courage, and his frankness. On leaving the Academy, although then only sixteen years old, he was a man in self-sufficiency. He had the world against him, yet he never flinched, nor, indeed, behaved as if in being true to himself he were doing anything unusual. Heredity, education, self-interest, urged him to accept the Absolutist conditions which satisfied his family and his caste: but he had heard other voices, had seen other visions, to which he must dedicate his life. And soon everything he saw confirmed him in his resolve. The forbidden books came into his hands; the evangelists of the new gospel spoke to him over mountains and seas. He needed but to glance at the state of Piedmont, in order to be sure that he was right. But before he could become a leader, it was indispensable that he should prove his ability to lead himself. That is what he did during the five years' ordeal in the army; but at the time, his friends supposed that he had thrown away his chance in life, and perhaps he too looked forward to no vindication.

CHAPTER II

ELEMENTS, INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL

CAVOUR now realized in all its bitterness the lot of a second son in a country where primogeniture ruled. As an army officer, he had had his salary, with prospect of promotion. Any aristocrat might engage in the soldier's career without offense to his caste. But unless a noble were a soldier, a prelate, or a diplomat, he must either loaf or be ostracized. To go into business or a profession was unheard of: and when Massimo d'Azeglio, also a younger son, became a painter a few years before, the Turin patriciate treated him as if he had committed something worse than a crime. Camillo never showed envy of his brother Gustavo, but he chafed at the ill-luck which made himself a cadet. He detested the dependence which it forced upon him and which now seemed more burdensome through idleness. He welcomed, therefore, his father's proposal that he should take charge of a farm belonging to the family at Grinzane. The village of Grinzane, forty miles from Turin, offered him no companions except peasants. The farm had run down, and his father warned him that he would scarcely be able to keep a horse or a man-servant. But Camillo eagerly seized the opportunity which promised him partial independence and an occupation: no doubt his kinsfolk congratulated themselves on getting him away from the capital.

For the next three years (1832-35) Grinzane was his home. To everybody's surprise he made the despised farm pay, and the Government appointed him, probably out of compliment to his father, syndic, or mayor, of the little commune. He plunged into agriculture with characteristic enthusiasm, mastered every detail of farming on the estate, and read whatever books he could lay his hands on: never suspecting that in so doing he was training himself to be the most practical finance minister of modern times. But his duties at Grinzane consumed so little of his time that he had much leisure for reading, and when ennui palled upon him, he took flight to Turin.

In the family circle, although discussions occasionally were heated, he was gradually restored to favor. At least, they accepted him in spite of his perverted opinions; for family affection was strong among the Cavours, and Camillo, without denying one jot of his principles, now thrust them forward less eagerly where they could only irritate. So long as he wore his lieutenant's uniform, he felt a special obligation to speak out in order to prove his honesty: now, his views were known, and nobody could allege that he held his peace from a selfish motive. His character was now catching up with his mind, which had matured so early. It is one thing for an alert intellect, as if by intuition, to perceive truths; it is quite another thing for these truths to become a part of one's being, and to express themselves through conduct.

From the remarkable Diary which Camillo kept in these years,¹ we learn how deeply he suffered from lack of sympathy. Family affection, inestimably precious though it be, does not take the place of complete agreement in ideals. The young, especially, crave comrades in their zeal. But Cavour had only one friend, Severino Cassio, in whom during childhood and youth he had found a perfect response. In moments of dejection he now doubted whether even Cassio did not admire his powerful intellectual organization, rather than love him; and he knew that admiration of one's talents can never take the place of love of one's self.² Perpetual self-repression made him fear that these intellectual gifts which all the world recognized, would wither from disuse. "Every day my mind withdraws itself into a narrower circle," he says; "the germ of my faculties (for in truth, if there has ever been anything in me, it has never been more than germs), far from developing, far from producing what it promised, has given only the most ordinary and common of results, a passably clever drawing-room man."³ He smarts under his dependent position, for the farm-work at Grinzane is, after all, but an ironical makeshift, compared with his ability and ambition. The future holds for him only a progressive and unceasing aggravation of ennui. "What should I be at thirty? A younger son, as I am now: I had a thousand times rather think that I shall be dead.

¹ The Diary begins Aug. 16, 1833, and continues, with many breaks, until Feb. 27, 1838.

² Bertì, II, 94.

³ *Ibid*, 94.

Ah! If it were not for the doubts that cling to me as to the banality of suicide, truly I would soon free myself of this irksome existence. But even reasoning as a Benthamite I cannot get rid of them." Then he goes on to consider the justification of suicide and concludes that, like Hamlet, he will not kill himself; nevertheless, he will pray earnestly for a galloping disease to carry him off — a solution which would neither trouble his conscience nor shatter in any one else the love of life. "They would remember me sometimes," he adds, "as a warning to my nephews against the dangers of a too precocious development of the intelligence, against excessive love of independence, and excess of vanity." ⁴

Too much stress must not be laid on self-examination during a fit of depression; yet in the case of Cavour such a revelation cannot be ignored. The man the world sees and the man as he sees himself have always to be reckoned with by his biographer. The Cavour whom the world saw at twenty-two or three years was able — witty — arrogant — stubborn — good-natured — sarcastic — conceited — according to the point of view of his critics. In his self-scrutiny, he blinked none of his defects. He acknowledged his vanity, but he almost despised himself for taking even a momentary pleasure in the cheap admiration which his cleverness brought him. He knew that what seemed stubbornness or arrogance was often due to the instinct of self-preservation: unless he stood his ground even in small things he might be overborne in all. He perceived that since his talents had no natural means of expansion, subordinate traits came to the surface and assumed an exaggerated importance. His conscience goaded him not to allow his faculties to droop in spite of their hostile environment. As he measured the pettiness to which the Piedmontese were condemned, by the life which his ideals painted as within their reach, he struggled not to become cynical. He could honestly declare to himself that mere personal ambition was not his main incentive, and that the traits for which he had been most blamed, were, on the contrary, most worthy of approval. To understand such a nature, while it is striving to be itself in scorn of adverse fate, we must think of it as we would of a strong man thrown into a dungeon. And Camillo Cavour felt

⁴ Berti, II, 95.

from childhood that his true self was imprisoned. His spirit went "seeking Liberty, which is so dear." "There is no great man," he said, "who is not a Liberal. The degree of the love of Liberty is proportioned in each man to the moral elevation he has attained." ⁵

To probe Cavour's heart during this period of transition we must turn either to his Diary or to his letters to the few correspondents to whom he wrote freely. One of these was the Marchioness Juliette de Barolo, she who, years before, had taken him to drive in her gilded coach, and who now, a middle-aged woman, felt the fascination of his wit and character. She held views opposite from his, but that did not prevent their mutual confidence. Replying to a letter, in which she expressed pain at Camillo's discontent, he made this striking confession: "When one throws one's self quite young into the world and into politics, and brings to it a fresh heart and haughty spirit, it is not astonishing that one gives one's self up to the most deceitful illusions of vanity, celebrity, glory, ambition, and I know not what else. I for my part gave myself up completely to these, and I will confess, at the risk of making you laugh long at me, that there was a time when I believed nothing lay beyond my strength, when I should have thought it quite natural to awake some fine morning Prime Minister of the King of Italy. The violent strain which the state I had long been in caused to my feelings, contributed powerfully to keep up this illusion in me much longer than was reasonable; but deprived, at critical moments, of the ordinary props which support us on our entrance into life, the aid of an over-excited pride was indispensable to save me from weakening. There was so much absurdity in these illusions, that I had to abandon them as soon as I was for a month together in a calmer state. I will not deny that this shattering of a series of ideas which had long been dear to me, caused me a good deal of pain; but now it is about over; only from time to time some recollections not wholly blotted out cause me a little irritation: but, as I am something of a mocker, whatever be my bad humor, I always end by mocking at myself and at the ridiculousness which these illusions of youth present. It is true that my mayorship has annoyed me a trifle, through the silly contrast which I could

⁵ Berti, I, xix. This maxim seems to be quoted by Cavour.

not help making between what I am and what I believed I ought to be." ⁶

"You will have known about all the vexations I have had to bear, — the suspicions held about me, the measures that were taken, and finally the decisive step which I felt I ought to take," he wrote his Aunt Cécile de Sellon, while the resignation from the army was still fresh. "But it is not what particularly concerns me that has most distressed me. The state of Italy, of Europe and of my country have been for me the sources of the keenest sufferings. How many hopes dashed, how many illusions unrealized, how many ills have befallen our beautiful country." ⁷ "I shall continue to uphold Liberal opinions with the same zeal," he assures his Uncle Sellon, "without hoping or almost wishing to make a name for myself. I shall uphold them for love of truth and out of sympathy for mankind." ⁸

The Liberal principles which Cavour now embraced did not differ in essence from those which had possessed him since boyhood: but experience had taught him that the best of principles requires to be put in action at the proper moment in order to be effectual. The French Revolution of July greatly interested him. He hoped at first that the Absolutist governments would invade France, as they had done in 1792, and attempt to restore the Absolutist King; that Louis Philippe would gather the might of France about him, repel the invaders, and carry the standard of Liberalism beyond the Rhine and the Alps; for Charles the Tenth's quick collapse must be repeated in Germany and Italy, where Absolutism was equally rotten. Such the vision of Cavour and many an older head in the summer of 1830. But the Absolutist monarchs, instead of invading Louis Philippe, reluctantly acknowledged him and set up the new doctrine of non-interference, and he, who cherished no dream of conquest, settled back in his throne as if it were an easy-chair, and proposed to stay there by adopting a policy of compromise. There was logic withal in his plan. At one end of the French see-saw were the Jacobins, at the other the Absolutists, who had been in turn high in air or quashed to earth for the past forty years: he would stand in the middle and so trim the plank as to keep it horizontal.

⁶ *Lettere*, I, 280; C. to Marchioness Barolo, Oct. 2, 1832.

⁷ *Ibid*, v, 15; Jan. 4, 1832.

⁸ *Ibid*, v, 13; Dec. 19, 1831.

Being of portly build, and having no special leanings — except that he must hold on to his throne at all costs — he seemed to have the necessary qualifications of a successful balancer. Soon his theory of the Golden Mean (*Juste Milieu*) was erected into a system, but when practised, it showed that it needed something more than corpulence or egotism to make it run smoothly.

Writing to Professor August de La Rive,⁹ Cavour thus clearly defines his own position: "I have been for a long time undecided among these contrary movements. My reason drew me back towards moderation: my excessive desire to make our retrogrades go ahead thrust me forward towards Revolution: finally, after many violent agitations and oscillations I have ended by settling down, like the pendulum, in the exact middle. So I announce to you that I am an honest middle-man (*Juste Milieu*), desiring, wishing, working with all his might for social progress, but resolved not to purchase this at the cost of a general overturn, political and social. My *Golden Mean* position does not prevent me, however, from desiring at the soonest possible moment Italy's emancipation from the barbarians who oppress her; and, consequently, I foresee that a crisis, however slight its violence, is inevitable; but I would bring this crisis to pass with all the cautions which the state of affairs demands, and I am besides *ultra-persuaded* that the efforts of the madmen of the movement only retard it and make it more ticklish." A further explanation of his political creed appears in a letter to his old tutor, Abbé Frézet. He says: "The *Golden Mean* is found in all forms of government. Geneva, although a republic, is by essence, in theory and in practice, *Golden Mean*; this is why her affairs go on marvelously, in spite of the shocks and perturbations which troubled all Europe for almost five years. Geneva, although a land of liberty and equality, lives happy, in peace and perfect tranquillity, which seasonable concessions, and the energetic resistance she knows how to bring to bear at the proper moment against the promoters of turmoil, assure her. My desire is to see our Government enter the way of the *Golden Mean*, so that, even if it did not adopt the entire system, it might nevertheless go forward with progressive steps, in the political and social innovations which the times demand. All Europe gravitates towards the *Golden*

⁹ Berti, I, 283; May 13, 1833.

Mean. . . . In short, it is the only possibility we have of safety. - . . . I feel sure that, having danced round the Liberty Tree, and caressed the Jesuits, you will rest on ground where are truth and moderation.”¹⁰

This in a nutshell was Cavour's theory of right political method — that method which, he was destined to prove, may, in the hands of a master, be far more effective than revolution. It is the method of the highest Opportunism — not the Opportunism of Louis Philippe, bent only on keeping his throne, nor even of Bismarck, making unnatural alliances with political opponents for the sake of passing an unessential measure: but the Opportunism of a statesman whose acts all tend to the desired goal, although like the wise pilot he may lay his course to port or starboard, to catch a favoring wind or to ride out a gale. Opportunism has come to mean drifting, without chart or compass; Cavour meant by it that, having dedicated his life to certain principles, he would seize every means, use every tool, gain now an inch and now an ell, in endeavoring to make those principles prevail. To justify this method, we must appraise the ideals by the goal arrived at: they may lead to mere Jesuitry, or, as employed by a Lincoln or a Cavour, to the crowning achievements of statesmanship.

At two-and-twenty, the Piedmontese cadet might dream of being prime minister of a United Italy, but he had renounced all his illusions as to the probability of ever entering public life. He was already remarkably mature. His genius for the positive side of life had been feeding since he left the Academy on the vanward ideas of the time. Nothing better indicated that he belonged to the future and not to the past, than his absorbing interest in economic and social questions. The men of the French Revolution, to speak broadly, had aimed at political reconstruction: their successors saw that forms of government are but the outside; that within are economic and social concerns which touch at last the daily life and most intimate human relations of every man, woman, and child. Unless these be understood, no political system can rest on a solid basis. The most precious legacy of the 18th century was the ideal of Liberty: the American colonists had achieved it in politics; the French philosophers practised it in

¹⁰ Berti, I, 135.

thought; Immanuel Kant demonstrated its supremacy in the world of morals. Growth, or Evolution, the dominant idea of the 19th century, was already recognized while Cavour was still a youth, although its general laws had not yet been formulated. By these two principles, Liberty and Growth, he became possessed as soon as he could reason. During his 'prentice years in the army, we find him reading Adam Smith, Ricardo, Bentham, Comte, Guizot, Benjamin Constant, Jouffroy, and other intellectual leaders of the time,¹¹ and filling his commonplace books with passages which struck him, or with his own comments upon them. For him, political economy was not the "dismal science" but "the science of love of country"¹² — a statement which reveals how clearly he understood the deep implications of patriotism. "Every excessive halt is perilous in a world where all is in motion." "Free states cannot endure unless the principle of responsibility be largely diffused through all classes of citizens." "Great and happy results have never been obtained at the sacrifice of the great laws of humanity." "If laws were immutable, they would be excessively harmful." "The worst of miseries is the oppression which covers itself with legal forms." These maxims, taken at random, sum up his early political and social beliefs, which time enriched and strengthened but did not alter.¹³

By a mind so searching, religion could not be ignored. Brought up in a Catholic household and at the Academy where Catholic worship was as rigid as the military drill, Camillo was in youth a Catholic. But the Protestantism of his Swiss relatives — his mother, indeed, remained a Protestant until after he was born — taught him that no church has a monopoly of orthodoxy. As soon as he could think for himself, he began to find difficulties in the claims of revealed religion. The Law of Growth applied, as he saw, to religions not less than to other institutions: how reconcile the Catholic assumption of immutability and infallibility with the historic facts of change and decay? He became a skeptic, or rationalist, but not of the abusive or satirical type; for he fully recognized the importance of the religious sentiment

¹¹ Adam Smith, I need hardly remark, belonged to the previous generation; but only after the fall of Napoleon, did the *Wealth of Nations* become a dominant influence.

¹² This phrase he quotes from Pecchio. ¹³ Berti, II, xviii-xx, and *passim*.

in the life of the individual, and its immense influence, at certain periods, in shaping the development of a people. The Catholicism which prevailed in Italy was, he saw, a medieval product — an institution perfectly reflecting the credulity, the mystic piety, the schoolmen's logic, the standards of conduct, the belief in sorcery, the fears and hopes and zeal, of the epoch in which it originated, but now surviving in an epoch which had other needs and other criteria. Like its coeval, Feudalism, it exhibited all the hideousness of a decomposing institution. One might admit the validity of its tenets, and yet insist that, if those tenets were systematized today, they would be embodied in very different forms, in forms, that is, adapted to the ideals of today. This conflict between dead forms and living needs is the tragedy of institutions, the cause of hypocrisy, cant, unbelief, depravity: and towards these Cavour never spared his sarcasm.

His Diary contains many references to the corruption of the clergy and the superstition in which they kept the lower classes. One day, he records his disgust at seeing tipsy priests boozing with trulls in a tavern at Bra, and adds: "And this is the way that the Catholic clergy behaves, in the presence of a hostile philosophy, and of a party which is seeking in all ways to overthrow it. The finger of Providence has marked it on the forehead, the end of its time draws near. When I speak of the end of its time, I do not mean one year or two, but a century. But when it is the question of an edifice which has lasted almost two thousand years, one may well call the dawn of the century which will behold its fall, the beginning of the end." ¹⁴ He quotes with satisfaction Voltaire's epigram, "Superstition is to religion, what astrology is to astronomy — the very foolish daughter of a very wise mother." And at this time he seems to find in this passage from Jouffroy the statement that fits his own need: "It is by a necessary law that a creed is produced; by a necessary law that it reigns; by a necessary law that it passes, when its mission is done. That of Christianity appears to me to have been to accomplish the education of mankind, and to render them capable of knowing truth, and of accepting it without other warrant than its own evidence. As soon as this work is completed in a soul, Christianity must withdraw from it, but in withdrawing it takes

¹⁴ Berti, II, 46; Oct. 18, 1833.

with it the germ of all faith, and it is never a new religion, it is always philosophy that succeeds it. This mission of Christianity is far, very far, from being accomplished on the Earth.”¹⁵ A little later, after witnessing the death of his young and charming sister-in-law,¹⁶ he writes: “Two nights in succession we repeated all together, around her bed, the prayers for the dying. How imposing and terrible are these prayers, which are recited as if to smooth the passage from life to death! The litanies of the saints, this lugubrious *Ora pro eo*, these *oremus* in which one addresses only the soul of the dying, — all, all, is highly tragic. What power must not a believer attribute to this church, to this worship, to this priest, who appear in this world to hold in their hands the keys of heaven and hell. After what I saw, far from being astonished at the immense donations which the clergy in the Middle Age extorted from the dying, I am astonished that they did not succeed in making themselves the sole owners of the country.”¹⁷

Cavour's genius being positive, he wasted no time over problems which his reason had declared insoluble. Fully persuaded that it was vain to speculate on the riddle of existence, he turned his attention to the practical side of religion. He would have made worship an affair of conduct and not of ritual; he would have had moral truths taught in their simple majesty, instead of being encrusted with poisonous superstitions; he would have sought out spiritual men for spokesmen of the spirit; he would have purged the Church of its irreligious worldliness and lust of temporal power. But his mission lay in the field of secular reform, and his references to the Catholic institution, after he had diagnosed it, are few. He took it for granted that the institution required a complete reorganization. His own work was so to regenerate political, economic, and social conditions that even the Church would be forced to reform.

Cavour's genius was positive, but it was none the less capable of powerful emotions and unquenchable enthusiasms. He, too, came under the spell of Jean Jacques Rousseau, the magician who, having fired the generation of 1789, was inspiring the Romanticists of 1830. “From the time when I read Rousseau's

¹⁵ Berti, II, 60. ¹⁶ Adele Lascaris, wife of Gustavo Cavour; died Dec. 31, 1833.

¹⁷ Berti, II, 82.

books for myself," he writes to Uncle Sellon in 1833, "I have felt the liveliest admiration for him. He is, to my thinking, the man who has striven most to uplift the dignity of the past centuries. His eloquent voice more than anything else contributed to fix me in the path of progress and of social emancipation. *Émile*, above all, has always pleased me by the justness of its ideas and the force of its logic." ¹⁸

Whatever the lion eats, turns to lion. Two men more unlike than Cavour and Rousseau in their practical efficiency and in their moral sense it would be hard to name: and yet Cavour drew the best from Rousseau and converted it into force for doing his own work, just as he took their best from Bentham and Adam Smith.

And now we come to an experience which tested the range of his passion. During his sojourn at Genoa, it will be recalled, he had fallen in love with Countess Anna Giustiniani, a woman older than he, of a rare mind and great personal fascination.¹⁹ Evidently, she idolized him, and, with perspicacity which time verified, she foresaw in her lover the statesman of genius. After Camillo's return to Turin, few letters seem to have passed between them. His own tormented life distracted him; the thought that marriage was impossible doubtless helped to cool his ardor: besides, he was only twenty, and first love is oftener deep than lasting. Perhaps the Countess, an enthusiastic Republican, displeased him a little by urging him to join the Republicans. At any rate, after three years and a half of separation, with long silence, she had become for him a memory, a regret, sweet and dear, but not too poignant. "All my desires," he says, "were to see her again, to be useful to her, and to devote to her a sincere and disinterested friendship." Hardly the words of passion.

Suddenly, one summer's day, to him busy at Grinzane the post brought a note in that well-known hand, "which told him she had reached Turin and wished to see him." For a space he was puzzled to divine her motive: did she simply wish to explain the cause of her silence? or was she again swayed by that passion

■ Berti, II, 138.

■ Her husband was Count Stefano Giustiniani; she was born in 1806, the daughter of Baron Giuseppe and Maddalena Corvetto Giustiniani. She died in 1841, and is buried at Genoa, in the graveyard of the Concezione dei Cappuccini. *XIX Secolo*, Genoa, Aug. 10, 1910.

against which she had vainly struggled? He thought the very brevity of her letter revealed an ill-concealed tenderness; "but it could be only an illusion of my heart or my vanity," he writes, "for there was not a single word which announced a change in my favor." In a flash, his old passion kindles; he orders his farmer's gig, and dashes off, in the broiling midday heat. He changes horses at Bra, and at eight in the evening drives into Turin. To dress and rush to the hotel where the Countess was staying takes but a moment. At the hotel, he learns that she has gone to the opera, whither he follows without delay. "I scrutinize the boxes, and in the sixth on the left in the first tier, I see a lady in deep mourning, wearing on the sweetest of faces the marks of long and cruel suffering; it was she. She recognized me at once, and followed me with her eyes until I had left the parterre to go to her. My God! what charm in that look, what tenderness and love! Whatever I might do for her in the future, ah! I could never repay her for all the joy she made me feel at that moment. Her box was full: intolerable bores were overwhelming my poor friend with the most stale and insipid talk. In vain our eyes tried to express the sentiments of our hearts, we were burning with impatience. Finally, for a moment we were alone. Alas! the flood of things we had to say to each other choked the word in our throats. After a long silence, she said to me: 'What have you thought of me?' 'Can you ask what I have thought of you?' I replied. 'You have suffered much!' 'Suffered! oh yes, I have indeed suffered!' These are the only words I recall.

"I left her that evening full of hopes, of love, of regrets, or remorse. I believed in the constancy of her passion; I was proud and intoxicated by a love so pure, so constant, so disinterested; but on the other hand, when I thought of my conduct towards her, when I pictured to myself the terrible sufferings which [Nina] had undergone on my account, and of which I could see the deep traces she bore on her beautiful, sad face, I was furious at myself; I accused myself of heartlessness, of cruelty, of infamy." ²⁰

Under the summer stars, he set out to walk to Santena. "It was midnight. The moon shone bright and soft; the banks of the Po, the hills of Turin, lighted by this pale and sad light, made

²⁰ Berti, I, 163-66.

a scene wholly in harmony with my heart's sentiments. What a rapturous walk! When shall I feel again emotions as lofty as I felt that night?" ²¹ The next morning he takes his father into his confidence, and he, "without making a single remark, left me free to act as I chose." That evening the lovers met. Nina tells him, with much reserve, what she has suffered. He is filled with compassion: with love too, but we perceive that compassion wears the mask of love. "Wretch!" he writes of himself in his Diary; "I am unworthy of so much love! How, how can I repay it? Ah! I swear that I will never, never forget, never again leave this heavenly woman. My existence shall be dedicated to her. She shall be the aim of my life, the sole object of my cares and efforts! May Heaven's curse light on my head, if it ever happen that I willingly cause her the least sorrow or wound the slightest sentiment of this perfect and adorable heart." ²²

Presently the Countess goes to Vinadio, a remote watering-place among the Alps. They correspond by every post, one, two, three times a day. Camillo joins her there for a few days; but the opportunity for mutual confessions at their meetings does not suffice, and when they are not together she is pouring out her soul in messages which, for pure passion, rival the deathless utterances of Héloïse. Camillo's letters have not been published, nor is it certain that they have been preserved: ²³ but we can judge his state from the tone of his Diary, and from references in her self-revelations. She is only too sensible of her unworthiness. "Our position is very dissimilar," she writes. "Judge for yourself. I was ill, discouraged, unable to take part in the delights of life; I could look forward only to some languishing and useless days, which death would infallibly end very soon. To find a being who would accept this remainder of a life, share my troubles, love me — in a word — was happiness I had no right to expect. But fate marked you as my last support, you, full of force, of life, of talent, you, *perhaps called to pursue the most brilliant career*, to contribute to the general welfare. My life is worn; yours begins. I accept your help; it comes to me from Heaven. But it is my duty to tell you that what on my part might seem a sacrifice, would be on the contrary an act of pure

²¹ Berti, I, 166.

²² *Ibid*, 166.

■ In 1910 the discovery of several of his letters was reported.

egotism, whilst in you the same action would spring from ■ devotion I do not deserve.” ²⁴

Cavour would have given up his future for her, but she wisely forbade him. Such a course would have involved exile, and her womanly instinct warned her that with increasing invalidism, especially in an irregular union, she might lose her hold upon him. Her relatives, regarding her infatuation as a sign of mental derangement, threatened to force her into seclusion. “Is it madness to love you with passion?” she writes Cavour, when such threats are first made. “Is it madness to see you, write you, die for you? And is it not equally madness to have irrevocably decided to renounce life sooner than allow you to doubt my love? There you have the only signs on which they base their assertion that my mental faculties are clouded. I pity them; they are unable to understand love.” ²⁵

It is not, however, to exhibit a high-strung soul on the rack of passion, that we quote her burning words, but to show the influence of such a woman on Cavour, and also to get an insight into what such a woman found in him. She had a quick intellect, for the most part self-cultivated, learning through her sympathies as readily as through books. She writes him on immortality, on religion, on Catholicism. “I discovered,” she says, “the absurdity of the practices of Catholicism, and, by the greatest good fortune, as I did not cease to believe, my heart was not irritated. Since then my religion made me regard death with joy, not only as the end of my sufferings, but also as the beginning of an existence which should satisfy at once my thirst for love and for knowledge. I wished to love all, to know all.” ²⁶ They discuss Shakespeare together, and she paints for him a scene from *Romeo and Juliet*. But politics are their chief topic. Four years have brought a change in their position; she is no longer Egeria, but the willing pupil of her former pupil. Camillo found that she regarded Armand Carrel as a god, and Raspail and Trélat as heroes. She admired Mazzini and sent money to *Young Italy*. “The degradation of the country,” Cavour explains in his Diary, “has so upset her heart that she clutched impetuously at the principles she deemed best adapted to restore to it liberty and independence. I have done my utmost to bring her back to more

■ Berti, I, 171-72.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 174.

²⁶ *Ibid*, 177.

reasonable views. It was easy for me to prove to her the vanity and baselessness of the theories which had allured her. Reason is omnipotent when it has love for an ally." By a little judicious ridicule, he adds, "Trélat and Raspail disappeared. I have allowed her still to adore Armand Carrel, both because I think him infinitely superior to his Republican brethren, and because it is dangerous to destroy at a single blow all the objects that our soul is accustomed to respect." ²⁷

In her first letter to him, in the old days at Genoa, she had written: "I am sure that a day will come in which your genius will be put in evidence. I pray that everything may fall out according to your desires." Since then, however, plots and persecutions have startled Piedmont, and now she dreads lest Camillo may be driven by his impatience or indiscretion into peril. "Madame de G., after many preliminaries," he records in his Diary on July 31, 1834, "wished to make me promise that I would never be mixed up in the political events which may occur in Piedmont. I positively refused to promise: I wish to deceive her the least possible. Besides, I should have done wrong in yielding to her wishes: soon or late, she would have blushed for a man who had subjected himself to such unworthy conditions. To give up playing a part — but in truth, it is scarcely worth while to exert one's self to extort that promise from me, when I am pretty nearly good for nothing. Speaking politically, I am done for. I have aged so fast in a few years without acquiring a single new talent or acquaintance, that it would be ridiculous for me to cherish still the illusion of greatness and glory which flattered my years of youth. I must make a virtue of necessity and resign myself to be all my life only an honest and peaceable bourgeois of Turin. Ah! if I were English, by this time I should already be something, and my name would no longer be wholly unknown. But after all, I am Piedmontese, and since I cannot change myself, I ought at least to avoid making myself ridiculous by silly pretensions. Madame took the matter very well; she seemed to accede to my reasons, and finished by assuring me that nothing could shake her passion, that, on the contrary, adversity would only increase it. *Can it be possible!*" ²⁸

We suspect that Cavour could not keep pace with her hectic

²⁷ Berti, I, 178-79.

²⁸ *Ibid*, II, 124-25.

adoration. He was healthy in body and mind, capable of strong emotions, but never forgetful of reason. Although he loved her passionately, his was not a nature to maintain even love in hysterics. Remorse pricked him for having roused such a fever in her, and for being unable to satisfy it. The heart of man is a mosaic of contradictions: perhaps her unconcealed idolatry proved a little cloying. Compassion began to prevail over love; and yet, as is the way with first love when it has once mastered a strong nature, he felt again and again its spell. The Countess lived in seclusion away from Turin, and after that feverish summer they seldom or never met. At first they corresponded frequently; then silence ensued; but from her refuge, she followed his career with unabated eagerness. Although her passion consumed her, she blessed the lover who inspired it.

"The woman who loved you is dead," she wrote in her last letter to him: "she was not at all beautiful, — she had suffered too much; what she lacked, she knew better than you. She is dead, I repeat, and in the realm of Death she has met ancient rivals. If she has yielded to them the palm of beauty in this world, where the senses must be decoyed, here she surpasses all. None has loved you as she has, for, Camillo, you have never been able to measure the extent of her love. How could she reveal it to you? no human word could express it; no act, however devoted it might seem to you, was even the shadow of that which this heart wished to produce in you. And you have often seen me silent and self-centred, abandoning every incomplete manifestation, and hoping within myself that the day of truth would come. What! does this immense passion exist to be pent up forever? Will not this burning germ have its complete development? and is so much love created to consume the heart that harbors it? Camillo, farewell. As I write these lines I have immutably resolved never to see you again. You will read them — I hope — but when an insurmountable barrier shall have come between us — when I shall have received the great initiation into the secrets of the grave — when perhaps — I shudder to think of it — I shall have forgotten you." ²⁹

Consumed by passion, like Pia, Nina Giustiniani died of love. It throws light on the customs of the time to learn that at the

²⁹ Berti, I, 183-84.

height of their tragic ecstasy, Cavour made a confidant of his mother and read to her Nina's burning letters; that the tender-hearted Marchioness wept for pity at them; and that Nina overflowed with gratitude on hearing of her sympathy. She remained the only woman who ever wholly captivated Cavour's heart.

This love affair closes Camillo Cavour's period of storm and stress. Outwardly he accepts the inevitable — the lot of second son, of farmer at Grinzane, the door shut to his political hopes — but inwardly he renounces none of his principles. He can wait. Hostile destiny has not been able to crush out his ideals; now he will find a way through other channels for employing his vast, restless energy.

For a Liberal, the state of Piedmont had never been so desperate. The hopes which greeted Charles Albert's accession to the throne soon sank in gloom. A conspiracy, the real extent of which could not be known, was discovered and stamped out with a ferocity which indicated that the Government had succumbed to a panic. Severest measures were taken to prevent further plotting. The King himself belied the promise of his youth, when he had been a gay, gallant prince, easy of access to all and genial to his friends. His unfortunate connection with the Revolution of 1821 seemed to blast his character. The Liberals, who then believed that he was with them, now regarded him as a traitor; the Absolutists treated him as a renegade; and when it became clear that he would succeed Charles Felix, Metternich and the intriguers of the Holy Alliance extorted from him an oath that he would never consent to a constitution in Piedmont. He grew taciturn, distant, and morbidly pious, a figure on whom rested a curse as black as that of the Thebans. To dwell amid perpetual suspicion, to know that every motive is misconstrued, are tests to which only the strongest natures rise superior: Charles Albert had many fine traits, but not strength. He had an abiding sense of duty, and a very real sense of the divine right of kings. Fasts and vigils and a hair-shirt kept him in such a neurotic state that his will was the sport of his physical condition. He blew now hot now cold; resolved today, recanted tomorrow; until his subjects nicknamed him "King See-Saw." Such fickleness was naturally attributed to insincerity, if not to deceit.

Nevertheless, Charles Albert seems to have been, in his patho-

logical way, sincere. He began his reign sternly, leaving no doubt that he was an orthodox Absolutist. He did not prefer cruelty, but consented to it when advisers less ingenuous than himself pronounced it to be necessary. Thenceforward, as he said, he lived "between the dagger of the Republicans and the chocolate of the Jesuits." The former would have terrorized him into Liberal concessions; the latter did terrorize him against conceding anything, making him believe that such concessions would be heresy. He had for chief minister an Absolutist through and through, Count Solaro della Margherita, a narrow, duty-bound man of the Torquemada stripe — but several sizes smaller — who questioned neither the Satanic origin of Liberalism nor his own obligation to destroy the Liberal brood. To rally round the altar and the throne was the watchword which the King and Count Solaro wished to plant in every loyal heart. Piedmont swarmed again with priests, monks, and nuns. The Jesuits held the King's conscience and controlled education. And, as a counterpart, the army flourished, in numbers and drills and parades, if not in efficiency.

Among Charles Albert's friends Marquis Cavour took a high place. In 1833 he was appointed Syndic of Turin, and, after holding the post for two years, the King created him Vicario, an officer whose duties included the maintenance of public order and the supervision of the secret police. The Vicario had daily interviews with the King, whom he kept informed of all matters, not omitting gossip, scandal, and suspicions, that his agents reported. Such an office could not make its holder popular, but Marquis Michele accepted unpopularity as a part of his trade, conscious that, in hunting down political plotters, he was serving his king and country, and feeling well repaid by Charles Albert's confidence. It seems ludicrous that so orthodox a father should have a son as heretical as Camillo, whose "dangerous" characteristics were known not only to the Piedmontese police but to the Austrian as well. When Camillo wished to make a business trip into Lombardy, he found the frontiers closed to him.³⁰ The Austrian envoy at Turin had put the director-general of police at Milan on his guard against this youth, whose father, he said, was "the first to groan at his conduct and principles."

³⁰ This was in 1833.

"I consider him," continues Count de Bombelles, "a very dangerous man; and all the attempts made to reform him have been fruitless. He merits, therefore, a constant surveillance."³¹

Meanwhile, however, the Government looked at him a little more tolerantly, because it understood that, whether Camillo were penitent or not, he could be trusted not to connive with the party of revolution. He was appointed a member of a Statistical Commission, for which he prepared a report on the English Poor-Laws (1834). The King, however, would not consent that the "impertinent Carbonaro" should be assigned to any departmental office; the mayorship of Grinzane measured the extent of royal favor. Yet even at Turin, there were degrees in the prevailing darkness, and Camillo found among the upper classes a few spirits who, if not zealous for political reform, were filled with worthy philanthropic purposes. There were others, a still smaller group, Liberals at heart, who tacitly agreed, for discretion's sake, to hold their peace in public. To these M. de Barante, Louis Philippe's minister to Piedmont, gave comfort by his frank praise of constitutionalism. Camillo called upon him frequently, a fact which, in the first months after his return from Bard, was carefully recorded against him. He formed with Count d'Haussonville, the minister's secretary, a warm friendship, and had at first-hand descriptions of the public men then uppermost in France and an insight into the Golden Mean theory which he was coming to adopt. Among the Piedmontese whom he met, Count Cesare Balbo, a man now over forty years old, was deservedly esteemed both for intellectual attainments and for character. Like Cavour, whose talents he recognized, he had been shut out from public service on account of his Liberal views, and he had taken to the study of Dante and of history as a refuge. Another figure of the time was Silvio Pellico, recently returned from his imprisonment in the Spielberg. He had just published "My Prisons," a work which was to carry into all lands the picture of the brutality of Austria towards political offenders and to create sympathy for Italian patriots in their yearning for independence. Pellico, subdued in spirit after his terrible experi-

³¹ Bombelles's letter is dated Oct. 2, 1832; *Lettere*, I, 12-13. Only in 1836 was Cavour permitted to cross Lombardy to Villach, where he went to buy cattle. Even then he was subjected to exasperating prying. Berti, II, 223-35.

ence, shunned agitation and gave himself up to pious meditations and works; but he was counted among the reformers, and he seems to have been on the friendliest terms with Cavour.

But while Cavour drew what comfort he could from such associates in Turin, he longed for the real companionship that awaited him in Switzerland. "I feel that a stay in Geneva ought to do me an immense good," he wrote his Aunt De Sellon (May 13, 1833); "for, after having lived three years in the midst of the most violent and conflicting exaggerations, the atmosphere of reason one breathes with you ought to be a complete restorative." ¹² Three months later, he was breathing that air. In those days Geneva was doubly distinguished: it still preserved the traditional character, at once ethical and open-minded, of its natives, and it attracted visitors of enlightenment from all parts of the world. It was enriched, further, by very potent memories. Men in their prime recalled Byron's sojourn on Lake Lemman; their fathers had seen Gibbon at Lausanne; the patriarchs could tell of meeting Voltaire and Rousseau face to face. The city had flourishing manufactures — it had long made the watches for Europe — and equally flourishing schools. Material prosperity had not stifled thought. In 1833, Sismondi the historian, De Candolle the botanist, Cherbuliez the economist, Pictet the zoölogist, had won European reputations, and with them were associated De Sellon, De La Rive, Naville, and many others, whose diversified interests and sound judgment gave to Genevan society a uniformly high quality. The presence of foreigners, among whom the French predominated, and the rather close relations between the savants of Geneva and those of Paris, assured Geneva against provincialism.

Cavour entered this circle with zest. Hitherto, he had visited Geneva as a boy or a youth; now he came as a man, and it is plain that he was welcomed not less cordially by the learned than by the men and women of the world. His Diary, which he began to keep here, shows us the range of his social acquaintances and of his intellectual curiosity, which fastened on every fact. He jots down noteworthy points in his political talks. He followed the course of events abroad, not overlooking even Portugal and Holland, and anxiously awaiting news from Poland, where

Russia was taking vengeance on the defeated patriots. He visits the historic shrines. At Ferney, he remarks, "the simplicity of the furniture is extreme. The drawing-room is covered with pictures which have nothing remarkable except their extreme indecency." At Coppet, he experiences the painful feeling that comes to one in a place which genius once made illustrious, and has now only a memory for its inhabitant.³³ At Chillon, he thrills on beholding Byron's name cut in the pillar to which Bonnivard was chained. "In return," he says, "Byron has cut the name of Bonnivard in all generous hearts which still beat with the holy love of country and of liberty." Climbing to the height of Montreux, he indulges in a picturesque description of the magnificent view, really to feel which, he adds, "one must have the love of St. Preux or the despair of Lord Byron."³⁴ The life of the people interests him scarcely less than the conversations of the savants. He sees how an election goes off in the city, and he devotes a page to a plowing-match in which he compares Swiss and Piedmontese methods. An agricultural dinner follows, which he attends. "I cannot express all that I felt," he says, "at hearing these good peasants make the air ring with cheers in honor of their country."³⁵

His record of events is interspersed with criticism of his reading, which includes the English reviews. He visits the De La Rives at Pressinge, their country-seat, where discussions lasted far into the night.³⁶ At Bocage, the villa of the Clermont-Tonnerres, he hears denunciations of Louis Philippe and meets high representatives of the Old Régime. On one occasion, Aunt and Uncle Tonnerre pour out "all possible insults on the Americans," and one of the guests declares that "there can be nothing more frightful than a country where servants are loath to give the name of master to those whom they serve." "If my good cousin had reflected a moment," Cavour says, in commenting on this affair, "he must have been convinced that this repugnance is nothing else than the exaggeration of the loftiest sentiment of human nature, that of natural dignity." And he goes on to show that comparisons of national points of view are valueless unless one takes into account the history and ideals from which they spring. "Thus, in the case of Europe and America, we see two

■ Berti, II, 4.

■ *Ibid*, 33.

■ *Ibid*, 31.

■ La Rive, 34.

social states. One is based on the principle of the dependence of man towards his fellow, modified by institutions and ideas opposed to it, but still in full force; the other having for principle the absolute independence of man and man. Which of these two principles is the higher, the nobler, the nearer to the sublime maxims of the Gospel? I let every impartial man reply. . . . I will only remark here that if we insolent masters are amazed and shocked at the haughtiness of the American lower classes, these would be far more shocked and pained at the absolute lack of dignity in the greater part of our servants and workmen whom no insult displeases, no ill-treatment causes to revolt. Uncle Tonnerre," he adds, "got so hot over this discussion that he sulked at me and sulks still." ³⁷

With Sismondi, the voracious Piedmontese finds a different outlook. Cavour is surprised at the historian's interest in the editors of *Young Italy*. "Even when blaming their exaggeration, both theoretical and practical, he believes that they have generous and lofty sentiments. He has known Mazzini well, and judges him incapable of staining himself in an affair as horrible as the Rhodéz assassination. Good Sismondi! how his heart sympathizes keenly with Italian misfortunes! To inspire pity is the last dignity of a fallen power." ³⁸ The Diary gives us many similar glimpses of Cavour's activity during his two months at Geneva. Occasionally, there is a mocking reference to himself. "I imagined that I was sublime at Chevilly with M. Châteauvieux and M. Naville. Adèle ³⁹ informed me that I was simply a twaddler and a bore. Oh vanity, vanity! what illusions you weave for us!"

In October, Camillo returned to Turin, where the air seemed by contrast more stifling than usual. His Swiss visit had done much to steady him. Intercourse on even terms with men of ability had brought out his best qualities: for at Geneva he was not always on the defensive, nor reminded at every turn of his past "errors" and of his galling cadetship. During the next year, he lived as we have seen, partly at Grinzane, partly at Turin or Santena; accustoming himself as best he could to the

■ Berti, II, 29-30.

³⁸ Mazzini was accused of instigating an assassination which had taken place at Rhodéz.

³⁹ Adèle de Sellon, his cousin.

hateful conditions; reading, meditating, and mixing in the sombre gaiety of Turin with a truly catholic appetite. Then in the summer came Countess Giustiniani, and the tropical days of passion. That autumn, his father at last consented to Camillo's desire to see Paris.

On his way thither, Camillo spent two months at Geneva, where he heard Cherbuliez lecture on political economy, Dumoutier expound phrenology, and De La Rive physics. He renewed old friendships and made new ones, and after his eager fashion he had intellectual contacts of many sorts. One scrap of conversation between his aunts, Victoria and Henrietta, is worth quoting. "'Have you noticed,' said Aunt Tonnerre, 'how cold Camillo seemed when I talked to him about the sights of Paris? In truth, I don't see what will interest him on his travels. The poor child is wholly absorbed by revolutions.' 'It is true,' replied Aunt Henrietta, 'Camillo takes no interest in things — only in politics. Still, he has got over a good many notions; but the idea of being a younger son dominates him, he can't submit to it, and it torments his life.' Aunt Victoria strongly supported this excellent explanation of my Liberalism; then she added: 'He busies himself enthusiastically with political economy — with that erroneous science which warps the mind and is of no use.' . . . This is a slight specimen of the way in which two persons, otherwise very intelligent, but blinded by a blind and narrow party spirit, judge men and things." ⁴⁰

Towards the end of February, with Pietro di Santa Rosa for companion, Cavour reached Paris. The diary, if he kept one during his stay there, has been lost, but we can glean from his letters some idea of his bustling life. He studied the manifold society of the French capital as eagerly as a lover of paintings studies his first great gallery. He had introductions to some of the most eminent public men, but in order to fix their attention, he said, "one must have some title to celebrity. And I, alas! an obscure citizen of Piedmont, have done nothing to make myself known beyond the borders of the commune of which I am syndic." ⁴¹ So he did not call twice on Guizot, then at the height of his political prestige, whom he regarded as "the great thinker of the epoch." ⁴² But he made many acquaintances that were

■ Berti, II, 153-54.

⁴¹ *Lettere*, v, 40.

⁴² *Ibid*, I, 290.

far more useful. Foremost among these was that of Madame Anastasia Klustine, Countess de Circourt, a young Russian lady, whose salon was already the resort of the leaders in literature, politics, and society. "At the first glance," she said long afterwards in speaking of Cavour's presentation to her, "I recognized in Cavour the most high-minded man of his time." The acquaintance thus begun ripened into a life-long friendship. Cavour always trusted her judgment, her disinterestedness, and her discretion. Through her he could get a sane report on the state of public opinion in Paris, and to her in his busiest hours he turned for the high sympathy which at once soothes and stimulates.

The multitudinous interests of Paris did not, however, dazzle him. He wrote Auguste de La Rive that he found nothing "to take the place of those evenings when, seated round the fire, we chatted at our ease on the affairs of Europe, setting right the false systems, remodeling the bad ministries, arranging everything for the best. However little trouble our political lucubrations gave us, I verily believe that their results — if they had been carried out — would have been quite as beneficial to humanity as is all that is going on without our permission." ⁴³ He seized this opportunity of inspecting the actual operation of the political Golden Mean, which had now been tested for five years: and although he saw that its best promises had not been fulfilled, he still held its principles as sound. None of the illusions which befogged French partisans deceived him. He saw through the intrigues of the Legitimists to set up their pretender, "Henry V," in place of Louis Philippe: as if the mere change of person could check the course of evolution. The Republicans might, he thought, at a distant day become dangerous, "because they had in their favor the tendency of the age." "We must not deceive ourselves," he wrote De La Rive; "society advances at great strides towards democracy: perhaps it is impossible to foresee the forms which this will wear; but, as to the main fact, there is, in my eyes at least, no doubt. And are you not of my opinion? Do you believe in the possibility of the reconstruction of any sort of aristocratic power? The nobility crumbles on all sides — the princes as well as the peoples tend equally to destroy

■ *Lettere*, v, 35-36; dated Paris, March 31, 1835.

it. The patriciate, a municipal and restricted power, has no further place in the actual social organization. What is left, then, to struggle against the popular tide? Nothing solid, nothing powerful, nothing durable. Is it a good? is it an evil? I cannot say certainly, but it is, in my view, the inevitable future of mankind. Let us prepare ourselves for it, or at least prepare our descendants whom it concerns more than us." "Here we have a premonition of the great statesman that was to be, so eager for the special fact, so sure in discovering its general application.

One other letter, written by Cavour during these weeks in Paris, must be quoted freely, because it is a document in which his very soul speaks. A lady who, like Madame de Circourt, had quickly recognized his great talents, urged him to abandon Piedmont, where he must live a cramped and suffocated life, and to settle in Paris, the world's capital, which gave a welcome to every sort of ability. To this suggestion, Cavour replied in a vein which recalls Dante's letter to his Florentine Friend. "No, Madame," he begins; "I cannot leave my family or my country. Sacred duties stand in the way and keep me at the side of a father and mother who have never given me the least cause of complaint. . . . And why abandon my country? To come to seek a literary reputation in France? To run after a little renown, a little glory, without ever being able to attain the goal which my ambition would aim for? What good could I do humanity away from my country? What influence could I exert in behalf of my unhappy brothers, strangers and proscribed, in a land where egotism occupies all the chief social positions? What is this great mass of foreigners doing at Paris whom their misfortunes or their choice have cast far from their native land? Who among them has succeeded in creating a great career, in conquering a real influence on society? Not one."

He speaks particularly of the Italians, whom exile has rendered sterile. Among them all, Pellegrino Rossi alone has won a place for himself. "But what place! what position! The most keen-witted man in Italy, the most flexible genius of the time, the mind most practical (perhaps) in the world, has succeeded in getting a chair at the Sorbonne and a seat in the Academy, the last goal to which his ambition can aspire in France. . . . No,

⁴⁴ *Letters*, I, 287.

no, not in fleeing one's mother-country because she is unfortunate can one reach a glorious end. Woe to him who abandons in scorn the land that bore him, who renounces his brother as unworthy of him! As for myself, I have resolved never to separate my lot from that of the Piedmontese. Fortunate or unfortunate, my country shall have my whole life — I will never be untrue to her, not even were I sure of finding elsewhere a brilliant career."

Having given voice to his deepest emotion, he proceeds, after his fashion, to analyze his talents, and to calculate what he might hope to win by them, if he should desert Piedmont. He specifies three roads to fame — literature, the exact sciences, and the political and moral sciences. As to the first, he confesses frankly that he has no literary genius. "My head reasons and is little inventive. I should seek in vain to develop imagination in me — I possess no germ thereof. I have never in my life been able to invent the least fable, the merest story to amuse a child. Do what I might, I should never be more than mediocre, a third-rate literary man. Now that, Madame, is a prospect which does not tempt me at all. In matters of art, I conceive of only one position as tenable — the first rank." In science, he admits that he might make a name for himself as a mathematician or chemist. "That is one way of getting glory, like the rest; only, it has slight attractions for the Italian with the rosy complexion and child's smile." Moral sciences, on the other hand, offer a vast field. He loves them passionately, but he declares that they can be more profitably pursued outside of the artificial society of Paris. The great philosophers, moralists, economists, have not lived in the great capitals; they have worked in the silence of their obscure retreats. "Look at those men who appeared ■■ precocious geniuses and astonished the Parisian world by the earliness of their mental development — what have they become? . . . How has Cousin the philosopher turned out, who was going to cause Kant and the Scotchmen to be forgotten? . . . Up to now all these embryos of genius have not been able to make up one great man of the calibre of the Germans or of the old French thinkers." ⁴⁵

⁴⁵ *Lettere*, I, 287-90; C. to Mme. Mélanie Villeneuve de Waldor; Paris, May, 1835.

Nothing that Cavour ever wrote better illustrates the depth of his sense of duty, his patriotism, his power of distinguishing essentials from accidents, his self-analysis, at once trenchant and sober. Though the cosmopolitan life of Paris delighted him, it could not tempt him to forswear the compact which he had made with himself — to consecrate his talents to the welfare of his country and of mankind.

In May he and Santa Rosa crossed the English Channel. What the sight of Eldorado would have been to Raleigh, that was England to Cavour in 1835. There was the abode of Liberty, the home of a race of men who lived by law, who moved forward from precedent to precedent and gained more by reasoned and orderly growth than other nations by revolution. In England, too, the great problems of the new age were being solved. Economic and social questions — free trade, factory laws, poor-rates, the legal and political status of the Jews, the Established Church — were in the foreground of discussion. Intense activity in commerce and industries had followed upon the general adoption of steam. The steamboat had already revolutionized coastwise traffic. Railways were beginning to bind together all parts of the Kingdom in their magic net. On every hand, Cavour found in operation those agents, material and intellectual, of the new epoch which had been his admiration since boyhood. He found also a large and hopeful spirit. The benefits of industrial progress were still the main theme. Tomorrow would be an improvement on today. Comfort had been suddenly brought to millions. The Reform Bill had not only tested the soberness of the British character and the elasticity of the British Constitution, but its successful passage encouraged the belief that social ills of every kind could be cured by legislation. To men who have just discovered the delight of using new powers, difficulties are incentives, optimism a necessity. The prosperous enjoyed their prosperity without that qualm which comes from time to time to trouble the modern rich. The comfortable classes could honestly declare that they took the kindest interest in the miseries of the poor, and that they had both skill and purpose to find a remedy for pauperism. They still approached social evils as sentimentalists. And through all classes there permeated the British sense of superiority, — the confidence that even what was

bad in Britain was better than the good elsewhere—and there was the British pluck that took whatever came, if not exactly with a frolic welcome, yet with a stolid fortitude sometimes lighted by a play of humor that bespoke a strong race. The spirit of that decade is nowhere else so perfectly embodied as in the pages of Macaulay, so clear, so resonant, so hopeful and healthy, yet so external. It is well that men should take joy in their labor, well that they should feel the stimulus of a worthy success, and excellent that they should make each achievement a ladder to the next. These privileges belong to a generation which sees what it deems progress blossom with amazing swiftness.

Cavour moved eagerly amid this exhilarating life. He observed the economic conditions, the industrial establishments, the political methods. Being already aware that one test of a nation's welfare is the number and character of its paupers, he inspected the workhouses. He visited the Tothill Fields and Millbank prisons, the hospitals, the Thames Tunnel, then under construction, the docks and viaducts, and the railways. He notes that the English possess in a high degree the talent of working in common. "They discuss without quarreling; they have a great respect for each individual opinion, and no matter how small the minority may be, it is sure to be listened to with attention and patience."⁴⁶ Wherever he went, he got fresh evidence of the power of that parliamentary spirit which, in years to come, he was to introduce into Piedmont. He attended sessions of the House of Commons, where the celebrities were pointed out to him and he heard Peel speak. Although his circle of acquaintances was smaller than in Paris, it sufficed for a glimpse of London society at many points. He dined at John Murray's, where he sat between the publisher's wife and daughter, who could not speak French, and his own English gave out. He was struck by the length of an English dinner-party, nearly three hours and a half, and at the number of bottles drunk, and remarked that as the wine circulated "the conversation became noisy."⁴⁷ At Almack's he saw a great ball where he admired the charming faces of many of the young women, and had "the pleasure of acquiring for myself a feeble notion of the way in which the English practise their famous snub."⁴⁸ He sat next to

⁴⁶ Berti, II, 207.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 169.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 185.

Lord Ripon at the annual dinner of the Royal Geographical Society, and on being called upon unexpectedly to respond to a toast, he made his "maiden speech."

But his real business was the study of British politics. He gathered the opinions of men on all sides, and read all the newspapers. He had memorable talks with Nassau Senior, in whose garden he met De Tocqueville, then just rising into fame. William Allen, the Abolitionist, took him to a great anti-slavery meeting of Quakers, who denounced the cruel treatment suffered by the negroes in Jamaica. "Among these accusations," Cavour says sarcastically, "some were truly puerile and ridiculous. Would anybody in Piedmont believe that they condemn the governor of Jamaica for having forbidden the negroes from attending public meetings and from signing petitions?"⁴⁹ Cavour stood for reform, but his belief in moderation was so consistent that he regarded the coming into office of the Tories as a healthy sign that the rush towards Radicalism would not be too precipitate. England, he concluded, was far from being threatened by the revolutionary tempest; although, in time, she must suffer, like other nations, a long and painful social transformation: history has confirmed his prevoyance. The latent military strength of England, and the desirability of winning her for an ally, also impressed him.⁵⁰

After an excursion into Wales and the midland counties, Cavour returned to the Continent, and reached Turin before the end of July. At Brussels, he saw Vincenzo Gioberti,⁵¹ an exiled priest, a man of astonishing intellectual range, destined to play a great rôle in the drama of Italian independence. What these two said to each other is not recorded.

The six months of travel were of inestimable value to Cavour. They revealed to him other political systems at work, other customs, other points of view. They brought him face to face with the great physical and economic agents of the New Age. They taught him world-standards. They introduced him to some of the men who were shaping the policy of France and England. He had gone forth a Piedmontese; he came back a citizen of the world.

⁴⁹ Bertì, II, 197. ⁵⁰ *Lettere*, I, 290-96; C. to Barante, London, June 9, 1835, giving a remarkable survey of English politics.

⁵¹ Gioberti was born at Turin, April 13, 1801, in the same house as Cavour.

CHAPTER III

A CAREER — BUT SECOND-BEST

ON his return, as there was still no hope of serving the State, Cavour embarked on a career into which, although it was but second-best, he poured all his energy. His father was now Vicario, without leisure to look after his business affairs, which had suffered loss during his two years' mayoralty. Camillo's management of the Grinzane farm had been so successful, and his purpose to refrain from political agitation was so apparent, that his father decided to entrust to him the care of the family estates. Camillo accepted the offer. "I do not regret the career I have undertaken," he wrote to August de La Rive; "without doubt there are others more brilliant, but in my position there is none that suits me better." ¹

"I have become an agriculturist for good," he tells another Genevan friend. ". . . The occupation I first took up from reason, I now pursue for pleasure. Little by little I have become attached to agricultural work, and it would not be without a keen disappointment that I saw myself forced to give it up. But I can rest easy on this score; nothing will come to trouble me in the career I have chosen. Even if I kept the same taste for politics which I had a few years ago, it would be impossible for me to mix actively in public affairs under a government from which both my opinions and my personal circumstances equally estrange me. However moderate, however Golden Mean, I have become, I am still very far from approving the system in vogue with us. Therefore, necessity as well as my taste fixes me henceforth in agricultural occupations, which will certainly suffice to busy my mind and to satisfy the need which every worthy man feels to make himself useful to the society of which he is a part." ■

The estates which Cavour undertook to manage consisted of four large farms at Leri, a little village lying in the plains north of the Po, between Trino and Livorno, and about twenty-five

¹ *Lettere*, I, 301; May, 1836.

■ *Ibid.*, I, 297; July, 1835.

miles, as the crow flies, northeast of Turin. It is an ugly district, "very flat, without foliage to break its monotony, without streams to enliven its dead or slumbering nature; nothing but rice-fields and meadows, whose unhealthy verdure contrasts with the whiteness of the long clayey roads which, crossing them, stretch out in a straight line as far as the eye can see; then, at great distances from each other, immense farm-buildings, or rather clusters of low buildings, made of an earthy and yellowish brick, species of villages which seem overwhelmed beneath a consuming sky, and which the fever-laden wind from the marshy solitudes comes at times to poison with its fetid breath." 3

There in a little dwelling such as a head farmer might occupy, Cavour settled himself, attended only by a man-servant and a secretary. Henceforth we hear no lamentations from him. Accepting without reserve the career which grudging fate offered, he was soon to show how genius can turn all obstacles into stepping-stones. "I can do nothing by halves," 4 he said, and accordingly he tackled farming as if that had been the dearest object of his ambition. No gentleman farmer, he, but the most practical. He rose at daybreak, took his cup of coffee and roll, and was out giving the laborers instructions before they started for the fields; then, he visited the barns and stables, inspected tools and cattle, audited the factor's accounts; next, he went a-field himself, to oversee the sowing or harvesting, or to direct the digging of some drain; or he experimented with the new sieve for cleansing the rice; or estimated the probable crop of maize when the ears began to fill out; or drove in a rustic gig to the nearest market to buy more stock. Until sunset he toiled without repose; then he dined frugally, unless there were guests, and spent the evening consulting further on farm matters with his factor, Corio, or with his foremen. When at length all these duties had been dispatched, he turned to his books and read until midnight. Four or five hours' sleep sufficed to restore him for a similar round on the morrow.

From the summer of 1835 down to 1848, the management of

3 La Rive, 60. His description of Leri belongs to a later date, when Cavour's ten years' labors had made it one of the great prosperous domains of Piedmont.

4 *Lettere*, I, 28; C. to A. de La Rive, 1835.

the estates at Leri, together with his farm at Grinzane and the lands adjoining the family château at Santena, was Cavour's chief business in life: in all, a domain of many thousand acres. He managed them so ably that they yielded a large income to the family and a fortune to himself. Soon outgrowing the original terms between him and his father, by which he acted merely as overseer, he hired the Leri property and bought on his own account other farms near it. His success in agriculture was not due only to his energy and perseverance; it was due in large measure to his being perhaps the earliest in Piedmont to understand the significance of the new forces which science and invention were taming for human use. Just as he had clearly seen in Liberty the dominant spirit of the new epoch, and in Democracy the method by which that spirit was transforming government, so he saw that science was creating new material conditions for men, and bestowing on them such a mastery over Nature as they had never dreamed of. He already perceived that the forces at work changing the religious, political, social, and industrial conditions were embodiments of the same spirit, and that they had for their end the endowment of the race, whether multitude or man, with greater power, and consequently with larger liberty. New methods of production must so transform the producers themselves as to react on the social and political constitution of the State. When Fulton launched his paddle-wheel steamer *Clermont*, when Stephenson started his locomotive *Rocket* on its first trip, mankind set out on a career of conquest compared with which the campaigns of Cæsar were transitory, and the empire of Napoleon provincial.

Taught by his travels the latest applications of science to the arts, to industry, and to agriculture, Cavour set about adopting them. Agriculture throughout Italy was still so backward that, could Columella have returned to life, he would have found in some parts of the Peninsula tools of the same pattern he had known eighteen centuries before. Even in Lombardy, the most fertile garden in Europe, adherence to methods, obsolete elsewhere, prevented the soil from yielding its full bounty; and Piedmont lagged far behind Lombardy. Clumsy implements fitly typified the ignorance of the peasants, who clung to tradition and folk-lore in all their transactions with Mother Earth. One of

Cavour's men at Grinzane assured him that, whilst four oxen had not been able to plow a certain piece of land during the new moon, a single yoke had plowed it easily during the last quarter! ⁵ The great landlords had usually less practical knowledge than the factors to whom they entrusted their estates; and they were too unenterprising to risk their capital on novelties; better the old ways, with smaller returns, than the new, with uncertainty and perhaps loss.

When, therefore, Cavour began to introduce modern agriculture on a large scale at Leri, he had to encounter not only the ignorance but also the superstition of his laborers. Neither daunted him. In the course of a few years he brought his estate up to the highest standard of cultivation. He followed closely the progress of agricultural chemistry, which was just coming to be widely studied in France and England, and applied its discoveries to his lands. He experimented in manures, to the use of which Italian farmers had paid little attention. He tried new inventions for sifting rice and for threshing, new plows, and new nurseries for silk-worms. He watched the effect of different crops on the soil and found out how, by judicious rotation, to avoid exhausting it. Learning that rice had been successfully raised in the salt lands of Provence, he inferred that rice must contain chloride of sodium, or at least sodium, and wrote to a practical chemist to verify this conclusion by analysis. At another time, he asked his chemist friend to ascertain what substances asparagus drew from the soil, and no manure supplied: for asparagus was one of the staple products at Santena. To increase the yield of rice and to make the country salubrious, he carried out a wide scheme of irrigation. The French had recently cultivated beets for sugar; accordingly, he planted many acres of beets and set up a factory for making sugar.⁶ He took a true cattle-fancier's pride in improving the breed of his flocks and herds. And although among so many innovations not all turned out profitably, the net result was the conversion of the Cavour estates into models of progressive farming, the improvement of the laborers on them, the permanent restoration of the family fortunes, and the financial independence of Cavour himself. And all the while he was acquiring experience and trying his ability

⁵ Berti, II, 132.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 2-4, 5, 6, 8, 9.

in ways which, as the future proved, reinforced his authority ■ a statesman.

Veneration for science did not prevent Cavour from holding scientific theorists in distrust. In his own mind there lay no half-explored border-land or twilight between what he knew and what he did not know; he could define exactly where his ignorance began, and so was saved from mistaking, as most men do, the beginning of his ignorance for the ending of his knowledge. Eagerly receptive of suggestions, he tested them by experiment, from which he admitted no appeal. For persons who would not give their theories a similar trial, he had little respect. "Not long ago," he writes jocosely, "a learned professor of chemistry maintained before me that it would be easy for the Piedmontese and Lombard farmers to treble the product of their fields if they were but a little conversant with the science of manures. I dared not contradict him — he would have crushed me under the great mass of fertilizing salts he had probably prepared in his laboratory: I contented myself with thanking Providence under my breath that, in denying a single hectare of land to this worthy professor, it had saved him from certain ruin." ⁷

To plan and carry out these undertakings at Leri, far from exhausting Cavour's energy, strengthened it. The need of reaching a market for his products led to commercial relations which gave him as exact a knowledge of the financial and industrial conditions of Piedmont as he had of its agriculture. With his old friends the De la Rues, bankers at Genoa, he engaged in ventures which his shrewdness and their capital usually made profitable. He had that audacity which springs not from recklessness but from seeing very clearly how to succeed. If he were buying or selling grain or maize or rice, he had the state of his own crops to guide him, and the latest information as to the probable demand in England and the prospective harvests in Russia and India. If the Government issued a loan, before investing he took into account the political situation of Europe. His business correspondence with the De la Rues fills an entire volume,⁸ in which the reader, as he traces the steps by which Cavour became a great financier, learns also how large an influence Cavour's private enterprises exerted on the general economic progress in Piedmont.

⁷ La Rive, 63-64.

⁸ Berti, II, *passim*.

TURIN in 1840

1. Royal Palace
2. Ministries
3. Palazzo Madama
4. Piazza Castello
5. Military Academy
6. Palazzo Carignano
7. Palazzo Cavour
8. Church, Madonna degli Angeli
9. Hotel Europa
10. Post Office
11. Arsenal
12. Theatre
13. Church, S. Carlo



The paternal régime there meddled in every concern of life; consequently, it drew its own surmises when Cavour shipped a flock of merino sheep to the Pasha of Egypt, or imported a cargo of manure, or applied for a license to manufacture beet sugar. Even without specific record, we can well believe that the bureaucrats shook their heads over the first invoice of guano, and made sure that it was not a new brand of revolutionary explosive before they let it pass the custom-house. In truth, their instinctive repugnance to every manifestation of enterprise was well-grounded; for enterprise introduced into economic conditions modern improvements which would react on the political system. Despots still had a wholesome suspicion that wherever the new giant, Steam, went, his twin brother, Liberty, was sure to follow.

Notwithstanding obstacles, official or other, Cavour successfully adopted the modern methods of farming, and engaged in large commercial transactions. He set up a fertilizer factory, and a factory for making sulphuric acid and other chemical products. He was one of the organizers of the Lake Maggiore Steamboat Company; he promoted the establishment of the Bank of Genoa, and helped to create the Bank of Turin. And when railways were projected in Piedmont, he, among the first, subscribed for bonds. Nor did his activity stop here. Debarred from his true sphere, politics, he busied himself mightily on its outskirts. He founded at Turin a Whist Club (1841), the first of its kind in the city, jealously eyed by the Government, which knew how easily a party assembled for a rubber might fall to discussing forbidden topics. Even earlier than this he had, with four other philanthropic gentlemen, petitioned the Government for permission to establish infant schools and asylums in Piedmont.⁹ Count della Margherita, Charles Albert's chief minister, frowned on the request: to educate the children of the people, would tend to make them, he protested, not good Christians and good subjects. Nevertheless, the King finally gave his consent, provided that the teaching should be controlled by the religious Orders (1839). To the society incorporated on these terms,

⁹ *Lettere*, I, 24: C.'s associates were Carlo Boncompagni, Count Federigo Sclopis, Count Luigi Franchi di Pont, and Fantini, priest of the Church of the Annunziata, Turin.

Cavour devoted much time for many years, serving as its treasurer. "It costs far less," he maintained, "to give a good direction to a hundred boys than to repair the ills of a single man who, not having had the benefit of education and instruction, pursues a vicious course."¹⁰

The most important of the societies which Cavour helped to found, and one in which he exerted great influence, was the Agrarian Association, ostensibly a gathering of large landed proprietors for the encouragement of improved methods of farming and stock-raising. It met the usual opposition from the logically unyielding Margherita and others, but was favored by the King, who after granting it a charter signified his approval by joining it. In a short time it counted more than three thousand members and forty-one branches.¹¹ It held cattle-shows, published an agricultural journal, and had an annual convention at which delegates, besides listening to papers of value to them as farmers, might possibly hear unofficial allusions to matters political and semi-political which concerned them as citizens. Guarded enough must such talk have been, and hardly avowed by those who took part in it: yet the result was what Cavour and his fellow promoters had in view — the creation of a feeling of unity among a large and influential class of Piedmontese, of an object-lesson in organization, and of opportunities for spreading ideas as to the resources of the country and its needs.

Thus we perceive that, although Cavour accepted the vocation of farmer in good earnest, he could not be dulled by bucolic routine. So varied were his interests, some of them requiring long absences from Leri, that we wonder how he attended to all of them: but the fact that his estates were the best managed in Piedmont, proves that he never neglected them. In 1836 he made a trip to Villach to buy sheep. The Austrian Government decided to allow him to cross its frontiers, but warned its police to watch this "suspected foreigner."¹² He witnessed the Easter fêtes at Milan. At Verona, "out of respect for Shakespeare and to quiet his conscience," he visited the tomb of Romeo and Juliet, "which is nothing but an ox-trough to which they have given a

¹⁰ *Lettere*, I, 26.

¹¹ *Ibid*, 30.

¹² *Ibid*, 40. For C.'s memoranda of his journey, see *Diario*, 223-35. See also D'Ancona, *Nuova Antologia*, Jan. 16, Feb. 16, 1899.

pompous name"; and having concluded his bargain for the herd of merino rams, he returned by way of Trieste and Venice. The following year, on the death of the Duke of Clermont-Tonnerre, his widow, Cavour's Aunt Victoria, appointed him to administer the estate. This sent him off at midsummer into Dauphiny and Franche Comté, to take an inventory of the Duke's lands, and then on to Paris to confer with financiers. That same winter he was called again to Paris on his aunt's affairs, and during the next few years, he made other journeys, now to Geneva, now to France, on similar business.

Most memorable was his sojourn in the French capital from November, 1842, to May, 1843, of which, fortunately, his Diary preserves a consecutive record. The picture which we form from his hasty memoranda is of intense activity. His insatiable curiosity touched the circle of Parisian life impartially at all points. He had contacts with the dissipated and the devout, with the learned and the frivolous, with bankers, statesmen, and merchants. He was no longer merely the syndic of an obscure Piedmontese village, but a man whose great talents were already recognized by persons whose recognition gave distinction. Some he charmed by his ever-ready wit, others by his vivacity or by his clear insight. As usual, he inspected the institutions of Paris and made the tour of the chief factories and industrial establishments. He improved his opportunity of hearing the lectures on the most diverse subjects by the eminent professors — Michelet, Jules Simon, Pellegrino Rossi, Ozanam, Chevalier, St. Marc Girardin, Royer-Collard. Mickiewicz, the Polish poet, aroused his enthusiasm for poetry; Abbé Cœur, who then outshone even Lamennais and Lacordaire as a religious revivalist, moved him deeply. "The doctrines of Abbé Cœur," he wrote to Santa Rosa, "have sunk into my mind and stirred my heart, and when I see them sincerely and generally adopted by the Church, I shall probably become as devout a Catholic as you."¹³ Any one reading Cavour's abstracts and comments might suppose that he had gone to Paris for the special purpose of study; but every page of his Diary shows that lectures took up only a small part of his time. From the visitors' gallery of either Chamber he watched important debates, and he seldom passed a day without spending

¹³ *Lettere*, I, 47; C. to Santa Rosa, March 16, 1843.

an hour at one of the many salons — Madame de Circourt's, Madame de Castellane's, Princess Belgiojoso's — where he met celebrities and obscurities of all shades. He frequented the receptions of the Duke de Broglie, the statesman whose character and principles he most admired. He joined the Jockey Club, the resort of the wildest revelers in Paris, and went to the masked balls of the Opéra Comique. He discussed acting with Rachel, then at the height of her reputation; he pumped the postmaster of Paris for details as to the management of the post-office; he attended exhibitions of mesmerism, which piqued the curiosity of the fashionable and the learned alike, and thought he detected many evidences of fraud. But we need not lengthen the tale of his activity in Paris.

Being joined by his friend, Professor August de La Rive, he crossed to England, where, though his round was smaller, it gave him a view of the great agitation over the Corn Laws, of Irish Repeal and of social ferment, and enabled him to examine the latest improvements in industries and agriculture. England is a country of immense resources, he had written Mme. de Circourt, after his first English journey in 1835, "but what one seeks in vain there is that admirable union of knowledge and wit, of depth and amiability, of substance and form, which makes the charm of certain salons in Paris, — a charm which once tasted one regrets one's whole life, and never meets again after quitting that intellectual oasis."¹⁴ This second visit confirmed Cavour's admiration for the English as "the vanguard of civilization."¹⁵ To what good purpose he studied them appeared as soon as he returned home, about midsummer, 1843, in his introduction of new machinery on his farms, and in the writings to which he now gave his spare hours.¹⁶

Cavour first essayed authorship in 1834, when he drew up an abstract of the English Poor-Laws. This called forth the praises of Cesare Balbo, whose opinion carried then most respect in Piedmont.¹⁷ Professor de La Rive thereupon urged him to contribute to the *Bibliothèque Universelle*, a review edited by him at

¹⁴ Nigra, 28-29.

¹⁵ *Lettere*, I, 103.

¹⁶ As a member of the Statistical Commission (appointed Dec. 10, 1836) he prepared a report on the moral and intellectual statistics of the nation. Chiala prints the report, v, 99-115, presented Jan. 17, 1840.

¹⁷ *Lettere*, v, lv-lx, reprints Balbo's article and (lxi-xcvii) C.'s abstract.

Geneva. Cavour was pleased by the request, but not blinded as to his own limitations. "Do not expect from me," he replied, "any article in which any show whatsoever of imagination is required. In me imagination is an idle old creature, whom I can never set in motion, prod her how I may. . . . I have never succeeded in making up the simplest story to amuse my nephew, though I have tried many times. I restrict myself therefore to matters of pure reasoning, and of these I must tell you that there is an infinity I could not deal with, because my literary education has been singularly neglected in certain respects. Of all the moral sciences, there is but one which I have studied thoroughly, political economy. . . . There is, however, one subject which has been more especially the object of my investigations, above all in my recent journey; that is the great question of pauperism, which I have studied deeply in England. . . . Tell me frankly your opinion, for I feel no vanity in this matter."¹⁸

At that time (1835) the proposition went no further, either because De La Rive deemed the subject unsuitable, or because Cavour's newly assumed duties at Leri left him no leisure. But on his return from his travels in 1843, he set about writing an article to show the defects in the model farm system which was then attracting the noble agriculturists of Piedmont.¹⁹ That finished, he prepared a review of Lullin de Châteauvieux's *Voyages Agronomiques en France*, in which his own experience as a farmer and his investigations in France and England give to his opinions the authority of an expert.²⁰ Soon afterward, letting himself be carried away, as he said, by the fury inspired in him by the follies about Ireland daily poured out by newspapers of every stripe,²¹ he wrote an article on the Irish Question, the first essay in which, dropping the rôle of economist, he spoke as a statesman. How hard Cavour found composition, he has himself revealed in a letter to De La Rive. "I admit to you plainly," he says, "that I do not feel capable of expressing in agreeable fashion all I think. From lack of practice, if not of talents, I ex-

¹⁸ *Lettere*, I, 298; C. to A. de La Rive, Nov. 30, 1835.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, I, 37; printed in the *Gazette* of the Agrarian Society, Aug. 31, 1843.

²⁰ Dated "Santena, Sept. 11, 1843"; printed in the *Bibliothèque Universelle*, Geneva.

²¹ *Lettere*, I, 328; C. to A. de La Rive, Aug. 24, 1843.

perience great difficulty in framing my ideas so as to present them to the public. In my youth, they never taught me how to write; in my whole life, I never had a professor of rhetoric, nor even of the humanities; moreover, it is only with the greatest apprehension that I shall decide to send you a manuscript to be printed. I have perceived, but too late, how essential it is to make the study of letters the basis of all intellectual education; the art of speech and of good writing exacts a refinement, a suppleness in certain organs, which one cannot acquire unless one exercises them in youth. Make your son write, make him compose, so that, when his head shall have become a workshop for ideas, he may be able to employ with ease the only machine which can put them in circulation — the pen.”²²

In spite of difficulties, Cavour had his essay finished by Christmas. It appeared in the *Bibliothèque Universelle* for January and February, 1844, and attracted the attention of political thinkers in France and England.²³ Well might British politicians marvel that such an analysis of their most harassing question of internal policy should come out of remote Turin. Those were the days when O’Connell, having roused the Irish people by his Celtic eloquence, confronted the English Parliament with the demand that the Union should be repealed. The issues of peace and war seemed to hang on his single decision. Fivescore thousand of his countrymen, assembling on Tara Hill during the previous summer, had been swayed by his voice as by an enchanter. Since Peter the Hermit had by similar sorcery turned the host at Clermont into Crusaders, Europe had scarcely witnessed such a spectacle. Cavour, however, was not deceived by appearances. “O’Connell’s conduct,” he wrote De La Rive, “proves clearly that he is audacious only in proportion to the patience of his adversaries.”²⁴ In his essay, after outlining the history of England’s relations with Ireland, stating with equal impartiality the wrongs done by the English and the petty retaliations and intractableness of the Irish, he concluded that England ought not to consent to repeal the Union, and that, even though she did consent, Ireland would lose more than she could gain.

²² *Lettere*, I, 330.

²³ Full title: “*Considérations sur l’État Actuel de l’Irlande.*”

²⁴ *Lettere*, I, 331; C. to A. de La Rive, Nov. 3, 1843.

We need not analyze minutely this remarkable essay; it remains, after many years, of permanent value to any student of the Irish Question; but we may draw from it two passages in which biographers of Cavour have seen personal revelations. Speaking of the act which abolished the Irish Parliament and established the Union, he says: "We must first distinguish between the merits of this measure in itself and the means employed to accomplish it. There can be but one voice to blast the infamy of those who trafficked the independence of their country, who bartered their rights and their political influence for money and places, who sold their vote and sanctioned an act which their conscience censured. But must we equally condemn the government which bought these corrupt men? I should not hesitate to do so, were it not that, by a fatal error, public opinion in past centuries and even still in our own, has in some sort sanctioned governments in the use of morals different from those which they recognize for individuals; if it had not, at all times, treated with an excessive indulgence immoral acts which have led to great political results." ²⁵ In his own career we shall find Cavour more than once confronted by a similar dilemma.

Still more famous is the passage in which he describes William Pitt: "We form, in general," he says, "a very false idea of this illustrious statesman. We commit a grave error in representing him as the partisan of all abuse, of all oppression, like a Lord Eldon or a Prince de Polignac. Quite the contrary, Pitt had the enlightenment of his age; the son of Lord Chatham was not the friend of despotism, nor the champion of religious intolerance. A puissant and vast mind, he loved power as a means, not as an end. He entered political life to make war on the retrograde administration of Lord North; and from the time he joined the ministry one of his first acts was to proclaim the need of parliamentary reform. Certainly, Pitt was not one of those ardent souls who become impassioned for the great interests of humanity, who do not heed, when they perceive these at stake, either the obstacles which lie before them, or the embarrassments their zeal may create. He was not one of those men who wish to reconstruct society from top to bottom, with the aid of general ideas and of humane theories. A profound and cold genius, stripped of

²⁵ *Scritti*, II, 241-42.

prejudices, he was animated solely by love of his country and by love of glory. At the opening of his career he saw the defective parts of society, and he proposed to correct them. Had he continued to hold power in a period of peace and tranquillity, he would have been a reformer after the pattern of Mr. Peel and of Mr. Canning, uniting the boldness and breadth of the former's views with the latter's wisdom and skill." ²⁶ Those who would see, in this portrait of Pitt, Cavour himself prophetically outlined, or at least his ideal of a statesman, must still admit that it lacks several features, perhaps the most characteristic, to render it lifelike.

When he next had leisure, Cavour wrote an article on the English Corn Law agitation.²⁷ Since his youth, nourished on the works of Adam Smith and Ricardo, he had been a free trader: for free trade meant the application to commerce of that spirit of liberty which he revered as the ruling spirit of the new era. Step by step, he followed the reports of the struggle in England, and in common with most Liberals at that time, he hoped that, when the campaign had been decided in the British Parliament, other civilized nations would quickly reform their tariffs. He hailed it as a good omen that the French Chamber adopted a new schedule for sugars. "Monopolies are solidaire," he wrote Naville. "When one privileged industry is sacrificed, a mortal blow is dealt to the Protectionist system." ²⁸ This was in 1843, shortly after he had had with Léon Faucher, at Paris, in a meeting of the Society of Political Economy, a passage worth recording. "Those are very fine principles," said Faucher sarcastically, "of the kind one proclaims when one knocks at the door of power; but when this door is once opened and the threshold crossed, one throws them out of the window." "Speak for yourself," rejoined Cavour; "as for me, I give you my word of honor that if I ever happen to be a minister, I will resign, or I will cause my principles to prevail." ²⁹

In his essay Cavour predicted the early repeal of the Corn Laws, and discussed the effect which the example of one nation, regulating its foreign commerce according to scientific principles,

²⁶ *Scritti*, 244-45. ²⁷ "De la Question Relative à la Législation Anglaise sur le Commerce des Céréales," *Bibliothèque Universelle*, Jan., Feb., 1845.

²⁸ *Lettere*, I, 326.

²⁹ *Ibid*, I, 33.

would have on the economic conditions of the Continent. His prediction as to the repeal came true the next year, but political considerations, allied with industrial greed against the natural operation of economic laws, put off the fulfilment of his larger prophecy. He returned to this subject in 1847 in an article in which he examined, with special reference to Italy, the influence Peel's reforms would exert. This article has peculiar interest because it was the first which he wrote in Italian for publication in an Italian review. Like all upper-class Piedmontese of his generation, he had been brought up to use French as his mother tongue, and the Piedmontese dialect in his dealings with the uneducated; but before he reached manhood he set to work to *Italianize* himself, and he became proficient in Italian. To the end of his life, however, his thoughts flowed more readily in French.

The last of the essays which deserve attention was called forth by Petitti's book on Italian railways.³⁰ His first trip to England in 1835 revealed to Cavour the immense changes which railways would work in all departments of modern life. He had himself promoted the construction of a line between Lyons and Geneva, encouraged the laying-out of a system to connect Turin with the chief Piedmontese cities, and welcomed the plan of a tunnel through the Alps. In his essay, published at the instance of the Duke de Broglie³¹ in the *Revue Nouvelle* of Paris, Cavour insisted that the various Italian States ought not to construct their lines on a merely local scale, but that they ought to coöperate, to the end that each road might connect with its neighbor and consult, first, the interests of the entire Italian Peninsula. He suggested the proper route for the great trunk-lines, to serve as arteries for Italian commerce. Instead of echoing those who then deplored Austria's intention of uniting Lombardy and Venetia with Vienna by rail, he argued that Italian products would thereby find new markets north of the Alps, and that, when the hour of Italy's emancipation came, no mere railroad would save Austria. He predicted that the moral benefits railroads would bring to Italy would exceed the material benefits which everybody expected from them: for they would foster national feeling

³⁰ I. Petitti: *Delle Strade Ferrate Italiane, e del Migliore Ordinamento di Esse* (Capolago, 1845).

³¹ May 1, 1846; reprinted in *Scritti*, II, 8-50.

and they would create that mutual confidence between the Italian governments and their peoples upon which the peaceful introduction of reforms must depend.

Only a few copies of the review containing this article reached Piedmont, but one of these fell into Charles Albert's hands, who read it with alternate satisfaction and displeasure. The patriotic heart in him exulted at this forecast of Italy's independence, while his politic head, always see-sawing between "I would" and "I would not," resented the audacity of a subject who presumed in print to discuss politics. The King decided to send his secretary, Canna, to intimate unofficially to Cavour that he had better absent himself from Piedmont for a while, that being Charles Albert's method of punishing those whom he did not care to prosecute openly; but either the message was never given, or the King changed his mind, for Cavour remained unmolested.³² It may have been on this occasion that Charles Albert said of Cavour, "He is the most dangerous man in my Kingdom."³³

At this very time, when Cavour had revived the King's long-standing dislike, his independence brought down upon him a storm of unpopularity from another quarter. Since the founding of the Agrarian Society in 1842, he had been one of its most energetic members, serving on its committees, drawing up reports for its *Gazette*, stimulating his associates to improve their crops and cattle, and throwing his influence on the side of orderly progress. But there was a party in the association that aspired to make it too quickly and too openly the vehicle of political agitation, a party led by Lorenzo Valerio, a bourgeois, eloquent, impetuous, persistent, who aspired to play the part of "Friend of the People," and played it so well that ere long he was nicknamed "Caius Gracchus." In theory, no rôle could better become a statesman; but history warns us that professional "friends of the people" have been in nine cases out of ten sheer demagogues, — parasites, that is, of the whole flock instead of a single bell-wether. Valerio, indeed, was sincere; but sincerity precludes neither fanaticism nor self-deception, and in his case it certainly did not guarantee wisdom. Nevertheless, he and his friends fought so valiantly for "democratic" principles in the Agrarian Society, that they at length worsted the "aristocrats,"

³² Predari, 94.

³³ La Rive. The King called him also a Jacobin.

captained by Cavour, and forced the Government to interfere so far as to take the nomination of the presidents and vice-presidents of the Society into its own hands. This result was a serious personal rebuff for Cavour, who had been defeated because he was unpopular. In order to magnify his unpopularity his opponents had not shrunk from misinterpretation and calumny. They hinted, for instance, that he was double-faced: that he wrote patriotic essays, but secretly informed the Government against real patriots; that he preached the benefits of an enlightened commercial system, but actually cornered the grain-market at a time when a bad harvest brought on a famine. They visited upon him the odium which his worthy father, during his long service as Vicario, had aroused: for that official must, by the very nature of his duties, resort to espionage hateful to every respectable citizen and dangerous to every criminal. Moreover, Cavour's wealth excited the envy of some; his ability, quickly recognized by whoever competed with him, stirred the jealousy of others. That Valerio and his Radicals should thus early combine against him, indicates how true an instinct guided them.

So Cavour's name appeared no more on the Agrarian Committees. He was even asked to resign the treasurership of the Infant Asylum Society, lest the continuance of so unpopular a person should harm it. When Cobden came to Turin (1847) and was seen walking between Camillo and his brother Gustavo, a wit remarked, "There goes Free Trade guarded by Monopoly" ³⁴ — an epigram which the public generally enjoyed. But Cavour had had too long a schooling in unpopularity — from boyhood he had been in opposition — to be downcast over this latest disappointment. He felt keenly the imputation on his honor, but except to his intimate friends he said nothing. And although he smarted, his humor must have been tickled by the implication that he and his father were secretly of one mind; but then and always he was loyally reticent in public concerning his father's reactionist principles. A strenuous fighter himself, he accepted with a soldier's relish the hardest blows of his adversaries, provided they fought fair: it was the injustice, the meanness they stooped to that moved his indignation. Such assailants, he repelled with scornful silence. Nevertheless, deep must have been his chagrin as he

³⁴ Predari, 155.

realized that Fortune had wrapt him in this cloud of misunderstanding just at the time when, as all signs portended, a new era was dawning for Italy — that era in which, he had long dreamed, he might dedicate to his country the talents which from youth up he had trained to that end.

The death of Gregory XVI and the election of Pius IX, in June, 1846, marked the beginning of the change. During that autumn and the next winter, one incident after another, seemingly trivial at the moment, heralded the rising tide. A great buoyancy uplifted men's spirits. At Rome, the immemorial stronghold of reaction, the new Pope himself uttered the magic word, reform. The Tuscans, less persecuted than their neighbors, began to assume that a change was inevitable. In Piedmont, a little quarrel with Austria over salt and oil duties, drew from the Government such a show of independence as had not been seen in thirty years. On several occasions Charles Albert used expressions which patriots throughout Italy hailed as signs that he would indeed fulfil his promise to D'Azeglio and "at the right hour sacrifice his army, his treasure, and his life in behalf of the national cause." By the beginning of October, 1847, the popular movement, having gained great headway at Rome and Florence, had spurted up into local insurrections in the Austrian provinces, and had brought on a ministerial crisis at Turin. The Old Régime was making its exit with Solaro della Margherita, whom the King asked to resign: the New was coming in with Cesare Alfieri and the Moderate Liberals, for the most part aristocrats, who represented as much of progress as was compatible with the inherent conservatism of their class.

This juncture found Cavour in retreat at Leri, busy with his lands, busier watching the swift currents of events. His friends, believing that at last the hour had struck for him to take office, wondered at his apathy. They could not doubt his fitness: why, then, did he seem to turn his back on Fortune when she beckoned him, or desert his country when she plainly called for her ablest sons? To one intimate, Marquis Costa de Beauregard, who put these questions, Cavour opened his heart in a memorable letter.

"According to you," he said, "I ought to bestir myself to obtain a place and to play a part on the political stage. Speaking to a friend like you, I will affect no false modesty. I will not say

that I consider myself incapable of serving the King and my country. Wrongly, perhaps (but I declare that I do not think so) . . . I delude myself to the point of thinking that I have as much capacity and knowledge as the majority of persons who occupy the first rank in politics. If I hold aloof, it is for another motive. It is because I am convinced that between office and me there are obstacles I could not surmount without sacrificing my personal dignity: and it is still probable that the sacrifices I might be willing to make would lead to no results.

“This position is regrettable, but I should be powerless to change it. Perhaps you will judge it as I do, when I have let you know in a few words some details of my history. Appointed a page when very young, I was the object of marked favor from the Prince of Carignano. I responded very ill to this high predilection; led on by the heat of youth and by the exaltation of sentiments which, so far as substance goes, I do not disavow to-day, I broke with the Court, thanks to some imprudent words uttered on leaving the Academy. The Prince treated me with excessive rigor; he denounced me to Charles Felix, who, to my great astonishment, showed himself very tolerant towards me. Far from the Court, I gave free rein to my opinions, which were, I confess, very exaggerated. I spent five years in the Engineers, . . . hiding from nobody my way of thinking; but without ever committing the smallest act or making the least engagement contrary to the oath I had taken. When the Prince mounted the throne, one of his first acts was an act of severity towards me. He sent me to the fortress of Bard,³⁵ at a time when there was neither work to be done nor workmen to be overseen. I bore this exile, but at the end of eight months, I got permission from my father to leave the army and return to private life.

“Since then, I have always devoted myself to serious things. Age and study have much modified my opinions, without in the least changing them. I am at bottom as Liberal as I was at eighteen — in this sense, that I ever desire what can bring about the greatest good for humanity and the development of civilization. I am just as persuaded as on leaving college that the world is drawn by a fatal tendency towards a new goal; that to wish to

■ Cavour's memory is at fault. Charles Felix was still king when he was sent to Bard, March 6, 1831; Charles Albert succeeded to the throne April 27, 1831.

check the course of events means to stir up tempests, without chance of bringing the ship back to port. But I am now persuaded that the only real progress is the slow and wisely ordered progress. I am convinced that order is necessary for the development of society, and that of all the guarantees of order, a legitimate power which has its roots in the history of the country is the best. Moreover, after all, I do not think myself more Liberal than a great number of those who occupy the avenues of power. Men in high office have so judged, and on several occasions they have sought to connect me with the Government. But they have always encountered an invincible obstacle in the supreme [royal] will. Count Pralormo, who, as you know, is tenacious in his projects, returned to the charge several times, but without success.

“What befell me several years ago would happen again, and with stronger reason now. I was young then, and might without inconvenience have accepted a subaltern position. At present, I could not, or, if you prefer, I would not. Eight years ago I was popular enough. I am no longer popular in the least. In the Agrarian Society I fought energetically an exaggerated Liberal Party. The Government upheld this party, and declared me wrong; and I have lost at once my place in the Association and the Liberals’ favor. I have done nothing to regain it, so that were the King to give me employment, he would displease more persons than he would satisfy. There is therefore no chance of his thinking of me, and if any one were to suggest my name to him, there would be no reason for him to overcome the repugnance it causes him. There you have, my dear Léon, a sincere explanation: it will make my conduct seem less strange to you. I have given myself up to agriculture. I practise it on a scale large enough for it to have real interest. Up to the present I have reaped sufficient success. I have gone outside the ordinary rut, and tried betterments of a new sort. They have succeeded fairly well. I am not indifferent to the country’s affairs, and I strive to be useful to it, so far as a private individual can be. I have succeeded in founding at Turin a bank of discount, which will, I hope, be of great benefit to commerce and to farming and manufacturing industries. I have created a vast factory of manures and chemical products which has, I believe, no rivals in Italy.

Finally, I flatter myself on having contributed more than any one else to the erection of a magnificent rice-mill which is about to be put in operation at the Park.

"If I tell you what I am doing, it is not to boast, but solely to prove to you that I am no idler who, under the pretext of cultivating his fields, passes his life in easy-going indolence. I have no merit in working, for idleness hangs heavy on me, and I should have asked nothing better than to be able to consecrate all my time and all my means to the service of the State, in a public position. If I remain in private life, it is because I cannot quit it with dignity, nor in such a way as to be truly useful to the country." ³⁶

Shortly after Cavour wrote this letter, the earliest of the King's concessions were announced, chief among them being a reform of the censorship "compatible with the interests of religion, of morals, and of the regular conduct of affairs." ³⁷ If journalism, as critics urge, has deteriorated in proportion to its enormous development in material resources, we cannot hold Charles Albert and his fellow monarchs to blame for liberating it. Having kept it kenneled as long as they could, they unleashed it only under compulsion. A free press was indispensable in that new world-order towards which the down-trodden peoples of Europe were struggling; they revered it as the ark of publicity, the medium of discussion, the reflector and educator of public opinion. Journalists then conceived their mission highly. They held themselves as liegers of truth, bound to maintain the principles which they believed to be true, and if need were, to suffer persecution therefor.

Cavour saw in the new press law another opportunity for action, and at once took steps to found a newspaper. But at the outset he had fresh evidence of his unpopularity, as Castelli thus relates: "I had been invited by Count Cavour to take part in the editorial management; meetings of the principal subscribers and shareholders were held at Cavour's house, when, in one of these reunions, after long and complicated discussions, I perceived that all those in attendance had gone out one after the other,

³⁶ *Lettere*, I, 384-87; Oct., 1847.

³⁷ Cappelletti: *Storia di Carlo Alberto* (Rome, 1891), 315. See A. Manno's *Aneddoti Documentati sulla Censura in Piemonte* (Turin, 1906) for an exhaustive study of the censorship.

and that only Cavour and Balbo remained. Not knowing what to say to such a desertion, while the two leaders were trying with much heat to understand the fact, and were protesting that even alone they would publish the paper, I had, so to speak, mechanically approached the door, when Cavour came to me in haste, and grasping my hand with much emotion said, 'Do you too abandon me? Stay, I will prove to you that I do not deserve the reputation they have given me.' I returned, stirred to the bottom of my soul, and from that day to the last moment of his life I did not quit him."³⁸

Other friends besides honest Castelli rallied round Cavour, and on December 15, 1847, the first number of their newspaper was issued. It had a prophetic name — *Il Risorgimento* ("The Resurrection"), the name by which history now designates the great struggle which culminated in the union and independence of Italy. Cesare Balbo, universally revered for his character, his literary attainments, and his moderation, presided over its management, but Cavour was its dominating spirit, and conducted its discussion of economic and foreign questions.³⁹ Its program, drawn up by Balbo, comprised independence, the union of princes and peoples, progress in the way of reforms, a league of Italian princes among themselves, and strong but orderly moderation.

Having reached the year 1848, in which Cavour was to pass from private citizenship into public life, let us pause a moment and sum up the essentials of his life as we have thus far beheld it. We have seen how early, though flung into a world in transition, he distinguished between the negative forces of a régime that was passing away, and the positive, life-bringing forces of the régime which was emerging from that dissolution. Having made his choice, he trod thenceforth on solid ground. All his faculties, all his hopes, all his ambition drove him irresistibly towards statesmanship as the field in which he could best serve his time. But fortune thwarted him; as if in caprice she withheld from him on whom she had showered every other qualification the final

³⁸ Castelli: *Cavour*, 7; see also *Lettere*, I, 435–37, for letter in which three years later Cavour expressed his gratitude to Castelli.

³⁹ *Lettere*, 77. Castelli, Santa Rosa, F. Galvagno, and E. Rignon were the other original directors.

gift of opportunity. But, though thwarted, Cavour was not disheartened. Denied the career of his preference, he accepted the next best, accepted it manfully, without sullenness or whimpering, and threw himself into it with his whole energy. And his reward was not merely to amass wealth: it was to gain from practical experience knowledge of the conditions of his own land — most necessary knowledge, which must precede any wise leadership in the impending revolution; for this was to be, as he foresaw, in its essence a social revolution. With all classes, from cabinet ministers to peasants, he had intimate contacts; and though the Government, in shutting him out from politics, thought it had rendered him harmless, he became inevitably an organ through which the new spirit pushed forward its regenerating work. He was among the first in Piedmont to use the instruments which that new spirit was forging for human progress: popular education, science, commercial enterprise, steam, railways, public discussion, journalism — he applied one after another of them, and watched them slowly operate changes compared with which the fitful explosions of conspirators made but a dent on water. His travels acquainted him with eminent men and the social situation in France, England, and Switzerland. Reading opened to him the ruling ideas of his age. Finally, that fifteen-year-long apprenticeship confirmed his character, making his self-reliance proof against rebuffs, enduing him with self-respect which neither misconstruction nor calumny could shake, and teaching him patience — the one virtue attainable by man which no gods can take away.

Looking backward, it is easy to see that in 1847 Cavour already possessed above all other Italians a statesman's equipment; but we must not forget that he had not then been tested as a statesman. He occupied no such conspicuous place in popular estimation, as we, enlightened by the sequel, know he was actually filling as a force in Italy's new life. Had he died before coming to power, only a few of his intimates would have understood the possibilities quenched by his death: the same would have been true of Cromwell or of Washington or of Bismarck, with the elements of whose various apprenticeships Cavour's early career has the likeness of kinship. When such men stride upon the scene and take almost at once the supreme command,

we are apt to imagine that they, like Adam, were born mature, and that a happy fortune has placed them today on the summit for which yesterday would have found them unprepared. But it is the privilege of history to take us into the studio where Destiny models the world's heroes; there to watch the statue in human form and heroic proportions grow as the block of marble wastes under the sculptor's incessant hewing; until at last it stands a masterpiece which the world has but to see in order to applaud. And the world, ignorant of the toil, imagines that such perfection was inevitable, was easy.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ For Cavour's life up to 1848 the main sources are Berti's two volumes; the letters, edited by Chiala, Bert, Nigra; La Rive's *Souvenirs*; and Massari's biography. As this chapter goes to press Professor Francesco Ruffini sends me advance sheets of the first part of *Giovinezza del Conte di Cavour*, which is to contain valuable inedited material. At the same time there comes *Cavour, 1810-1850* (Gotha : Perthes, 1911) — the first volume of a new German life by Walter Friedensburg, which promises to be an important contribution to Cavourian literature.

CHAPTER IV

THE YEAR OF REVOLUTION. 1848-1849

IN November, 1847, King Charles Albert went to pass several weeks in Genoa, where the people welcomed him with extraordinary enthusiasm. Gratitude for his recent concessions and a desire to propitiate him to concede still more, moved even the Genoese to applause. But the King, as if to show his indifference to popularity, attended mass at the Church of the Jesuits. Thenceforth the crowds never cheered him without adding, "Down with the Jesuits." For in that year of general awakening, a keen instinct, which has always asserted itself whenever men have made a collective effort for civil, religious, or intellectual reform, impelled the peoples of Europe to suppress the Jesuits as the first obstacles to progress. This instinct has controlled not only Protestants and Rationalists, but Catholics whose loyalty could never be doubted, popes and prelates not less than pious men and women whom the Church has enrolled among her saints.

In a letter to Madame de Circourt, who had sent him an eloquent apology of the Company of Jesus by Father de Ravignan,¹ Cavour himself passes this judgment on Jesuitism. "When he speaks of the disinterestedness of his Order, of its love of progress, of civilization, of the sciences, and even of liberty, I have only to cast my glance round me to recognize the vanity of his words. I wish, Madame, that I could take you for an instant into one of the colleges which the Jesuits direct in our country, that you might have a glimpse of their methods and their results. . . . They do better in France, in Switzerland, than with us. But why? Because in those countries, which are not under the yoke, they have to take precautions, to show consideration to the governments and the peoples. . . . If you wish to understand the real nature of the Order, it is not where they are on the defensive, where their position is precarious, that you must study them.

¹ De Ravignan: *De l'existence et de l'institut des Jésuites* (Paris, 1844).

They can be fully judged only there where, encountering no obstacle, they apply their rules logically and consistently. They have learned nothing, forgotten nothing: their spirit, their methods are unchanged. Woe to the country, woe to the class that should confide to them the exclusive education of youth! But for fortunate circumstances, which destroy in a man the lessons of his childhood, they would make in a century a bastard and brutalized race — like the *grandees* of Spain or the Neapolitan nobles; that is to say, something midway between man and brute. . . . In a country of knowledge and enlightenment they will always be forced to modify, to transform themselves: they will never acquire a real and durable empire either in the sphere of politics or in that of intelligence. I could wish, for humanity's sake, that we might treat with the Jesuits and concede to them, in lands from which they are still excluded, three, four, ten times more liberty than they grant the peoples they dominate." ²

In that autumn of 1847 few patriots indeed would have echoed Cavour's tolerant views on the Jesuits. Least of all should moderation be looked for among the ever turbulent Genoese who, throughout Charles Albert's stay, manifested their loyalty to him personally and their detestation of the Order whose existence in Piedmont cast doubt on his assumed patronage of reform. After he returned to Turin, the Genoese took no pains to mingle compliments with their curses. Early in January a crowd numbering four thousand collected before the Jesuit College and would have sacked it but for the appeal of several trusted citizens, who suggested that a deputation should at once lay before the King a petition for the expulsion of the Jesuits and for the formation of a Civic Guard.

The very evening when this deputation was expected at the capital, the leading journalists and other eminent citizens met in Hotel Europa to agree upon a policy which, while reconciling the Genoese and the Government, might prevent any backsliding towards reaction. Marquis Robert d'Azeglio presided. Valerio, Friend of the People and editor of the *Concordia*, thrust himself forward and proposed that the meeting should adopt the Genoese petition. They all, he said, had equally at heart the expulsion of

² Nigra, 51-53; C. to Mme. de Circourt, Feb. 15, 1844.

the Jesuits and the creation of a Civic Guard, which would be very useful in the approaching war with Austria. Angelo Brofferio, a Radical still more aggressive and certainly much abler than Valerio, spoke next, in the same vein. Then Cavour followed. The tumult in Genoa indicated, he said, that the reforms already granted were insufficient. He was quite ready to support the petition, but he believed that they should demand *more*. In any case the petition was illegal: if the King refused it, those who supported it would suffer as much disfavor as if they had asked for more; whereas, if he granted it, his very concession would corroborate their argument that the administration was fatally weak. To remedy this, Piedmont required a constitutional government, or at least a consultative body which would be strong because it represented the intelligent public opinion of the country. Given such a body, and the Civic Guard, the expulsion of the Jesuits, and much else would come to pass naturally. "I propose," he concluded, "that we demand the Constitution."

As Valerio listened, he saw that his occupation would be gone, that ridicule would pursue him, if Cavour's motion prevailed. How could Caius Gracchus explain to Demos that it was not himself, but the man whom he had branded as aristocrat, grinding monopolist, counterfeit Liberal, who now dared to make the most radical demand? When Cavour sat down, therefore, Valerio jumped up and vehemently opposed the plan. It was untimely — it had not been sanctioned by popular vote — it might so exasperate the King that he would refuse even the two simple requests of the Genoese — it was wise to go slow — it was unfair to force on the meeting, called for a definite purpose, matters of a different scope. Valerio's colleagues of the *Concordia* agreed with him; but Brofferio declared that he would always support those who asked for more rather than less. The great majority also sided with Cavour, and having passed a resolution embodying his proposition, adjourned to confer with the Genoese deputation. The next day another meeting was held at Marquis d'Azeglio's house, but the Valerians again broke in upon deliberations otherwise harmonious.³

³ *Lettere*, I, 78-84. *La Rive*, 180-83. *Predari*, chap. 17. *Tavallini*, I, 51-52. *Massari: Cavour*, 52.

Beaten on their own ground, the Valerians covered their retreat by pouring into the ears of the people fresh insinuations against Cavour. They hinted that his demand for a constitution could be only a subterfuge. He was scheming for a constitution after the English pattern, wholly in the interest of the aristocracy. For the present, the popular movement would enjoy more liberty if it were unencumbered by any constitution. Above all, no true friend of the people could do better than to oppose every measure, however alluring, which the wily "My Lord Camillo" advocated. At the same time other enemies — or were they the same speaking a different voice? — circulated the report that the meetings had been held to organize a rebellion. Finding themselves thus traduced, the Cavourians drew up a letter to the King in which they accurately related their proceedings, and this letter, for lack of official intermediary, they sent to him through the post-office. Charles Albert read it without dissatisfaction, but his censors prohibited its publication in Piedmont.⁴

Nothing could be more fitting than that he who was to head the resurrection of Italy by constitutional methods should be the first publicly to demand a constitution. By his practical audacity he nonplussed the theoretical Radicals, who posed as the sole guardians of progress and taunted him with ignoble moderation. In the *Risorgimento* he kept reiterating his demand. Whatever the people had thus far won might easily be withdrawn, since mere concession depended on the royal pleasure. Were Charles Albert, whose health was bad, to die, what guarantee had Piedmont that his successor would respect his acts — nay, that he might not himself at any moment revoke them? Cavour saw that only by planting Liberal institutions in the organic law of the State, could they be set beyond reach of royal ambition, passion, or caprice. Charles Albert shrank from the very thought of a constitution: not because he wished to abuse his autocratic power, but because he believed autocracy to be a trust imposed on him by God, and that in giving it up he would betray his trust. Long before he came to the throne, he signed a pledge never to alter the fundamental law of Piedmont.

⁴ Text in Predari, 250-57; it was printed by Tuscan and Roman newspapers. The signers were C. Cavour (*Risorgimento*), Giacomo Durando (*Opinione*), Angelo Brofferio (*Messaggere Torinese*), Francesco Predari (*Antologia Italiana*).

A king so scrupulous was hard to deal with. But events swept on, heedless of his scruples. The popular tide, rising in all parts of Italy, threatened to engulf the princes who resisted it. The Romans, to whom the Pope had granted a Consulta, were already clamoring for a Parliament. On January 29 the King of Naples, terror-stricken by the successful revolt of his subjects, proclaimed a constitution. Two days later, the Grand Duke of Tuscany announced that he would immediately introduce reforms. Charles Albert at last perceived that he too must yield or perish. His religious qualms having been quieted by an archbishop, and his political doubts solved by his most loyal advisers, he issued on February 8 a proclamation which stated that as soon as possible he would frame and promulgate a constitution. On March 4 this instrument was published. It provided for a Senate, whose members, appointed by the King, held office for life, and for a Chamber of Deputies, to be elected by duly qualified voters. In all essentials it opened the way to political freedom.

To describe the rejoicings of those weeks the historian must needs dip his brush in colors beside whose metallic intensity the rainbow's tints look pale. The whole Italian people united in jubilation. They had won, and, except in Sicily, they had won without violence, the boon for which, as for the consummation of earthly bliss, during months and years they had prayed. Few indeed could realize that in securing free government they were but entering upon greater responsibilities. The many regarded the Constitution as a talisman — as the philosopher's stone, or the elixir of life — possessing virtue to satisfy all desires. To their inexperience, the very word had magic in it, to exorcise evils. Thus does destiny shed an irresistible glamour round those ideals which it intends mankind shall strive for. Romancers conclude when, after unraveling a long tale of accidents, disappointments, and adventures, they have successfully brought their hero and heroine to the altar — as if the dramatic interest of life ceased with wedlock. For a brief moment in 1848, it seemed as if the Italians expected that, having celebrated the espousal of People and Constitution, they were to enjoy a future of unbroken happiness. "We have already cheered all we could cheer, and sung likewise, and our voices are frightfully hoarse," wrote

the shrewd Marchioness d'Azeglio. "I do not know what will be invented to manifest our joy." ⁵

Emancipation made even the sober-minded Turinese fertile in expressing their exultation. They arranged for February 27 such a festival as that usually sombre city had never witnessed. From dawn on that day the Parade Ground began to fill with crowds, which at the appointed hour were marshaled in a procession. At their head rode Robert d'Azeglio, respected by all classes and beloved by most. The revelers marched ten abreast, two files to a platoon, each platoon commanded by a captain. Every city of Piedmont had its fifties or its hundreds in line. Each guild, each profession, each division of laborers and peasants contributed its band of enthusiastic representatives. As the column moved southward, the vanguard sang Mameli's patriotic hymn, "Brothers of Italy," which one by one the sections took up when their order came to fall in. So great was the concourse that the head of the column had reached the Church of the Great Mother of God before the rearward detachments were quitting the Parade Ground. In front of the church, an altar had been erected, and there the *Te Deum* was celebrated. Then the procession turned back into the city, across the bridge, and up the broad Via di Po. Multitudes thronged the porticoes, and at every window and balcony up to the very roofs on either side of the street were groups of gaily dressed women and children. The red-white-and-green banners of Italy, the blue banners of Savoy, hung in festoons from balcony to balcony, or waved above the heads of the marching host.

Even a stranger, viewing that celebration from some point of vantage and recking little of its import, must have been unceasingly delighted by its varied picturesqueness: for many of the marchers still wore the traditional dress of their trade or order or province; the knee-breeches and buckled shoes and queues of the older generation were still conspicuous among the monotonous coats and trousers of the younger. But few indeed of these spectators looked merely at the picturesqueness of the pageant: to nearly all it seemed as if the history and hopes of their race were passing visibly before them. A great car (*carroccio*), drawn by caparisoned oxen, bore the warriors in armor, the trumpeters,

⁵ C. d'Azeglio, 194.

the hermit and the bell, of medieval times, and from its tall mast hung a flag whose streamers swept the ground. Here floated the gonfalon of Genoa, a reminder of the glories of that republic. There marched six hundred Waldenses, just admitted to religious freedom, after a persecution which had tormented their clan for centuries. Great was the excitement caused by a group of careworn men, bearing a flag with the dates 1821-1831-1833: these were the survivors of the patriots who had been driven into exile after the upheavals of those years, and whom a recent amnesty restored to their home. And now appears a detachment of men clad in black; they carry no flag; they neither cheer nor smile; at sight of them the crowds pause in their acclamations and pay by their silence a tribute to brothers in distress — to Lombards and Venetians, whose presence makes a tragic background for the otherwise festal scene. Now they have passed, and other divisions, provoking fresh gayety, follow. University students, actors, sailors, mountaineers, magistrates, syndics of towns near and remote, on they sweep, rank after rank, impelled by a common exhilaration.

Of all the fifty thousand processioners, the little group of two-score journalists probably attracted least attention by any strangeness of garb: and yet that was precisely the group whose very existence would most have surprised a looker-on of an earlier age. To him the guilds and professions and provincial delegations would have been familiar, but not those journalists, who were the outgrowth of modern conditions and best typified the new epoch. In this group we recognize several men whose names were already known to newspaper readers, and others destined to become still more distinguished than they. Brofferio and Valerio — the Democratic Castor and Pollux — acknowledge many a salute from admiring bystanders. Pinelli and Durando, too, lack not applause. But we hear no hand-clapping, no hurrahs for the short, stout editor who walks beside Torelli, and sets his companions in a roar by some satirical sally whenever there is a pause in the march. He stands a little below middle stature; his complexion is fresh, almost rosy, his hair blond, his eyes blue verging on gray, the lids pursed after the habit of the near-sighted; his mobile mouth quickly loses its seriousness as he utters some jest, half-playful, half-sarcastic; his chin has that massive-

ness which we associate with a strong will. When he lifts his hat, we see a large, compact, well-formed head, and the full expanse of his commanding brow. His gold-rimmed spectacles give him a professorial air. He has a habit, due partly to near-sightedness and partly to intellectual vigor, of fixing his eyes on an object as if he meant to pierce it through and through. This is Cavour. He and Pinelli, equally unendowed by nature with a musical ear, are doing their best to add sound, if not melody, to the singing of the national hymn. The carriers of wine-kegs, who precede the journalists, and the wood-carvers, who follow, surpass them as easily in singing as in grave deportment. "We are no better than so many dogs," says Cavour to Torelli; and they laugh over the queer disposition which has wedged the representatives of the press between the wood-carvers and the keg-carriers.⁶

And now the first files of the column have reached the Castle Square, at one corner of which Charles Albert on horseback, attended by his sons, waits to review the procession. The Queen looks down from the Balcony of Pilate opposite. The windows of the Royal Palace, of Palazzo Madama, and of the other buildings in the Square, are thronged and decorated. Charles Albert alone of all that exultant host seems, as Brofferio remarks, out of tune. His white hair and moustache, his pallid cheeks and sunken eyes, his livid lips, his emaciated form, are a reminder of the vanity of human pomps at this very moment when Piedmont is celebrating her national joy with all the pomp she can. For five hours the King receives the salutations of his subjects, almost as rigidly as a statue might. Then the great multitude disbands and disperses. When night falls, the chief streets shine with innumerable lights, and the festivities continue until far on towards morning. Such the welcome the Piedmontese give their long-sought, late-found goddess, Liberty: nor do they, in exulting over their own happiness, forget their still-unblest Italian brothers. The pageant, what is it but the symbol of Italian union and brotherhood? ⁷

Before the festival ended, news came to sober the few who at once understood its significance: on February 24, Paris had revolted and dethroned Louis Philippe! A revolution in France,

⁶ Castelli: *Cavour*, 11. Torelli, chap. 5.

⁷ Brofferio, pt. III, 34-41. C. d'Azeglio, 201-03. *Lettere*, l. c.

■ Cavour foresaw and as the sequel proved, must seriously buffet, perhaps wreck, the political movement which Italy had just launched so successfully. To France the Italians had long looked for initiative: and now French initiative was likely to mean the violence and haste characteristic of the revolutionists on the Seine; it might mean Republicanism, Communism, the triumph of doctrines which would alarm the Italian princes, who had required the strongest pressure before conceding the most moderate reforms. Had the Monarchy been undisturbed in France, although it might have refused active help to the Italians in their coming struggle, it would have stood for order: the Republic, uncertain and agitated, set an example which agitators in Italy were not slow to follow.

More than one Italian ruler, on hearing the tidings from France, congratulated himself on having prudently yielded in time to save his throne. To Charles Albert, however, such thoughts could not be imputed; as he would have abdicated rather than betray his royal trust, so now, having consented to the New Régime, he proceeded to support it honestly. By appointing Cesare Balbo president of his first constitutional Cabinet,⁸ he left no doubt of his sincerity. Balbo, although not an old man,⁹ had for years been regarded as the patriarch of Piedmontese letters. He came of an ancient, honored family, and therefore, was acceptable to the aristocracy; being more than nominally a Catholic, he enjoyed the confidence of the Clericals; he was the author of *The Hopes of Italy*, which rendered his patriotism unassailable; better than all, his personal character had that fleckless purity which even enemies acknowledge. A moderate, learned man, never a courtier to king or people, but possibly too old a teacher to be willing to sit as pupil to Experience, a safe tillerman for a quiet voyage — he was one of those champions of right reason and temperate counsels to whom sovereigns who have just renounced Absolutism instinctively turn.

If the problem before Piedmont had remained simple, if she had been permitted to devote herself solely to the application of Liberal principles to every part of her civic life, to learn the rudi-

■ The Cabinet took office March 16, 1848. Balbo was president, Ricci, minister of the interior, Pareto, of foreign affairs, Revel, of finance, Des Ambrois, of public works, Sclopis, of grace and justice, Boncompagni, of public instruction, Franzini, of war.

⁹ Balbo was born in 1789.

ments of parliamentary practice, to establish a wise system of public education, to reform her commercial laws, to frame uniform codes of civil and criminal procedure, to set moving the hundred mechanical inventions by which the material progress of France and England was driving ahead — had she been able, in short, to transform herself gradually from 18th-century to modern conditions, she would have had a sufficient task. Hercules performed his twelve labors one by one. But the Piedmontese, and all other European peoples, in that year of revolution, were confronted by a dozen labors simultaneously; it allowed no academic leisure for doctrinaires to solve their problems in; it mocked at parliaments, by seeming to favor their endless loquacity, while it left the decision of great causes to be fought out on the battlefield. In Italy, the rapid attainment of political freedom hurried forward the question of independence. Lombardy and Venetia must be free, Austria must be expelled, before the Italians could be sure of keeping what they had already gained. From the end of February, the war spirit ran high, but it had not yet become uncontrollable, when, on March 18, the Milanese revolted. Five days earlier a revolution had exploded at Vienna, Chancellor Metternich was chased into hiding, Hungary had risen, the Hapsburg Empire seemed about to fall asunder. Every post brought tidings that were as a torch to tinder throughout Italy: the Milanese were not only holding their own, they were actually chasing Radetzky's veterans before them; the Lombard cities were sending bands of patriotic volunteers to the capital; Venice too had shaken off the Austrian yoke; the Liberals were triumphant in Germany; Austria was indubitably going to pieces.

At Turin these tidings caused the wildest excitement among the people, the gravest concern in the Palace. The populace clamored for war; Charles Albert and his ministers hesitated. The King sincerely desired to rid Italy of her oppressors, and deep in his heart he had long hoped to be the champion of Italian independence. He inherited the ambition and the soldierly instincts of his race. But he had also an inveterate horror of revolutions with a republican bias, and the news that came from Lombardy was tinged with republicanism. At the same time, the British Minister was warning him to remain neutral unless

he wished to incur the displeasure of Lord Palmerston, who had thrown the official influence of England on the side of Austria. To stand still, to take time to weigh chances — Charles Albert could do neither. Already his subjects were trooping by hundreds across the frontiers to aid their Lombard brothers. If he denied the great call of patriotism, his enraged people might sweep him away as unworthy; if he gave the word to advance, a single lost battle might uncrown him and swamp his kingdom.

In the *Risorgimento* of March 23, Cavour gave the Government a strong man's advice. "The supreme hour of the Piedmontese Monarchy has struck," he wrote: "the hour of strong resolves, the hour on which hang the fate of empires and the lot of peoples. In the presence of the events of Lombardy and Venice, hesitation, doubts, delays are no longer possible; they would be the most disastrous of policies. We, men of cold mind, wont to listen far more to the dictates of reason than to the impulses of the heart, after having closely pondered all our words, must in conscience declare: One way alone lies open to the nation, to the Government, to the King. War! War immediate, without delays. . . . We are in such a situation that audacity is the true prudence, temerity is wiser than caution. . . . We repeat — in the actual crisis there is but one policy, not the policy of the Louis Philippes and the Guizots, but the policy of the Fredericks, of the Napoleons, of the Charles Emanuels. The grand policy, that of daring resolves."

To those who urged that time was needed to put the army on a war footing, Cavour replied that the moral effect would be attained if a corps of only five thousand men marched at once. "Woe to us," he exclaimed, "if, to augment our preparations, we should arrive too late! Woe to us if, when we shall be on the point of crossing the Ticino, we receive news of the fall of the Queen of Lombardy." And, indeed, he argued, since war had virtually begun between Piedmont and the Austrians, it followed that if Austria succeeded in regaining her power at home, she would inevitably wreak vengeance on the Piedmontese. As to the protests of England, to heed them would be baseness — "a wretched policy which, without screening us from the dangers that threaten, would cover the nation with ignominy, and perhaps cause the ancient throne of the Savoy Monarchy to crum-

ble amid the indignation of an infuriated people. . . . We have never shared the illusions of some of our countrymen who for several months past regard England as the future liberator of Italy." He insisted that the statesmen of Britain would never consent to a war which had for its aim the crushing-out of liberty and the restoration of Austrian despotism. If England did that, "a tremendous coalition would be formed against her, not of princes, as under Napoleon, but of peoples. And there would be no more peace in the world until the power of a people which had betrayed the cause of humanity, had been destroyed." ¹⁰

When "men of cold mind" spoke thus, the Government could dally no longer. That same afternoon a royal proclamation announced that the King would at once lead the armies of Piedmont to the rescue of the Milanese. Well had it been for future harmony in that war of independence, if he had so decided in time to take an active part in liberating Milan. On March 23, the Milanese, after their five glorious days, saw Radetzky's beaten regiments retreat eastward; when the Piedmontese entered the city, what claim could they bring forward to share either in the gratitude of the Lombards, or in the subsequent disposition of Lombardy? For a brief season, however, the evil consequences of this delay did not appear. All Italy celebrated the advent of Independence as lustily as it had welcomed Liberty. The Pope blessed the Roman volunteers gaily setting forth on the patriotic crusade. The King of Naples sent several regiments of his regular army. The Grand Duke of Tuscany ordered his troops northward, and pledged his utmost support to the holy cause. From all quarters volunteers swarmed to the front, and in that year volunteers were popularly esteemed superior to veteran regulars. Radetzky, at bay, had fortified himself in the Quadrilateral; unless he were reinforced, which the Italians regarded as most unlikely, what could save him? February witnessed the coming of Liberty, March ushered in Independence, April brought Unity — three avatars in as many months! Verily, the age of miracles was not past; or was this but mirage, hallucination, self-deception, on a national scale?

Blessed is fact, divine is reality; convention may disguise them in times of ignoble calm, but in times of stress they reveal

¹⁰ *Scritti*, I, 127-83.

themselves in unmistakable clearness. Put to the test of fact, how genuine was the April Unity of the Italians? That they honestly supposed they desired unification was indisputable; that they rushed to the Lombard camps proved that they had courage equal to their desires; but they lacked the one thing indispensable, they lacked collective forbearance. Though fully agreed on a common end, they fell out over the means to that end. So soldiers, who have stood side by side for life and death in a dozen campaigns, may quarrel over a straw. In those weeks when independence seemed assured, the Italians discussed their political future. Such discussion was like digging up a forgotten graveyard where victims of the plague had been buried centuries before. Municipal, provincial, dynastic ambitions reasserted themselves, and jostled the theories of latter-day doctrinaires. Gioberti's scheme of a monarchical federation, headed by the Pope, looked seductive to one party; Mazzini's federal republic was the least that another would accept. The fate of Lombardy and Venetia was the real bone of contention, since the union of those great provinces to Piedmont would give Charles Albert, as sovereign of ten millions of Italians, a dangerous preëminence in Italy. 'Under the plea of expelling Austria, we shall have been duped into creating a too formidable rival. Italian unity, so captivating in theory, means being swallowed up by Piedmont. Are we simpletons?' Thus the other Italian princes reasoned, not illogically. From the opposite quarter came equally trenchant objections. The Lombards and Venetians had each freed themselves by their own energy; they claimed the right, therefore, to choose their own government. In both provinces a considerable faction desired autonomy; Venice had already established a republic; in Milan some of the ablest leaders were Republicans. They too were asking themselves whether they had plotted and dared and conquered merely to aggrandize Charles Albert. They too protested their devotion to unity as an ideal, while they recoiled from it as from an obligation to surrender principles which they held still more sacred.

The first defection came from Rome. On April 29, Pope Pius IX announced that, as Vicar of the Prince of Peace, he could not suffer his soldiers to engage in war against a friendly Catholic Power. He had sent them to the frontier to repel a pos-

sible attack on his territory, and not to take the offensive against his cherished spiritual son, the Emperor of Austria. His Liberal ministers labored with him, but finding him obdurate, they strove to soften the shock of his decision; but his apostasy could not be explained away. For twenty months the Italians had used Pius as a stalking-horse. Construing his concessions far more broadly than he intended, and saluting him as a pioneer, they had lured one reluctant ruler after another into the path of reforms; and as long as they could lend any semblance of truth to the fiction that Pius sympathized with the Italian cause, they might hope to calm the fears of conservative Europe and to persuade each other that all were harmonious. But now he repudiated them. The next backslider was the King of Naples. Cowardice led him to grant a constitution; cowardice made him feign devotion to the National Cause; and now, having rid himself by a counter-revolution of his Liberal advisers, he betrayed both the Constitution and the patriotic war. (May 15.) His perfidy emphasized the sad fact that the Italian movement had ceased to be national. Had Ferdinand sent to Lombardy the forty thousand troops he promised, Radetzky might indeed have been beaten: but faithlessness was to be expected of one whose father and grandfather had shown that oaths were an easy device by which kings may escape from the wrath of their subjects. And after all, what would it profit Ferdinand to help Charles Albert to a larger kingdom?

Meanwhile Piedmont briskly shouldered her double task of bearing the brunt of war in the field and of organizing Liberal institutions at home. Her army outnumbered the Austrian, and in the first engagements, Fortune — as if to beguile her to overconfidence — gave her the victory. Even after Radetzky took refuge in the four strongholds, the Piedmontese needed only to close the valley of Trent and to guard the frontiers of Venetia in order to starve him out. But neither Charles Albert nor his generals possessed military genius. Instead of pressing forward after their early advantages, they trusted, like second-rate commanders, to regular preparations rather than to dispatch, and they could congratulate themselves even in defeat on having obeyed the rules laid down in the manuals. They were deliberate but not persistent, cautious but not alert. After sitting down

before Peschiera, they changed their plan and moved against Mantua; and then, finding Mantua stubborn, they broke camp and returned to invest Peschiera. Besides the difficulty of handling their own army, they were embarrassed by the many thousands of volunteers, some of whom acted independently, while others resented being nominally directed from Piedmontese headquarters, and all were ill-disciplined. Only in courage was there no lack.

To organize an army is, admittedly, an arduous task: but to organize a government is a feat of which any novice thinks himself capable. In reality, efficient governments have hardly stood in the ratio of one to ten with efficient armies. What wonder, therefore, that the Piedmontese, having secured their Constitution, imagined that they could easily construct a parliament and set it going? Their Statute had been proclaimed on March 4; the Electoral Law, drafted by a commission of which Cavour was a member, was published on March 17; the general election was fixed for April 17 to 27, and the convening of Parliament for May 8. Parties did not yet exist. The electors, a small body of citizens whose right to the franchise depended on property or intellectual qualifications, had had no experience. The war, by projecting the supreme Italian Question into the foreground of Piedmontese politics, introduced complications which would at any time have been perplexing. Valerio and his friends, who regarded the Statute as too favorable to the Court and Aristocracy, seized the occasion to urge that the elections should be postponed until the Lombards and Venetians should formally vote to coalesce with Piedmont; then, they said, a Constituent Assembly could draw up a constitution satisfactory to all the members of the new State. Cavour combated this proposition, first, because he thought it imperative that Piedmont should at once secure whatever ballast the Parliament could give, and next because he had a wholesome aversion to constituent assemblies, which, in times of revolution, quickly fall a prey to extremists. He held also that the other provinces should come to Piedmont, ■ to the centre; not that Piedmont's fate should be determined by the vote of her neighbors.¹¹ This view prevailed. The elections passed off without incident, and most of the men who had

¹¹ *Scritti*, I, 102-106; *Risorgimento*, March 31, 1848.

recently become conspicuous in public affairs, together with many whose reputation had not radiated beyond their native district, were chosen. Cavour alone among the real leaders of public opinion was unsuccessful: a candidate in four places,¹² he was beaten in all. His enemies revived the old calumnies against him, and the voters refused to elect the "aristocrat masking as a Liberal," "the son of the detested ex-Vicario," the "rapacious monopolist." Although chagrined at a defeat compassed by such means, he practised his own maxim — "recriminations in politics are folly"¹³ — and girded himself to defend the cause of Moderation by his pen and by unofficial speech.

The Subalpine Parliament assembled in the Carignano Palace at Turin on May 8. The Chamber of Deputies being still in the hands of the carpenters, the members met in a hall on the ground floor where, lacking chairs and desks, they proceeded to organize. To expedite business, the ministers had drawn up rules based on the procedure of the French Chamber; this at once roused the indignation of certain patriots-in-little, who resented being asked to profit by the experience of any foreigners.¹⁴ Nevertheless, permanent officers were chosen and rules were adopted, in due course. The Speech from the Throne, read in the King's absence by Prince Eugene of Carignano, gave the signal for the first discussion. Instead of treating that purely formal utterance with appropriately formal dispatch, the deputies wasted nine days over it. A general loosening of tongues had to be tolerated in a body of men who were allowed for the first time to use that organ as a political instrument. Two thirds of the deputies were lawyers,¹⁵ which may have swelled the volume of talk. The Speech from the Throne, the verification of the credentials of members, and an attack on the character of the Senate, busied the Chamber during its first weeks, and these matters would have served as well as any as an exercise in parliamentary methods had Piedmont been at peace: but with war blazing in Lombardy and Venetia, and with all Italy in upheaval, discretion should have suggested the need of attending strictly to the vital business of solidifying constitutionalism throughout the country.

¹² The V Turin, Vercelli, Cigliano, and Monforte. ¹³ *Lettere*, I, 396-403.

¹⁴ Brofferio, I, 4.

¹⁵ Of 204 deputies, 144 were lawyers.

Although political parties had not yet taken distinct form, the Chamber contained the three elements out of which European parties usually develop. The Radicals on one extreme, the Conservatives on the other, and between them the Moderates, bent on holding a middle course, already existed in the utterances of their respective spokesmen. The Radical group at once took the lead in discussion, if not in wisdom, and among the Radicals Angelo Brofferio excelled. A man of various talents, a popular satirist, a lively though partisan historian, a slashing journalist, a quick-witted, aggressive speaker — Brofferio deserved the respect even of his antagonists: for he had never shrunk from persecution in the days of Absolutism, and he never truckled to power in the days of Liberty. A devout Democrat, he had the failing common to devotees: he thought his panacea could be applied immediately, and bring any people, no matter what their needs or conditions, to a state of political perfection. In times of orderly transition such men often render invaluable service by goading the sluggish majority forward, and by keeping ideals bright; in times of turmoil, however, they often work irreparable harm by unseasonably insisting on doctrines good in themselves but baneful when misused. We shall do Brofferio no injustice if we think of him throughout this history as of a man who carried everywhere with him a bottle labeled "Democracy," from which, on any occasion, he drew the cork and poured a copious dose as a cure for every local or chronic ill. In the first session of the Subalpine Parliament he boldly criticized the shortcomings of the Statute — and there were several — asserting that it had been framed solely in the interest of the privileged classes, who were at heart hoping for a favorable chance to abolish it. The only safety for popular government lay in completing the process of democratization. A statesman might have pleaded the unwisdom of beginning to amend the constitution before it had been tried: possibly, the very provisions which looked bad in theory might work well enough in practice; certainly, the abnormal conditions of Piedmont and Europe would affect the operation of any system; would it not be wiser, such a statesman might have asked, to wait for quiet to be restored, or at least until events had shown what was indeed wrong and how to correct it, before they began to remodel? Brofferio,

however, was not a statesman, and he regarded as cowards those who suggested making Time their ally, or Experience their tutor.

The progress of the National War threw on the legislators business which they eagerly accepted. The Subalpine Parliament, though less than a month old, had already a keen appetite for meddling in the conduct of the campaign. Deputies who would have hesitated to display their ignorance in any other matter, leaped as confidently into the criticism of strategy and logistics as if they had each won an Austerlitz. Such criticism would do no more harm than the froth it resembles, were it not that in constitutional countries the men who vent it have power, by their vote, actually to upset military operations. How can generals in the field give their whole attention to the enemy in front of them, when they must also constantly heed what amateur knights shout at them from far in the rear? And yet such legislative critics, who may not know a trigger from a touch-hole, plead patriotism, and not curiosity nor officiousness, to justify their meddling.

By early June the position of the National army might well excite anxiety; for the inadequacy of its leadership — inadequacy which a few small victories had obscured for a time — was now patent. The marshes of Mantua and the summer heats were beginning to decimate the regiments. Instead of being conquered, Radetzky, after cleverly effecting a junction with reinforcements, worsted the Italians at Vicenza, and was waiting to take the offensive whenever it suited him. Neither the Subalpine deputies nor the great mass of Northern Italians, who had been reckoning on the defeat of the Austrians as a foregone conclusion, would credit the first intimations of failure. A temporary reverse was not to be interpreted as an omen of disaster: but the deputies at least insisted on knowing the reason why an army which had only to reach out and crush Radetzky at its pleasure, should suffer even temporary reverses. They pressed the ministers for explanations, and the reticence of the ministers, who declared that the public discussion of military affairs would be most imprudent, simply whetted their urgency. If there were dangers lurking, the representatives of the people ought to know of them. If errors had been committed, those same representatives would advise how to correct them. Even when Prime Min-

ister Balbo privately laid before a few of the most persistent questioners the real condition of the army, and convinced them that to debate the matter in the Chamber would give important knowledge to the enemy and might fatally hamper the King, many of the patriots still regarded the ministerial silence with suspicion.

They chafed likewise at the reserve with which the Cabinet very properly veiled its tangled diplomatic negotiations. In April, Lamartine, the political will-o'-the-wisp who temporarily served as head of the French Republic, spoke friendly words about Italy which, in his youth, he had called the "land of the dead." Brofferio's party in Piedmont, and the Republicans elsewhere, wished to cement an alliance with France, and dreamed of the coming of a French army to hasten the expulsion of the Austrians; but to this scheme Charles Albert would not listen. He, the champion of Monarchy against Republicanism in Italy, could not ask French Republicans to aid him in his monarchical enterprise. Mindful that foreign interference had been for ten centuries the scourge of his country, he took for his motto, "Italy will work out her own salvation."¹⁶ If the French, having driven out the Austrians, decided to stay, who would drive out the French? On this point, therefore, the royal government and the Radicals clashed.

In spite of all their political and military difficulties, however, the upholders of the National Cause seemed to be gaining ground until far into June. By an overwhelming vote Lombardy and the Duchies established fusion with Piedmont. The Austrian Government, less stubborn than Radetzky, even offered to surrender all claims to Lombardy and to make peace; but Charles Albert chivalrously refused the offer, because, having pledged his honor to free both Lombardy and Venetia, he would not abandon the Venetians.

Although unsatisfied with many details, Cavour energetically supported Balbo's general policy during these fateful weeks: for he saw the drift towards revolution in the plausible agitations of the Radicals, and he believed that the constitutional monarchy must be preserved at all hazards, that the sincere concord of prince and people must not be broken. At a supplementary

" *L'Italia farà da sè.*"

election on June 26, four electoral colleges returned him to Parliament; ¹⁷ he took his seat as the representative of the First Turin college. On July 4 he began his parliamentary career by a speech on the proposed electoral laws for the new Kingdom of Upper Italy. Nature had given him none of the arts, nor did he ever learn the artifices of the orator. He experienced at first that difficulty in speaking his thoughts which he had had in writing them. Still, three qualities were his without which the most voluble orator is but as a tinkling cymbal or as sounding brass: he knew exactly what he wished to say; he knew how to say it in straightforward, logical fashion; and he could not be disconcerted. Though he might hesitate, he never became confused. And as he habitually addressed the reason rather than the emotions, he could afford to forego the satisfaction of immediate applause. If he consciously followed any models, they were the statesmen he had heard at Westminster, men like Peel and Grey and Cobden, who owed little to verbal embellishments. Oratory of this kind could not at once be rightly appraised in an assembly of Italians, whose love of rhetoric — the mark of three centuries of intellectual decadence — made them regard its absence as a proof of defective eloquence. They were men of adjectives; Cavour, like Dante, was a man of verbs and nouns. They had come to associate oratory with the vehement outbursts and ringing invectives of Brofferio, with Gioberti's fantasmagoria of phrases, with Valerio's ready sarcasm, with Rattazzi's brilliant parry-and-thrust: but Cavour, the novice, had only plain facts, put with a novice's hesitancy.

Many years later Brofferio described Cavour's entrance on the parliamentary scene in language still worth quoting. "His bulky person, his vulgar aspect, his ignoble gestures, his unpleasant voice were against him," says the Democratic historian, who wrote with the bitterness of one who had been worsted by the person he thus decries. "Of letters he had no trace; he was ignorant of the arts; devoid of all philosophy; no ray of poetry flashed in his soul; the scantiest instruction; words issued from his lips maimed, Frenchwise; his blunders were so numerous that to put him in accord with the Italian language would have seemed to everybody an impossible task." ¹⁸ Not a flattering portrait,

¹⁷ These were I Turin, I Iglesias, Monforte and Cigliano. ¹⁸ Brofferio, I, 146.

truly; and valuable now simply as it reveals Brofferio's lack of insight, and the prepossessions against which Cavour had to battle on his entrance to Parliament. Brofferio does not tell us that during the next thirteen years he and this man of vulgar aspect and "scantiest construction" were constantly opposed to each other in debate, and that although Brofferio displayed all those gifts of oratory which he taunted Cavour with wanting, Cavour's unlettered speech sufficed to win Parliament, Piedmont and Italy, Europe and the world, to his side. But Brofferio was not the first of the vanquished who have unwittingly given their own measure while intending to belittle their conquerors.

In July, 1848, however, the Piedmontese cared little whether Cavour sat in the Carignano Palace or not. Events had swept beyond the control of any mere deputy. In Piedmont there was rejoicing over union with Lombard brothers; on the Mincio, Radetzky was about to make that union as cheerless and barren as a deathbed marriage. The very day (July 28) that a new Cabinet,¹⁹ embracing representatives from the various sections of the enlarged State, took office, couriers brought word to Turin that Charles Albert had been terribly beaten at Custozza (July 25). Thereafter, for ten days, there was agonizing suspense. It was known that the shattered Piedmontese army was retreating westward, with the Austrians pressing hard upon its heels; but the hopeful still insisted that the King would turn and chastise his pursuers. Post followed post, but only to report fresh disaster. One day, the news came that Charles Albert, having rallied the remnant of his forces under the walls of Milan, had resolved to defend that city to the death; the next day's messengers announced that he found Milan untenable; their successors told of a truce and of the rising of the Milanese, not against the Austrians but against the unhappy king who had failed to protect them. And then the highroads of Piedmont were cumbered with home-faring regiments, accompanied by vast crowds of Lombard exiles, a long, melancholy procession, the reverse of that which, five months before, had sung hymns of joy in the streets of Turin.

Disaster smote too suddenly to be borne with submission. The people refused to accept the evident cause of defeat as the true one; they pried for hidden reasons; they listened to insinua-

¹⁹ Casati's.

tions against the loyalty of the King and his officers; they persuaded themselves that nothing less than wilful negligence, if not betrayal, could account for the swift collapse of an army which so recently seemed invincible. They harkened to agitators who told them that the Italian cause might still be retrieved if the Italian people would rise in their might. Charles Albert, these agitators said, had failed, as all the other princes had failed: it was time to have done with Princes and to trust in the collective strength of the People, that power which would neither betray itself nor flag nor yield. Who had secured constitutions up and down the Peninsula? The People. Who had chased the Austrians from Milan and Venice? Was it the Royal army with its boasted equipment? No, no — the undisciplined bands of the People; and these volunteers could again overwhelm Radetzky's veterans, before whom the Royal army had fled. No statement of facts could frustrate these plausible appeals. With Piedmont hurrying towards Democracy, the utmost that her sober men could do was to check the rate of the democratic velocity, to gain time, to prevent, if might be, a political revolution. Casati and his Fusionist Cabinet resigned; a Ministry presided over by Marquis Alfieri took office (Aug. 19).²⁰ Thoroughly Piedmontese in complexion,²¹ it was expected that its acts would commend themselves to Piedmontese patriotism. Having two generals among its members, it might be relied on to safeguard military interests and honor. It set honestly to work to persuade England and France to mediate with Austria, and it accepted the unpopular duty of raising funds. But it lacked aggressiveness, and, week by week, it saw its opponents gain ground.

At the head of these now towered Gioberti, whose immense popularity as the prophet of Italian independence had placed him in the dangerous position of a citizen above the law. Multitudes, who received his opinions as inspired, could not believe that the rhapsodist of patriotism was not the wisest guide in practical affairs. Gioberti declared that the first campaign had

²⁰ The Alfieri Cabinet: Alfieri, president, minister of agriculture; Pinelli, interior; Perrone, foreign affairs; O. di Revel, finance; Santa Rosa, public works; Merlo, justice and public instruction; Franzini, war. Boncompagni soon took the portfolio of public instruction, and Torelli that of agriculture.

²¹ Torelli was the only Lombard.

collapsed through the inefficiency of the Royalist management and not through the inherent superiority of the Austrians; accordingly, he threw his influence on the side of the Democratic agitators, denounced the proposed mediation as a means of preventing the Italians from retrieving their defeat, and arraigned the ministers for not breaking the armistice and renewing the war forthwith. He was not a Democrat after the fashion of Brofferio, who wished to substitute a republic for the monarchy; but he imagined that the masses could succeed where the classes had been beaten, and consequently he urged that Italy's redemption must be entrusted to the virtuous, the valiant, the invincible People. Not in a spirit of vulgar conceit, but with the sophistication of a man who does not pretend to hide his popularity from himself, Gioberti further intimated that he alone was capable of carrying out this scheme.

Against the Giobertian invectives the Cabinet could make no adequate defense. At best it had a thankless task, and could not avoid the odium begotten by circumstances and not by its own deeds. Marquis Alfieri retired from the premiership and was replaced by General Perrone (Oct. 11), a change which instead of silencing the enemy's fire merely turned their aim on a different target. In the Chamber, Cavour was the most vigorous of the Cabinet's supporters; but his support was sure to antagonize those who opposed on principle whatever he advocated. They did not let the old calumnies sleep: they dubbed him "Anglo-maniac," because he cited English precedents; they applied to him the still more damaging epithet "*Codino*," derived from the old-fashioned queue or pig-tail, and used metaphorically as the emblem of bigoted Clericals and Absolutists; they did not even refrain from casting suspicion on his patriotism. The bare fact was, however, that he who boldly urged the King to declare war, did all in his power to rouse public opinion to prosecute the war. With envy not less than pride he saw his young nephew depart for the field, and his patriotism exulted, though his grief was intense, when the news came that that nephew had died heroically in the battle of Goito.²² After Custozza, he was the first to

■ Castelli states that on going to Cavour's house when the news of Augusto's death came, he found him on the floor, weeping desperately. This was one of the few occasions on which Cavour gave vent to his naturally vehement emotion. Castelli: *Cavour*, 27.

enroll in the corps of volunteers who expected to be sent to the front. But when the armistice put an end to hostilities, and mediation seemed to offer a peace, which, while not gratifying, was not dishonorable, Cavour resisted the wild policy of the war party. He maintained that Piedmont could not hope to conquer if she undertook another campaign unaided; he did not believe that the miracles promised by the Democratic spokesmen could ever be wrought, but rather that the Democratic agitation would add political confusion to military disaster.

If argument, compounded of reason and put forth with subtle tact, could have checked the Opposition, Cavour's great speech of October 20, in which, while appearing to concede the probable necessity of renewing the war, he showed conclusively that the moment was inopportune, would have marked the turning-point in Piedmontese affairs in the autumn of 1848.²³ But the majority of the Chamber, and the most active if not the most numerous of the citizens of Piedmont, were in no state of mind to listen to reason. In December, Perrone's Cabinet having resigned, the Democratic Ministry, with Gioberti at its head, took office.²⁴ At last, the Prophet had his long-desired chance. With responsibility, however, the scales dropped from his eyes. He realized that the triumph of his Democratic colleagues would result in anarchy; that the renewal of hostilities, while the army was still unprepared, would precipitate a second, more terrible disaster; that the Reaction, already gaining ground in Europe, must be reckoned with by the Italians before they could permanently reorganize their affairs. Rome deserted by the Pope, Tuscany deserted by the Grand Duke, were in the hands of Republicans, who were urging the convening of an Italian Constituent Assembly, in which the Piedmontese should join. Although Brofferio and the Democrats were clamoring in their behalf, Gioberti hesitated. He sympathized with the Republicans at Rome and Florence in so far as they represented the National Cause, but he foresaw that those republics, however

²³ Victor Emanuel had the same opinion. Writing from Alessandria on Oct. 27, 1848, he says, "If we had now to enter Lombardy, we should be very weak, and easily beaten." Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, 18.

²⁴ Gioberti Cabinet: Gioberti, president, foreign affairs; Sineo, interior; Ricci, finance; Tecchio, public works; Rattazzi, justice; Cadorna, public instruction; Sonnaz, war; Buffa, agriculture.

gallantly they might struggle, lacked the elements of lasting strength. The Reactionary Powers would interfere, and effect a restoration in which not only the National Cause but also Liberal government would be crushed. But if there were to be intervention, Gioberti reasoned, it ought to be native rather than foreign. So he planned to send a Piedmontese corps to restore the Grand Duke. If he succeeded, he would rescue Liberalism from the fast encroaching Anarchy, bind the Grand Duke and possibly the Pope, whom Gioberti hoped also to restore, to Piedmont by ties of gratitude and common interest, and ward off a foreign invasion of Central Italy. A statesmanlike plan this, though much derided then and since: but when Gioberti announced it, there rose a cry of "Treachery!" The political clubs, the professional street-spouters, the Democratic newspapers, very logically hurled their wrath at the man whom they had put in office to carry out a Democratic program and who now proposed to strangle the new-born republics of Florence and Rome. His own Cabinet, disavowing complicity in his design, charged him with deceit. Amid a pelting of scorn and indignation from those who had recently idolized him as "Gioberti the Supreme," he withdrew from the Ministry (Feb. 19, 1849). Happier was the lot of ancient prophets who set the fulfilment of their predictions in a distant future: it is too much to require one man to be both seer and doer.

Gioberti's exit left the stage clear for the authentic Democrats to play the last act of their drama. After brief delay, they decided on war. Several circumstances seemed to favor the resumption of hostilities: the army had had time to recuperate; a Polish general, whose ability, being untried, was assumed to be Napoleonic, had been chosen to lead it; the Revolution in Hungary would at least prevent Austria from sending reinforcements to Radetzky, if it did not succeed in forcing her to withdraw troops from Northern Italy. The costliness of an armed truce was ruining Piedmont's finances; the prolonged suspense fostered political agitation, internal discords, and lawlessness, which threatened at any moment to culminate in revolution or civil war. The melancholy King, seared in spirit by the relentless insinuations against his good faith, wounded in pride at the remembrance of the lost campaign, sick of the ranting of dema-

gogues and of the mizmaze of diplomacy, grimly rejoiced at the prospect of freeing himself from all these by victory or by death in battle.

Even the conservative classes, whose numbers had grown in proportion to the vehemence of the Democratic minority, welcomed this desperate solution of the crisis. "I tell you," Cavour wrote to his friend De la Rue, "that I desire it as ■ means of making an end. If we have one success, I doubt not peace will be concluded. If we are beaten, the King will abdicate, we shall pay the expenses of the war, and all will be over. Of the two alternatives, either will cost us less than to remain in the condition we are in." ²⁵ On March 20 the campaign opened; on March 23 the Piedmontese army was routed by the Austrians at Novara, and that same evening Charles Albert abdicated in favor of his eldest son, Victor Emanuel, Duke of Savoy. The War of Independence, so gloriously embarked on just ■ year before, was shipwrecked.

²⁵ Berti, 275; C. to De la Rue, March 8, 1849.

CHAPTER V

SAVING LIBERTY IN PIEDMONT. 1849-1850

IN the drawing-room of the modest Bellini Palace at Novara, Charles Albert abdicated on the evening of the battle. All day long he had sought death at the most exposed parts of the field: he had lingered among the last within range of Austrian bullets, before permitting a flag of truce to be hoisted; and now, when his messengers, Generals Cadorna and Cossato, returned from the Austrian camp and reported that the enemy would consent to an armistice only on shameful terms, Charles Albert quickly decided to renounce the crown. With true Piedmontese devotion, his generals urged him to reconsider; but pointing to the Duke of Savoy, he bade them obey him as their king. A little later, having had a final, solemn interview with his sons, he departed into voluntary exile, to die after four months at Oporto of a broken heart. A strange, pathetic being, at odds with himself and his time; compounded of monkish asceticism and soldierly courage; autocratic, but irresolute; holding his honor dearer than his life, yet pursued through life by accusations of dishonor: such was Charles Albert, to whom when he had passed beyond reach of their praises or their blame, his countrymen gave the epithet "magnanimous."

The new king who, amid the grief of parting and the gloom of defeat, began his reign on that fearful night, was scarcely known to his people. He was already twenty-eight years old, but the punctilio of Charles Albert's court had kept Victor Emanuel, and his brother, Ferdinand, Duke of Genoa, in the background. He was bred a soldier, and during the recent campaigns he distinguished himself in many engagements; but few knew whether he had ability to govern, or what his intentions might be. His comrades recognized in him a bluff, straight-forward, almost jovial nature, which did not, however, suffer the least infringing on its dignity, and a mother-wit and common-sense, which often served him better than genius. In such sayings as "We must

blindly obey those who blindly command us," or, "Be a cavalry soldier in war-time if you want to live long," uttered during the blundering operations of the previous summer, he revealed that knack of mingling truth with irony which became one of his most popular traits.¹ There is a story that, at the close of the battle of Novara, when he saw his army hopelessly routed, he brandished his sword towards the Austrians, and said, "And yet, by God, Italy shall be!"

On the next morning, he gave proof of his instinct for doing the right thing, by seeking a personal interview with Radetzky. Pride might have held back another from this seeming humiliation: Victor Emanuel, zealous for his country's welfare, paid no heed to any motive save duty. Arriving at the Austrian headquarters, he found the troops drawn up there to salute him with royal pomp. When Radetzky, stiff in body with his eighty-three years but vigorous in mind, had been lifted from his horse, and had embraced the young king, they walked apart to confer. Their staffs, watching from a distance, tried to guess by their gestures the drift of their talk. The Marshal was evidently persistent, persuasive, bland: the King frequently shook his head, or emphatically waved his hand, as one who puts away a tempting offer. And indeed, for Victor Emanuel, that was a crisis of temptation. Radetzky, who despised Charles Albert as a traitor, felt a chivalrous sympathy for the young king, called to bear a calamity he had not occasioned. He remembered, too, that Victor Emanuel's mother and wife were Austrian princesses, and above all, that Austria desired to remove the certain source of future trouble in Italy by destroying constitutional government in Piedmont. So the old Marshal, after referring to the ruin which had overtaken Piedmont through the adoption of Liberalism, hinted that Austria would consent to make peace on very easy terms if the King would abandon the Constitution. This Victor Emanuel firmly refused: he would uphold the institutions which his father had sworn to maintain, and he asked only that Austria should demand no more than his shattered kingdom could fulfil; for, he intimated, demands too exorbitant would sweep away the last remaining guarantee of order, — the Monarchy, — and leave anarchists for Austria to reckon with.

¹ Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, II, 15.

Touched by the young king's resoluteness, Radetzky agreed to an armistice to be followed by a treaty of peace to be negotiated as soon as possible by representatives of both countries. On the King's word of honor, in the meanwhile, the carrying out of provisional conditions rested.

News of the collapse of the campaign came tardily to Turin, the direct line of communication being cut by the Austrian troops. On March 25, therefore, the capital was still in suspense as to the outcome of the cannonading reported to have been heard round Novara on the 23d. Then, on the 26th, the truth began to spread. The frenzy of desperation succeeded to the torture of suspense. Few would believe that Piedmont's army of 80,000 men could have been honestly overwhelmed in a single day: treachery alone could explain such a disaster. But there was no time now to fix the blame; for at any moment, the Austrian vanguard might appear on the eastern highroad. Turin must prepare to defend herself, every citizen must arm, the peasantry throughout the land must rise to a man. If Milan, just a year ago, had dislodged this truculent Radetzky, Turin could at least repel him from her gates. Later in the day, however, it was announced that, as a truce had been agreed upon, an Austrian invasion was not imminent. Popular anxiety accordingly shifted to another side. Would the new King restore absolute monarchy? Had he a secret understanding with Radetzky? Could he be expected to uphold sincerely the National Cause? So little was guessed of his political principles that the greatest distrust prevailed, and extremists in the clubs assumed that they must save the country from a predetermined reaction. Shortly before midnight, Victor Emanuel entered Turin, having chosen that time and given no warning, in order to avoid a hostile demonstration. The next day he issued a proclamation in which he called upon his subjects to give him their aid, affection, and confidence in his task of preserving the national honor unspotted, of restoring public credit, and of consolidating constitutional institutions. At the evening session of the Chamber on the 27th, Pinelli read the terms of the armistice. When the deputies heard that an Austrian corps was to occupy part of Piedmont and half of the fortress of Alessandria, they burst into wild cries of "Infamy!" "Treachery!" Pinelli, scarcely able to speak for emotion, tried

to soothe the frantic legislators by telling them that, hard though these conditions were, they were far lighter than those which Radetzky originally proposed.² In that first access of wrath, however, the Chamber would not be calmed. It sent a deputation to protest to the King, who left no doubt, in their minds at least, of his own loyalty, and of the impossibility of renewing the war if they rejected the armistice.

On March 29 in the Senate Chamber of Palazzo Madama he took oath to maintain the constitution. As he was mounting the staircase, a great block of stone fell from the ceiling above and grazed the shoulder of Colonel Menabrea at his side. With characteristic coolness Victor Emanuel said to Menabrea, "Do not mind that — we shall see plenty more." The King's bearing during these days of ordeal did much to reassure those who came near him. To Vimercati, on the night of Novara, he had said, "I shall preserve intact the institutions my father has given. I shall hold high and firm the tricolor flag, symbol of that Italian nationality which today has been beaten, but which will one day triumph. This triumph will be henceforth the aim of all my efforts."³

To the great body of the people of Piedmont, his taking the oath gave the pledge they craved; for to trust implicitly in the honor of their kings was part of the religion of the Piedmontese, and no king of the House of Savoy had betrayed that trust. Nevertheless, the sting of defeat tormented them too sorely to allow them to submit at once to the dictates of reason. As a man writhes in his pain, though well aware that writhing cannot relieve him, so the Piedmontese cast about for some means of escape from the vise in which fate held them. Politicians, some sincere, and some bent on destroying the Liberal Monarchy, encouraged them in their angry outbursts. The Radicals shouted that if the Democracy were in power it would prove invincible in Piedmont, as it was in Florence, in Rome, in Venice, and they instigated a rebellion in Genoa which soon passed beyond their control, and had to be quelled by La Marmora with blood and iron. Liberals of various shades wished to hunt down and punish the Clericals who had secretly circulated among the soldiers innuendoes against their generals' honesty and exhortations to

■ Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, II, 28.

■ Brofferio, II, 775 ff.

mutiny or desert. From the discussion of military might-have-beens, it was but a step to the discussion of the possibility of retrieving disaster. What could be easier than to crush Radetzky, if the Government would only proclaim a levy in mass? Did not the French in 1792 prove that foreign foes can never withstand collective popular wrath? How many, many weak heads that example of the French has intoxicated!

Over such a kingdom was Victor Emanuel called to reign. Civil war, anarchy, reaction, Radetzky, an empty treasury, an unnerved army, an incompetent administration, a chaotic Chamber, these the dangers which confronted him; these the instruments by which he must save Piedmont from destruction. His own loyalty to free government, his frankness and common sense, formed the nucleus of order: La Marmora's vigorous suppression of the revolt in Genoa gave the first sign that any vigor remained to the Government, and that one man dared to exercise it. The new ministry, though willing, lacked energy, public confidence, and an aggressive plan. Its president, General Delaunay, was a Savoyard gentleman, whose conservatism roused the suspicion of all who feared, or pretended to fear, a return to absolute monarchy. Its most conspicuous member, Pinelli, had more brilliance than audacity. Dabormida, the Minister of War, could be relied on to guard military interests in the negotiations with Austria. Gioberti, cured of his Democratic fever, sadder if not wiser, would, it was hoped, be able to secure by his eloquent appeals the protection of the French Republic. Nigra, the foremost banker of Turin, was expected to repair the shattered finances.⁴

A few weeks sufficed to show, however, that this Government could not resist the incessant heckling of the deputies, and carry through a definite policy. With that tact for opportuneness which distinguished him, Victor Emanuel summoned Massimo d'Azeglio to replace Delaunay as premier. Massimo d'Azeglio was one of the most remarkable Italians of the age. Nature gave him in generous measure that versatility which she

⁴ The Ministry of March 27, 1849, had Delaunay, president and foreign affairs; Pinelli, interior; Nigra, finance; Galvagno, public works and agriculture; Cristiani, grace and justice; Dabormida, war and navy. Gioberti, minister without portfolio, went on a special mission to Paris.

lavished on the men of the Italian Renaissance and of Elizabethan England, but which she seems to begrudge to moderns. Born an aristocrat, he early scandalized the prejudices of his caste and family, by earning his salt, and a little more, as a painter. For years he lived the Bohemian life of artists in Rome, painting pictures which — whatever we may now think of them — were eagerly bought by connoisseurs then. He had written two historical novels which surpassed in popularity all other Italian fiction except Manzoni's masterpiece. Everybody had read his political tracts. His acquaintance with men of all classes was wide and intimate. He commanded a regiment during the preceding summer, and still suffered from a wound received at Vicenza. In manners, he had the ease of the thoroughbred aristocrat, with vivacity and charm peculiar to himself. But the one quality which permeated his works, his conversation, his conduct, the quality which was indissolubly associated with his name and rendered him, at this crisis, invaluable, was his integrity. Whatever Massimo d'Azeglio might do, no one thought of impugning his motives: for he stood before Italy as another Bayard, gallant, chivalrous, spotless in honor, loyal to duty. If rectitude in king and prime minister could redeem Piedmont, her future was secure.

Victor Emanuel seems to have enjoyed D'Azeglio's companionship better than that of any other of his ministers. D'Azeglio relieved the tedium of business by his sparkling talk. He treated the King with perfect deference, yet with perfect frankness — a combination which Victor Emanuel prized most of all. Thus, at one of their early interviews D'Azeglio said to him, "There have been so few honest kings in history that it would be really fine to begin the series." "Am I to play the honest king?" Victor Emanuel asked, laughing. "Your Majesty has sworn faith to the Statute, and has had regard for Italy and not for Piedmont. Let us continue in this way to hold for certain that in this world king and humble citizen have only one word, and that they ought to abide by that." "Well," rejoined Victor Emanuel, "this seems to me an easy business."⁵ Thenceforth, the nickname *Re galantuomo* — "King Honest-Fellow," or "King-who-

⁵ Torelli: *Lettere di Massimo d'Azeglio*, Milan, 1870, pp. 289-90. Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, I, 107.

keeps-his-word" — became current, and to the end of his life Victor Emanuel acted in such wise as to deserve it.

D'Azeglio's chief task was to conclude a treaty of peace with Austria. He had to resist the exorbitant demands of the victors and to persuade the vanquished that the conditions he accepted were the best obtainable. He had to act alone, for Piedmont was without a friend in Europe. Gioberti's mission to Paris failed: Louis Napoleon would send an army to suppress the Roman Republic, but not a regiment to save Piedmont. In England, Lord Palmerston took the tone of a rigid schoolmaster towards a disobedient scholar. "You remember," he said to the Piedmontese ambassador, "how often I told you to resist the factions that were hurrying you into war. You did not care to heed my suggestions. . . . It is proper, therefore, that you suffer the consequences of your conduct."⁶ Only on one certainty could D'Azeglio count: Europe would not permit Austria to dismember Piedmont. Short of that, the little Subalpine Kingdom need not expect the Great Powers to interfere. During many weeks the negotiations dragged on at Milan. At first, the Austrian commissioners put forward excessive claims; for finding that Victor Emanuel could not be seduced from his constitutional pledges, they naturally desired to cripple Piedmont beyond the possibility of recuperation for many years. The firmness of the King's Government, however, caused Austria gradually to moderate her demands. 'If you force on us conditions which we cannot honorably accept, and which the country rejects, you overthrow the monarchy; do you prefer to deal with the party of anarchy rather than with the party of order?' Thus, in substance, argued the Piedmontese envoys; and since Austria knew that she ran a better chance of being paid her indemnity by the King's Government than by any other, she refrained from driving it to desperation. One by one the points in dispute were adjusted, until there remained only the settlement of the fate of those citizens of the provinces recently annexed to Piedmont who were once more, through the misfortune of war, Austrian subjects. Piedmont felt in honor bound to protect them from possible persecution. To abandon them would be not only shameful, but would deprive Piedmont of the right to stand, even in defeat,

⁶ *Stor. Doc.*, vi, 151; Bianchi's third chapter should be read.

as the leader of the National Cause. On her side, Austria declared with equal justice that she could not in honor consent to be dictated to by a beaten foe concerning her treatment of her own subjects. They were technically rebels, whom the Emperor might pardon if he chose, but his pardon must never appear to be wrung from him by Piedmont. With honor pitted against honor, an agreement seemed unattainable, until at last the Austrian negotiator announced that, although no mention of amnesty could be made in the treaty, he would promise orally that the Emperor would proclaim an amnesty as soon as the treaty had been signed.

On Victor Emanuel's accession, Parliament was at first prorogued and then dissolved. Deputies elected to support the Democratic ministry, which had hurled the country into the abyss of Novara, could not be asked to prop up the new cabinet, on which was laid the odious burden of atoning for their sins. The Chamber was therefore dissolved; but in the new elections of July 15, 1849, a majority of the irreconcilables was returned. When Parliament convened a fortnight later (July 30), they showed their "implacable and fierce" spirit, as Brofferio proudly called it, by choosing for President of the Chamber Marquis Pareto, who had been entangled in the Genoese rebellion and would have been banished but for the King's magnanimity. The persistence with which they harassed the Cabinet on every petty question foreshadowed their attitude when the great question of ratifying the peace with Austria was presented to them. The treaty, signed on August 6, restored the Piedmontese frontiers as laid down by the Congress of Vienna in 1814, and compelled Piedmont to pay a war indemnity of 75 million francs. Having put off action as long as they dared, the deputies on September 24 took up the treaty. Balbo proposed that the Chamber should approve it "without discussion, but with the protest of silence."⁷ There is a class of professional politicians, however, who believe that patriotism consists in their perpetually informing the world that they are patriots. Virtuous women long ago found it unnecessary to go about shouting "We are chaste"; honest men avoid wearing placards labeled "We do not steal"; but the professional patriot deems it treason to hide

⁷ Ricotti: *Cesare Balbo*, Florence, 1856, p. 284.

his light under a bushel. The Subalpine Chamber, being largely composed of gentry of this stamp, rejected Balbo's suggestion. Some declared that the King had acted tyrannically in signing the treaty before submitting it to Parliament; others pointed out that, since the Chamber alone could authorize appropriations or cession of territory, the terms which pledged Piedmont to pay a cash indemnity and to give up its recent provinces, were plainly unconstitutional; others again would have no peace ratified in which the status of emigrants from the Austrian provinces, and of those Italian subjects of Austria who had not emigrated, was not explicitly defined. Instead of closing a business distressing to all, in silence and dignity, there ensued a prolonged din in which the voices of the professional patriots filled the halls of the Carignano Palace. "Unable to overthrow us," writes D'Azeglio, "they wage on us a war of pin-pricks." "The Chamber," he adds, "represents neither the opinion of the country, nor the *possible*, from a general point of view." ■

Although the irreconcilables could not eject the Cabinet, they could and did protract the deadlock to the danger-point. They goaded the Ministers for assurance that they had not secretly agreed with Austria to smother freedom in Piedmont at the first favorable moment, and they insinuated that Pinelli, Minister of the Interior, was bent on a Cromwellian stroke, by which the Chamber should be subdued at the point of the bayonet, the Statute should be suspended, and the King left free to carry out dictatorially whatever policy he chose.⁹ Pinelli resigned, and Galvagno, a man less unpopular, took his place. On November 13, Buffa, one of the leaders of the Left Centre, moved that the ratification be accepted by the Chamber as an "accomplished fact." Cavour seconded him, although, he said, he should have preferred the adoption of Balbo's suggestion of acceptance by silence. Buffa's motion was lost, a majority of his own group voting against it. Three days later, Cadorna, likewise a member of the Left Centre, moved that, before approving the treaty, the Government should provide for the safety of the Lombards and Venetians. If carried, this motion would plunge the country further into irritating discussions, and postpone indefinitely the settlement of the great question

■ D'Azeglio: *Politique*, 66-67.

■ Brofferio, III, 168.

of peace, without which Piedmont could not begin to recover from her calamities. Cavour opposed Cadorna, and urged the need of mutual concessions. He summed up the situation in a single sentence: "This is not a question between the Ministry and us," he said. "The question of the treaty is a question between us and fate: and even if the present ministry did not exist and there were another chosen by whatever part of the Chamber, we should be equally forced to recognize this fatal law and to accept the treaty."¹⁰ But Cadorna's motion, put to a vote, passed by a majority of six — 72 to 66.

Here was a crisis full of peril. The King and Cabinet, and, as they believed, the country itself stood in hopeless antagonism to a majority of the legal representatives of the country. Without the support of the Chamber, no cabinet could proceed: but, as Cavour said, even a cabinet formed from the irreconcilable majority must ratify the treaty, or go under. D'Azeglio acted promptly: he again dissolved the Chamber and advised the King to issue a personal admonition to his subjects. In the proclamation dated at the royal château of Moncalieri, November 20, 1849, Victor Emanuel reproved the stubbornness of the Chamber, which made it impossible for him to maintain justice and liberty. He relied on the good sense of his people to choose proper deputies in the coming elections; "but if the country," he said boldly, "if the electors deny me their coöperation, not on me henceforth will fall the responsibility for the future; and in the disorders which might result therefrom, they could have no right to blame me, but themselves."¹¹ Despite the angry remonstrances of the party against which it was addressed, the proclamation did its work. Strictly constitutional it was not; but the common sense of the Piedmontese recognized this as one of those emergencies which no statute can provide for, and that the King's purpose was to save the constitution even though he resorted to means contrary to its letter. The elections on December 10 resulted in a complete victory for the Ministry, and on January 9, 1850, the new Chamber, almost without discussion, ratified the treaty by a vote of 112 to 17. Six members declined to vote. The best comment on this long and vain and perilous episode Brofferio

¹⁰ *Discorsi*, I, 215; Nov. 16, 1849.

¹¹ Text in Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, I, 91-93.

himself, the ablest of the irreconcilables, wrote years afterward in his history: "If the apparent consolation of patriotic inflexibility remained with the Opposition, the real merit of wise courage belonged to the Government party, which took wholly on itself the odious responsibility for a cruel but inevitable treaty with the eternal enemy of our country. Easy was it for Josti, for Radice, for all the others to utter blustering words and to refuse their vote: easy was it, because they all knew that the ratification of the treaty would not fail. But without this certainty, would they have spoken thus and voted thus? And thus voting, thus speaking, would they not have brought the land to a deeper abyss?"¹²

To issue from such agitation with the Statute un mutilated gave Piedmont a better outlook. Let us repeat, however, that it was her King and not her Parliament that rescued her Liberal institutions. During the first year of its existence, the stormy year of revolution, her Chamber took a quick leap to militant demagogism; during the nine months since Novara the demagogism of the Chamber, unchastened, sullen, and unrepentant, had not scrupled to force Piedmont to the verge of a precipice. What must the Piedmontese multitudes, who had no political education, think of constitutional government as thus exhibited to them? The staunchest believer in Liberal institutions could only plead that the times had been abnormal, and that, after all, the Constitution had survived the storm; he could but deplore the incompetence and the puerile bluster, the ineffectual passions and the factiousness which substituted clique for country; he could but hope that the system of government which his convictions sanctioned, might establish itself before new storms assailed it. Out of the ordeal there emerged one good of supreme importance: Victor Emanuel's honesty, his devotion to free government, had withstood the fiercest tests. Henceforth, he was the only Italian sovereign whom the Italians trusted: every other prince, from the Pope to the dukeling of Modena, tried by the revolution of 1848, had proved false to the National Cause. Even Charles Albert had been pursued by ungenerous suspicions. But Victor Emanuel frankly made the noble choice, and resolutely upheld it: that choice, that integrity

¹² Brofferio, III, 399.

of his, was the corner-stone on which Italian independence might be reared.

One other good, of immense consequence to Italy, was slowly preparing during these fiery months; a good not discovered then, but known and accurately valued now — the impression began to spread that Cavour might be used for the country's welfare. Defeated at the elections in November, 1848, by an amiable nonentity named Pansoya, in the *Risorgimento* and in private discussions he kept on battling for moderation. Exasperated rather than discouraged by the disasters which culminated at Novara, he wrote Madame de Circourt that "if my advice had been heeded, if I had held the reins of power, I would, without an effort of genius, have saved the country, and, at the present moment, have had the Italian flag floating on the Styrian Alps. But my friends joined with my enemies to keep me out of office." ¹³ A few weeks later, when D'Azeglio accepted the premiership, Cavour rejoiced, and professed satisfaction that he had not been asked to enter the Cabinet. His friends hint that he was disappointed, and indeed he may have been, for he had reached a position where he had a right to expect consideration. D'Azeglio, however, besides feeling little attraction for Cavour personally, regarded him as still too unpopular from his past reputation, and too pronounced in policy, to fit into a cabinet which hoped that its conciliatory purpose would not be mistaken for weakness. D'Azeglio himself was so straightforward that he imagined that the Opposition would immediately approve his plans. He soon learned that it requires something more than uprightness to make even the best of causes prevail.

Whatever Cavour felt, he loyally supported the D'Azeglio Cabinet. Today's battle was too absorbing to leave him leisure for regrets over yesterday's failure, or to heed the past at all except as a warning. "There is no need to lose courage," he wrote Salvagnoli, when the outlook was very dark; "so long as liberty exists in a corner of the Peninsula, there is no reason to despair of the future. So long as Piedmont can preserve her institutions unharmed by despotism and by anarchy, there will be a way to work effectively for the regeneration of the country." ¹⁴ Cavour declined the post of minister to England, privately

¹³ *Lettere*, I, 414; C. to Mme. de Circourt, April 26, 1849.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 417.

offered him in the summer of 1849, because he thought he could be more useful in Parliament.¹⁵ In the July election his Turin constituents returned him to the Chamber, where he sat with the Ministerial minority, spoke on the chief questions, and acquired more and more the authority, not yet formally acknowledged, of a leader. Instead of the hisses, groans, and uproar by which members of the Opposition and the public in the galleries formerly tried to drown his speeches, attentiveness, if not deference, now usually greeted him when he rose to speak. Those who followed only his voice in the tribune, could not guess the range of his indirect influence on the Government. Count Nigra, Minister of Finance, consulted him almost daily as to placing loans.¹⁶ It was his weight that made the friend of his youth, Santa Rosa, Minister of Commerce and Agriculture (Oct. 20). It was likewise his urgency that helped to secure the appointment, as Minister of Grace and Justice, of Count Siccardi, "a man of eminent talent. If courage does not fail him, he will be the most important member of the Ministry" ¹⁷ (Dec. 18).

Though Cavour chafed at the long postponement of his own hopes, he understood exactly the ticklish tenure of ministers in revolutionary times: for in the first eighteen months of Constitutionalism in Piedmont, he had seen eight premiers, and nearly sixty members of different cabinets. To take office was to put one's self in the pillory; yet ambition or a sense of duty made this sacrifice popular.

The approval of the treaty of peace cleared the field for dealing with internal questions which had been put off or neglected. The most momentous involved a conflict with the Roman Church, which presumed to ignore the Piedmontese Constitution in so far as that declared that, in civil concerns, all citizens were equal before the law. The Church denied the competence of the State to bring ecclesiastics within the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The State insisted that henceforth it could not tolerate two standards of justice; that priests, as citizens, must be governed by the same law which all other citizens obeyed; that for the State to permit a foreign power to exercise some of the functions which belonged to itself, would be tantamount to surren-

¹⁵ Bert, 315; C. to De la Rue, June 25, 1849.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, *passim*.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 364.

dering that authority on which all governments are based. The question was purely civil and political, but Rome, treating it as religious, declared that the Pope and not the King should decide it. Thus at the outset of Piedmont's task of regeneration she encountered the opposition of that Power which had during ten centuries kept Italy disunited, which since the sixteenth century had attempted to thwart every advance of civilization, and which now adopted, as a principle from which it would never recede, unyielding hostility to freedom, whether that freedom were political, or intellectual, or of the conscience.

A traditional Protestant usually dismisses this subject with an impatient reference to the errors, the superstitions, the medieval incongruities of the Romish faith or ceremonial. He assumes that a church which holds dogmas different from his own must as a matter of course be liable to corruption in all of its parts. He is still, though he often does not suspect it, too much of an antagonist, too conscious that Romanism is still a living rival of Protestantism, to take the broad view, the historic view, the view of sympathy rather than of antagonism. He can look at the religion of Buddha, or of Hellas, or of Mahomet, or of Japan, without a lurking feeling that here is a possible enemy of his own religion: he cannot so look at Romanism; the good which issues from it he regards as exceptional; the evil which it bears seems to him the legitimate fruit of the seed of error from which it grew. But we shall miss the significance of the warfare which little Piedmont now waged with Rome, if we shut ourselves up in such narrow assumptions as these. We must endeavor to grasp the vast design of the Roman Church in its entirety, if we would understand the motives which guided its rulers in combating the makers of modern Italy. We must realize that the quarrel was not merely between individuals over petty or transient ends, but between two irreconcilable, mutually destructive principles. As we watch the conflict, whether we side with the Pope or with the King, we shall not watch intelligently unless we see that each was right from his own point of view. We shall not judge intelligently until we admit that this is one of those causes to which absolute justice can no more be applied than to the antagonism of the seasons, or to youth and age, or to the fatal struggle among species in the animal kingdom.

Who shall describe in fitting words the ideal Church of Rome? — its venerableness from age and achievement, its adaptability to very different spiritual needs, its subtlety, its self-possession, its uncompromising rejection of doubt? It is to be conceived of not as a stupendous system imposed on Christendom by the masterfulness of a few men, but as the organism which grew from the fourth century to the sixteenth out of the hearts, freighted with hopes and incessant fears, of Western Europeans. Spiritual in its origin, it early became embodied in a visible institution, a hierarchy which, after the manner of institutions, had its own life, its own interests, irrespective of the religious purpose in which it originated. The qualities required of the men who controlled an institution made up of myriads of subalterns and millions of laymen, were very different from those which shone in the early apostles of Christianity. The high places in the hierarchy became at last the spoil of men of craft, audacity, ambition: and no wonder, for to be pope was to outrank all worldly princes, and to be cardinal was to be pope possibly, and the maker of popes certainly. After all, since the Church logically implied that the character of her individual priests and prelates could in nowise affect the truths which they administered, why should not a Borgia receive in Peter's Chair the adoration of the devout? Why should not a long line of pontiffs use their brief term of sovereignty to enrich their families, if not to extend the worldly domain of the Papacy? Their very nature deprived them of such salutary restraint as law and public opinion offer to all other mortals, even to despots: the Pope as head of the Church was infallible, opinions which clashed with his were heresy. And thus the Papacy, the most human of institutions, ran its course, clearly reflecting the immorality and the virtues of each age which it passed through, identifying its interests with those of the religion which it had been organized to serve, shrinking in territory and in prestige, yet abating none of its immense pretensions.

How could that religion, the spiritual nature of this stupendous organism, survive not only the inevitable changes of fifteen hundred years but the monstrous irreligion which had at one epoch or another marked the government of the Church which professed it? It survived because it was founded on the principle

of Authority. To obey that principle was the universal instinct of the men who flourished during the infancy of the Church; it is today the ruling instinct of a majority of the Western world. The early Christians were not critics; they wished to believe, and they believed voraciously. They were not critics, nor were their descendants, and after a millennium Catholics were still unconscious that the complicated system of sacraments, dogmas, and ceremonial which had grown out of and round the original kernel of Christ's teaching, had not existed from the days of Christ himself. Dante, the supreme product of Catholicism, questioned none of these things; it was the worldliness and vices of the hierarchy which he arraigned. Luther's protest against Papal corruption, which reached its lowest depths in his day, brought schism, the recognition that the individual conscience has rights, and the establishment of new churches. But while the Reformation was a great movement toward religious freedom, the churches into which it crystallized set up Authority anew, as the branches of the banyan strike down and take root in the soil which nourishes their parent stem, but are banyans still. So must every church do, which lays claim to be the sole, special confidant of God. Institution for institution, however, how parvenu and local and partial must any of these seem to the historic imagination which has grasped the scope in time and space of the Church of Rome! When Anglicanism or Scotch Calvinism or German Lutheranism proclaims "Thus saith the Lord," it cannot set vibrating those chords of venerableness and mystery, those associations which embrace not merely a single people, or a sect among a single people, but the collective religious experience of Western Europe from the time of Constantine to the time of Charles the Fifth: the Roman Bishop alone can do that.

Modern churches establish their validity on grounds satisfactory to their members, but since they date from an age in which criticism and liberty were beginning to undermine the Catholic principle of Authority, the authority to which they appeal cannot but differ from that principle which is the soul of Romanism and dates from an epoch when men never dreamed of questioning its supremacy. Time was when every department of life was organized on this same principle of Authority: then feudalism was the natural form of government; then knowledge

was not the result of observation and experiment, but the blind acceptance of the assertion of a few; then tradition, which is but another name for Authority, tyrannized over commerce and trade and social relations. Gradually, however, the opposing principle of Liberty has risen to be the dominant ideal of the Western world, and under its slow dissolving influence one after another of the old forms has disappeared. It was inevitable that the most deeply rooted of all the embodiments of Authority, the Catholic Church, — which had outlived its kindred, survived countless schisms, and seen nations and dynasties vanish before it as waves run their little race to the foot of the cliff and break and are done, — it was inevitable that this principle should close at last in a life-or-death struggle with its antagonist, Liberty.

The nineteenth century witnessed the opening of this campaign; it witnessed the apparent victory of Liberalism in partial engagements: but the conclusion lies far ahead. Liberty cannot completely triumph so long as men are born with a temperament which finds solace for its religious needs in the principle of Authority as taught by Rome. To imagine that this race will soon die out, is to ignore the present and the past. In the evolution of mankind, as in that of all animate nature, types so overlap that the appearance of the new type is not necessarily the signal for the immediate extinction of the old. Nay, it often happens that lower forms persist from age to age: their hold on life being tenacious in proportion as it is rudimentary, they survive with ease changes of climate and surroundings which kill the more highly developed organisms that require a very nice adjustment to outer conditions in order to exist at all. Unless we approach Roman Catholicism and the immemorial religions of Asia in this way, we shall never fathom, so far as the human mind can fathom, the deeps of history. Macaulay, for instance, contrasted in a brilliant passage the constant decadence of the Latin countries of Europe with the constant expansion of England, Holland, and Germany since the Reformation, and he explained it by pointing out that the former were Catholics and the latter Protestants. But this explanation illustrates the wrong way of approaching history, the way of the partisan and the controversialist. We may be very sure that it is not simply because the creed of Rome is false and the creed of Canterbury true, that

Spain sank and England has risen. Spain was rigidly Catholic when her empire touched its zenith; Venice was equally Catholic during her thousand years of splendor and during her decline. If we seek for causes, let us not begin by mistaking results for causes; let us not say of a people: Its religion differed from others, and therefore it perished. Were this all that the study of the past could teach us, we should be better employed blowing soap-bubbles. We must take the other way of approach, searching out not only the creed which men profess, but the spirit in which they live by it. We must watch the influence of racial temperament, always so much more determinant than mere professions. We must distinguish the real current of an epoch from its eddies and undertow. Doing this, we shall not attribute England's aggrandizement to her Protestantism alone, but we shall see that her Protestantism has been only one manifestation, and that by no means the chief, of the spirit which has been embodying itself through her during the past ten generations. Doing this again, we may hope to follow intelligently the contest between Italy, wakened from her long slumber, and Rome, inflexibly grounded on Authority.

The proposed reforms by which Piedmont first angered the Roman Curia were slight enough in themselves, but they involved the recognition by the Church of the supremacy of the State in all temporal matters. Early in 1850 a special commission laid before the Subalpine Chamber three bills, recommending (1) the abolition of ecclesiastical courts and immunities; (2) the diminution of holidays; (3) the suppression of mortmain, and the prohibition of ecclesiastical corporations to acquire real property by will without the consent of the State. From the secular point of view, each of these measures was indispensable, and none of them touched in the least the spiritual authority of the Church. For how could the State maintain a uniform system of justice, so long as the Church had courts in which ecclesiastics charged with civil crimes, or civilians who had cases against ecclesiastics, must be tried? How indeed could there be justice, so long as a murderer could seek asylum in a church, beyond reach of the civil authorities, and thence be allowed to escape? One of the curses of Piedmont was the innumerable holidays, appointed by the Church. How, therefore, could the

people be made industrious, if two or three times a week they were commanded by the Church to be idle, under threat of punishment? And finally, in proposing to curtail the immense possessions of the religious corporations, the State justified itself on the ground that those possessions were harmful to the public welfare, and incidentally to the interests of religion. The Church could reply, of course, that she was the only judge of fitness in this matter; she could intimate that the world would be better if every farthing of its treasure were given to her to spend: but how could the State command obedience from its other subjects, if it allowed its Clerical subjects to command it?

Constitutional government had hardly been organized in 1848, before Charles Albert's ministers made overtures to the Roman Curia for a readjustment of the Church and State to conform to the new ideas. But Pius IX would listen to no compromise. He had already been roused from his dream that Authority and Liberty could somehow flourish side by side, and that Liberty would politely give way whenever Authority spoke. Henceforth in all his transactions with the Italians, he refused to admit that the civil and political functions of government could be valid without the sanction of the Church. It mattered not at all that the reforms proposed by Piedmont had long since been accepted in other Catholic countries: the Pope and his advisers adopted the policy of conceding nothing, because they saw that the most innocent-seeming concession might loosen the first stone of their foundation. Authority must be accepted as absolute, or be meaningless.

In the spring of 1849 the Piedmontese Government, still desirous of conciliation, sent Count Balbo to Gaeta; but that pious Catholic could only report that the Pope had received him pleasantly, but had declined to negotiate. A few months later Count Siccardi went to Portici, where Pius was basking in the hospitality of King Bomba. Siccardi, too, was a loyal Catholic, as well as a learned jurisprudent; he, too, had courtesy shown to him personally — and nothing more. "The Holy Father," said Cardinal Antonelli to him, "is ready to go as far as the Devil's antechamber to please the King of Piedmont, but the chamber itself he really cannot enter."¹⁸

¹⁸ Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, I, 96.

Having failed in all efforts to reach an understanding through private messengers, D'Azeglio's Cabinet reluctantly brought the matter before Parliament, where Radicals and Moderates were proclaiming that the time had come for making Liberal institutions a reality. On March 5, 1850, a commission reported in favor of abolishing ecclesiastical courts and the right of asylum, of limiting the number of holidays, and of restricting the right of religious bodies to acquire real property.¹⁹ The Clerical deputies at once rose in protest. They were joined by several Moderate Liberals, like Revel and Balbo, who had hitherto supported the Government: for these men believed sincerely that, however desirable political progress might be, there was one thing still more important, the chief concern of Catholics, and that was the maintenance of the authority of the Church. Before the State, men were but citizens; before the Church, they were souls. The venerable Balbo made a plea full of dignity, and not without cogency for those who accept the argument that because a thing has always been so it must never be altered. Siccardi, the Minister of Grace and Justice, by whose name the measures were known, was the spokesman of the Cabinet. Brofferio, the Republican, found himself for once pouring out his eloquence in behalf of the Ministry.

The great triumph of the debate, however, fell to Cavour. On March 7²⁰ he answered the opponents of the bill to abolish ecclesiastical courts. Some of these had urged that the moment was inopportune; either because Parliament had at length reached an internal tranquillity which it was impolitic to disturb, or because the conditions were not yet tranquil enough. After remarking that these arguments were mutually contradictory, Cavour went on to show that the times were highly opportune. "I am not an alarmist," he said; "nevertheless, without being one I think we can see at least the possibility, if not the probability, of stormy times. Well, gentlemen, if you wish to take precautions against these stormy times, do you know the best way? It is to push reforms in quiet times, to reform abuses

¹⁹ For text: Brofferio, iv, introd., 122-24.

²⁰ Persons who note historical coincidences will recall that on the same 7th of March, 1850, while Cavour at Turin upheld the cause of liberty and progress, Daniel Webster, at Washington, defended the Fugitive Slave Law.

while these are not forced upon you by the extremists." He reminded those who urged further negotiations with Pius before taking parliamentary action that during nearly two years Rome had repulsed every overture. Out of courtesy, and not because it recognized the right of the Church to dictate in secular matters, the State had sought for an amicable agreement with the Church; for to declare at the outset that the Church must consent by a certain date to a concordat, would be equivalent to a declaration of war. Passing on to the political aspect of the bill, Cavour insisted that the Government could no longer avoid taking once for all a definite attitude towards progress, abandoning "its semi-negative path of small reforms, of improvements more or less homoeopathic," and proving by its acts that it could pilot the State between the Charybdis of Revolution on the Left, and the Scylla of Reaction on the Right. With frank audacity he predicted that this law would transform into open enemies the Clericals who had hitherto connived in secret against constitutional government, and that this would be a great gain; for "I hold," he said, "that open enemies are infinitely less dangerous than hidden enemies." Finally, he urged them to emulate the example of Wellington, Grey, and Peel, who, by wisely conceding reforms in season, enabled England alone to ride out unharmed the recent gale of revolution.²¹

This speech belongs among the most remarkable of the great speeches of the century that have epitomized the views of one party in a conflict of fundamental import. Though it dealt with a theme in which immemorial passions were interwoven, it bears no trace of passion. Cavour refuses to take the question into the arena of theology; granting the authority of the Catholic Church to exercise her spiritual functions in Piedmont, assuming likewise the sovereignty of the State in secular affairs, he grapples with the real question before the Chamber, the question of political right and expediency. In doing this, he set up a model for the conduct by the party of Liberty of their warfare with the party of Authority. And not less characteristic is the tact with which he moulded his arguments — his regret at differing from Balbo — his tribute to the sincerity of his adversaries — in a word, his urbanity, which never for an instant, however, could

be mistaken for a disposition to temporize or to yield. Of oratory, if by oratory we mean rhetorical embellishment, the stirring of emotions, the dramatic emphasis which captivates those who read not less than those who hear, Cavour's speech had no trace: but it was a masterpiece of the rarer oratory which, scorning to play on passions, speaks directly to the reason, enlightens, kindles, frees, and which teaches how strength of soul may shape itself in sane acts. The effect of his words on his immediate hearers was magical: long and tumultuous applause greeted him from the benches and the galleries. "The honorable speaker," says the parliamentary report, "receives the congratulations of those deputies who sit round him, and as he descends from his place to leave the hall, all the Ministers shake hands with him, and several deputies of the Left congratulate him." At last, Cavour's power is acknowledged.

This bill and its fellows passed the Chamber by large majorities, and, after a brief delay, the Senate concurred. Popular sentiment, so far as it could be gauged, rejoiced: but Monsignor Frasoni, Archbishop of Turin, bent on putting the question to the test, issued a pastoral letter to his priests forbidding them to obey the new laws. The Government suppressed the pastoral as illegal, and summoned Frasoni to appear in court. On his refusal, he was arrested and taken to the Citadel, where he remained until the Court of Appeal had examined the case and sentenced him to a month's imprisonment and 500 francs' fine. Nothing could have pleased him better. Catholic zealots, compassionating him as a martyr, presented him with a costly gift. Cardinal Antonelli withdrew the Papal nuncio from Turin, and demanded the liberation, with proper restitution, of the "persecuted" prelate. Pius IX, in secret consistory, deplored the wickedness of Piedmont. Two Sardinian archbishops imitated Frasoni and felt the rigor of the law. The Government, which would gladly have put off the conflict, by not bringing the Siccardi Laws before Parliament, acted with loyal firmness in their defense, and had the satisfaction of knowing that public opinion was overwhelmingly on their side. An obelisk was erected by general subscription to commemorate the liberation of the country from ecclesiastical tyranny. And yet the Radicals already grumbled because the reforms were incomplete.

Fransoni had served his sentence, and the excitement had somewhat abated, when a fresh act of Clerical rigor raised popular indignation to the highest pitch. Santa Rosa, Minister of Agriculture, fell sick, and finding his end near, he asked for the last Sacrament. But Father Pittavino refused to absolve him unless he should acknowledge the sinfulness of the Siccardi Laws, and repent the share which he, as member of the Cabinet, had had in introducing them. Although a sincere Catholic, and fully conscious of the peril which, as his Church teaches, those who die without absolution incur, Santa Rosa held out. "My God!" he exclaimed, "they require of me things which my conscience cannot bend to: I have four children — they shall not inherit a dishonored name from their father." And when he died unabsolved, Archbishop Fransoni gave further instructions that his body should be denied religious burial (Aug. 5, 1850).²² The news of Santa Rosa's death swept the capital into fury. The public conscience revolted at what seemed to it an outrage against humanity — a venting of malice under the cover of religion. Mobs collected, eager to avenge the victim of Clerical persecution. The Government had to decide between placing the city under martial law and sending away the Servite Fraternity, to which Father Pittavino belonged: it chose the latter course. Two of the Ministers, Galvagno and La Marmora, sought out the Archbishop, who had taken refuge in the country. He denied that the curate had acted under his instructions, and although indubitable proof confronted him, he asserted that the responsibility really rested with the curate, who might have declined to follow orders if he had wished! When the blustering Fransoni learned that the Government could not undertake to protect him, he withdrew his prohibition of Santa Rosa's burial. Subsequently, he was again arrested, and confined at Fenestrelle, whence he went into voluntary exile at Lyons.²³

Santa Rosa's funeral, attended by scores of thousands of excited and incensed persons of all classes, was the popular retort to Clerical pretensions. Each party to this conflict had acted logically. Pitiless Authority had used its spiritual torments to punish a political offense which it could not otherwise reach: Liberty had maintained its supremacy by using the physical

■ Bersezio, v, 113.

■ *Ibid*, 114-17.

power at its command. The Church had succeeded in embittering public opinion, thus assuring the zealous support of all her partisans; she had embarrassed the State, and, what was to her very precious, she had secured a fresh stock of grievances. The State, on the other hand, had proved that it could and would uphold the law. By the Proclamation of Moncalieri the Liberal Ministry had triumphed over the Reds, the party of Revolution; now, by subjecting refractory prelates to the civil law, it triumphed over the Blacks, the party of Reaction.

Cavour felt Santa Rosa's loss keenly, for their friendship went back to boyhood: the incidents attending it exasperated him. "One must have seen what I have seen, and heard what I have heard," he wrote De la Rue, "to believe that such things are possible in the nineteenth century."²⁴ "As devoted as any one else to the widest religious liberty," he wrote to the editor of *L'Armonia*, the Clerical organ, "I ardently wish for the times when it can be practised by us as it exists in America, thanks to the absolute separation of the Church from the State, a separation which I deem an inevitable consequence of the progress of civilization, and the indispensable condition to the welfare of societies governed by the principle of liberty."²⁵ Santa Rosa's death left a vacancy in the Cabinet, which D'Azeglio did not intend to fill until Parliament reassembled in November. But within a month La Marmora was urging that the post be offered to Cavour. The Prime Minister shook his head. He could no longer allege Cavour's unpopularity as a reason for rejecting him: ever since his Seventh of March speech, Cavour's ascendancy over the ministerial majority in the Chamber had been undisputed. But D'Azeglio did not care to encumber himself with an ally in whom he detected all the attributes of a potential dictator. Perhaps he resented a little the tone in which at the end of the session Cavour had lectured the Government, laying bare its shortcomings and stating what measures it must push forward if it hoped to keep the support of the Cavourians. "He would turn the Ministry topsy-turvy in a month," said D'Azeglio to La Marmora. "I don't wish to be bored." La Marmora replied with a laugh that Camillo was "really a very good fellow; and besides," he added, "under our influence he will moderate."²⁶ The

²⁴ Bert, 391. ²⁵ *Lettere*, I, 430; C. to Birago di Vische, Aug. 23, 1850.

■ *Lettere*, I, 162-64.

General's persistence finally won D'Azeglio over, and Cavour was sounded. "I regard my entering the Ministry at this moment as a misfortune for me. I should spend myself uselessly," he confided to De la Rue. "They wish to charge me with the Navy, which I understand nothing about; they wish to put on me a burden beyond my strength."²⁷ Still, Cavour was not the man to be daunted by the bulk or uncongeniality of the work allotted to him. He defined frankly the terms on which he would accept, and D'Azeglio agreed to them. But when the nomination was referred to the King, Victor Emanuel remarked, "Don't you gentlemen see that that little fellow will send you all heels over head? Take care."²⁸ Later, perhaps, Cavour might be thought of; for the present the King wished his Ministers to suggest "a more sympathetic name."

Victor Emanuel could have had as yet slight personal acquaintance with Cavour, but he did not forget that the Count was disliked by Charles Albert — and this reason, unless counterbalanced by a stronger, still guided him in choosing his advisers. Moreover, as a shrewd reader of men, he doubtless saw in Cavour one who would, if given the opportunity, drive the Government at a faster pace than the King, who, like D'Azeglio, was naturally averse from business, would find comfortable. But La Marmora's insistence again prevailed, and the King consented. "I warn you," he said to D'Azeglio, "that this man who enters the Cabinet by the little back door will soon turn you all out." The "little back door" was the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture, to which that of the Navy was shortly added. Cavour accepted, "after three days of painful hesitation,"²⁹ and on October 10, 1850, he embarked on his ministerial career.

Before taking up his work, he made a trip to Lake Maggiore. At Stresa, he met Manzoni at Rosmini's villa, and stirred them by his hopeful views on Italy's destiny. "We shall do something," he would say from time to time, rubbing his hands. "That little man promises well," Manzoni remarked with satisfaction, when he had gone.³⁰

²⁷ Bert, 400-401; C. to De la Rue, Oct. 6, 1850.

²⁸ *Lettere*, I, 164. The King, as Chiala remarks, used an unprintable Piedmontese phrase, of which this is a polite version. Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, I, 114.

²⁹ Bert, 401.

³⁰ Massari: *Cavour*, 61.

CHAPTER VI

THE RENASCENCE OF PIEDMONT. 1850-1852

THE Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce was the humblest post in the Cabinet: Cavour soon showed that it might be the most important. When Parliament met, in November, the country felt a new vigor impelling the Government. From the Ministerial bench Cavour defended not only the policy of his own department but that of his colleagues. With a readiness smacking of presumption he spoke now for one and now for another, interpreting bills to conform to his general scheme of progress, in which all branches of civic development must advance together. And if some of those colleagues may have been inclined to chafe at his forwardness, they found compensation in the support he gave them. At first, indeed, most of them welcomed the coöperation of a man of boundless energy and wide knowledge, who asked only to be allowed to do others' work in addition to his own.

D'Azeglio's artistic temperament unfitted him for parliamentary leadership: he fretted at long discussions; he had little patience for the tactics by which in deliberative assemblies opponents delay or postpone the passage of bills. The War Minister, General La Marmora, busy remodeling the army, found the wear-and-tear of debate equally irritating. As a soldier he was accustomed to give commands and see them obeyed; discussion affected him almost like lack of discipline. Count Paleocapa, Minister of Public Works, a man of much technical erudition, was a doer rather than a debater. Count Nigra, who controlled the finances, relished conflict with captious deputies so little that he usually sent a clerk to explain his plans to them. Obviously, therefore, the Cabinet was immensely strengthened by the advent of Cavour, who never declined a challenge, who understood better than any one in Piedmont the methods of parliamentary warfare, who never lost courage, and who never waited to defend himself when he could be the first to attack.

But he did more than bring strong aid to Ministerial projects: he helped to train the Subalpine Parliament in the efficient use of its functions. A system of government in which the executive works through a responsible ministry, cannot be strong if the ministry be weak. In Piedmont, owing partly to inexperience, and chiefly to the disturbing influence of revolutionary conditions, the Ministry had not yet taken its proper position in the general system. One makeshift cabinet after another had risen and fallen, until it seemed as if government were a game of skittles, in which ministers existed only to be bowled over; or as if the people, through their representatives, could take vengeance on the results of their own blunders or on destiny itself, by ousting eight gentlemen from office and putting eight others in their place. But if the ministers thus ousted had not caused the evil, to remove them did not remedy it; and changes so swift both harmed the cabinet as an organ of government and convicted the representatives themselves of petulance and caprice, if not of incapacity for strenuous and consecutive exertion. D'Azeglio's common sense and uprightness, reinforced by the King's blunt honesty, had given pause to the merely wanton destroyers: the partisans of rebellion were quelled in Genoa, the inevitable treaty with Austria was signed, and the first mild ecclesiastical reforms had been carried through. But the position of the Cabinet was still very precarious, and its leading members, as we have just seen, were constitutionally unequipped to strengthen it. D'Azeglio seems almost to have regarded the announcement of his honorable intentions as a sufficient reason why the Chamber should adopt his measures. Cavour, on the other hand, took a very different view of the Cabinet's scope. Ministers, he believed, should be more than heads of departments, more even than executors of the laws passed by Parliament: guided by a definite policy, they should originate bills and fight for their passage; they should, in a word, be the leaders, and not simply the instruments, of the party in power. To realize this ideal the Cabinet must be able to count on a loyal Ministerial majority in both Chambers. But Cavour was only the latest-comer among the Ministers, entrusted with the least important portfolio.

This in nowise disheartened him. Without delay he set about reforming the State wherever it touched his administration.

Long before, he had perceived that in the great task laid upon the nineteenth century — the diffusion of Liberty — economic and industrial reform must be the basis of the new political structure: having now the opportunity to apply his principles, he seized it. Piedmont's grievous debts called for instant remedy. Cavour's first plan was to stimulate her commerce by relieving it of the burden of differential duties, navigation acts, and high or prohibitive tariffs. In quick succession he negotiated commercial treaties with France, Belgium, England, Holland, Switzerland, and the German Customs Union. But he found it easier to make terms with them than to persuade the Subalpine Parliament to ratify his treaties: for he had to combat at home not only the general ignorance of economics, but also the convictions of men bred in protectionist doctrines, and the greed of beneficiaries of special privileges that dated from feudal times. In Sardinia, indeed, the feudal system, only recently abolished by law, still survived in many usages. Economic reform involved, therefore, more than a change of percentages: it involved the wrenching away of associations, instincts, traditions, which the unthinking supposed were necessary to their own existence. Nevertheless, Cavour fought his battle without flinching. Whoever reads his speeches on the commercial treaties and on tariff reform will be struck first of all by their educational quality. Well aware that he was addressing a public little versed in political economy, he took pains to lay down the theory on which his measures rested, to explain its reasonableness and justice, to show how illogical it was to set up Liberty as the guiding principle in law and government and conscience, while denying its application to trade. Nor did he fail to point out how protection, the most insidious modern form of privilege, rendered honest government difficult and equal government impossible, and how industrial selfishness, which did not scruple to beg for special favors from the lawmakers, would go on to demand those favors as a right, nor hesitate at last to keep them by corruption. Cavour was not less candid than educative. He freely acknowledged that the new measures had many defects, that in some cases Piedmont had conceded more than she got in return, that it had been impossible to devise a perfectly equitable scheme of taxation. But he demanded that final judgment should be passed

on the system as a whole, and not on its flaws, making due allowance for any transitional measure. Cavour displayed his maturity in statesmanship by refusing to exaggerate the excellence of even the laws whose adoption he regarded as necessary. Knowing that, although legislation can do much, it cannot do everything, he never suffered from that mania for lawmaking which has more and more afflicted popular assemblies.

In the course of these debates his mastery of the minutest details of Piedmont's commercial conditions gave him a decisive advantage over his opponents. Having been a practical farmer, a banker, a manufacturer, with wide commercial relations throughout the land, and having traveled up and down Piedmont and through other countries, he usually had little difficulty, when honorable members rose to defend some particular interest, — the iron trade, or the cloth manufacture, or the wine or olive-oil industry, — in proving their estimates incorrect. And his intimate knowledge of foreign parliaments, particularly of the British, enabled him to silence much ineffectual theorizing. In the main he held the conversational tone of a man of affairs setting forth his projects and answering objections without flourish or reservations: but his humor enlivened the most technical passages, and he did not refrain from a satirical rejoinder when garrulous or carping adversaries could not be disposed of otherwise. Only near the end of his labor on the treaties, did he give free rein to his eloquence in a peroration in which he contrasted Liberty and Privilege as the two great forces competing with each other for the supremacy of the modern world.

"Humanity," he said, "tends, in the field of economics, to the amelioration of the lower classes. To reach this goal, two ways present themselves. All the systems conceived in modern times by the wisest and boldest intellects may be reduced to two. One of these has faith in the principle of liberty — in the principle of free competition, in the free development of the moral and intellectual man. They believe that with the ever greater realization of this principle there must follow a greater welfare for all, but especially for the least favored classes. This is the economic school, these are the principles professed by the statesmen who rule in England. Another school professes principles absolutely different. It believes that the miseries of humanity cannot be

bettered except by restricting individual action more and more, by enlarging markedly the central action of society as a whole, represented by a government to be created, in the general centralization of individual forces. This is the Socialist school. We must not deceive ourselves: although this school has reached unfortunate and at times atrocious conclusions, we cannot deny that it has in its principles something seductive for generous and lofty souls. Now the only way to combat this school, which threatens to invade Europe, is to set other principles against its principles. In the economic world as in the political world and the religious world, ideas are now only effectively combated by ideas, principles by principles: material repression avails little. For a time, certainly, cannons and bayonets can repress theories, can maintain order, but if these theories rise into the intellectual sphere, believe me, gentlemen, sooner or later, these ideas, these theories will transform themselves into facts, will win the victory in the political and economic field.

"Now, gentlemen, I affirm that the most powerful allies of the Socialist school — I refer of course to the intellectual order — are the Protectionist doctrines. They start absolutely from the same principle: reduced to their lowest terms, they assert that it is the right, and consequently the duty, of the government, to interfere in the distribution and employment of capital; that the government has the mission, the power of substituting its will, which it deems more enlightened, for the free will of individuals. Were this accepted as an unquestioned truth, I know not what we should reply to the laboring classes, and to their champions, when, appearing before the government, they put forward the following argument: 'You believe it your right and duty to interfere in the distribution of capital, in the regulation of capital; but why do you not interfere to regulate the other element of production — wages? Why do you not organize labor?' And in fact, I think that, if we admit the Protectionist system, there follows logically the necessity of admitting if not all, at least many, of the Socialist doctrines."¹

Before the close of the session (July, 1851) the treaties were ratified and the new customs laws passed.² Seldom has so import-

¹ *Discorsi*, II, 381-82; speech in the Chamber, April 15, 1851.

² Kinney, the American *chargé d'affaires*, writes Daniel Webster, Secretary of

ant an economic revolution been so rapidly achieved. It could not, indeed, entirely satisfy Cavour, whose words just quoted show that the attainment of absolute commercial liberty was his ideal, but it illustrated his genius for the opportune. Had he attempted to embody in a single bill his free-trade principles, he would have been beaten: but by introducing a group of measures one by one, and by overcoming the objections to each separately, he secured a mass of reforms which gave a healthy impulse to Piedmont's material expansion.

This labor, which another man might have thought Herculean, by no means exhausted Cavour's energy. Besides being Minister of Commerce and Agriculture he had been, since October, Minister of the Navy — a branch of the public service which required from him immediate, special study, as he had had no experience in naval affairs. Still undismayed by work, he accepted (April 19, 1851) the portfolio of finance — an appointment which established his ascendancy in the Cabinet, and was inevitable if he was to remain in the Cabinet at all; for Count Nigra, his predecessor, not only lacked the vigor needed for waging the economic campaign then in progress, but he shrank from appearing in the Chamber. His habit of sending an underling — Arnulfe — to address the deputies, irritated Cavour.³ That a person not a Minister should virtually occupy the Ministerial bench was manifestly improper, and tended to weaken the Government. After repeatedly remonstrating, Cavour resigned; whereupon Nigra, over whom personal ambition had no influence, insisted on quitting himself the post for which he recognized his rival's superior fitness. The interdependence of the departments of commerce and finance was so close that it was almost essential that they should be directed by a single purpose before the new economic system could be carried through. In Cavour's hands, this end was attained.

Piedmont's finances had reached the pass where bankruptcy seemed imminent. For two years Nigra had succeeded by hook or by crook in postponing the day of reckoning — once, indeed, when the treasury was empty, he drew on his own banking-house State, of Cavour's "remarkable discourse, which showed a profound study of the present commercial relations with the world, as well as an intimate acquaintance with the condition and capabilities of his own country." *Amer. Arch.*

³ *Lettere*, I, 445; C. to D'Azeglio, April, 1851.

for 400,000 francs; but only by a radical reform, by measures which called for courage not less than for financiering ability, could the worst be averted. Everybody dreaded to know the truth, dreaded, and yet understood that the truth must still be known. Cavour, however, went at his task as a cool surgeon takes up a desperate case, and within a fortnight he had so far probed the department of finance as to be ready to report on it. "To-day" (May 8), writes Marchioness d'Azeglio, "Cavour should give the Chamber his terrible financial statement, which, with reason, keeps the whole country anxious, for they say it will be frightful."⁴ His revelations justified the most anxious. He showed that it would take fifty million francs beyond the ordinary receipts to pay the expenses of 1851, and that several years would be required for restoring the equilibrium. The Government's book-keeping was so hopelessly confused that no one could estimate accurately the public debt. Thus in 1816 a royal ordinance had appropriated six million francs for a work which had never been undertaken and would have been forgotten but for the fact that the six millions were annually registered among the national obligations. Similar absurdities cropped out in every ledger; and the accounts of one department were muddled with those of another, or scattered under several heads. Only by a complete reorganization of national book-keeping could such abuses be cured: and this required time. For the immediate problem of paying expenses Cavour would accept only one solution. If he could provide funds by increasing the taxes or by raising loans, he would not consent to a penny-wise economy. He would cut down the number of government employees to the lowest limit, and would save what he could by the merging of bureaux; but he insisted that the remodeling of the army under La Marmora's direction must not be interrupted; that the railways should be completed as soon as possible; that the public-school system should not be allowed to die in its infancy for lack of support; that, in general, public works that were absolutely necessary for the expansion of Piedmont should be prosecuted.

Most statesmen shrink from jeopardizing their popularity by levying high taxes: Cavour, at the outset of his Ministerial career, dared to propose to his countrymen the heaviest scheme

⁴ C. d'Azeglio, 422.

of taxation they had ever known. Wherever he could, he levied direct taxes, the most honest and the most odious kind. No group of producers or source of capital went untithed. Incomes and inheritances, members of the arts and professions, personal property, corporations, land — each contributed its share to the treasury. While sparing nobody, Cavour laid the burden according to the means of each contributor. He traversed the delusion that liberty should be cheap; despotism, he said, can afford to exact less tribute than free government, because it gives less in return. And besides the normal expenses of free government, Piedmont had to pay the debt which two disastrous wars and the Austrian indemnity had created.

To cancel the last instalment of this indemnity, and to complete the construction of the railways, Cavour resorted to a loan of seventy-five million francs. Previous loans had been contracted for with the house of Rothschild at Paris: but in order to emancipate the Piedmontese Treasury from "this Jew who strangles us,"⁵ Cavour negotiated with the house of Hambro at London. He entrusted the negotiations to Count Revel, although they had had in the recent debates over tariff reform more than one lively⁶ encounter: but "in politics there is nothing so absurd as rancor," and as Revel was the financier best fitted to persuade the Hambros, Cavour did not hesitate to employ him. Revel accepted the mission in the same patriotic spirit, went to London, acted with notable sagacity, and secured the desired amount on favorable terms. This operation may be described as taking Piedmont out of pawn: it raised her credit at home and abroad; it freed her from subservience to a single clique of money-lenders. Incidentally, it drew the attention and interest of Englishmen to the resources, the reorganized political and industrial life, and the hopes of the little Subalpine Kingdom. Cavour surely did not forget that where John Bull's

⁵ Bert, 408.

⁶ "Lively" is too mild a word. On Feb. 9, 1855, Cavour, in recalling Revel's opposition in 1851, said: "The Chamber will remember that perhaps no speech more bitter, more nettling, was ever delivered by a political adversary against a Minister. In spite of this, I did not regard the Honorable Revel as a political adversary, and I think that shortly after I gave him the greatest proof of confidence which one can show to a member of Parliament, in appointing him to an important foreign financial mission; an act, this, which I do not repent of, as he fully corresponded to what was expected of him." *Discorsi*, ix, 123.

treasure is, there is his heart also, nor did he exaggerate the importance of propitiating that heart.

Thus before the close of 1851, Cavour had revolutionized the financial system of Piedmont, and opened the way for material progress, which, he believed, must precede the attainment of political aspirations. His activity in Parliament, which had been unexampled, established his reputation as a debater; on the tariff alone he made fifty-two speeches. He had lifted the Cabinet into the commanding position which belonged to it as one of the coördinate organs of government: nay, more, so far as he could, he had recomposed it after his own pattern by ridding it of Mameli, Siccardi, and Nigra, when he found them unwilling or unable to take his pace. D'Azeglio laughingly remarked, "With this little man I am like Louis Philippe — I reign and do not govern":⁷ but D'Azeglio, who was frequently prostrated by his wound, and always restive under the routine drudgery of political leadership, gladly submitted to the "little man's" energy. The old calumnies against Cavour had partly died out: at least, his enemies no longer taunted him with being a *codino* in disguise; they almost ceased to nickname him "My lord Camillo," or to insinuate that the speeches which he delivered in Parliament in the afternoon he had crammed from the French and English papers in the morning. Friends and foes alike acknowledged his power.

Many witnesses might be cited to show how quickly Cavour took the ascendant. On April 7, 1851, Massimo d'Azeglio writes his nephew Emanuel, Piedmontese Minister in London: "Cavour is made on purpose to lead affairs and Parliament. But he is as despotic as a devil, and I, who don't like tyrants, was for clearing out, a few days ago. . . . But now all is arranged in the best fashion."⁸ A fortnight later Constance d'Azeglio writes: "Cavour mounts higher every day. He certainly shows himself a superior man, as you will see by his speeches in the Chambers on all questions. His latest discussions with Ottavio Revel, who expected to pulverize his adversary, were truly luminous, admirable, without his even having taken notes whilst his adversary was reading. He would be admired no matter where."⁹ Finally,

⁷ M. d'Azeglio: *Lettere a Sua Moglie*, 13. ⁸ N. Bianchi: *Lettere di Mass. d'Azeglio* (Turin: 1883), p. 121. The Premier adds, "My not clearing out is the greatest sacrifice I have made in all my life to the King and to the country."

⁹ *Ibid*, 232; April 21, 1851. C. d'Azeglio, 421.

Farini, Cavour's most devoted disciple in the Cabinet, writes to Castelli, another member of the Cavourian inner circle: "We shall have a somewhat brief discussion on the supplementary treaty with France, but it will be approved because Cavour makes it a Cabinet question, and Cavour is now recognized as indispensable even by his opponents and enemies, who are many among the Right and the Left. But he is such a man of heart, genius, and capacity for work, that I don't believe that Europe today has his like, and he will triumph now and for a long time to come over all the petty envies and anger."¹⁰

His ambition was now the favorite target for hostile critics, who did not hesitate to say that he would sacrifice any of his principles to win a personal triumph. Ambitious he certainly was: that he should be accused of trimming, shows how long the foremost characteristics of an original man may be misunderstood. "Nobody here trusts Cavour," Pallavicino wrote to Gioberti on Feb. 3, 1852: and this statement of a political opponent was hardly extreme. Even Cavour's kinsfolk, as Marchioness d'Azeglio sufficiently reports, doubted his sincerity.

Nevertheless, his service in giving a daily lesson in parliamentary practice cannot be exaggerated: for representative government was to the Piedmontese deputies and senators a tool which they hardly knew how to use. They instinctively leaned towards the French practice, with its florid rhetoric, its personal abuse, its outbursts of passion, and general excitability. But Cavour, having ever before him the English model, insisted that reason should prevail over passion, that through debate the truth should be sifted, that opinions and not persons should be attacked, and that the verdict of the majority should rule. He presented his case without flourish, fact by fact, and so candidly, that the dullest could understand and only the captious could doubt his sincerity. When asked, for instance, why the Ministry neglected to press a bill, he replied that, since the financial reform was the main issue, "in a certain way a life-or-death question," he would not prejudice that by bringing forward a secondary measure which was sure to arouse vehement opposition.¹¹ In spite of his love of dominating, he usually conducted himself in

¹⁰ *Lettere*, v, 233; April 22, 1851.

¹¹ *Discorsi*, vi, 275-78; reply to Saracco, Jan. 11, 1853.

the Chamber with such good humor that even his opponents joined in the laugh which his remarks continually called forth. Beyond other statesmen of the first rank he had a gift of irony, which he used with the finest effect, whether to expose a fallacy, or to enliven a technical discussion; and often, by playfully turning it against himself, he captured the goodwill of his hearers. It served him as humor served Lincoln, not only as a subtle political weapon of great efficacy, but as a means of momentary relaxation in times of terrible tension. Cavour never allowed his respect for parliamentary decorum to silence him when his honor was impugned. In the debate on the commercial treaty with France, Sineo, an orator of the Left, intimated that the proposed tariff on sulphur was fixed to benefit Cavour's chemical factory. At that, Cavour jumped to his feet and hurled "You lie!" at his maligner. The President of the Chamber properly called the Minister to order, and there followed moments of heated suspense.¹² The Chamber sided with Cavour, but not with his unparliamentary expression, and Sineo, threatened with a duel, formally declared that he had not intended to say anything which could in the smallest degree impugn Cavour's honor. "Sineo's ill-judged attack caused the passage of the treaty by an immense majority," Cavour wrote Castelli the next day; "many deputies who were against it voted for it to show me their sympathy."¹³ Sineo was silenced, and no deputy dared subsequently to make so unguarded an attack in the course of debate: but Cavour's enemies continued for a long time to circulate the calumny that he secretly enriched himself by his office. The charge was easily made and readily believed by persons rendered cynical by the practices of office-holders under the Old Régime.

When he had been a year in office, Cavour was recognized as the strongest political force in Piedmont. He even persuaded Parliament to sign a commercial treaty with Austria — an act which, in spite of wounded national pride, hatred and desire for revenge, he carried through by an appeal to reason. And now, having reorganized the financial system, and remoulded the Cabinet so far as one not actually Prime Minister could do so, he went on to effect another important improvement in the political evolution of his country. The progress of the New Régime

¹² *Discorsi*, vi; June 30, 1851.

¹³ *Lettere*, v, cccxcvi.

might be checked unless it were constantly pushed by a vigorous Cabinet; but the Cabinet itself depended on the support of a parliamentary majority: how could this be secured?

Although parliamentary government was only three and a half years old, parties had already undergone many changes. Their first general division was into Conservatives and Liberals. The War of Independence, and the question of annexing the Austrian provinces, almost immediately drew new lines of divergence. After Custozza, the plunge towards Democracy altered still further the meaning of party names. After Novara, the members of the Right wished to accept the peace offered by Austria, the members of the Left persisted in rejecting it. Only in January, 1850, when the war and its disastrous sequel had ceased to be the chief issue on which men divided, could parties take shape according to the more permanent ideals which their members professed. The debates of 1850-51 tended towards the partition of the Chamber among the following groups: The Extreme Left, comprising about a dozen members and captained by Valerio, construed Liberalism as the widest application of Democratic principles compatible with the Monarchy. They had ability; they were pugnacious and persistent; but they were doctrinaires, rather than statesmen, and could never quite harness the restless concrete realities of life in their hard-and-fast formulas. The Left Centre, a group of twenty, started by sharing their general views, but gradually learned by experience that political efficiency must include more than mere maxims. Rattazzi, the leader of this group, excelled in adroitness: Lanza, his ablest colleague, was outspoken and practical. The Right Centre, numbering upwards of sixty, consisted of Liberals who wished to steer the middle course between Revolution and Reaction. To them the D'Azeglio Ministry looked for regular support. Finally, the Extreme Right, about thirty strong, was composed of Conservatives of all sorts, from the irreconcilable Clerical, who set Church above State, to the venerable Balbo, who believed in Liberty but dreaded its rapid diffusion. As a fringe to each of these groups were a few waverers who voted now with one and now with the other. It will be seen that the Right Centre, the Ministerialist body, could at any time be outvoted by a combination of all the other groups.

To Cavour, who took the British House of Commons for his model, this seemed a very imperfect condition. He wished to see two parties instead of the several factions. Government by groups is the worst form of parliamentary government. It frustrates continuity in legislation; it encourages unprincipled bargains; it sometimes puts the fate of an administration at the mercy of a small clique whose votes may turn the scale; it usually degenerates into a personal warfare on the cabinet; it never fairly represents the views of a majority of the electorate. Cavour sought, therefore, to construct a ministerial party, which should be held together by allegiance to certain large aims, and have a solid backing in the country. True to his instinct, he avoided both extremes and fixed upon the Left Centre as the group whose views most nearly corresponded to his own. His faithful political aide and devoted friend, Castelli, sounded the leaders of the Left Centre, and in due season Rattazzi, Buffa, and Cavour met at Castelli's house, where they had no difficulty in uniting on a program summed up under the heads "Monarchy, Statute, Independence, Civil and Political Progress."¹⁴ Rattazzi promised to break away formally from the Left and Cavour from the Right, whenever a favorable occasion should present itself. Meanwhile the interview and agreement were to be confidential. Early in the session of 1852 Cavour judged that the moment had come to unmask. Louis Napoleon's strangling of the French Republic (Dec. 2, 1851) gave joy to Reactionists all over the Continent. Piedmont now stood alone before Europe as the exemplar of Liberal institutions, but the Radical newspapers in Piedmont, by their violent attacks on Napoleon, endangered the liberty they professed to defend, and his fellow despots, the sovereigns of Prussia and Austria, warned Victor Emanuel that if he were wise he would throw over the Constitution and enter the circle of Absolutist monarchs.¹⁵ The King had no thought of heeding this advice: "I intend to be master in my own house," he said. Nevertheless, he and his Ministers, recognizing the folly of needlessly exasperating foreign governments and the harm which abusive journalism wrought on public opinion at home, decided so to amend the press laws as to bring the editorial criticism of foreign rulers under a censorship.

¹⁴ Castelli: *Cavour*, 41.

¹⁵ *Lettere*, I, 220-21.

To Cavour fell the task of persuading the Chamber to pass the bill. No one believed more sincerely than he in the freedom of the press as an instrument in the development of Liberal ideas. Less than three years before, when the Ministry had proposed a gag law, he boldly declared as his policy, "Hands off the press." But, not being a doctrinaire, he did not now mistake the shadow for the substance. If in time of war, the freest government under the sun exercised the right to prevent the publication of news or rumors that might injure the State, why, he argued, should it not take similar precautions in time of peace? He justified the bill by pointing out the radical difference between native and foreign statesmen as targets for journalistic virulence. Any newspaper which assailed a Piedmontese might be prosecuted for libel; the charge could be easily sifted; and even malignant falsehoods could do comparatively little harm, because the public man against whom they were aimed would have friends to stand by him. But when a foreign ruler was accused, the Piedmontese public could not be expected to know whether the charge were true or false; and that ruler would, on the other hand, judge Piedmont by the insolence of some irresponsible editor who might have no credit at home. In this way, international arrangements of great importance to Italy might be broken up. To allow a handful of journalists under a plea of liberty to imperil the national welfare was an amazing contradiction.¹⁶

Cavour's arguments prevailed, but the part of his speech which excited the keenest interest was that in which, turning to Rattazzi, — who, although opposing the bill, had announced that, if the Minister of Finance would uphold the fundamental laws, the Rattazzians would all support him, — he acknowledged the friendly offer, and expressed the hope that in the coming session it might be carried out. Then addressing himself to Menabrea, the most aggressive member of the Right, Cavour remarked: "Perhaps my declaration will be taxed with imprudence, because, having made it, the Ministry must expect to lose once for all the feeble support which it has received for some time past from the Honorable Deputy Menabrea and his political friends." Menabrea replied that, if Cavour wished to set his sails towards other parliamentary shores, he might do so: for himself, he would stand

¹⁶ *Discorsi*, iv, 325-59; speeches of Feb. 3, 5, and 7, 1852.

firm, unseduced by love of popularity, by personal considerations, or by political tactics. In the debate which ensued, Boncompagni spoke after his solid fashion in behalf of the Ministry, Balbo repelled the charge that the Right had given the Ministry only a "feeble support," and Revel, the ablest leader of the Right, declared his astonishment that the Ministry should not only have divorced itself from its old allies, but should have made at the same time a connubial alliance (*connubio*) with the other party. Revel's word *connubio* has stuck to this critical transformation in Piedmontese politics.¹⁷

On its political side the *Connubio* was a masterly stroke, approved by common sense and sagacity, wonderfully justified in its results. But at the moment, personal considerations of great delicacy affected the criticism passed upon it. Has a minister the right, without consulting his colleagues, to make or break a compact with a parliamentary group? If he has, then courtesy, harmony, subordination, go by the board. By arranging the *Connubio*, Cavour showed at the time that he thought himself justified. Three years later, in the course of a memorable defense before the deputies, he said: "I declare from the house-tops that there is no act of my already unfortunately somewhat long political life, which I recall with greater satisfaction than that. . . . I believed it to be not only opportune, but necessary, indispensable, to constitute a great Liberal Party, summoning to take part in it all persons who, however they might have differed on secondary questions, agreed nevertheless on the great principles of progress and of liberty. And I think — I am forced to say it — that thereby I rendered a service to our country; because I believe that in this way I raised a barrier so high that Reaction can never sweep over it."¹⁸

In 1852, however, D'Azeglio and those of his Cabinet who were not in the secret awoke to find themselves involved in a new program which made them appear disingenuous towards their former allies, and forced them to simulate friendship for their former opponents. On the day when Cavour made his fateful speech, D'Azeglio, being kept in bed by his wound, had held in

¹⁷ *Discorsi*, iv, 351 ff. La Marmora reminded the Cabinet that, according to the Old Testament, although the Lord permitted Abraham to take Hagar a concubine, he did not permit Sarah to be divorced.

¹⁸ *Discorsi*, ix, 114; Feb. 6, 1855.

his chamber a council, at which Cavour remarked petulantly, "This Menabrea tires me, and I am tempted to throw over his support." "I knew no more than that about the matter," D'Azeglio wrote afterwards. "We were in a ticklish situation; I did not wish the public to hear of our internal divisions, and I acted like the general who, disobeyed by his troop, nevertheless put himself at its head to hide the sedition from the enemy."¹⁹ In accepting responsibility for Cavour's "explosion," D'Azeglio certainly behaved magnanimously; although it might be urged that he could not logically have done otherwise: for he had, during nearly sixteen months, consented to Cavour's holding an exceptional position in the Cabinet, to his shouldering most of the work and being popularly regarded as the framer of the Cabinet's policy.²⁰

The truce between Cavour and his colleagues could not last long. He was not only impenitent: their slowness in admitting the necessity of his stroke irritated him; their suspicions, warranted by his recent secrecy,²¹ touched his honor. But having adopted the only course which, he believed, could save Piedmont from Reaction, he would not allow his colleagues' unwillingness to keep him from pursuing it. D'Azeglio, good, easy man, would have waited for the Left Centre to come to him; Cavour, seeing that the Left Centre could be useful, went to it, and he spared no pains, whether in the Cabinet or in Parliament, to strengthen the alliance. He succeeded in causing Rattazzi to be elected vice-president of the Chamber, and shortly afterward, on Pinelli's death, he had Rattazzi elected president, in spite of Ministerial opposition (May 11, 1852). At this flaunt, D'Azeglio's patience gave way: he had no strong love for power, but as he could no longer continue, with self-respect, to preside over a cabinet in which one of his subordinates persisted in usurping the Premier's leadership, he and his colleagues resigned.²² The

¹⁹ D'Azeglio; *Politique*, 74-75; M. d'Azeglio to Rendu, May 24, 1852.

²⁰ D'Azeglio was usually both generous and politic in his relations with Cavour; although brief intervals of temper came to both of them.

²¹ The secrecy, however, was not so complete but that various observers suspected that Cavour and the Left Centre were going to unite. See Maineri: *Il Piemonte*, p. 241. Ercole Ricotti says that Cavour told him that he had made the league with the Left. This was before the public announcement; and there was no reason why Cavour should have singled out Ricotti to receive his confidence. A. Manno: *Ricordi di Ercole Ricotti* (Turin, 1886), p. 215.

²² Massimo d'Azeglio writes his nephew at the end of May: "I did not write

King commissioned him to form a new cabinet,²³ from which Cavour, and Cavour's busy lieutenant, Farini, were both excluded. At a parting interview with Victor Emanuel, who intimated that the dictatorial ex-minister's services would not be needed for a long time, Cavour explained to the King that the Left had changed its policy, and was no longer dangerous. Victor Emanuel listened impatiently, and cut him short with, "Count, you have 150,000 livres income, and, whatever comes, you need n't worry; but let me tell you that I do not intend to end as my father ended." ²⁴

Piedmont could now measure exactly Cavour's importance in the Government. To make the test easy and to lessen the friction of daily contact with his recent companions, Cavour quitted Turin and spent the summer in England and France. In London and Paris, although he received many attentions, he perceived that Massimo d'Azeglio was still looked upon as the chief if not as the only Italian statesman whose tenure of office guaranteed the maintenance of Liberalism. So little had foreigners followed the political evolution of Piedmont that they did not yet recognize its real director. If Cavour expected ovations, therefore, his vanity must have been chilled. He was not, indeed, unknown to the politicians in England and France, but they supposed that they had penetrated him when they called him brilliant, rash, and uncertain. The Ministerial coalition with the Left Centre seemed to portend that Piedmont was drifting towards a foolhardy policy, particularly repugnant to British capitalists who had invested many millions in her funds, and to diplomats bent on you in the days of the muddle, because I had no time. Today I write briefly, because I am as tired as a pack-horse. We were playing a game in which the stakes were for the country liberty, for Italy the last plank from the shipwreck, for the King good name, for the House of Savoy sympathy and the future, and for me all the good that I have desired and can hope for in the world." N. Bianchi: *Mass. d'Azeglio*, 195.

²³ Kinney, in his dispatch of May 22, reports that the new cabinet is in office, and that popular feeling is so strongly in the King's favor that no radical change need be anticipated. He refers to the "universal and decorous commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the Constitution on the 9th inst." "By a recent royal decree," he adds, "the Italian language is henceforth to be the official language of all the universities in the Kingdom instead of Latin, which has heretofore been the medium of intercourse between the professors and the pupils, the professorship of Latin Eloquence and Disputation and that of Roman Law being excepted." *Amer. Arch.*

²⁴ C. d'Azeglio, 450-51.

stamping out the last ember of revolution. At home, the great objection to Rattazzi had been his identification with the disaster of Novara. Abroad, Cavour found that Rattazzi was still regarded as a revolutionist.

All these observations convinced Cavour that haste would be perilous. Whatever his ambition, his country's welfare was always his first consideration, and so long as Massimo d'Azeglio's administration could win favor for Piedmont in Europe, he determined not to overthrow it. This did not mean that he would refrain from goading it on to a more resolute Liberalism, nor did it shake his conviction that D'Azeglio was unequal to the task. The Prime Minister himself, rid of his embarrassing colleague, had no wish to embitter him further; on the contrary, he ordered the Piedmontese ambassadors in London and Paris to treat Cavour with especial courtesy. "Cavour is a great sly-boots, and so we must keep him friendly," ²⁵ Victor Emanuel remarked, between jest and earnest. "He is a man who can help the country, and we must propitiate him," ²⁶ D'Azeglio wrote to his nephew, the Piedmontese Ambassador in London. In this way, which characterized Piedmontese statesmen, the two antagonists gave outward proof that they set patriotism above personal resentment. Cavour on his journey wrote to Castelli (July 13), "Try to preach patience to our friends. Be sure that for the moment it is the ablest policy." ²⁷

So the summer wore on: D'Azeglio and his colleagues at Turin keeping watch on the wandering star; Cavour trying to disabuse English and French politicians of their notion that he was a dan-

²⁵ *Lettere*, I, 264.

²⁶ N. Bianchi: *Mass. d'Azeglio*, 202. See also 203-04, D'Azeglio's further instructions to his nephew. "I have been ruminating," M. d'Azeglio says, "how we can make this journey useful to him in the sense of breaking the colt and fitting him for drawing the car of State. The sad thing is that the chief defect lies in the love of tyranny, which for Liberals with a hundred thousand francs' income is like the need of office for the priest. And at forty, when one has been a spoiled child up to that time, the conversion is difficult; all the more with the addition of an ambition which seems to me equal among human passions to love, anger, and jealousy." On June 8, 1852, M. d'Azeglio wrote to Panizzi in London: "What you write me about him who considers himself as my antagonist, is perhaps true. But first it is not in my nature to make certain base wars; then, I think that as he is a man of much capacity (and there are not many such) it is well to keep him in reputation, so that, though he has not been able to serve now, he may serve later." Panizzi, p. 236.

²⁷ *Lettere*, I, 513.

gerous man. D'Azeglio, already too conscious of his own inability to cope with Cavour, wrote to his nephew, in London, to weave a little plot for bringing the "wicked rival" to his senses. 'He will of course see Palmerston, Minto, Gladstone, and others; persuade them to intimate to him that as in this world we have to deal with the world inside and out, he cannot hope to make everything and everybody bend as used to be the case in the house of his marquis father—and *Vicario*.' "I realize," Massimo adds naïvely, "that what I suggest is hard and that these gentlemen will be little disposed to undertake to skin those cats." ²⁸

Cavour on his side displayed no amateurishness in plotting. He made no secret that he was a candidate for the succession, and through his trusty friends, Farini, Castelli, San Martino, he kept in touch with the situation at home. He did not wish to wreck the Cabinet so long as it made any head against Reaction; but he would force it to keep its pledges. The independence and integrity of Piedmont should suffer through no act of his: but he regarded it as both lawful and patriotic to work to strengthen his party and to hasten the day of its triumph. In Paris he saw Thiers, an old acquaintance, who said to him: "If after having made you eat snakes for breakfast they serve them up again at dinner, don't be disgusted"; ²⁹ at which Cavour remarks, privately, that if Thiers himself had swallowed a few more snakes, France might not be in so desperate a plight. But his chief object was to propitiate and fathom Louis Napoleon, whose hold on France, he predicted, would be long if he flattered the Democratic instincts of the masses and did not permit himself to be carried too far by the Reactionist torrent. ³⁰ Napoleon and his Ministers received Cavour very cordially, listening with apparent sympathy to his exposition of the situation in Piedmont. Cavour desired particularly to dissuade them from the notion that he was unsafe, or that the *Connubio* portended a lurch towards Radicalism. He even summoned Rattazzi to Paris and presented him to the Prince President, who told Fould: "I am delighted to have known M. Rattazzi. A quarter of an hour's conversation sufficed to destroy the false opinion I had of him. They told me that he was hot-headed: I found him very reasonable." ³¹ Cavour left

²⁸ N. Bianchi: *Mass. d'Azeglio*, 204.

³⁰ *Lettere*, I, 539.

²⁹ *Lettere*, I, 513.

³¹ *Ibid*, 546.

nothing undone to secure the good will of the French. "As you have often reminded me," he wrote Castelli, "it is above all on France that our destiny hangs. Whether we will or not, we must be her partner in the great game, which, sooner or later, will be played in Europe." ³²

In England he had a warm welcome from both the Tories, recently restored to power, and the Whigs. The English admired little Piedmont, ³³ with a sportsman's admiration for a plucky little fighter. Incidentally, they had a financial interest in her prosperity. Her gallant resistance to Papal aggression particularly pleased them, for they were still nervous over the secession of a few Anglicans to Rome. But Cavour assured himself that in case of war the sympathy of England, whether Whigs or Tories were in office, would be limited to the expression of friendly sentiments. ³⁴ After his habit, he inspected whatever might be of profit to Piedmont, visiting particularly the naval establishments at Woolwich, Portsmouth, and Gosport. "I shall not be any better sailor for that," he wrote, "but at least when any one talks to me about a great arsenal, I shall know what is meant." ³⁵ He found that D'Azeglio was still the name to conjure with in London. "Ninety-five per cent of the English public men absolutely know only him, and attribute to him all that has been done in Piedmont." ³⁶ To his surprise, Lord Malmesbury told him that both England and France desired Cavour's return to the Cabinet, ³⁷ and that D'Azeglio himself wished it. Was this Massimo's little plot? "Happily, even startling things do not disconcert me," Cavour wrote La Marmora; and he replied to Malmesbury that, although he was charmed at this expression of goodwill, the party he represented had been treated so cavalierly by D'Azeglio that he could not return to office without receiving full satisfaction for it. ³⁸ To this Malmesbury replied: "Naturally, you cannot return without your friends." ³⁹ "You see," Cavour adds, "how wrong is the opinion of those who

³² *Lettere*, I, 542.

■ See remarkable article on Piedmont, *Edinburgh*

Review, July, 1852; vol. 96, pp. 36-54.

³⁴ *Lettere*, I, 516.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 526.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 515 (July 16, 1852).

³⁷ To Malmesbury Cavour replied, "But I cannot go back alone; I represent ■ party which I have labored to create, and which, assuredly, I am not inclined to desert." Malmesbury rejoined: "Very naturally, you cannot return to office without your friends." F. Mogliotti: *Urbano Rattazzi* (Pinerolo, 1862), 117.

³⁸ *Lettere*, I, 527; Aug. 5.

■ *Ibid*.

think I am disposed to reënter the Ministry like the prodigal son. I have counseled and still counsel prudence, but never the abnegation of one's own dignity. I will never have any official relation with D'Azeglio as head of a Ministry." ⁴⁰

"Piedmont's factotum," as Cavour called himself, mingled pleasure with business. He spent a fortnight or more in Scotland, which enchanted him — "above all, Edinburgh." "If the Reaction ever triumphs and chases us out of Italy, we will come, if you take my advice, and settle here! There is a mixture of ancient and modern, of Greek and Gothic, of simple and select, which makes of Edinburgh a unique city. The only thing which seems to me not very agreeable is the climate, but a Piedmontese has no right to be fussy." ⁴¹ "While so many persons imagine me as preoccupied with politics, crazy for office, weaving intrigues, I go about with Walter Scott in my bag, visiting the places he has made famous. Massimo does the idyllic at Sestri: well, I do the romanticist among the lakes of the West and the mountains of the North of Scotland." ⁴²

On his way home, Cavour stopped again at Paris, where Rattazzi joined him, and at Geneva. While holding to his resolution to be patient, he chafed more and more at the signs of incompetence in the Piedmontese Cabinet. "It is time that the comedy D'Azeglio is playing should end," he wrote Ponza di San Martino; "if he wishes to remain in office, let him say so, and he shall have in us sincere allies. But if he is tired of power, let him get out, and stop rendering the government problem almost insoluble by his perpetual hesitations." ⁴³ Late in October, Cavour reached Turin and hurried to Leri, as if the state of his rice-fields were for him the most pressing concern in the world.

D'Azeglio's Ministry was hurrying to a crisis. Its weakness in the ordinary routine of administration had been growing more patent from month to month. And now it had to confront the subtlest of its enemies, the Vatican. In the preceding session a bill to authorize civil marriage was introduced into the Chamber. The Pope not only launched his anathema against it, but addressed to Victor Emanuel a letter warning him that this was equivalent to legalizing "concubinage." The King, whose religion,

⁴⁰ *Lettere*, I, 534.

⁴² *Ibid*, 532; Aug. 15.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 534.

■ *Ibid*, 538, Sept. 4.

like that of all his ancestors, had a superstitious basis, shrank from doing what the head of the Church branded as impious, and declared to his Cabinet that he would never approve a law which "might displease the Pope" (Oct. 21). D'Azeglio would gladly have avoided the clash, but he had pledged himself to support the new law, and he was a man of his word. Dreading the opposition, more or less active, of Cavour in the Chamber,⁴⁴ he would have restored him to the Cabinet if the "wicked rival" had consented. He did not feel strong enough to withstand the King's anti-Liberal aberration. He decided to retire. "The hour of dying," he said to his colleagues, "comes at one time or another for all, but the hour of dishonoring one's self ought never to come."⁴⁵ Accordingly, they resigned.⁴⁶ Victor Emanuel at once summoned Cavour, and asked him to form a ministry on condition that no further ecclesiastical legislation should be taken up until a compact had been arranged with the Pope. Cavour replied that he could not accept on these terms (Oct. 24). "I am sure of the King's loyalty," he wrote a friend. "The astuteness of the priests and D'Azeglio's feebleness have led him astray; he misunderstands the state of the country. As soon as facts have disabused him, he will send the Clerical Party to the Devil *before its time*."⁴⁷ Then the King turned to the venerable Balbo, who set about the unpleasant task, but failed at the outset to secure the coöperation of Revel, on whom he had counted.⁴⁸ Perforce, therefore, Victor Emanuel had to send again for Cavour (Nov. 2) who, while refusing to withdraw the civil marriage bill, agreed not to make it a Cabinet question, and was willing to negotiate with the Holy See with a view to reëstablishing friendly relations.⁴⁹ On November 4, Cavour and the new Ministry — known in history as the Great Ministry — began their work.⁵⁰

⁴⁴ N. Bianchi: *M. d'Azeglio*, 213.

⁴⁵ *Lettere*, I, 271.

⁴⁶ M. d'Azeglio gives his nephew a terse account of the cabinet crisis in a letter of Nov. 7, 1852. N. Bianchi: *M. d'Azeglio*, 214-16.

⁴⁷ *Lettere*, I, 551-52; Oct. 29.

⁴⁸ C. d'Azeglio, 453-59, gives vivid peeps behind the scenes during this crisis.

⁴⁹ As Balbo read a list of possible ministers, one more Reactionary than the other, the King stopped him. "Enough, enough," he said brusquely; "I have summoned M. de Cavour." C. d'Azeglio, 458.

⁵⁰ The Cabinet comprised Cavour, president and minister of finance; Dabor-mida, foreign affairs; Boncompagni, grace and justice; La Marmora, war; Palco-papa, public works; Cibrario, public instruction.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONDITION OF AUSTRIANIZED ITALY

WHEN Cavour became Premier in November, 1852, Piedmont had been for nearly three years an oasis of Liberalism in the midst of a Sahara of Reaction. Not only official Italy, but official Europe was trying to forget the year of Revolution. The immense conservative forces latent in society came to the aid of the special classes who now hoped to secure themselves in their recovered privileges. Everybody not actually a fanatic admitted before the end of 1849 the failure of the mighty but mismanaged struggle for popular liberty and nationality. The instinctive craving for order gained on multitudes who had either taken part in the upheaval or sympathized with it. Even the middle classes, which in several countries had at stake an equal prize with the people, were ready to cry quits. Business and commerce, interrupted or checked, required peace, and business is an opponent against which, in the long run, even religion and patriotism, unless they be inspired by the zeal that upholds martyrs, cannot make head. The great inventions of the previous half-century — the expansion of manufactures, the adoption of railways, the springing up of industries employing large numbers of hands — tended to strengthen the claims of business. Society, organized on an industrial basis, must have routine, and routine is the antithesis of revolution.

Louis Napoleon, the wildest of all the adventurers swept into power in 1848, knew this, and by appealing to their need of quiet for prosecuting their industries, he captured the French, the stormiest of all the peoples in that revolutionary crisis. His enemies voted for him because they believed that he alone could save them from the Commune, with its red flag and barricades, its massacres, pillage and civil war. And now France was glad to believe his assurance that the Empire meant peace. Germany fell back even more easily than France into the comfortable ways of Reaction. The German Liberals had proved themselves

doctrinaires rather than doers; the hold of feudal ideals and the idolatry of caste were too strong to be abolished by a group of enthusiasts in a short-lived revolt. The German Governments varied in the degree to which they carried reaction, but they all accepted its main principles, and the smaller states settled themselves complacently to watch the struggle for primacy between Prussia and Austria, leaning now towards one and now towards the other as their interest suggested. Austria herself, having come as by a miracle through the ordeal of disruption at Vienna and at Prague, in Italy and in Hungary, returned with what her critics denounced as brutal frankness to her policy of Absolutism. She acted consistently on the theory that conquered rebels have no rights. Even England, the citadel of constitutional freedom, did not escape the general reaction, in so far, at least, as it caused her forward movement to halt. She had had her nervous flurry over Chartism. She was beginning to perceive that the extension of the franchise, pushed to its logical conclusion, would give the majority of votes, if not the political control of the Kingdom, to the masses in whom she put no trust. Free trade and industrial development were making her so rich, that she wished to shun political experiments which might disturb her prosperity. Very willingly, she adopted the unheroic policy of "prudence at home and peace abroad."

Conservatism has deep roots in human nature. "Let well enough alone," counsels the forgotten sage; and Shakespeare warns us to bear those ills we have rather than fly to others that we know not of. Fortune, the Unexpected, plays so large a part in life! The Conservative flatters himself that he can deal, and deal successfully, with only the known and the tried, the system which has stood the test of time. Often, he is not consciously selfish. He has a religion, a philosophy, a political theory that honestly teach him that God created most men with bits in their mouths and saddles on their backs, and a few others, booted and spurred, to ride them. He is as sincere in exhorting his saddled kinsmen to do their duty in that state of life into which it has pleased God to call them, as he is in making himself a first-class rider. In proportion as his religion influences his conduct he inclines less and less to meddle with the established order of things. Who is he, forsooth, to attempt to bring to a level of equality those whom

God sends into the world hopelessly unequal? Jesus said, "The poor always ye have with you": how impious, therefore, to dream of doing away with poverty, a condition which the Saviour himself seemed to recognize as necessary.

Reaction is Conservatism in an acute form. It has the virtue of being hysterically sincere. The spectator who studies it from the outside seldom gives credit to the reasons by which it justifies itself to its partisans. He is indignant at the cruelty, disgusted at the greed, contemptuous at the bungling; and all the while the Reactionists may be honestly persuading themselves that they stand in the breach between civilization and on-rushing chaos. More than ever was this true of the Reactionists who regained control of Europe in 1849. They laid no claims to unselfishness, but they could say to the Revolutionists whom they had subdued: "You have had your chance, and proved yourselves utterly incompetent. You promised us Utopia and gave us havoc; your liberty is anarchy, your equality is envy, your fraternity is hatred." And so they proceeded to deal with the crushed Liberals, Socialists and Republicans — among whom they made no distinctions — as the keepers of an insane asylum deal with homicidal maniacs who have broken out and been recaptured. There was a disposition, indeed, to regard the Revolution as a species of collective insanity from which society had suffered, and from a recurrence of which it must be protected. The Revolution taught the privileged classes that their only safety lay in no compromise; it confirmed their beliefs that reform, however smooth and persuasive it might sound in speech, would in practice lead inevitably to destruction. As they identified their interest with that of society, they assumed that whatever measures they adopted to promote their own welfare must be for the general good.

No other country felt the hand of repression so heavy as Italy: for no other, not even Hungary, had risen out of such depths and soared to such exhilarating heights. During the three years between the election of Pius IX and the battle of Novara, the Italians lived in an enchanted world, where the dreams of a thousand years seemed just coming true: Italy was to be independent; her sons, citizens of a free country, could look any one straight in the eyes; the race from which had sprung a world-religion, the

medieval republics, a great literature, painting, sculpture, architecture, the culture of the Renaissance, could at last resume its place in the vanguard of progress. Then came sudden disaster and the Icarian fall.

The Restoration of the Old Régime was most odious in Lombardy and Venetia, because there it brought back the foreign masters. Austrian influences prevailed again in the Duchies and in Tuscany and in Naples, but the Lombards and Venetians had to bear in addition the bodily presence of the Austrians themselves. Their provinces were placed under martial law, and Field-Marshal Radetzky, the veteran of four score and three years¹ recently victorious at Custozza and Novara, was appointed governor-general. If ever a soldier deserved the gratitude of his sovereign that man was Radetzky. Though driven from Milan by the surprising insurrection of March, 1848, he lost neither head nor heart. He rallied his fugitive troops in the Quadrilateral, checked the onslaught of the elated Italians, waited, stubbornly waited, for reinforcements which might never reach him; was unmoved by news of the general dissolution of the Government at Vienna and of the Emperor's flight: and when the time came, he turned and crushed his foe. Verona was a mighty fortress and Mantua was well-nigh impregnable, but without the determination in Radetzky's heart, Verona and Mantua and Italy itself would probably have been lost forever to Austria. And not only Italy, the Hapsburg dynasty and the existence of its polyglot Empire, held together by the balancing of mutual antagonisms, depended on Radetzky's rocklike stability. He was not a master of warfare, but he had an iron resolution, which won battles without fighting them, and proved the salvation of his cause.

Until 1852 the Constitution extorted from the Emperor in 1848 was supposed to be in force, but Radetzky paid no attention to it. A soldier, he naturally chose the soldier's way of exacting obedience. Cruel punishments did not move him: indeed, he evidently believed that a display of cruelty would serve as an effective deterrent against further rebellion. It was a time when physicians who did not know what else to do bled their patients. Radetzky favored blood-letting, not only for its wholesome effect

¹ Born in 1766; died in 1858.

on the patient, but for the relief it gave the operator. The Austrian officers and soldiers thirsted to be revenged on the people that had humiliated them in 1848. They had always regarded the Italians as effeminate and servile; yet those creatures whom they despised had chased them from Milan and Venice and almost wrested Northern Italy from them. Radetzky felt no reluctance against allowing his men to let off some of their pent-up wrath. He did not look too closely into the cases of Italians arrested on political or treasonable charges; nor did he reprove his lieutenant, Marshal Haynau, who, having put down the revolt at Brescia, unmoved alike by the magnificent heroism of the vanquished and by the demands of common humanity, took an atrocious vengeance on the Brescians. An affair which passed under Radetzky's own eye illustrated the temper of the Governor-General, the Austrians and the natives. On the Emperor's birthday (Aug. 18, 1849) the Austrians had their appropriate celebration, with *Te Deums* in the Duomo, and a military parade; but the Milanese held sullenly aloof. A certain Annetta Olivari, a glove-dealer by day and a courtesan in the favor of Austrian officers by night, flaunted the Imperial colors from her window. Italian passers-by shook their heads, murmured, and hissed, while Austrians in the Caffé Mazza opposite clapped their hands and laughed derisively. A crowd collected: then suddenly platoons of soldiers, with bayonets fixed, rushed upon the scene. Some of the Italians were jabbed or trampled and several were arrested. After a mock trial, fifteen men and two women were stripped and flogged in public at the Castello.² Others went to prison. By Radetzky's command the Olivari woman received from the Municipality of Milan a present of 30,000 lire. Worst of all, the Municipality paid perforce five florins 17½ kreutzers for ice and vinegar, eight florins for the rods used, and four florins for the services of the soldiers detailed to act as nurses to the victims of the flogging.³ If a victim was on the point of fainting, he was given vinegar to smell, until he regained sufficient strength to bear the rest of the blows allotted to him: to flog an unconscious person would have been, of course, a waste of time and muscle. When the punishment was over, ice was rubbed on the bleeding welts and more vinegar was applied to the nostrils.

² Aug. 23, 1849. ³ Zini, I, i, 68-70. Tivaroni, I, 8-10; itemized bill on p. 10.

But there are smarts deeper than the flesh can feel, wounds to pride and decency which will not close, and these were inflicted upon the Milanese by the brutal charges for ice, vinegar and rods.

In further evidence that Radetzky could not be accused of untimely mildness, the number of political executions in Lombardy in a brief year reached 961.⁴ "The aftermath of an unsuccessful rebellion is injustice and suffering." As the Austrian authorities construed liberally the term "political offense," the tale of their victims swelled accordingly. A workman caught urging some companions not to smoke, was sentenced to 50 lashes for disloyalty. To own a fire-arm or deadly weapon, to circulate anti-Austrian publications, to know of a conspiracy without denouncing it, were capital crimes. The Italians adopted an attitude of passive resistance which galled their masters. They abandoned the theatres and everyday places of amusement: they took no part in festivals; they shunned intercourse with the Austrians: they even renewed their war on tobacco (effective in January, 1848) as a means of reducing the revenue. In these ways and in others they nettled their conquerors.

Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, the Austrian Premier, seems to have wished to harass the Italians as little as was compatible with a firm administration; but Radetzky, whose methods were stern and summary, applied the law. An imperial decree of October 16, 1849, separated Lombardy and Venetia into two kingdoms,⁵ with a governor-general, Radetzky, over both; Montecuccoli and Strassoldo, heads respectively of the civil and military departments: Carl Schwarzenberg, lieutenant for Lombardy and Baron Puchner for Venetia. Proclamations were issued containing pleasant phrases — the writers of such documents became expert euphemists — but no euphemism could gloss the hateful facts that rankled in the Italians' hearts. They submitted, of necessity, to the physical repression, recognizing that they were in a plight where the law of the stronger was bound to rule; but they resented the unceasing demands of the tax-gatherers. According to Italian authorities, Radetzky levied on the Lombards incidentally contributions amounting to over one hundred

⁴ Tivaroni, I, 10; from Aug. 6, 1848 to Aug. 22, 1849; I have been unable to verify this figure.

⁵ The word in the decree is *regni*.

million lire in the half year between the Salasco Armistice and the renewal of hostilities, and when Novara left him complete master of the situation, he used the Emperor's Italian subjects as if they were conquered foreigners. He punished rich magnates and merchants by mulcting them of large sums. Corporations and municipalities did not escape: even the Great Hospital at Milan was held up for 300,000 lire. The province of Mantua had imposed on it a special fine amounting to 400,000 lire; Brescia, which had already paid six and a half millions, was squeezed again for 90,000 lire, besides 12,000 lire for the expense of the trial and execution of the insurgents, and 14,000 lire for the powder and shot used in bombarding the city. A tactful conqueror would not have presented these last bills. Then there was a deficit of a million and a half for military expenses in 1848, and a special levy of six millions a month throughout 1849 for the army. The fixed taxes were likewise increased; the *imposta prediale*, for instance, was made to yield 58 millions instead of 38 millions of Austrian lire; the inheritance tax in Lombardy rose to five per cent. as against three per cent. in the Transalpine states of the Empire. Zini estimates that Lombardy-Venetia contributed 120,000,000 lire a year, of which sum only 50 millions were expended for the benefit of the contributing provinces; he computes, further, that the extraordinary levies in two years aggregated 200,000,000 of lire.⁶ That all the high offices should be filled by Austrians was to be expected; but the salaries paid, amounting to about 770,000 lire a year, seemed to the Italians exorbitant.⁷ The historian will probably never be able to verify many of these figures, but there can be no doubt — first, that Austria extorted enormous sums partly for vengeance and partly for punishment; next, that Austria established a permanent scheme of taxation more burdensome for Lombardy-Venetia than for other parts of the Empire;⁸ and, finally, that the Italians construed this unfair apportionment as a sign that Austria regarded them and their property as mere plunder to be disposed of at the conquerors' will.

⁶ Zini, I, i, 249–51.

⁷ 768,186 lire is the exact figure according to Cesati, quoted by Tivaroni, I, 12.

⁸ Czörnig: *Ethnographie von Oesterreich* (Vienna, 1857), v, 78, gives Lombardy in 1857, 2,741,000 inhabitants and Venetia 1,884,646. See also R. Bonghi: *La Vita ■ I Tempi di Valentino Pasini* (Florence, 1867), pp. 687–96, 713–24.

This feeling was intensified by Austria's treatment of the political emigrants. On August 12, 1849, Radetzky announced an amnesty for all Lombards and Venetians, absent for political causes, who should return to their homes before the end of the following September. He excepted 86 persons⁹ who "on account of their unjustifiable perseverance in revolutionary ways and of their subversive tendencies," could not at present be tolerated in the Emperor's realm. The 86 proscribed included many nobles and rich bourgeois — so many, indeed, that it looked as if the government had an eye on their wealth. Many of the emigrants, however, distrusted the sincerity of the offer, and others preferred exile with freedom to home with Austrian despotism; to punish them Radetzky decreed that an old law,¹⁰ sequestrating the property of Austrian subjects who emigrated without permission, should be enforced. (March 12, 1850.) The government adopted this unpopular measure from various motives — anger, cupidity, and self-protection. The majority of the Lombard emigrants had taken shelter in Piedmont, where they were active in anti-Austrian agitation. Some of them had become naturalized as Piedmontese subjects, and some, unquestionably, were carrying on treasonable intrigues with the friends they had left behind them. By seizing their property, Austria cut off their supplies — a very logical proceeding. But it aroused from the sufferers such a storm of protest, followed by a shower of notes between Milan and Vienna, which deemed Radetzky's severity indiscreet, that the order was reversed, and by "Sovereign grace," emigrants were permitted to reside abroad, and even to become citizens of a foreign state, without forfeiting their Lombard possessions.

Venetia, a province of much scantier resources than Lombardy, and exhausted by the magnificent defense of Venice, which held out until August 22, 1849, had to submit to similar burdens. The process of reconstruction was complicated by gangs of outlaws, who infested the neighborhood of Padua, Rovigo, and

⁹ Among these were Counts Giberto and Vitaliano Borromeo; Duke Antonio Litta Arese; Count Gabrio Casati; Count Giuseppe Durini; Count Francesco Arese; Marquis Gaspare Rosales; Marquis Giorgio Raimundo; Marquis Giorgio Pallavicino Trivulzio; Vitaliano Crivelli; Cesare Correnti; Achille Mauri; Pietro Maestri; Ferrante Aporti; Anselmo Guerrieri; Cristoforo Negri; Valentino Pasini; Sebastiano Tecchio; Francesco Dall'Ongaro and Gustavo Modena.

¹⁰ Sovereign patent of 1832.

Vicenza, and when captured posed as patriots. The executions genuinely political numbered over 500. Floggings were common, not only to punish the guilty but to extract confessions from the innocent. Austria renewed her policy of crippling the city of Venice by transferring her business, shipbuilding and commerce to Trieste. She encouraged illiteracy, because she regarded ignorance and superstition as soil uncongenial to Liberalism. She spent 26,000,000 lire on the fortifications of Verona and doled out about one million a year for primary schools. Nothing escaped taxation. The revenues produced 104 million lire net in 1850 and 170 million in 1858. The population of Venetia in 1849 was about 2,250,000 and in 1858 it had risen to only 2,350,000.¹¹ It appears, therefore, that in 1850 every man, woman and child paid in ordinary taxes to the Austrian government 50 lire a year.¹²

Such was the system adopted by Austria towards her reconquered Italian subjects. Judged by the standards of the time, by the practices of Russia and Prussia towards the Poles, and of England towards the Sepoys, or even by later practices, as of the Prussians towards the Danes and of the Germans towards Alsace-Lorraine, Austria does not appear to have made a new record for severity. International public opinion took it for granted that rebels should receive no mercy. Austria acted with a two-fold purpose of taking vengeance on the offenders, and of securing herself against a second rebellion. She relied on her power to terrorize; for conciliation, she thought, might be mistaken for timidity or weakness. Radetzky cherished no delusion as to the conversion of the Lombards and Venetians into patriotic Austrians. They were war-won subjects, whom race, geography and interest would forever prevent from accepting the Hapsburg Empire as their true mother country. To hold them under effectually and to draw from them the largest possible tribute — in other words, to feed Austria's pride and fill her

¹¹ I give the figures cited by Tivaroni, I, 22-241, from Meneghini, Morpurgo, Allievi, Tegoborski, and Zannini. They differ somewhat in details, but are identical in general drift, and are confirmed by Czörnig, an unimpeachable Austrian witness.

¹² The nominal value of the Italian lira was 20 American cents; thus every inhabitant paid a tax equal to \$10 a year; but if we estimate by purchasing power \$10 in Venetia in 1850 would represent at least \$35 in 1911.

purse — were Radetzky's aims, approved by the Imperial Cabinet. This policy entailed the maintenance of the state of siege, more or less open, and of espionage and censorship, and the acknowledgment that hostility was the normal relation between the conquerors and their victims.

The Lombards and Venetians adopted a passive resistance which galled their masters. They ostracized any Italian who sought favor or employment of the Austrians, or frequented their houses. Their bill of grievances included the unnecessary roughness of officials; the impediments which poor roads put on commerce; the perpetual showing of passports; the corruption of the police, who denounced as spies persons whom they could not win over, or whom they wished to be rid of; the secrecy in regard to the administration and to the finances, which touched the Italians most nearly; trials without jury, or even a pretense of fairness; the granting of monopolies; the slowness of procedure in the civil courts; the wretched public schools; the crushing taxes; the impossibility of reaching the sovereign by petition.¹³

Such the system which Austria imposed on her five million Italians. Her example was followed zealously by the princelings who owed to her their restoration and the guarantee of their continuance. Francis V, on returning to Modena (August, 1849),¹⁴ soon showed that he had no Liberal intentions. He was a typical petty despot; not so cruel as his father — whom posterity remembers for his message, "Send me the hangman" — but a busybody and a martinet. In 1850 he recalled the Jesuits and entrusted to them the public education, with the result that lay education was not encouraged. Francis congratulated the University that its students were falling off; presently he closed it. He decreed that the pupils in the public schools should be required to bring certificates as to their religious state. Political discussion was a capital offense: tribunals were dominated by the police; newspapers and theatres were prohibited. With the air of a connoisseur,

¹³ See, for instance, the reasons Don Enrico Tazzoli drew up in prison for Italians' hatred of Austrian rule. Tivaroni, I, 2.

¹⁴ On Aug. 11 Francis V appointed the following ministers: Foreign affairs, Count Giuseppe Forni; interior, Count Luigi Giacobazzi; good government, Marquis Luigi De-Buoi; justice, Rinaldo Scozia; finance, Ferdinando Tarabini; commander of troops, Gen. Agostino Saccozzi. See Bayard de Volo: *Vita di Francesco V.* Modena, 1878-79, I, 293.

Francis lamented that the "timely and wholesome death penalty is so seldom applied."¹⁵ He boasted that he was the only sovereign in Europe who really ruled: and yet, while seeming to be his own master, he entered into a customs league with Austria, and was in every essential the obedient servant of the power which propt up his throne.¹⁶

Parma had a similar experience with her petty despot, Charles III of Bourbon, who began by promising a constitution, "suitable to the exigencies of the times and to the maxims of a sane policy, one to assure to our people true happiness and true liberty which cannot exist apart from order and from obedience to the laws"; and then he dropped back into unmitigated Absolutism. He was a drunkard and a debauchee, whose palace, according to report, was the scene of abominations which recalled the worst days of the Farnese. He hated alike the priests and his wife, their bigoted follower. He not only meddled in every detail of administration, but in petty affairs, as when he forbade magistrates, civil and judicial office-holders, and all members of the Court, except military officers and knights, to wear "full beards, moustaches, or goatees," but allowed them to indulge in whiskers, of the sort known as *favoris*. Earrings were forbidden for all. The uniform prescribed for civilians as well as for the military required a sword.¹⁷ No lawyer nor doctor might practice without a diploma signed by the Duke. He closed the high schools (*scuole superiori*) of Parma and Piacenza, and punished students for attending the funeral of a Liberal professor. The supporters of the provisional government he condemned to pay a fine of 587,000 lire. The persons with whom he surrounded himself were so corrupt that the people nicknamed them *Birboni* (great rascals), a play on his own family name in Italian — Borbone. He looked to Austria for a garrison of 8000 soldiers which cost four million lire in eight years.¹⁸

Charles prided himself chiefly on his nicely graded scheme of

¹⁵ La Varenne: *L'Italie Centrale*, 226.

¹⁶ For the other side read Bayard de Volo's panegyric of Francis V, vol. I, chaps. 22-24, 28, 30. The eulogy, which some critics might regard as fulsome if applied to Washington, buries the facts under a shower of roses.

¹⁷ See *I Borboni di Parma, nelle Leggi, ecc. dal 1847 al 1859*. (Parma, 1860.) Decree of Jan. 25, 1853. The officials were classified in eight grades.

¹⁸ La Varenne: *L'Italie Cent.*, 265. The editor of *I Borboni di Parma* estimates the cost at 2,000,000 lire; see section "Erario," 4.

punishments, and their rigorous enforcement. The courts were ordered to apply the following "criminal penalties": 1. Death. 2. Solitary confinement for life. 3. Limited solitary confinement, that is from 5 to 20 years. 4. Hard labor, from 3 to 20 years. 5. Imprisonment from 1 to 3 years. 6. Perpetual banishment. 7. Suspension of civil rights. 8. Civil death. 9. Money fines. 10. Confiscation of goods, for the crimes of *lèse-majesté* and rebellion. The following "correctional penalties" were to be applied, without trial, by the police or by the agents of public safety: 1. Imprisonment up to one year, with or without hard labor. 2. Relegation (that is deportation to some other town) for from 6 months to 2 years. 3. Corporal chastisement, with rod or cowhide. 4. The short chain. 5. The shackles or stocks.¹⁹ 6. Prison, with bread and water. 7. The political *precetto*.²⁰ 8. Money fines.²¹ Charles of Parma regarded flogging as an excellent form of punishment, and he amused himself by watching it. On one occasion, a parasite who sat beside him remarked jocosely, as the blood spirted from the victim's back, or the lash tore off strips of flesh — "That's for Charles Albert! and that's for Pius IX! and that's for Italy!"²² On youths under 18 and on women switches were used; on male adults the heavy rod, the blows not to be fewer than 5 or more than 20: but this limit was often exceeded, although 40 blows were regarded as deadly even for strong men. As the executioner received at the rate of one Austrian lira for every 20 lashes,²³ he did not complain when sentences were heavy. We dwell on these hideous details because they justified the loathing which the Parmese and Modenese came to feel for their rulers, and they explain why the hatred of the Italians was implacable. To be tyrannized over at all was bad enough; but to be tyrannized over by cowards, who made Austria's pro-

¹⁹ I am unable to learn that stocks were used as late as this; but shackles or fetters were common.

²⁰ The *precetto* empowered the police, without warrant or trial, to require a person to dwell in a certain town, or a certain quarter, and to report at specified hours every day at the police office, and forbade him from going out after certain hours, from holding intercourse with persons named and from frequenting the theatres. "In the Roman States and with the Archdukes," adds La Varenne, writing in 1859, "there were few notable persons not in *precetto*." *L'Ital. Cent.*, 72, n.

²¹ La Varenne: *Les Autrichiens et L'Italie* (Paris, 1859).

²² La Varenne: *Ibid.*, 222.

²³ See *I Borboni*, *passim*. La Varenne: *Les Autrichiens*, chapters on Modena and Parma.

tection a screen for their own cruelty, was unendurable. Apologists for the Dukes long since threw up their task, after 1860, when the publication of the official decrees and orders²⁴ left nothing to be said; unless it be a valid extenuation that Charles III by debauchery brought on himself outbreaks of madness during which he gloated over cruelties.²⁵

The political significance of the condition of the Duchies lies in their subservience to Austria. In 1847, Francis V wrote confidently: "If my own forces do not suffice, I have a reserve of 300,000 men behind the Po."²⁶ That Austrian reserve failed him in 1848, but it restored him to his throne in 1849. He knew, and Charles III and all the other restored Absolutists knew, that their existence depended on Austria, and Austria of course encouraged their sense of dependence. Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, whose ability as a statesman has been very much underestimated by posterity, conceived the plan of binding all the Italian States except Piedmont to Austria. He established the customs union, which gave them commercial reasons for clinging to the Empire; he leased to them regiments, which enabled them to bully and martyr their subjects with impunity; and he urged them to join a secret league for mutual protection, for boycotting Piedmont, and for stamping out the last traces of Liberalism in the Peninsula.²⁷

During the Revolution, Tuscany acquitted herself with the least credit of all the Italian States. The heroism of her University Legion at Curtatone alone redeemed her record. Her intellectuals showed the least capacity for leadership, her Radicals sank the quickest into demagoguery, her Grand Duke most completely lost his reputation for honor. As soon as they saw that a restoration was inevitable, the Provisional Committee, composed

²⁴ *Documenti Risguardanti il Governo degli Austro-Estensi in Modena dal 1814 al 1859*. Modena, 1860. Published by Farini during his dictatorship in 1859: as the volumes are neither paged continuously nor indexed they are inconvenient to cite.

²⁵ The reader who has not access to *I Borboni di Parma* and the *Documenti Austro-Estensi*, will find the best summary of their contents in C. de La Varenne's *L'Italie Centrale*. Neuilly, 1858. The salient features are given also by Tivaroni, Reuchlin, Zini, etc., etc.

²⁶ La Varenne: *L'Ital. Cent.*, 195.

²⁷ Schwarzenberg to Hügel at Florence, Aug. 21, 1851. *Stor. Doc.*, vi, 569. Also, Reuchlin, iii, 123.

of the intellectuals and upper class Moderates, urgently invited Leopold to return from his refuge at Gaeta. They assured him that they abhorred the anarchy into which Tuscany had fallen without his guidance, and made it clear that they regarded him as a great and noble ruler, whose presence would suffice to bring back peace and prosperity to his adoring subjects. They were palpably, almost ludicrously insincere, but their aim was patriotic; for they hoped by flattering Leopold to save him from falling into the power of the Reactionists and to prevent an Austrian invasion. If he resumed his reign in the Pitti Palace, amid the vivas of all Tuscany that was respectable, there would be no excuse for the intrusion of the white-coated Imperial troops. Leopold listened blandly to the sugary subtleties which neither he nor his flatterers believed, and all the while, he, like a practical man, was secretly negotiating with Radetzky to send an army corps. The Austrians crossed the frontier in May, took Leghorn by assault, triumphantly marched into Florence with myrtle leaves bound round their helmets, and overran the Grand duchy. No doubt, the Radicals had brought Leghorn to a state of terror; but even those Tuscans who rejoiced at the restoration of order, blushed to see the work done by a foreign invader. General d'Aspre was a man after Radetzky's heart: he killed four hundred of the Livornese, levied a tribute of 1,200,000 lire on the city, established martial law and proceeded to deal with the Tuscans everywhere as a conquered people. Flogging was introduced; the death penalty — long since abolished — was revived; the Tuscan regiments were dressed in Austrian uniforms; and when an appeal for mercy was made in behalf of several condemned prisoners, it was referred not to the Grand Duke but to Radetzky.

While the Moderates persisted in asserting that Leopold himself regretted the truculence of the Austrians, he kept up his part of the comedy until he deemed it safe to return to his capital, where his fickle subjects received him with joyous demonstrations. He granted a partial amnesty, appointed a Reactionist cabinet, and appeared at an official reception in the uniform of an Austrian field-marshal. His chief commissioner, Count Seristori, who was either an incredible dupe or as finished a knave as Leopold himself, retired with extraordinary honors. The Cabinet found it easy to discern the highest wisdom in Leopold's com-

mands. Even the very best of Tuscany's best citizens — men like Gino Capponi, blind and venerable, and Ubaldino Peruzzi, gonfaloniere of Florence — continued to treat the Grand Duke as if they counted on his sincerity; or at least on their power to win him back.²⁸ Leopold might well claim that, whatever he may have said to them, they could blame only themselves for misconstruing what he did. The Austrian occupation, which Serristori declared in the spring had come to pass without Leopold's sanction, was now made permanent by Leopold's request. He took into his pay 10,000 Austrian troops — "auxiliaries," he called them — which the Emperor was very glad to have maintained at another's cost.²⁹ By the summer of 1850 the Austrianization of Tuscany was complete. A censorship gagged free speech; newspapers were suppressed; even religious liberty, the boast of Tuscany since the days of the great Leopold, was sacrificed through a concordat³⁰ which restored to the Church many powers previously exercised by the State. To expedite the punishment of political offenders and suspects, the Grand Duke conferred judicial powers on police officers and prefects, authorizing them to keep suspects in jail without trial.³¹ The pursuit of political victims became not only retroactive but also precautionary. Thus when Colonel Spannocchi and other Sieneſe gentlemen protested against a sentence to three years' imprisonment, they were informed that they were punished not for past crimes, but to prevent the crimes which they might in future commit.³² When friends of the heroes of Curtatone laid garlands on the memorial to them in Santa Croce, Leopold issued an order forbidding the commemoration of the patriotic youths and denouncing the garland-bringers as "libertines."³³ Very different the wild enthusiasm which earlier had greeted Radetzky's entry into Florence, when the populace cheered him in the streets, and court ladies at the Pitti reception kissed his hand and plucked the plumes from his chapeau to keep as precious relics.³⁴ In

²⁸ Ricasoli, II, 43-44; U. Peruzzi, to Ricasoli, Nov. 21, 1849.

²⁹ The Austrian contingent was not withdrawn till May 24, 1856; it was paid 36,614,739 lire, to which should be added many millions more for miscellaneous expenses. La Varenne says it numbered 30,000, but this is an extravagant figure. *Italie Centrale*, 69. ³⁰ Text in Tivaroni, I, 149-52; signed April 25, 1851.

³¹ Text in La Varenue, *L'Ital. Cent.*, 72-74; police officers might, without judicial sanction, inflict imprisonment for eight days and prefects for three months.

■ *Ibid.*, 74.

■ Tivaroni, I, 154.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 145.

July, 1850, Leopold paid a visit of homage to his Imperial nephew at Vienna. Shortly after his return he announced that, as the conditions of the time did not suit representative government, he dissolved the General Council, assumed temporarily full powers himself, and handed over the censorship to the police. Thereupon the Municipality of Florence voted to send the Grand Duke an address in which they would respectfully inform him of the "anxiety of pacific citizens, through doubt at the indefinite term set for the restoration of constitutional methods." Leopold immediately dismissed Peruzzi, the gonfaloniere, and forbade the address from being presented.³⁵ The Moderates did not abandon, however, their efforts to convert their renegade ruler. "Salvagnoli, Galeotti and the best of our best citizens," wrote Vincenzo Ricasoli to his brother Bettino (Jan. 10, 1850), "lose their time asking for a Constitution, not perceiving that now Tuscany has ceased to exist, and that she can be only a province united to another State."³⁶ That State was Austria.

On May 6, 1852, Leopold abolished the Constitution, having made it a laughing-stock, and disbanded the Civic Guard. The last vestige of the golden dreams of 1848 vanished. Up to the Revolution, none of the Italian princes, except Pius IX, had been as much respected as Leopold II. His conduct during and after the Revolution stamped him as a liar and a sneak, without honor and without courage. Nobody expected either heroism or decency from the Archdukes of Modena and Parma or from the King of Naples; but Leopold's defection was shocking in proportion to his supposed integrity.

The Tuscans felt keenly being his dupes, and having the brutal measures of Austrianization used on them.³⁷ For they regarded themselves as the quickest-witted of the Italians, far too cultivated a people to be put to the rough test of martial law or to be deprived of free speech and a free press. They had among them

³⁵ Tivaroni, I, 148.

³⁶ Ricasoli, II, 65.

³⁷ Kinney from Turin announces to Webster on July 22, 1852, the retirement of the Tuscan ministers. "Reactionary and faithful to the cause of absolutism as they had proved themselves to be, they were not, it is understood here, sufficiently subservient to the Court of Rome to satisfy the wishes of their emasculate chief, and they preferred retirement to subserviency to the ambitious views of the Order of Jesuits. Tuscany retains scarcely the semblance of a political sovereignty." *Amer. Arch.*

excellent talkers, clear thinkers, ready debaters, and if Italy could have been redeemed by the tongue alone, Tuscany would have led in the struggle for independence. Of competent doers, however, with one exception, she had none. That exception, Bettino Ricasoli, a man quite un-Tuscan in his taciturnity and in his Puritan austerity, had been swept aside when the revolution at Florence passed into Democratic control. Like all his friends in the Moderate Party, he accepted the restoration as inevitable. The thing to do now is "to make oneself forgotten," he wrote Salvagnoli, the trenchant lawyer; and so he devoted himself to educating his daughter abroad and to cultivating his vineyards at home. Some of his associates indulged that vein of satire which is the special gift of the Florentines; others desponded; Gino Capponi, who but for blindness might also have been a doer, solaced himself with his historical studies; Giusti, the most caustic of modern political poets, died of nervous disease aggravated by disappointment at the failure of the Revolution.³⁸ The situation of Tuscany was fairly well described by Lambruschini: "There are some Court and priestly dregs, but no more than those wrongly called Democratic; both are good for nothing. The rest, much more numerous, maintain dignity towards those in power, and desire the good as we understand it."³⁹ Whatever its sins, a state was to be pitied which confessed itself at the mercy of its "dregs," under a prince, deceitful and despised, who owed his throne to foreign bayonets. Peculiarly rasping was it to the cultured citizens of the modern Athens, to be cut off from books and newspapers. The Grand Duke permitted to circulate only the *Tuscan Monitor*, or court gazette, which recorded his promenades and audiences, and the *Lily*, a Jesuit journal, compiled for the edification of bigoted old ladies. The keen-witted Tuscans had to bide patiently, relieving their disgust by satirical outpourings in private, or waiting, like so many Cincinnati, on their farms, to be called again into public service.

The political fact of chief significance was that Austria had

■ Shortly before Giusti died in March, 1850, he wrote a sonnet on the identity of the words *Austrians* and *Grand Duke*. It concluded thus: "The Grand Duke holds power through the Austrians; the Austrians are here for the Grand Duke; and we pay the Grand Duke and the Austrians." Reuchlin, III, 106.

³⁹ Ricasoli, II, 55; Dec. 21, 1849.

caught Tuscany in her meshes: for Tuscany belonged, by her past and by the affinities of her educated classes, in the Liberal ranks. Let the Grand Duke trust the spirit of Nationality, let him feel that the best guarantee of his own throne would be the recognition by Tuscans that he would lead them to a free and confederated Italy, was the advice of Ricasoli and his friends. The Moderates did not expect that Italy could be united under a single ruler: they hoped, at the utmost, that if a constitutional régime were introduced into all the Italian States some sort of confederation might be effected. But Austria's prepotency, leagued with the fears and dynastic instincts of an Austrian prince, chained Tuscany to the chariot of Absolutism.

CHAPTER VIII

REACTION AT ROME AND NAPLES

IN endeavoring to dominate the Restoration in the Papal States, Austria met a formidable rival — France. As soon as Louis Napoleon captured the Presidency of the French Republic he began to scheme to make his power permanent. He was embarrassed by no scruples. The Republicans still controlled the government, but the conservative classes were reasserting their influence and Louis Napoleon led each party to believe that he was its special friend. In the early spring of 1849 he and his foreign minister, Odilon Barrot, proposed to despatch an expedition to Rome ostensibly to reconcile the Romans and the Pope. The French Republic, in other words, offered her services to her dear sister republic towards restoring Pius to his throne, but on the express condition that this restoration should in nowise injure the great principles of constitutionalism and liberty by which both republics existed. If the Romans rejected this magnanimous offer, they would see the Austrians and Neapolitans carry through a restoration based on vengeance and reaction. Since the Romans could not expect, therefore, to save both their liberty and their republic, common sense ought to warn them to save their liberty. Louis Napoleon hoped to earn the gratitude of the Pope, and to cut out Austria as best friend of the Holy See.¹ This was the benevolent purpose, as publicly avowed; the secret instructions to General Oudinot who commanded the expedition differed somewhat from it: "You must not stop at any resistance that may be offered in the name of a government which nobody in Europe has recognized, and which maintains itself in Rome only against the wish of the immense majority of the inhabitants." ²

¹ Falloux, *Mémoires*, II, 129, told Veillot that Napoleon organized the scheme rather to circumvent Austria than to help the Papacy.

² Drouyn de Lhuys to Oudinot: quoted in *Rome et Napoléon*, III, by E. Bourgeois and E. Clermont (Paris: Armand Colin, 1907), 23. For Drouyn's policy throughout see Harcourt: *Quatre Ministères de M. Drouyn de Lhuys* (Paris: Plon, 1882), chap. I.

The scheme had a plausible sound: but when Oudinot landed unbidden at Cività Vecchia, he found that the Roman Republic, having lately routed an invasion of Spanish and Neapolitan troops, felt itself strong enough to maintain its independence, and was quite unwilling to talk of restoring the Pope. Negotiations ensued, in order, as it turned out, to give Oudinot time to collect more troops and cannon; then, the agreement of the French envoy, De Lesseps, was suddenly disclaimed; Oudinot attacked the city, and after a gallant resistance the Roman Republic succumbed. Louis Napoleon had succeeded in forestalling the Austrians.

The French army entered Rome on July 2, 1849, and on July 14 — the anniversary of the Bastille — Oudinot proclaimed the restoration of the Temporal Power. A fortnight later (July 31) there arrived from Gaeta three cardinals — Della Genga, Vannicelli, and Altieri, prelates of the most reactionary stripe — to conduct a provisional government in the name of Pius IX, who refused to return to his unworthy subjects until they had atoned for their rebellion by penitent submission and until the political reorganization was completed. A conflict at once arose between the Papalists and the French President: for the Papalists planned a thorough restoration, going back to the methods of Gregory XVI for their model; while Louis Napoleon, who was being deservedly censured by the French Republicans for conniving at the extinction of the Roman Republic, did not dare, or wish, to throw off his mask of Liberalism. Having suppressed the Republic, and made it possible for the Pope to return to the Quirinal whenever he chose, besides providing troops to preserve order in future, Napoleon naturally expected his views to be listened to by his beneficiaries. But the Red Triumvirate, — as the Cardinals were called, to distinguish them from their Republican predecessors,³ not on account of their purple garb but of the blood they shed,⁴ — acting under instructions from Gaeta, which they bettered out of their own zeal, pushed the reactionary restoration as fast as possible.

The diplomatic agents of the Catholic Powers, who had followed Pius to Gaeta in November, 1848, waited patiently during the winter for news of the collapse of the revolution. Their bold-

■ Mazzini, Saffi, Armellini. ♦ Roncalli: *Diario* (Bocca: Rome, 1884), 191.

ness increased as Reaction gained ground. Charles Albert's defeat at Novara brought joy to them all, and confirmed the Pope's advisers in a policy of no compromise. They were rudely startled by the announcement of the French expedition to Rome, for France was still Republican and Louis Napoleon an enigma, and Pius had hoped that Austria, whose methods he approved, would subdue his rebellious subjects. The Papal Party at Gaeta did not lose heart, however, but worked to turn the expedition to its own advantage, and simultaneously the Clericals and other conservatives at Paris impressed on the Prince President the need of maintaining friendly terms with the Church. They succeeded so well that the expedition, instead of being confessedly friendly to the sister republic, became hostile and crushed that sister. This laid upon Louis Napoleon the ambiguous task of posing as the champion of liberty and of the Pope. The French Assembly, still blatantly Republican, raged at the thought that French regiments, paid in French money, had been sent to set up the Pope as an Absolutist ruler, on his former throne. At Gaeta the French envoys (De Corcelle and Rayneval) strove in vain to move the Papal decision: both Pius and Cardinal Antonelli declared that they were prepared to lose everything rather than yield an inch.⁵ On August 11 Antonelli held his twelfth conference with the envoys at Gaeta, and told them the utmost that the Holy Father would consent to do, which amounted to the restoration of things as they had existed under Gregory XVI. Rayneval, in behalf of France, urged that the Consulta, to be appointed by the Pope, should at least have a vote on questions of taxation. Antonelli replied that this could not be: to concede so much would open the way to agitation for representative government, which the Pope "in his conscience, judges incompatible in the States of the Church with that full liberty and independence of action, for which as spiritual head of the Church he is responsible to the Catholic world." ⁶ The Austrian envoy agreed entirely with the Cardinal, and reminded his colleagues that their business was not merely to rebuild for Pius IX, but for the Papacy itself, which required an edifice assured from every revolutionary shock. When Rayneval again put in his plea for

⁵ *Stor. Doc.*, vi 241; despatch of Bargagli, Tuscan Minister, May 31, 1849.

⁶ *Ibid*, 249.

Liberal institutions, as the only safeguard against further upheaval, the Spanish plenipotentiary, Martinez de la Rosa, replied that he had indeed helped to give Spain a constitutional government; but that the times were changed; and that the safe policy to pursue in settling the Papal Question was to allow the Holy Father to decide as seemed to him best. The Neapolitan ambassador declared that although his august master forbade him from presuming to give advice to the Pontiff, he might with propriety say that he concurred in the views of his Austrian colleague. Rayneval saw that he was beaten, but he covered his retreat by a final demonstration of the magnanimity of the French Republic and of the unwisdom of attempting to reorganize the Papal government on the old foundations. He feared also, he said, that France would vehemently resent the insult such action would do her.⁷

As soon as the report of this conference reached Paris, Louis Napoleon addressed the following letter to Colonel Edgar Ney, whom he despatched to Rome with orders to communicate it to the French commander and to the Papal Triumvirs, who had mentioned in their first proclamation neither the French assistance nor an amnesty.

"MY DEAR EDGAR:—The French Republic did not send an army to Rome to smother Italian liberty there, but on the contrary to regulate it in guarding it from its excesses and to give it a solid base by restoring to the Pontifical throne the prince who first placed himself at the head of all the useful reforms. I learn with pain that the friendly intentions of the Holy Father, like our own action, remain sterile in the presence of hostile passions and influences which would establish proscription and tyranny against the Pope's return. Say emphatically to General Rostolan⁸ that he must in no case allow any act to be committed under the shadow of the tricolor flag, that may denature the character of our intervention. I sum up as follows the establishment of the Pope's temporal power: general amnesty; secularization of the administration; Code Napoleon; and Liberal government. . . . Recommend to the General to have it distinctly understood that although France does not sell her services she at least exacts

⁷ For extended report of this conference see *Stor. Doc.*, vi, 246-54.

⁸ Who had recently succeeded Oudinot.

gratitude for her sacrifices and for her abnegation. When the French armies made the tour of Europe they left everywhere, as a sign of their passage, the destruction of the abuses of Feudalism and the germs of Liberty. It shall not be said that in 1849 a French army could act in a different sense and bring about a different result.”⁹

The Prince President could hardly have written a more adroit letter. His would be the credit if the Pope should break away from the “hostile passions and influences” and follow the Liberal policy advised by France; he would be free from blame, if the Papal cabal prevailed. And that allusion to the triumphal march of the French armies through Europe was a luscious sop for Gallic vanity. But opposed to Louis Napoleon were men whom pretty phrases could not move. The average Parisian, sipping his absinthe at his café on the boulevard, might warm a little at the President’s rhetoric, but the Papal leaders to whom it was really addressed disregarded it. In a private circular Cardinal Antonelli referred to Louis Napoleon as the “pretended author” of the letter, which, in any event, had no official character, and was viewed with displeasure by the French commander in Rome. It might revive for a moment, he said, “the boldness of the gang of libertines, the sworn enemies of the Papal Government”¹⁰ — that was all. If Napoleon and Antonelli had been in collusion, the affair could not have been arranged more pleasantly. Prince Schwarzenberg advised the Austrian representative at Paris that “that which had not been tolerated from Napoleon the Great would certainly not be tolerated from his little nephew.”¹¹ The Red Triumvirs, sure of their backing, refused to allow the letter to Ney to be published in Rome.

Meanwhile, however, the French Assembly was growing angry. Its Republican members still harped on the outrageous perversion of the expedition to Rome, and every one resented the apparent insult put upon French dignity by the refusal of the Papal party to heed French advice. De Tocqueville, Minister of Foreign Affairs, felt obliged to state officially that the expedition had a threefold purpose: “To maintain and extend French influence in Italy, to restore independence to the Pope, and lib-

⁹ Text in Zini, II, i, 130–31.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 132.

¹¹ *Stor. Doc.*, VI, 261; despatch of Sept. 13, 1849.

erty to the Roman people." He intimated that the Pope would inevitably fall unless he introduced radical reforms.¹² But as neither this warning nor Louis Napoleon's letter to Ney had any effect, and as the Red Triumvirs were using the French troops in Rome to carry out the punitive work on which they had embarked, De Corcelle and Rayneval decided to put on paper an official statement of the French demands. They therefore addressed to Cardinal Antonelli a note in which they reminded His Eminence that when one State calls on another for help and receives it, the helper has a right to suggest measures which will prevent further difficulty. The unique position of the Pope, as temporal ruler and as head of the Catholic Church, justified the influence which the Catholic Powers had exerted over the internal affairs of his Kingdom. They did not need to cite the Memorandum of 1831,¹³ as an excuse for the present intervention of France: the right was undisputed, and France had been too magnanimous to insist upon it. France limited her action to respectful suggestion. She requested the Pope to restore the constitution which he himself granted at a time when his volition seemed still free: but his conscience was now so much alarmed at the mere suggestion, that the French Republic did not press it. She did, however, submit the following demands: (1) Individual liberty — the public debt and the rights of private property must be guaranteed; (2) the courts should be reformed so as to ensure justice to the citizen; (3) civil laws, regulating the condition of persons and property, should be adopted from the Code Napoleon; (4) communal and provincial assemblies, to be elected, should be created; (5) the public administration secularized; (6) the Consulta restored, with at least a deliberative vote in questions of taxation. This was the minimum which would satisfy the French Republic. MM. Rayneval and De Corcelle begged to remind His Eminence, in conclusion, that, since Socialism and Anarchy were invading society, they could best be resisted by the adoption of such enlightened secular government as should bring the discontented multitudes into harmony with their rulers and with religion. "The forces, the pretensions, the furies

¹² Session of Aug. 6, 1849; Tivaroni, I, 169. "The French Government has paid dearly for the right to advise the Pope," said De Tocqueville to the Papal Nuncio at Paris, *Stor. Doc.*, VI, 245.

¹³ *Dawn*, I, 363. *Stor. Doc.*, III, 89.

of Socialism grow," they asserted, "in proportion to the enfeebling of religious beliefs." So the Pope, by unwise reaction, would sow the wind not only in his own States but elsewhere.¹⁴

To this note the Cardinal replied that while the Pope insisted on his right to regulate the internal affairs of his realm without foreign interference, he was still so mindful of the interest which all Catholics took in the preservation of the authority, liberty and independence of the head of their Church, that he would graciously impart to them his plans. His Holiness had devised measures which would assure both his own liberty and independence and the proper liberties of his peoples. He felt most profoundly, however, that the true remedy for the evils of the times was not political but religious, and he would leave nothing undone whereby the beneficent spirit of the Catholic Church might flourish among all nations and promote even their temporal prosperity.¹⁵ Such were the generalities which the Cardinal Secretary offered in reply to the French insistence: banal, but effective. Antonelli's snubs proved more than a match for the Prince President's tentative threats. Pius IX went to Portici, whence he issued (September 12) an address to his "best beloved subjects," congratulating them on having escaped from the tyranny of the evil and deluded persons who had availed themselves of his earlier concessions to overthrow the social order. His Holiness then announced that there would be (1) a Council of State to give its opinions, at the Pope's request, on projected bills and on all important questions of public administration; (2) a Consulta for finance, appointed by the Pope from names suggested by the provincial councils, to consider matters of taxation, but without any powers; (3) provincial councils, appointed by the Pope from lists furnished by the communal councils, to superintend provincial affairs; (4) municipal and communal councils, to be chosen on the basis of property qualification; (5) reforms and improvements to extend to the judiciary and to civil, criminal and administrative legislation; (6) amnesty. A vague document, with phrases that tickled the ear on first reading, but which, when analyzed, revealed that the one thing certain was the Pope's Absolutism. Pius made no special mention of the French, who had put down the "evil and deluded" Republicans,

¹⁴ *Stor. Doc.*, VI, 508-13; note of Aug. 29, 1849.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 513-15.

but an allusion to the "valorous armies of the Catholic Powers" — in general.¹⁶ Four days later the Red Triumvirs proclaimed an amnesty, couched in such terms that the list of those excluded from sovereign grace might be lengthened at pleasure.¹⁷

The French Assembly witnessed a last effort to redeem the prestige of Republican France, but the debate soon showed that Republicanism itself had waned. Thiers praised Pius and ridiculed the Italians as unworthy and incapable of representative government; Thuriot de la Rosière declared that as the Pope's temporal power belonged to all Catholics, the Romans ought gladly to accept the position of political serfdom for the sake of Catholics throughout the world; Montalembert asserted that the Pope's subjects had no right to enjoy the political liberty of modern nations. Against this unblushing truculence of French Royalists and Clericals, the Cabinet made a reluctant and half-hearted defense. Premier Odilon Barrot declared that the events of the war had absolved them from their obligations, and that, after all, the separation of spiritual and temporal power, desirable everywhere else, was not desirable at Rome. De Tocqueville, the Foreign Minister, closed by pointing out that the Pope's *motu proprio* might contain the germs of those reforms which France had requested. The Assembly, by a large majority, accepted the situation.¹⁸ So ended the pretense that the Papal States might be saved from a despotic restoration.

The Roman Expedition left a lasting blot on the honor of France. In 1849 Republicans, Clericals and Louis Napoleon, each hoping to outwit his rivals and benefit himself, supported it. The Clericals won. France did, indeed, forestall the Austrians in strangling the Roman Republic, and her garrison remained to protect the Pope, who loathed being indebted to her for protection. But Austria ruled the Papal policy and enjoyed the Papal favor, and she continued to do so even when Louis

¹⁶ *Motu proprio* dated Portici, Sept. 12, 1849; text in Zini, II, i, 133-36.

¹⁷ Text, Zini, II, i, 136-37. The excluded were: members of the provisional government, of the Constituent Assembly, of the Triumvirate and Republican government; heads of military corps; all persons previously amnestied who had participated in the recent rebellion; persons guilty of civil as well as of political crimes. "The present pardon is not meant to assure the permanence in government, provincial or municipal offices of all those who in the recent events proved themselves unworthy. This exception applies to the military and to the office-holders of every department." ¹⁸ Summary of debates in *Stor. Doc.*, VI, 275-76.

Napoleon, in the following year, atoned by the *coup d'état* for his temporary sinning with Liberalism. The French troops remained at Rome as a proof of the influence of the French Emperor, and as an insuperable obstacle to the completion of Italian unity: until in 1870 Nemesis exacted a terrible retribution for the plot conceived in iniquity and carried out in guile. The Emperor and his Empire were swallowed up as by earthquake, and the great French nation fell down into the dust. Those skilled in tracing effects home to their remote causes, see that the catastrophe of Sedan was preparing from the time when the Bonapartist adventurer hoped, by restoring Pius IX to Rome, to win the support of the Clericals. It was the ascendancy of the Clericals during the sixties which reduced the Empire to clutch at the insane expedient of a war with Prussia; and when that war came, it was the recollection of the French garrison at Rome that checked Italy from going to the aid of France.¹⁹

The Pope and his advisers, on the other hand, played their part well at Gaeta. Powerless to oppose French intervention in the spring of 1849, they sat themselves down to watch it, and were ready to get what they could from it. At first they did not know how sincere the Prince President was in pleading for a Liberal restoration or how far he would employ force to back it up. They let him plead, for they had already discovered the virtue of inertia. Over every path to reform they wrote "no thoroughfare" (*non possumus*). At every suggestion touching a purely political or administrative matter, they declared that the sensitive conscience of the Pope took alarm: what seemed temporal to laymen, he pronounced spiritual; and since he alone knew where temporal ended and spiritual began, who could gainsay him? Pius was resolved to jeopard everything, rather than to stoop to compromise. And so, by judicious waiting, he saw the time come when Louis Napoleon could not, if he would, force a Liberal régime upon him.

Pius was the most misunderstood ruler of his age. Originally of a kindly disposition, with an insatiable love of applause, he took the lead in the tentative reforms of 1847. The worship of his subjects and the adulation of Italians everywhere intoxicated

¹⁹ The best French historians now admit this. See Gabriel Monod's admirable preface to *Rome et Napoléon III.*

him. Never a thinker, he did not foresee whither the stream was tending. The Romans, however, for all their apparently delirious love-feasts, had a definite end in view, and would accept nothing less. They had flattered Pius into granting a constitution and into joining the "Holy War" for Italian Independence, before he hesitated. Then, when they simply demanded the logical fruits of his concessions, his conscience grew suddenly sensitive. They began to suspect him of backsliding, he them of betrayal. The murder of his prime minister, Pellegrino Rossi (Nov. 15, 1848), smote the last scales from his eyes. Terror-stricken, he fled to Gaeta, to reflect over the lying past and to plan for the future. He imputed to his subjects the evils due to his self-deception. They had abused his trust; they had wittingly drawn him into a course whose end they knew was revolutionary: they had perverted his benign concessions and made him appear their partner in wickedness. By the same reasoning, he persuaded himself that the reforms he had sanctioned must be bad because they had been coaxed from him by bad men wearing the mask of his adorers. He would have no more to do with either. Above all, he protested that he had never granted a temporal reform with the intention that it should infringe by a hairsbreadth on the spiritual domain which he had sworn to preserve inviolate. As a devout Catholic, he shuddered at the thought that such a charge could be laid against him. He was absolutely sincere. At Gaeta, surrounded by reactionary prelates and by envoys of Powers pledged to the Old Régime, Pius, who quickly took the color of his environment, became almost frantically reactionary. When the French entered Rome, he complained of their mildness.²⁰ He uttered no word against the ferocity of the Austrians in the North, no reproof for the rigor of the Red Triumvirs in Latium, for he regarded punishment as the divinely-ordained sequel to crime. He put off his return to Rome until he could feel sure his punishers had done their work so thoroughly that his own person would be safe.

The most powerful influence under which Pius fell at Gaeta was that of Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, who possessed in full measure

²⁰ Bargagli, Tuscan minister at Gaeta, wrote thence to his chief on July 7, 1849: "Mi sorprese l'udire dal Santo Padre stesso che la condotta dei Francesi padroni di Roma presentava mitezza da non potersi spiegare con tutta chiarezza"!!! *Stor. Doc.*, VI, 548.

the qualities which Pius lacked. This remarkable man was born April 2, 1806, at Sonnino, a small town not far from Terracina, "formerly noted for the picturesque costume of its women and the audacity of its brigands." Antonelli's father seems to have preferred farming to brigandage, although the two pursuits were often identical; his mother was a sturdy peasant. Early showing signs of an alert intelligence, the boy was sent to Rome, where he studied at the Collegio Romano, and looked forward to a career in the Church, which then offered to poor youths without backing, and to adventurers, the shortest cut to fame and fortune. Instead of taking orders, Antonelli busied himself in administrative work, and displayed therein an ability which seemed astonishing when contrasted with the standard of the sinecurists and grafters among whom he was thrown. Under Gregory XVI he was an orthodox Reactionist; when Pius IX made Liberalism fashionable, he blossomed quickly into a Liberal. The new Pope, captivated by the deferent, willing, and efficient young man, — young in comparison with the Papal entourage, — created him Cardinal Deacon (June 11, 1847), and appointed him to preside over the Council of State which framed the constitution and over the first constitutional ministry. Personal ambition was Antonelli's absorbing passion: having gratified that by rising to the highest post under the Pontiff, he devoted his energy to securing himself there. The task was hazardous, but it did not exceed his powers. He would blandly agree to the proposals of his Liberal colleagues, Minghetti and Pasolini, in the morning; closet himself with Jesuit Reactionists in the afternoon, and at night order the Papal printer to issue a proclamation directly opposed in tenor to that which the Pope and Cabinet had just adopted. He cheered the Roman Legion when it set forth for the Holy War, but secretly instructed Durando, its commander, not to fight; and as the Revolution outsped the limping Papal Government, Antonelli held himself more and more aloof, in order to avoid compromising his future, and to be able the more certainly from the background to manage Pius IX. Having counseled the flight to Gaeta, he was the first to welcome Pius on Neapolitan soil, and thenceforth held over him an ascendancy which lasted a quarter of a century.

Once safe at Gaeta, Antonelli ceased to dissemble. Foreseeing

that the Revolution must fail, he decided that complete reaction was the condition in which he could be sure of his primacy. Any concession, no matter how harmless in appearance or remote from Liberalism, might serve as an excuse for political agitation: therefore, there should be no concessions. He had no difficulty in leading Pius to this view, because he already ruled Pius by terror. The easy-going Pope lived in mortal fear of damnation: Antonelli played on this fear, hinting that the calamity which had overtaken the Papacy was a judgment on Pius for recently coquetting with the Liberals. The Pope an autocrat, Antonelli the autocrat's master — that was a simple program. To explain Antonelli's amazing control, men whispered that he had the evil eye, against which Pius was helpless; psychologists today might look for hypnotic suggestion; historians will see in it that interaction of personalities which appears everywhere in history, — a phenomenon as simple as love or hate, which has thus far eluded scientific analysis. Antonelli's brother cardinals accepted his domination because it promised to restore to them the good old days. He agreed with them in the policy of no compromise and in proclaiming that temporal and spiritual were identical. So long as they left him untrammelled in matters of politics, he had no concern to meddle in questions of dogma.

In person Antonelli, now at his prime, was tall, robust, well-proportioned; dark-featured, broad-browed, with an "eagle-beak," and black, penetrating, restless eyes.²¹ There was a touch of the Moor in his expression, a hint of the mountain bandit in his free, self-reliant carriage: "but his heavy jaw, his long teeth, his thick lips betray the grossest appetites."²² So a stern critic saw him. Women, on the contrary, were struck by his majestic presence; by his wonderful eyes, piercing, electric; by his rich dark complexion and bold gypsy features; and they noted the extreme delicacy and whiteness of his hands,²³ typical of many a clerical sensualist. In his earlier days he simulated lowliness, and even after he reached the summit of his power, unless he were angered, he chose the method of urbanity. So genial could he be, that he left on petitioners the impression that he would at once

²¹ E. Veuillot, praising Etex's bust of Antonelli, says it shows "a powerful head, resolute and fixed, which smiles, which understands, which calculates, and which smiles"; 46.

²² E. About: *La Question Romaine*. Paris, 1859.

²³ Frances Elliot: *Roman Gossip*. London: Murray, 1894.

carry out their wishes.²⁴ Men compared him now to Talleyrand and now to Mazarin, but he had neither the finesse and wit of the one nor the constructive statesmanship of the other. His success depended wholly on the personal infatuation he was able to exert over Pius IX; had any one of a dozen possible cardinals been pope instead of Pius, Antonelli's career would have been blasted; for he could not have hypnotized them. Long before his death, most of them came to hate him, with a discreet but bitter hatred. They resented his dictatorial assurance; they envied his power; they coveted his peculation; and the aristocrats among them chafed at being less esteemed than the son of a brigand-peasant. "Since your Holiness lends more credence to a *ciociaro*, than to a Prince of the Church," said Cardinal Altieri to Pius, "there is nothing left for me but to retire."²⁵

Antonelli had no more morals than the hawks of his Sonnino crags. He was one of the notorious libertines in Rome, at a time when the Papal Court scarcely made a pretense of hiding their profligacy. Not having taken orders, he had technically never vowed the vow of celibacy; and yet, as a cardinal, he could elect the next pope, or (as he doubtless hoped) be elected himself — an anomaly which shocked those Catholics who believed that the leaders of their Church should be models of conduct. But the plain fact is that his free life did not startle Papal society as did the magnitude of his peculations. During the quarter of a century between the return of Pius and Antonelli's death, the Cardinal Secretary amassed a fortune estimated at upwards of 60,000,000 lire.²⁶ Wherever money passed, there he took his toll. He embezzled public funds, appropriated public estates, sold offices, honors and favors, blackmailed the rich, stript the poor. Whoever had an important suit must buy the Cardinal's good offices in order to receive a favorable verdict. The great Catholic interests abroad, when they appealed to Rome for settlement, knocked first at his door, bearing gifts. He devised a

²⁴ E. Veuillot says that in his audiences he showed no ostentation: high and low might see him at any time.

²⁵ Larousse, under "Antonelli." *Ciociaro* is the Roman name of a peasant of the Campagna or adjacent mountains; from *Ciocie*, the raw-hide sandals worn by the peasants.

²⁶ Brockhaus: *Conversationslexicon*. 1892; article "Antonelli." The lowest estimate was 25 millions. See also Döllinger: *Kleinere Schriften* (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1890), 582, and 589-90. De Cesare: *Roma*, II, 148-50.

tap for diverting to his own purse the stream of contributions which flowed from the faithful all over the world into the coffers of the Holy See. He accepted an annual subsidy from the King of Naples, and probably from other rulers solicitous to have their schemes promoted. He exhibited in the highest degree the instincts of the bandit, who regards society as his natural enemy and lawful prey: and he made society no return for the immense sums he levied on it. No building, no monument, no shrine, no road, no garden, no collection of statues or paintings, rose to prove that he could be not less magnificent in bounty than in greed. The chief virtue he displayed was the bandit's loyalty to his clan: he ennobled several members of his kindred, and put all of them in positions where they could enrich themselves.²⁷ His colleagues marveled not that the Secretary of State should use public office for his private gain, — that had been the Papal practice from time immemorial, — they marveled, and envy mingled with their wonder, to see graft organized on so colossal a scale paying such enormous returns. The genius of the moribund Papacy — supple, adroit, unscrupulous, cynical, worldly, cruel, selfish, but with flashing eye and smooth white hands and ways to fascinate women — was incarnate in Antonelli. The eyes were the hawk's eyes, keen to see its booty from afar; the soft hands hid the hawk's talons, remorseless to clutch and vise-like to hold. Nothing could be more fitting than that the Papacy should be guided to destruction by its bandit cardinal.²⁸

²⁷ Cardinal Antonelli had close relations with capitalists. One of his brothers was a Director of the Banca Romana; "his second brother presided over the authority which arranged the import of corn (*annona*), . . . The brothers of the Cardinal Secretary of State could therefore fix the prices of corn, and they made use of their power in such a way that both they themselves and the middlemen amassed large fortunes at the expense of the people." Nielsen, II, 187-88.

²⁸ See also F. Nielsen, II, 131; Silvagni: *Rome: Its Princes, Priests and People* (London: Elliot Stock, 1887), III, 304-33. For unrestrained eulogy see E. Veuillot's sketch in *Célébrités Catholiques Contemporaines* (Paris: V. Palmé, 1870), dated 1862. Veuillot declares that "Antonelli is not less as a statesman and is more of a cardinal than Richelieu." Gregorovius has etched in a few paragraphs a terrible portrait of Antonelli, in which he describes the upper half of the Cardinal's face as "Egyptian, Asiatic," with "rolling," "demoniacal" eyes that would fit Mephistopheles. The lower part, he says, dates still further back by a few hundred thousand years. "When this jawbone and mouth appeared, there were as yet no men on the earth: all was still gigantic amphibia, the organic existence an everlasting devouring. The motion of the facial muscles shows what was the employment of those oxygen-breathers, for they go regularly up and down, down and up,

Cardinal Antonelli transacted the negotiations with the diplomats at Gaeta; he inspired the Papal *motu proprio* from Portici; he counseled the further postponement of the Pope's return to Rome. The French and the more Liberal Romans believed that if Pius could be withdrawn from Austrian and Neapolitan influences and witness the evil ways of the Red Triumvirs, he would be moved to take action. But Antonelli wished to have the work of restoration done thoroughly before he allowed Pius to gladden his "well-beloved subjects" by his presence. Only on April 12, 1850, did the Pope drive into Rome by the Porta San Giovanni, and give thanks in the Lateran Church to the God who had blessed his exile. "Nothing in the least untimely happened to disturb even slightly the solemn instant in which after 16 months' exile the Hierarchy of the Church returned to the capital of the Catholic World," wrote Count Ludolf, the Neapolitan ambassador. "Perhaps it would not be wholly true to assert," he added, "that on this occasion there was a show of great enthusiasm."²⁹

By this time the campaign of purging had been carried out. The first business was to punish those who had taken part in the Revolution. They were sentenced to imprisonment, flogging, the galleys, or the gibbet, with indiscriminate profusion; but in order to preserve the fiction of the Pope's benignity, no executions even when there is no booty at hand for the movement." *Dublin University Mag.*, LXXVII, 308; March, 1871. Although in the 35 years since Antonelli died attempts have been made to whitewash many of the reprobates of history, including Judas Iscariot and Borgia, no one has yet whited Antonelli. The suit brought in 1877 by Countess Lambertini, one of his offspring, for a share of his immense fortune, gave so world-wide a publicity to his morals, that no one has tried to apologize for him. The reports of the trial were printed in the leading papers of Europe and the United States. Pius IX, on learning that Antonelli was dead, said, "Never let me hear his name again." *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, the latest Ultramontane authority, dismisses Antonelli briefly. It concludes as follows: "In extenuation of the charge that his aim was to a large extent personal aggrandizement, it must be recalled that he was a statesman rather than a prelate, and that he was not a priest, although most assiduous in the discharge of his religious duties." Vol. I, p. 584 (New York, 1907).

²⁹ *Stor. Doc.*, VI, 552. A. von Reumont (*Aus König Friedrich Wilhelms IV Tagen*, 363 ff.) states that the entry and subsequent festivities passed off properly. "But it was now no longer the people who kept festival. Pius IX certainly heard once more the cry; 'Evviva Pio Nono!' but many were pleased to echo, 'No—no!'" Nielsen, II, 181. Ernest Renan, then a young traveler, happened to be in Rome at Pius's entry, and was surprised at the zeal with which the crowd on the steps of St. John Lateran hurrahed for the Pope.

were permitted in Rome itself. Women were stript and flogged, and the French soldiers, to their disgust, had to witness the spectacle. The torture of the *cavalletto*, or little horse, was revived: it consisted of seating the victim astride of the sharp angle of a beam and attaching such heavy weights to his feet that his agony soon became excruciating. The amnesty contained more exceptions than that of the Austrians in Lombardy, and it seemed frequently only a lure for bringing back within reach persons whom the Papal government wished to chastise. One writer estimated that 25,000 emigrants left Rome, either to escape the Red Triumvirs' mercy or to seek a civilized refuge abroad.³⁰ The abominations, administrative and judicial, which twenty years before the European Powers had declared intolerable,³¹ were restored. Antonelli had gravely assured the envoys at Gaeta that laymen filled all but very few of the offices;³² in fact, however, an ecclesiastic held every important office, and lay officials, in the police or customs service, had clerical overseers. Nepotism, a characteristic of Papal rule for four hundred years, flourished: even trivial places became hereditary.³³ Every office-holder, from Antonelli down to the humblest inspector, regarded his post as an opportunity for selfish gain. The magnates, following Antonelli's example, helped themselves generously; the little fellows took what they could.

The Papal judiciary system baffles credence, so many and so muddled were the courts and so unjudicial the procedure. A high ecclesiastic sat as judge, and decided causes according as his auditor, or lay legal assistant, advised him; verdicts were often affected by special inducements. Besides the ordinary ecclesiastical courts, there were in the provinces baronial courts, controlled by the barons or other feudal lords of the region. Several corporations — such as the abbeys of Quattro Fontane and of Nazzano — had courts of their own, for the trial of causes in which they stood as plaintiff or defendant. The likelihood that a litigant would be fairly treated in such courts must have been small. Another special institution, the Tribunal of the Fabbrica of St. Peter's, enjoyed the right of examining the wills of persons

³⁰ Torre, quoted by Tivaroni, I, 172.

³¹ See Memorandum of 1831.

³² *Stor. Doc.*, VI, 500. Conference of Aug. 11. Even before the secularization of the government in 1848, Antonelli declared that there were only 104 ecclesiastics to 5023 laymen in office.

■ Reuchlin, III, 63.

still living and of levying, for its own benefit, a tax on legacies. Interminable was the law's delay, medieval were its standards. In criminal cases, the presumption against the prisoner was usually too strong to be overcome. Judges were the creatures of their appointers. If the accused were charged with a political offense, the judge named the counsel to defend him; he was not allowed to confront his accusers, or to challenge witnesses, and, unless he were sentenced to death, he had no right of appeal. Ordinary punishments included imprisonment, the chain-gang and the galleys, but little care was taken to see that the convict got into his proper grade. As if these methods did not sufficiently guarantee the conviction of anybody whom the State wished, for any reason, to rid itself of, there was the "summary procedure," which enabled the judge, without trying the accused, to pronounce sentence, simply on the instructions jotted down by the magistrate who had ordered his arrest. Only when the sentence exceeded ten years in the galleys, could the victim appeal — with what results can be imagined. The Tribunal of the Vicariate, of atrocious memory, was revived; so was the Holy Inquisition; so was mortmain. Panic fear of political conspirators intensified the mercilessness inherent in criminal courts which dated from medieval times. With the best intentions in the world, it is hard to see how a judge, bound by such procedure, could arrive at justice: what hope then, in a system which aimed, not at justice, but at either spoliation or vengeance? Ecclesiastics were punished less severely than laymen who committed the same crime: this seems like a subtle arrangement for encouraging priests to commit murder or adultery, but it could not have promoted in the laity respect for the tonsure. A system is judged by its fruits: in 1850, when the Papal judicial system had been thoroughly restored, the prisoners numbered 10,436; in 1854, the number had grown to 13,000.³⁴ At both dates the prisons held many persons who were under neither trial nor sentence, but simply detained as a precaution.

The fiscal administration formed a counterpart of the judicial. One fifth of the taxes went to the collectors. Accounts were either not kept at all, or kept so bunglingly that they could not be understood. Exemptions and privileges prevented an equal

³⁴ La Varenne: *L'Ital. Cent.*, 334.

levy: Cardinal Albani, for instance, had his vast estates assessed at only one third of their current value; other prelates went altogether untaxed. The annual budget showed a deficit of about 10 million lire, covered by special loans, at usurious rates.³⁵ Agriculture languished from lack of roads, modern methods, capital and enterprise. The great landlords were absentees. Wretched communications restricted trade; the few passable highways maintained toll-gates. Smuggling, fostered by a high tariff, thrived so luxuriantly that even the highest treasury officials — some said the Minister of Finance himself — engaged in it as a matter of course. Pius denounced railways, as agents of progress, and, therefore, irreligious: consequently, industry and commerce remained undeveloped. There was no merchant marine: even the fisheries off the Papal coasts were chiefly exploited by Tuscans and Neapolitans.

Unchecked Absolutism ruled in the Papal government. His Holiness, Prince Schwarzenberg wrote, "seeks in nowise to dissimulate that, being forced to recognize and proclaim every parliamentary régime as directly menacing the free exercise of the spiritual power, he could not witness without alarm the propaganda and solidifying round him not only of the constitutional principles originally imposed by the Revolution, but even of more restricted representative forms whose contagion seems to him not less inevitable and disastrous in the interior of his States."³⁶ Directly or indirectly, every office-holder owed his appointment to the Pope. Even the councils and municipal bodies, which seemed to be representative, were chosen by him from carefully sifted lists, and had no initiative. Henceforth, Pius's attitude towards representative government resembled that of the man who having escaped drowning in a lake could never afterward be persuaded to approach a washbowl. Education, never encouraged in the Papal States, was not fostered now: the Jesuits controlled the seminaries; in the universities, purified of disturbing influences, archaeology was the favored topic. The country swarmed with beggars, partly because the general misery swelled the legions of paupers, and partly because

³⁵ Zini, I, i, 276, mentions a loan from Rothschild at "the heavy usury of 30 per cent." He probably means that Rothschild paid 70.

³⁶ *Stor. Doc.*, vi, 569; Schwarzenberg to Hügel, Aug. 21, 1850.

Pius encouraged the opinion that it was rather more creditable, perhaps a little holier, to beg than to earn one's living. Innumerable holidays, prescribed by the Church, interrupted labor, which thrives not by fits and starts, but by regularity which accumulates momentum. In lieu of industrial and political activity the people had religious pageants; and they were compelled to prove their loyalty by attendance at mass. Government employees were required at stated times to confess and communicate. The confessional was popularly regarded as one of the channels through which the police got information. While the police and spies and eavesdroppers busied themselves with suspected Liberals, the clergy promoted superstitions among all classes. At Rimini an image of the Virgin winked its eyes; at Fossombrone another responded; and presently reports came from many places of weeping crucifixes, nodding and winking Madonnas, and speaking Bambinos; and priests solemnly declared that by these miracles God Almighty wished to make manifest his joy at the restoration of the Pope.³⁷

The suppression of the Revolution in Pius's more remote provinces, in Umbria, the Legations and the Marches, fell to the Austrians, who undertook the task, unbidden, in the summer of 1849, only regretting that the French had forestalled them in Latium itself. They applied their usual military purge with immediate effect, shooting eight or nine score persons, torturing hundreds³⁸ and imprisoning or holding under surveillance thousands. They shot to death Ugo Bassi, the patriot priest. Outlaws, posing as Liberals, complicated the situation. The most famous of them, Stefano Pelloni, nicknamed Passatore, succeeded for more than a year in eluding the Papal and Austrian troops in the Romagna: a common brigand, without question, but regarded almost as a hero by the populations whom he harried. The severity aimed at him and his fellows fell indiscriminately on political suspects. The Papal government was powerless to protest when its foreign helper usurped the reorganization of its internal affairs. Finally, Austria handed back the control into the Pope's

³⁷ Zini, I, i, 279-80. ³⁸ Flogging was the usual torture. The victim was strapped naked to a wooden frame, and after five blows he was asked whether he would confess. If he refused, more blows were laid on in series of five until he gave in, or fainted, or died. "Confessions" thus extorted were published by the police as "limpid and spontaneous." La Varenne, *op. cit.*, 334.

keeping, but continued to maintain a garrison, which cost the Papal treasury nearly 40,000,000 lire before it was withdrawn.

All the reactionary Powers rightly viewed Pius's decision in 1849 as pivotal. They remembered how his patronage two years earlier had made the Liberal movement irresistible: for no Catholic sovereign could grant his subjects less than the Pope. They dreaded lest, out of his weakness or good-nature, he might leave some loophole through which the insidious doctrines could glide back and poison society again. But their fears were groundless. As we have seen, Pius had waked up to loathe his Liberal indiscretions.³⁹ He would not even hear the word "Italy" spoken.⁴⁰ He was henceforth a puppet in the hands of a man who, cherishing neither scruples nor illusions, set up absolute intransigence as the guiding principle of the Papacy. Cardinal Antonelli would brook no rival to his ascendancy over the Pope, and to his share of the spoils. Everyone recognized in him, nicknamed the Red Pope, the real ruler of the Papacy. In adopting the policy of no compromise, he had logic and convenience on his side. He would be troubled no more by splitting hairs. There was even a magnificent impudence in his demanding more, claiming more, and promising more in the days when the Papacy could not exist unsupported, than in its prime, when Christendom had accepted its rule without question. The modern world had given plainer and plainer warning that the Papacy had become incompatible with its needs: to this the Papacy retorted, not by adapting itself to changed conditions, but by denouncing them as wicked, and by requiring the faithful to swallow more rather than less. Impeccable was its logic. "I believe, because it is absurd," said Tertullian. One who believes gladly a few impossibilities soon hungers for more. During the next twenty years Rome provided bountifully for the appetites of her zealots, by preaching the identity of her temporal and spiritual power, by compiling the Syllabus and by setting up the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and of Papal Infallibility.

³⁹ The Romans now called him "Pio Nono Secondo," Pius Ninth the Second, to distinguish him from the earlier supposed patriot Pius IX. H. von Moltke: *Gesammelte Schriften*, I, 25 (quoted by Nielsen, II, 181).

⁴⁰ When Gavazzi, the Barnabite, had an audience, Pius said to him: "Father, I will gladly listen to you, but on condition that you do not mention the word: 'Italy.'" Gavazzi: *Orations* (London, 1851), I, 83.

But in July, 1849, sincere Catholics, leaving matters of dogma untouched, were asking themselves how even the Pope could make black white and white black at will. In 1848, in granting a Constitution, he declared that he acted spontaneously and that his spiritual authority was not infringed upon in the least by according to his beloved subjects rights which would be wholesome for them and were in keeping with the progress of the age. To remove doubts, Pius had caused the Constitution to be sanctioned by the Cardinals, after it had been framed by a commission of which Cardinal Antonelli was chairman; and, as we have stated, he appointed Antonelli president of his first constitutional ministry. And yet within a twelvemonth he branded the mildest form of local representation — not to speak of a central constitutional government itself — as wicked, because incompatible with the free exercise of his spiritual functions. If he was mistaken in 1848, what remained of his claim of infallibility? On the other hand, if he did grant the Constitution under compulsion, instead of spontaneously, what became of his veracity? And just what conception should be formed of a deity who entrusted his Church to the hands of a pontiff and cardinals who, to promote their personal safety and comfort, pursued one year a policy which they solemnly pronounced righteous and orthodox, and which the next year they solemnly repudiated as wicked and heretical? These paradoxes troubled the consciences of the devout and whetted the sarcasm of the profane.

Several circumstances combined to give the restorations in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies a horrible notoriety. King Ferdinand II had joined the War of Independence against his will. As sovereign of the largest Italian State, which numbered over ten million souls, he had no desire to assist in aggrandizing his rival, the King of Piedmont. He hated constitutional government, which he made a pretense of upholding only as long as terror compelled him. On May 15, 1848, his Parliament met amid stormy confusion, followed by a clash between the Royal troops and the popular party, with barricades, hand-to-hand fights up and down Via Toledo, slaughter, the eventual victory of the Royalists and massacre of their opponents. Until the next year, the King — who had meanwhile earned the evil name "Bomba,"⁴¹

⁴¹ "Bomba," short for *bombardatore*, bombardier.

on account of the five days' bombardment of Messina, carried on with his approval — still permitted a semblance of representative government; but the collapse of the Liberal cause at Novara restored his courage, and the presence of the Pope as his guest, first at Gaeta and later at Portici, with the reactionary doctrines which prevailed in the Papal circle, made him bold. On March 13, 1849, he dissolved the Chambers; then he revised his cabinet, forbade the use of the tricolor, and allowed the Jesuits to return. The popular party, quickly put down in the capital, continued to agitate in the provinces; but gradually its leaders were either dispersed or arrested, until by August, 1849, the King was master. Safe at last, he threw off all disguise, and ordered his officials to set in motion the machinery of vengeance. The police had already filled the prisons with persons implicated in the 15th of May disturbance, together with members of the Liberal Parliament, misguided political suspects, and noisy provincials. The courts moved so slowly that their cases had not come to trial before other arrests, still more startling on account of the character of the accused, brought fresh victims to the Neapolitan dungeons. The Government declared that it had discovered a secret society, called "Italian Unity," plotting to overthrow the Bourbon dynasty and to unite the Two Sicilies to Piedmont. It seized not only those against whom it had evidence, but anybody whom it deemed likely to engage in such a conspiracy, or whom it wished to lock up. Some of its most illustrious victims could have saved themselves by flight, but they refused, either because they knew that flight would be construed as a confession of guilt, or because they would not desert their comrades.

Only on June 1, 1850, when the accused had spent from four to eighteen months in prison, did the government begin the prosecution. Domenicantonio Navarro presided over the court. Among the sixty-two prisoners arraigned for conspiracy, were Carlo Poerio, Luigi Settembrini, Nisco, Pironti, Agresti, Romeo, men who enjoyed high reputations: Poerio, indeed, had been the leader of the Moderates and a Cabinet minister. The Constitution, which still existed in name, provided that deputies must be tried by the High Court of Peers; but the Constitution was become a laughing-stock, and the trial proceeded under

Navarro's jurisdiction, without regard for law or for precedent. Peccheneda, chief of police, kept the public prosecutor well supplied with false witnesses. There were 74 open sittings of the Court. The trial dragged on for more than six months. The government seemed to make a parade of its slowness, in order to impress on the public its confidence in being able to deal deliberately with the most formidable conspiracy. It seemed also to delight in keeping its victims in suspense, although it had secretly decided at the outset to condemn them. Otherwise, it would have been absurd to resort to the ponderous judicial machine to accomplish what could have been put through a police or military court in a few mornings. The attitude of the King and his satellites was this: "Here are several score men, some of them leaders in the late constitutional upheaval: others are implicated — though we cannot prove it — in a new political plot; and others who have not offended in act or speech, carry inconvenient doctrines in their heads. Their riddance shall be a warning to all their tribe." But even if the Bourbons had had some inkling of justice, the character and procedure of their tribunals, of bench and bar, would have made the attainment of justice difficult, if not impossible. For law in Naples was in decay: ideals of equity and legal methods, derived from an earlier epoch, did not fit modern needs. The best system at one stage of progress may become the worst at the next. So Neapolitan law in 1850 had retained the cruelty of feudal times, and added thereto the corruption peculiar to a rotting society and the love of intimidation of a caste that alternately bullies and cringes.

It happened that William Ewart Gladstone, then forty-one years of age and already a distinguished member of the British Parliament, passed several months at Naples during and after the first trial, which he watched with amazed interest. The atrocious treatment of the accused, the miscarriage of justice and the brutality of the vengeance wreaked on the condemned, roused him to address to Lord Aberdeen two letters which, when published in the summer of 1851, horrified the civilized world. Gladstone wrote with remarkable self-restraint. He tactfully avoided imputing to Bomba the responsibility for the horrors he described; but he did not spare the Government. "It is," he said, "not mere imperfection, not corruption in low quarters, not

occasional severity . . . it is incessant, systematic, deliberate violation of the law by the Powers appointed to watch over and maintain it. It is such violation of human and written law ■ this, carried on for the purpose of violating every other law, unwritten and eternal, human and divine; it is the wholesale persecution of virtue united with intelligence, operating upon such ■ scale that entire classes may with truth be said to be its object, so that the Government is in bitter and cruel, as well as utterly illegal hostility to whatever in the nation really lives and moves, and forms the mainspring of practical progress and improvement ; it is the awful profanation of public religion, by its notorious alliance, in the governing powers, with the violation of every moral law under the stimulants of fear and vengeance; it is the perfect prostitution of the judicial office which has made it, under veils only too threadbare and transparent, the degraded recipient of the vilest and clumsiest forgeries, got up wilfully and deliberately, by the immediate advisers of the Crown, for the purpose of destroying the peace, the freedom, ay, and even if not by capital sentences the life, of men among the most virtuous, upright, intelligent, distinguished, and refined of the whole community; it is the savage and cowardly system of moral, as well as in a lower degree of physical, torture, through which the sentences extracted from the debased courts of justice are carried into effect. . . . The governing power, which teaches of itself that it is the image of God upon earth, is clothed in the view of the overwhelming majority of the thinking public, with all the vices for its attributes. I have seen and heard the strong and too true expression used, 'This is the negation of God erected into a system of Government.' " 42

From the moment of arrest the accused were tormented as if they were convicted felons: "One was kept on bread and water for five days and frightened by brandished scourges: another was bound hand and foot for several days, one hand being released only when he ate; another was shown a cannon-ball to be fastened to his neck and thrown into the sea with him: others were caused to see a platoon of soldiers ready to shoot; some had their beards torn out, hair by hair, amidst insults, blows, and spitting

■ W. E. Gladstone: *Two Letters to Lord Aberdeen on the State Prosecutions of the Neapolitan Government* (London: John Murray, 1851), p. 6.

in the face; all were shaved close, convict clip; the wives of some were arrested and imprisoned secretly for five days in the fortress; some, after various tortures, were given a big tumbler of wine before their examination, and then were forced to answer in writing the questions of the commandant.”⁴³ “The prisons of Naples are another name,” said Gladstone, “for filth and horror.” Poerio and his partners in misfortune were shut up in some of the worst dungeons of the Vicaria — dens so awful that the prison physicians would not visit them. “I have walked among a crowd of between three and four hundred Neapolitan prisoners,” said Gladstone: “murderers, thieves, all kinds of ordinary criminals, some condemned, and some uncondemned, and the politically accused indiscriminately.”⁴⁴ “From the 7th of December last to the 3d of February Pironte, who was formerly a judge, and is still a gentleman, and who was found guilty on or about the last-named day, spent his whole days and nights, except when on his trial, with the other men, in a cell at the Vicaria, about 8 feet square, below the level of the ground, with no light except a grating at the top of the wall, out of which they could not see.”⁴⁵ Leipnecher, one of the accused, died of prison typhoid at the beginning of the trial, but the doctors, who had declared that he was shamming, did nothing in behalf of the others: for the doctors, like the police, and like the judges, knew that the order had come from above to show no mercy.

Although the prosecutors suspected that the prisoners belonged to the *Unità Italiana*,⁴⁶ they could not prove it, and so they fell back on forgeries and on false witnesses who could easily be secured by bribes or by intimidation. In one case, the witness failed to identify the person against whom he was testifying facts which, if true, could be known only by an intimate acquaintance. To prevent a similar slip, the judge took care thenceforward to call up the prisoner by name before the witness began. Poerio’s condemnation was particularly monstrous. But any pretext served: and when the government deemed that the

■ Tivaroni, I, 221.

⁴⁴ Gladstone, 12.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 13.

⁴⁶ R. De Cesare: *Una Famiglia di Patriotti* (Rome, 1899), says that Silvio Spaventa founded L’Unità Italiana, whose purpose was to overthrow the Bourbons in the Two Sicilies and unite Italy under a republic. The novice swore on the Bible, crucifix and poniard, “usare tutte le mie forze per liberare l’Italia da ogni oppressione interna ed esterna.”; 38-39.

public had been sufficiently cowed by the long proceedings, the judge passed sentence. The procurator general demanded the death penalty for all the forty-two; but only three, Faucinato, Agresti and Settembrini, were condemned to the gallows; Nisco and Margherita to 30 years' imprisonment in irons; Braico, Catalano and Vellucci to 25 years; Poerio, Pironti and Romeo to 24 years, and the others to less.⁴⁷ According to a barbarous custom, when six prisoners were condemned to death only three were executed, when four two, when two one: but in this case, there being three under capital sentence, all were kept in suspense. Being taken into the "extra chapel," where the doomed spent their last hours, they were dressed in convicts' garb, and gallows clogs weighing nearly thirty pounds were riveted to their feet to make sure that the hanging should be satisfactory.⁴⁸ After three days a messenger brought a reprieve for Agresti and Settembrini, but the hour of execution had almost struck before Faucinato was told that the King had graciously spared his life. So a cat delights in torturing a mouse.⁴⁹

A fate worse than death awaited all the condemned. Poerio and sixteen others, assigned to the galleys at Nisida, were confined, chained in pairs, in a room some 13 feet long, 9 wide, and 8 high. There "they had to cook or prepare what was sent them by the kindness of their friends." "Their chains were as follows: Each man wears a strong leather girth round him above the hips. To this are secured the upper ends of two chains. One chain of four long and heavy links descends to a kind of double ring fixed round the ankle. The second chain consists of eight links, each of the same weight and length with the four, and this unites the two prisoners together, so that they can stand about six feet apart. Neither of these chains is ever undone day or night. The dress of common felons, which, as well as the felon's cap, was there worn by the late Cabinet-minister of King Ferdinand of Naples, is composed of a rough and coarse red jacket, with trousers of the same material . . . nearly black in colour. On his head he had a small cap, which makes up the suit; it is of the same material. The trousers button all the way up, that they may be removed at night without disturbing the chains. The

⁴⁷ Nisco, II, 297.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 299.

⁴⁹ See Settembrini's *Ricordanze*, vol. II, for details of his experience.

weight of the chains, I understand, is about 8 *ruote* or between 16 and 17 English pounds for the shorter one, which must be doubled when we give each prisoner his half of the longer one. The prisoner had a heavy limping movement, much as if one leg had been shorter than the other. But the refinement of suffering in this case arises from the circumstance that here we have men of education and high feeling chained incessantly together. For no purpose are the chains undone: and the meaning of these last words must be well considered: they are to be taken strictly.”⁵⁰ There Gladstone visited them. After talking with Poerio, “a cultivated and accomplished gentleman,” he wrote Lord Aberdeen: “I cannot honestly suppress my conviction that the object in the case of Poerio, as a man of mental power sufficient to be feared, is to obtain the scaffold’s aim by means more cruel than the scaffold, and without the outcry which the scaffold would create.”⁵¹ The putting in chains was the act of the King’s brother, the young Count of Aquila, who, though barely twenty-five years of age, already displayed the Bourbon characteristic — inhumanity.

Gladstone’s visit cost the chief prisoners dear. Poerio, Pironti, Braico, Errichiello and Nisco were transferred to Ischia to a still more horrible dungeon, a sort of dank cavern through which ran a sewer; and there, from time to time, other companions in misfortune joined them.⁵²

Gladstone addressed his letter privately to Lord Aberdeen, who forwarded it to Prince Schwarzenberg. The Prince delayed in replying; Bomba’s government likewise. The latter, to which the indictment was also submitted, decided to ignore it. Con-

⁵⁰ Gladstone, 26.

⁵¹ *Ibid*, 28.

⁵² Nisco, II, 317, thus describes the famous cave-prisons of Ischia, which Ferdinand had closed in 1845, in homage to humanity, and caused to be reopened in 1850. De Franco, the abominable commandant, “*sulla pubblica via ci faceva denudare, e passata la visita, per numero ci cacciava, attraverso una fetida cava e per un piccolo uscio con imposte ferrate, in un antro che poggiava le sue oscure volte su grossi pilastri ed aveva le umide e grigie mura chiazzate di salnitro, le finestre munite di due massicce inferriate e senza imposte, e ad un lato il condotto lurido del soprapposto quartiere militare, che, rotti in una notte, innegava nelle sue lordure il buon Poerio.*” Nisco adds that confinement there gave Poerio lung trouble, Castromediano bronchitis, Pironti spinal inflammation, Stagliano arthritis; Schiavone lost an eye, Gennaro his reason; 17 suffered from hernia; Tuzzo, Serafini, and Sticci had hemorrhages; Ferraro, Zerli, and Cavallo died of *dysia*; Mellucci, Cimino, Panunzio, Gatto, and Torquato succumbed to cholera.

vinced that nothing would be done to lighten the lot of the political prisoners, Gladstone printed his first letter,⁵³ together with a second⁵⁴ in which he added further evidence "of the miserable tendency of tyranny, like every other evil, to multiply and reproduce itself." He drew this pertinent contrast: "Among ourselves the police constable is, as such, the object of general respect. . . . But in the Italian tongue he is a *sbirro* or a *sgherro*, words which carry the united idea of degradation in the person described, and loathing in those who utter them."⁵⁵ And then Gladstone declared that "no such extremities of fear, cruelty, and baseness, as it has been my irksome duty to describe, could be reached by any Government but one already unmanned by a bad conscience, and driven on by necessity to cover old misdeeds by heaping new ones on them."⁵⁶ Gladstone next quotes from the Constitution, granted by the King: "of Our own full, free and spontaneous will," sworn to in the name of the Holy Trinity; reconfirmed; and now set at nought with unblushing effrontery, which indicates not a transient lapse from honor but an ingrained and irremediable baseness. The English statesman goes on to show, by reference to the "Philosophic Catechism," how the Church conspired to support the iniquities of the sovereign and to reduce his subjects to political cretinism.

This infamous catechism, compiled about 1832, probably by Monaldo Leopardi, and used, after the revolution of 1848, to counteract the teaching of Liberals, had for its motto, "Beware lest anyone deceive you through philosophy."⁵⁷ In the form of a dialogue between Master and Disciple it pursues the method of specious candor. The Master concedes that Liberals may not all be intentionally wicked — some of them may be piteously deceived — but all are headed for perdition. Nobody is bound to obey the laws in a democracy, for it would be absurd for the governed to exercise the governing power. The sovereign power, which God alone sanctions, is divine and unlimited. Therefore the people cannot establish fundamental laws; "because a

⁵³ Dated April 7, 1851. See Gordon: *The Earl of Aberdeen* (London, 1893), 203-05. ⁵⁴ Dated July 14, 1851. ⁵⁵ Gladstone, 28. ■ *Ibid*, 39.

⁵⁷ *Videte ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam. S. Paul ad Coloss., II, 8.* My copy is entitled *Catechismo Filosofico per Uso delle Scuole Inferiori*. Proposto dai Redattori della *Voce della Ragione*. Pesaro: Tipografia Nobili, 1832. Paper, octavo, 80 pp. Price 20 bajocchi.

Constitution, or fundamental laws, are of necessity a limitation of the Sovereignty; and this can never receive any measure or boundary except its own act." This is too simple, however, for actual conditions; so the inquiring Disciple asks whether, if the people, in electing their sovereign, have imposed upon him certain conditions these conditions will not form the fundamental law of the State. To this the Master replies: "They will, provided the Sovereign shall have granted and ratified them freely. Otherwise they will not; because the People, which is made for submission and not for command, cannot impose a law upon the Sovereignty, which derives its power not from them, but from God." The Disciple pushes his question home: Is a Prince bound to maintain a constitution he has sworn to observe? The Philosopher, far from being staggered by this, replies, "He is bound to keep it, provided it does not overthrow the foundations of Sovereignty, and is not opposed to the general interests of the State." These exceptions once granted, open the way, of course, to any degree of tyranny. The eager Disciple hungers to have his last doubt resolved. "Why do you consider," he asks, "that a Prince is not bound to observe the Constitution, wherever this impugns the rights of Sovereignty?" The Master reminds him that as Sovereignty is conceded and made needful by God, it "must be preserved inviolate and entire; and cannot be restricted or abated by man, without coming into conflict with the ordinances of nature and with the Divine Will. Whenever, therefore, the people may have proposed a condition which impairs the Sovereignty, and whenever the Prince may have promised to observe it, that proposal is an absurdity, that promise is null; and the Prince is not bound to maintain a Constitution which conflicts with the Divine command, but he is bound to maintain entire and intact the supreme power established by God, and by God conferred on him."

It would seem as if this answer must wipe out the last doubt, but the Philosopher welcomes even superfluous questions, for they afford him an opportunity to display his omniscience. Accordingly, when the ingenuous Disciple inquires: "Why do you consider that the Prince is not bound to maintain the Constitution, when he finds it to be contrary to the interests of the State?" the Master pulverizes him with this reply: "God has

appointed the supreme power for the good of society. The first duty, then, of the person who may have been invested with it, is the duty of promoting the good of Society. If the fundamental law of the State be found adverse to the good of the State, and if the promise given by the Sovereign to observe that fundamental law would oblige him to promote what is detrimental to the State, that law becomes null, that promise void: because the general good is the object of all laws, and to promote that good is the main obligation of sovereignty. Suppose a physician to have promised, *and sworn*, to his patient, that he would bleed him; should he become aware that such blood-letting would be fatal, he is bound to abstain from doing it: because, paramount to all promises and oaths, there is the obligation of the physician to labour for the cure of his patient. In like manner, should the Sovereign find that the fundamental law is seriously hurtful to his people, he is bound to cancel it: because, in spite of all promises and all constitutions, the duty of the Sovereign is his people's weal. In a word, an *Oath* never can become an obligation to commit evil; and therefore cannot bind a Sovereign to do what is injurious to his subjects. Besides, the Head of the Church has authority from God to release consciences from oaths, when he judges that there is suitable call for it." "And now," says Gladstone, "comes the Keystone of the arch which makes the whole fabric consistent and complete, with all the consistency and completeness that can belong to fraud, falsehood, injustice, and impiety. '*Disciple*. Whose business is it to decide when the Constitution impairs the rights of Sovereignty, and is adverse to the welfare of the People?' '*Master*. It is the business of the Sovereign; because in him resides the high and paramount power, established by God in the State, with a view to its good order and felicity.' '*Disciple*. May there not be some danger, that the Sovereign may violate the Constitution without just cause, under the illusion of error, or the impulse of passion?' '*Master*. Errors and passion are the maladies of the human race; but the blessings of health ought not to be refused through the fear of sickness.'" ⁵⁸

This Catechism, ⁵⁹ dedicated "to the Sovereigns, the Bishops,

⁵⁸ Gladstone: *Letters*, II.

⁵⁹ The best summary in English of the *Catechismo Filosofico* is in Pres. A. D.

the Magistracy, the Teachers of youths, and all the well disposed," presents the doctrine of the divine rights of kings as absolutely as Cardinal Baronio two centuries earlier summed up the doctrine of the Pope's temporal power.⁶⁰ In neither case could fanatical extravagance go further. The author of the Catechism urged in his preface that teachers should not be continued in office unless they expounded it zealously, making it "the personal accomplishment of all the young" and giving it honor next to the Christian Catechism itself. "The Bishops will find means to circulate it in their seminaries, to prescribe it to their clerks, to recommend it to the parish priests, to cause it to become the food of the people, and to fix that in all examinations men shall be questioned upon the doctrines of political philosophy, just as they are questioned upon those of Christian belief and conduct, inasmuch as no one without being a good citizen

White's "A Catechism of Revolutionary Reaction," *Papers of Amer. Hist. Assocn.*, iv, pt. 1. The Catechism proves that men are not born free or equal, or with any rights; that constitutional government is unnecessary; that opinions when spoken or written become deeds, and therefore subject to police restraint; that the perfection of civilization is a fallacy and a stumbling block for the human race; that ignorance is the proper state for all but a few, in order to keep them obedient and content. Throughout the dialogue the *Master* attributes all subversive doctrines to the Liberals. His logic is often acute, his illustrations graphic. He covers the entire field. The *Disciple* asks, for instance, "When the Prince loads his subjects with enormous taxes and wastes the treasures of the State, would not the rebellion and insurrection of the people be just?" "It would not be just," the *Master* replies; "the people have not the right to judge regarding the needs and expenses of monarchy, and the Holy Spirit, by the mouth of St. Paul, has declared to the people, 'Pay tribute,' but it has not declared to the people, 'Examine the accounts of the King.'" "*Disciple*. But when the prince uses his subjects cruelly, and wastes their wealth and blood, would a rebellion and insurrection of the people be just?" "*Master*. It would not be just, because the people are neither the judges nor the avenger of the injuries done to private persons, and, least of all, of those done by the monarch." Ingenious, but not convincing, is the *Master's* attempt to disparage patriotism. It is as absurd, he implies, for persons born in Italy to have a peculiar feeling towards each other, and to desire to form one nation, as if all smokers, or all quick-tempered men, or everybody named Bartholomew, should try to form a nation, on the basis of accidental resemblances. In another place the *Master* declares that "the newly invented savings-banks are the carnal brothers of general instruction, and that philosophy is preparing, by means of them, to accomplish the diffusion of property and goods." The Catechism merits a much wider attention than it has received, and should be studied as a corollary to the Syllabus of 1864.

⁶⁰ W. R. Thayer: *A Short History of Venice*, New York, 1905. "The ministry of Peter, he said, has two parts, — one is to feed the lambs, the other is to kill and eat them; and this slaughter is not cruel, but an act of piety, because while by it they lose their bodies, they save their souls"; 276.

and a good subject can be a good Christian." Gladstone closes his survey of the Catechism with these words: "A broken oath; an argument spun from laborious brains to show that the oath ought to be broken; a resolution to preoccupy all minds, in the time of their tender youth, and before the capacity of thought, with his argument: no more cunning plot ever was devised, at least by man, against the freedom, the happiness, the virtue of mankind. . . . We have thus seen Perjury, the daughter of Fraud, the mother of Cruelty and Violence, stalk abroad in a Christian Kingdom; and have heard her modestly make for herself a claim (which, as I am informed, has been fully allowed) that her laws shall be expounded in every school throughout the country, coincident in extension, and second only, if second, in dignity, to the Catechism of the Christian Faith."

Gladstone's Letters, published in July, 1851, caused an immense sensation. His own eminence, the circumstantiality of his charges, the genuineness of his plea for humanity and the fact that Lord Aberdeen permitted his name to be used, made their force irresistible. Lord Palmerston took occasion in the Lower House to praise Gladstone, who, "instead of diving into volcanoes and exploring excavated cities," had frequented courts of justice and visited prisons "with a view to enlist public opinion in the endeavor to remedy those abuses."⁶¹ The Foreign Secretary further sent copies of the Letters to every British Minister in Europe, with instructions to communicate them to the government to which he was accredited. This gave them almost official validity. The enemies of Liberalism could not dismiss Gladstone's arraignment as the attack of a Liberal, for Gladstone still belonged among the Conservatives; and while his immediate motive was to redress the terrible sufferings of the Neapolitan prisoners, his deeper purpose, as he frankly avowed, was to show that, if the Neapolitan Government persisted in such a barbarous system, it would not only bring on itself a violent retribution, but also discredit the cause of Conservatism throughout Europe.⁶² No State could hope to endure whose sovereign broke his

⁶¹ III Hansard, 118, 1947-50. Palmerston in reply to question of Sir De Lacy Evans, Aug. 7, 1851. See also Ashley, II, 180-82.

⁶² "As a member of the Conservative party in one of the great family of European nations, I am compelled to remember, that that party stands in virtual and real, though perhaps unconscious alliance with all the established Govern-

solemn oaths to his people, who disregarded the laws he himself had sanctioned, who set up cruelty in the place of justice, and perfidy in place of good faith. "These practices," Gladstone warned, "are certainly and even rapidly doing the work of Republicanism in that country."

King Bomba, enraged when the storm of accusations broke, would have preferred to ignore them: but he deemed it wiser to order an official reply to be prepared.⁶³ This contained a general denial, to be deduced by a confutation of particular points. The roll of political prisoners was declared to be not "about 20,000" but exactly 2033. It was shown that Gladstone had erred in his description of the way in which the prisoners were chained; that he had misstated the number indicted in one of the trials; that he gave a wrong account of one detail, or slurred another. The apologists did not disdain the ways of pettifoggers. Gladstone had said that Pironti and two companions were confined for two months in a cell eight feet square, lighted only by a grating at the top, out of which *they could not see*. How could the cell have been *dark*, asked the apologists, when Pironti wrote his defense in it? Gladstone asserted that the dungeons at the Vicaria were so loathsome that the prison doctors would not go down into them, but instead, compelled even dying prisoners to crawl up the steep staircases for inspection. The apologists rebutted this charge by announcing that the doctors were able and good men. In no vital point did the official reply discredit Gladstone: nor were volunteer defenders of Bomba more successful.⁶⁴ Europe believed the tremendous indictment.⁶⁵

The King, however, would not mend his ways.⁶⁶ After tedious

ments of Europe as such; and that, according to the measure of its influence, they suffer more or less of moral detriment from its reverses, and derive strength and encouragement from its successes." P. 2.

⁶³ *Rassegna degli Errori e delle Fallacie pubblicate dal Sig. Gladstone, in due Lettere indiritte al Conte Aberdeen*. Napoli: Stamperia del Fibreno, 1851. The *Journal des Débats*, Paris, published "by authority" a French version; Sept. 27, 28, 30, 1851.

⁶⁴ Notably, Gondon, editor of the Ultramontane *Univers*, who wrote a pamphlet entitled "*La Terreur dans le Royaume de Naples*," and Charles Macfarlane, a Scotch resident of Naples and recipient of royal favors.

⁶⁵ For special details on Gladstone see John Morley: *Life of W. E. Gladstone* (London: Macmillan, 1903), vol. i, book 3, chap. 6; and Justin McCarthy: *The Life of Gladstone* (New York: Macmillan, 1898), chap. 11.

⁶⁶ Palmerston writes, Sept. 7, 1851: "Walewski told Milnes the other day, as

trials two other batches of political prisoners — the so-called 15th of May and 5th of September suspects — were sentenced to the worst horrors of the galleys. The prisons everywhere were swarming with victims who had either been summarily condemned or arrested on suspicion. In Sicily, where General Filangieri had put down the rebellion with fire and sword, martial law prevailed. On both sides of the Straits, the government relied wholly on terror. "The negation of God erected into a system" seemed to its supporters to be as solid as the Ten Commandments for the cornerstone of a kingdom.

In truth the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies had reached a state of social, moral and political putrescence which the reaction after 1848 simply uncovered. For a thousand years the Neapolitans had been the victims of evil rulers. Byzantines, Saracens and Spaniards had in turn conquered them, and each had grafted its peculiar vice on the native stem. Neither conquest nor racial mingling need necessarily debase — witness England, whose unequaled stock springs from Anglo-Saxon, Dane and Norman roots: but in Naples, everything tended to corruption, and except at rare intervals, the government, which elsewhere makes at least the pretense of protecting and uplifting the nation, laid itself out to encourage wickedness, idleness and ignorance. For the Neapolitan princes found it easier to control men by their vices than by their virtues. Feudalism, which had been somewhat mitigated by the reforms of Charles III and by the French occupation, revived after 1815. The country lacked roads, schools, industries, and even common safety. The Bourbon government oscillated between unrestrained barbarity and senile laxness. In the provinces, the energetic took to brigandage; in the cities, and especially in the capital, a vast criminal organization called the Camorra flourished. It lived by blackmail and intimidation and counted among its members Cabinet ministers, nobles, bourgeois, and barefoot lazzaroni. Even Bomba himself was suspected of being a Camorrista, and the thing seems probable: for the profits of the ring were large, and ■ proof of the goodness of heart of the King of Naples, that, at his, Walewski's, request the King had at one time promised to set free 300 *prisoners against whom no charge or no proof had been established.*" The prisoners, however, were not released. Ashley, II, 182. Palmerston's brother, Sir William Temple, then British Minister at Naples, confirmed in his private letters Gladstone's charges.

they were collected more regularly than the lawful income of the State. The Camorra had a chief, and, in Naples, a gang for each of the twelve sections. The ordinary Camorrista must usually give proof of his worth by at least one murder, before being admitted to the organization; then he swore eternal enmity against every public authority and the police. There were also "free sectaries," villains who cultivated fraud only and not violence. They frequented the Bourse, the banking-houses, the money-changers and the ministries, and took "the lion's share in every transaction." "The industries exploited by the Camorra are very numerous," says a contemporary witness. "We have the beggars, the sectaries in yellow kids, and those who speculate on gambling, on prostitution, on smuggling, on the customs, on public carriages, on usury. Others stick to the harbor, and prevent the fishmongers from selling if they refuse to pay the Camorra." ⁶⁷ Women camorristas ran brothels, secret lotteries, and other disreputable resorts, which both brought them direct revenues and enabled them to levy blackmail on their patrons. If the King was not actually a Camorrista, he pursued the methods of the Camorra. He took his percentage on the army contracts; he winked at the peculations of his ministers because he made them divide with himself. "Look out for your pockets!" was his joking remark to his fellow pillagers.

The King, nicknamed by his subjects "Bomba" and "the Negation of God," and execrated henceforth by the civilized world, was the necessary product of a dynasty in decay, and that dynasty the Bourbon. Strip him of his court apparel, and he would find himself perfectly at home among the lazzaroni who basked at Santa Lucia, or prowled among the network of narrow lanes traversed by Via Toledo. Born in 1810 he had known from infancy no good influence. As a boy he witnessed the perfidy of his grandfather, Ferdinand I; as a youth, he saw the vile life of

⁶⁷ Larousse. The Camorristas were neutrals in politics, or rather, they were for the Camorra first, last, and always. Witness their rhyme:

Nui non simmo gravanari,
Nui non simmo realisti,
Ma nui simmo Camorristi,
Cuffiano a chilli e a chisti.

Under Francis II, the daily customs receipts at Naples fell from about 4000 to 1000 ducats.

his father, Francis I. Jesuits trained him, sycophants fostered his defects by flattery. Before he succeeded to the throne (Nov. 8, 1830) he was accustomed to regard kingship as a sword whose two edges were treachery and cruelty. On his accession, when he seemed bent on giving his people a decent rule, he enjoyed a brief popularity: but he quickly slid back into the ways of his fathers. In 1848, terrified by the explosion of Liberalism, he granted a constitution; next, he pretended to support the War of Independence: then he betrayed both, and grew more and more truculent, as he felt his power more and more secure. He was no libertine — that was his solitary virtue. Of kingliness he possessed only the instinct of domination. Wishing to have it appear that nothing went on in his Kingdom without his consent, he palmed off as his own the plans which others originated. Devoid of a personality which commanded obedience, he resorted to trick or cajolery or deceit to make men obey him. He chose his advisers for their pliancy; having chosen, he despised and distrusted them, because he knew that they were corrupt and that they knew that he was perfidious. Let a leech gorge itself with blood, and then do not disturb it, was the theory on which he dealt with his officials,⁶⁸ whom he changed as seldom as possible, because each new leech required a fresh repast. Of finance, of legislation, of justice, of the laws of trade, he understood nothing, and he had no settled policy except to keep himself on his throne by fair means or foul. He would indulge any caprice that flitted through his narrow brain, a habit which made him, like a drunkard, now effusively familiar, now vulgar, now haughty, and now quarrelsome. Seated on the edge of a table and dangling his feet to and fro, he would receive great prelates of the Church, or, in a sudden access of dignity, he would repel his intimates by unexpected reserve. Without courage, or power to lead or to discipline, without even a bookish acquaintance with the art of war, he prided himself on his army, held frequent reviews and posed as a war-lord. The army and the clergy he recognized as the indispensable props of his dynasty, and, as if to symbolize their common mission, he created Ignatius Loyola, dead nearly three hundred years, an honorary field-marshal on his staff. A lazzarone by instinct, he recognized the hold that

■ Castille: *Ferdinand II.* Paris: Dentu, 1859, p. 28.

superstition had over the masses, and he took care to control the tools of superstition. The Blood of St. Januarius was worth to him many regiments: miracles and church pageants and festivals served better than the police to enable him to penetrate even the thoughts of his subjects. And yet, true lazzarone that he was, he probably mocked at one moment the relic to which he might cringe the next. He gave the Church a free hand so long as it worked to make his people docile; when it encroached on his power, he resisted. He welcomed the Jesuits in 1849, for he was then rallying to his support all the old instruments of Reaction; he encouraged them to supervise instruction and to found their official organ, *La Civiltà Cattolica*; as soon as they asked for more, he did not yield. To the demand of the Archbishops of Naples and Capua, and the Bishops of Aversa and Acerra, that he should substitute larger concessions, specified by them, for the Concordat which regulated the relations of Church and State, he returned a decided no.⁶⁹ For he knew that he could rely upon the self-interest of the Clericals to keep them subservient to his needs. In stature, Ferdinand II was tall, but ill-formed, his trunk being too long for his legs. A low forehead, a large red nose, and a heavy jowl and chin puffed out with fat, recalled the statues of the brutish Roman Emperors.⁷⁰

Such was the restoration in Italy, outside of Piedmont after 1849; such the men who banded together to maintain the Old and to crucify the New. Politically, Austria controlled the situation, for without her support, actual or potential, none of the princelings could have ruled a month. Nor was her control merely political. Austria did her utmost to force the restored Princes to join her customs league. She made them bend to her preferences in establishing railway and telegraph lines, and wished to supervise their postal communications. She aimed at benefiting herself and at injuring Piedmont, isolating and boycotting the sturdy little Kingdom. "Piedmont," wrote Prince Schwarzenberg to the Duke of Modena, after Cavour had negotiated his treaty with England, "has opened wide the doors

⁶⁹ Tivaroni, I, 214-15. ⁷⁰ Cf. Castille, 7-8. D. Galdi: *Ferdinando II (I Contemp. Ital.*, Turin, 1861), is a half-apologist. Later writers, like R. De Cesare (*Il Fine d'un Regno*), find little to extenuate in Ferdinand's character or acts. In English see H. R. Whitehouse's *The Collapse of a Kingdom*.

to the influence of Great Britain, not only in commercial but also in political concerns. From now on, Piedmont will be the citadel from which the bordering states will be menaced not only by an inundation of English goods . . . but also by the far more dangerous contraband of English subversive tendencies, whose action has been already so bitterly experienced by Italy." ⁷¹

But the crisis went deeper, far deeper, than politics or commerce, down to the very form of government itself, to the roots of property, to the freedom of the individual, to religion. The Papacy, which had taken root under medieval conditions; Class Privilege, derived from Feudalism; Despotism, — were surviving in an epoch in which they could never have originated. They were no longer institutions at the growing and ideal stage; but institutions which had become degenerate through age and through the inherent defects of human nature. No doubt, the Papacy as dreamed by Hildebrand, held up a noble ideal to medieval Christendom; no doubt the mutual relation of lord and vassal, or of vassal and retainer, was an improvement on what it supplanted; no doubt the theory of a paternal despot, to be a father to his people, has much to commend it, although it has seldom been seen in practice: but in 1850 these had all lost their original character and aims. Institutions whose justification had been that they promoted the general welfare, now existed to promote the selfish interests of the privileged few who controlled them. The despot thought only of himself, and not of his people; the nobles contrived to grasp the profits and to shirk the responsibilities of their positions; the clergy worked not for the glory of God or the good of man but for the enriching of themselves and their caste. The notion of service had been forgotten. Society was an organization in which the greed of the few devoured the product of the many. Under every system since men first congregated, the strong have ruled the weak; but side by side with the rude fact of power have grown the ideals of fellowship and of justice; and these have helped, in happy times, to correct the inequality and injustice which condition human life.

An institution dying of gangrene presents an awful spectacle. Italy in the middle of the 19th century witnessed the slow decay

⁷¹ Schwarzenberg to Francis V, April 10, 1851. *Stor. Doc.*, vii, 451. The best account of Austria's negotiations for the customs league, railways, etc., is in this volume of Bianchi, chap. I, with the accompanying despatches.

of the Papacy and of Absolutism. Everything was perverted. It was not foreigners and heretics, but Italians and Catholics who charged that the Church, which should be the fountain of truth, condoned perjury; that it debased the confessional into an instrument of political eavesdropping; that it saw unmoved the pretended celibacy of its priests and friars breed widespread immorality; that it substituted ritual for religion, mechanical tests for piety, superstition for Christ's simple tenets; that it was worldly, cynical, sly; and that it strained all its ebbing energy to hold the last shreds of temporal power, to lay up treasures where moth and rust do corrupt, to gratify ecclesiastical pride, the most heartless and insatiate of human passions. These accusers noted that the union of Church and Papacy, the attempted league of God and Mammon, which the greatest of Catholics — Dante and Savonarola, Sarpi and Rosmini — had deplored, led inevitably to moral death. The perversion of its functions is one sign of the decay of an institution; impotence is another. The Papacy-Church had ceased to adapt itself to the world in which it found itself. Powerless to initiate, it could only curse modern conditions and turn back to medieval precedents for succor. The medieval mind had produced the dogmas of Catholicism and the Papal scheme: therefore the modern mind must be purged of everything that prevented it from accepting joyfully those dogmas and that scheme. Quite naturally, the Jesuits, who organized the counter-reformation and formulated the program of temporal power in the 16th century, were summoned to restore medieval conditions.

In similar fashion, Absolutism had reached the verge of decomposition. The petty despots in the Duchies and in Naples were trying to perpetuate Renaissance tyranny; but standards which fitted Lodovico Sforza or Sigismondo Malatesta, tyrants of original force, were far beyond the reach of degenerate weaklings like Francis and Bomba, who might as well have tried to imitate Julius Cæsar. Tyranny itself, denatured in their hands, appeared timid, capricious and incompetent: its cruelty inspired not fear but loathing, its cowardice contempt.

In 1850, however, Reaction seemed to be firmly rooted, not only in Italy, but in Europe. The great conservative forces, by a common impulse, leagued together for mutual protection.

Lutheran Prussia was as reactionary as Jesuit-ridden Austria. The plea of the Italian despots that in upholding the Altar and the Throne they saved civilization from anarchy, might sound hollow to thinkers who asked, What Altar? and what Throne? But the phraseology of religion still exerted an immense power over the unthinking, and — so paradoxical is human nature! — myriads of persons who daily witnessed priestly or princely corruption did not recognize it in fact, although they would have been the first to be horrified by a description of it. Catholics all the world over would not believe the reports that came to them from Rome: for they followed a process of reasoning that is as familiar and as simple as it is fallacious: Rome, they said, is governed by the Pope; the Pope must be a very holy man; therefore Rome must be perfectly governed.

But after all, might not the Reactionists be right? The God of medieval Christendom, if Thomas Aquinas and the other doctors of the Church understood and reported Him correctly, certainly never contemplated popular government. A Catholic philosopher could, indeed, easily persuade himself that popular government was an offshoot of heresy, the political expression of that rebellion from the Roman Church of which the Protestant Reformation was the theological expression. Viewed in that light, every successive limitation of the prerogative of the Prince, under the spiritual headship of the Pope, must appear heretical; and the fact that freedom had flourished only in England and in the United States, Protestant countries, confirmed this view. So the upholders of Reaction might be regarded as zealots striving to lead society, which had strayed into the wilderness, back to the Earthly Paradise. They were heroes, fighting in the last ditch. If the enemies of God — that is, their own enemies — prevailed, the blight of irreligion would sweep over Christendom, civilization itself would totter and fall.

There is no question that the Reactionists had cause enough for anxiety. The transition from a social system which had lasted a thousand years to a new system, was a stupendous experiment. The Old might have its defects, but it had served; who could guarantee the New? If the French Revolution were an example, Conservatives inferred that Democracy was organized diabolism. Admitting that Democracy need not result in a Reign of Terror,

yet the natural difficulties against its functioning with even moderate efficiency, seemed almost insuperable. Every other form of government can be proved logical, Absolutism the most logical of all. Keen thinkers and master ironists, from De Maistre to Bismarck, make the judicious alternately smile and shudder at the absurdities, the paradoxes, the dangers, the evils of popular government. But, however sincere the supporters of the Reaction might be, and however unselfish, — though their private interest was so obviously identified with the maintenance of the old system that their unselfishness might be doubted, — they had a fatal weakness: they believed in classes, but not in Man, in symbols, but not in facts. That is the blight which overtakes a society at the point of dissolution. It was not by chance that Cardinal Antonelli embodied decaying Papalism, not by chance that Bomba incarnated putrescent Absolutism.

CHAPTER IX

THE FIRST YEAR OF THE PREMIERSHIP. 1852-1853

SUCH was the condition of Italy, such the general temper of Europe, in November, 1852, when Cavour became Prime Minister of Victor Emanuel II. The outside world, so far as it concerned itself with Piedmont, was either lukewarm or hostile. Austria, and her protégés in the Peninsula, hated the little oasis which refused to be Austrianized. France, having fallen back on her traditional rivalry with Austria, was pleased to offer to the Subalpine Kingdom a friendship which she did not intend should be exacting. In England, the Court was pro-Austrian, but Liberals and Conservatives alike felt a certain Platonic admiration for the sturdy people who had stuck to representative principles in spite of the example of all their neighbors and of the actual danger it involved. But Cavour knew that in case Piedmont were attacked neither the French sympathy nor the English would solidify in armed help. He regarded the goodwill of the Western Powers as indispensable, and he foresaw that it could be secured only by making Piedmont strong, progressive, and self-reliant, a model of those ideals which the best men in France and England cherished.

He came to the premiership not a day too soon. The impetus towards Liberalism, which the young King's loyalty to the Constitution in 1849 had kept up, was beginning to slacken. Massimo d'Azeglio, charming as man and chivalrous as patriot, had no talent for political organization.¹ Whatever fighting quality his ministry had shown, it owed to Cavour, the subordinate, whose self-assertion at last wore the aspect of mutiny. The Connubio needed to be followed up by a vigorous forward movement; without it, the Liberals wavered from May to November, 1852, and the Reactionaries grew proportionately aggressive. The

¹ His wound also hampered him seriously. A prime minister who was obliged for weeks at a time to hold his cabinet meetings stretched on a sofa and was prevented from facing Parliament, was at a great disadvantage.

Clericals among them felt the propulsion of that wave of Papal assumption which swept over Europe during the first years of Pius IX's restoration. Most ominously for Piedmont's liberty, the King himself seemed to hesitate. On June 9, 1852, the Chamber of Deputies by a vote of 84 to 35, passed the bill authorizing civil marriage. Immediately, the Clericals besieged Victor Emanuel to reject it. He wrote a personal letter, as from a dutiful son of the Church, to Pius IX, who without warrant published the letter and replied to the King that marriage was a sacrament to be performed by the Church alone; that civil marriage was mere concubinage, and that God would hold the King responsible for allowing his people to live in a state of sin. Victor Emanuel, like most of his Savoy ancestors, stood in awe of his religion. A positivist in politics, where he weighed each event with shrewd common sense, he never questioned the dogmas of his Church, nor quite freed himself from the notion that the Pope could indeed, like a master sorcerer, let loose the invisible agencies of blight against those who disobeyed him. Victor Emanuel not only had to combat this inherited attitude and the urgency of the Clericals, but also the entreaties of his mother and wife, women genuinely devout, who wished to save him from committing sacrilege. These varied influences began to undermine him. He declared at a Cabinet council (Oct. 21, 1852) that he would never consent to any law displeasing to the Pope, and that he was prepared to make any sacrifice whatever for his country except the sacrifice of his conscience. A few days later, after D'Azeglio's resignation, he called Cavour to form a new ministry and heard a different gospel. For Cavour insisted that the government must neither surrender nor compromise, and he recommended the King, if he were not ready to adopt that position, to seek advisers friendly to the Clericals. When this expedient failed, and Victor Emanuel again summoned Cavour, he took the helm on the understanding that there should be no veering. He agreed, however, not to make a Cabinet question of the Civil Marriage Bill, which was soon to come up in the Senate.²

Viewed through posterity's eyes, nothing can surpass the fitness of Cavour's accession to the premiership. His public career

² *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 64-69. D'Azeglio: *Politique*, 78. *Lettere*, I, 551-53.

had been a steady advance. Before entering Parliament he had, in the *Risorgimento*, announced his political creed; as deputy he learned to debate, and to distinguish between men's characters and their opinions; as minister he had proved his ability to dispatch business of all kinds, to deal with political groups and to inspire personal devotion. His enemies could not point to a promise broken, or to a blunder which he must apologize for or disavow. Although to genius like his, patience is the most difficult of virtues, yet he had been so masterfully patient that when the prize came to him it seemed inevitable. The ripe fruit dropt, almost of its own accord, into his hand. He accepted office on his own terms, unentangled by past combinations. Had he forced an issue with D'Azeglio in the spring, although he might have won, it would have been at the risk of inflicting deep wounds; now D'Azeglio could bid him god-speed. The King, too, could not complain that he had been hurried: for he had vainly tried every available substitute, only to find Cavour the indispensable man.

What either member of this fateful partnership felt at this time towards the other will probably never be known. Victor Emanuel had recognized Cavour's genius for several years, but we may doubt whether he relished the prospect of being guided by a prime minister with a terrible passion for work, and a definite, all-embracing policy. Cavour was too loyal a subject not to defer to the King within the bounds of Constitutionalism; but he expected the King to give a valid reason in case he opposed his Cabinet's program. Victor Emanuel's dearest wish was to rank among the world's great captains: but since destiny made him a constitutional monarch, he resolved to play that part well. He was, indeed, "King Honest Fellow" (*Il Re Galantuomo*): nor could he ask for a more glorious tribute at a time when every other Italian sovereign, including the Pope, stood perjured before his people. That Victor Emanuel kept his troth to constitutional government, is one of the marvels of that age. Everything — example, the drift of the times, dynastic interest and personal convenience — seemed to tug him in the other direction. He was no zealot, glad to consecrate his life to an abstract ideal. His religion was too deeply tinged by formalism — by the assurance that the performance of certain rites would purchase absolution

for past sins and secure an entry into heaven — to give him ■ strong ethical support: but he divined that the King's honor must be stainless, and that served him in place of ■ vivifying religion. He had an unusually domineering, sensual nature, to which the standards of the time and license of his position offered no check. He disliked the details of business and must often have recalled, regretfully, old Charles Felix's saying, "I am not King to be bored." He used to enjoy smoking his cigar in Massimo d'Azeglio's private office and listening to the witticisms and droll stories and reminiscences in which that versatile premier abounded. "My people say that I love to loaf," said the King to Balbo. "I have heard that intimated, Sire," replied Balbo, with a smile.³

So far ■ Constitutionalism promoted the welfare of Piedmont, Victor Emanuel accepted it frankly, in spite of personal discomfort to himself; but when it led to controversy and rupture with the Pope, he demurred. Let Parliament have jurisdiction over political and economic affairs, but let it not meddle with religion. This was his instinct, which of course the Court circle, the reactionary nobles and the clergy did their utmost to encourage. And yet Cavour saw clearly that his loyalty could be trusted. He felt that the King, as a symbol of Piedmont's unity, and as the embodiment of national ideals, was indispensable: to guard him from evil influences and to steer him straight for the Liberal goal became therefore the Prime Minister's duty. Cavour had yet to learn the limits to which his Master would consent to be steered. Victor Emanuel, with all his passion for women, his delight in the chase, and his love of indolence, had a rugged will. His prejudices and his sound common sense had always to be reckoned with. Not even Cavour could mould him as Bismarck moulded William I, now by flattery, now by argument and now by threats of resigning. In more than one crisis, as we shall see, Victor Emanuel's personal act did for Italy what no one else could do.

The King's popularity was already a strong factor in the renaissance of Piedmont. Even Republicans who less than four years before had called him "the traitor of Novara," now acknowledged his trustworthiness. But Cavour was still unpopular. His

³ Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, 142.

opponents, who could no longer dispute his power, vied with each other in slandering him. They kept alive the old insinuations that he was a Reactionist in disguise, and that he worked for his private gain. The aristocracy hated him because he had deserted the traditional conservatism of his caste: the Radicals distrusted him, because they would not believe that a renegade aristocrat could be sincerely Liberal. We must go back to George Washington to find another statesman so assailed with calumny. And yet no statesman ever spoke more candidly than did Cavour. The eleven volumes of his speeches are a monument to straightforwardness rarely surpassed. In reading them, we are constantly surprised at the frankness with which he stated the defects of the measures which he wished Parliament to adopt. When he became premier, however, the popular opinion of him could be summed up in three words — able, crafty, unscrupulous. Cavour himself discounted abuse, as the unavoidable accompaniment of political life under free conditions. "Abuse me as much as you like," he said to the vitriolic journalists who denounced the Press Law; "but let foreign rulers alone."

The Great Ministry which Cavour formed, comprised Alfonso La Marmora, in the War Department, a high type of soldier, a reformer of the Piedmontese military system, a stern disciplinarian: haughty, brave, zealous, not a great captain, but a great inspirer of confidence, he brought with him invaluable prestige as a noble whose Liberalism cast no suspicion on his patriotism. Another soldier, General Giuseppe Dabormida, held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, a man who dwelt with facts; positive, logical; "preferring silence to speech," and yet not ineffective as a speaker, because the sheer worth of his character gave body to his argument. Count Ponza di San Martino, an aristocrat, was Minister of the Interior: what we should call a solid man without a flash of genius or originality, but an excellent stopgap: for he had both his own strong opinions and his antecedents. The Minister of Grace and Justice, Count Carlo Boncompagni, was one of the foremost Italian masters of jurisprudence of his time; an exile, whose membership in the Piedmontese Cabinet might be taken to indicate that Piedmont did not regard any Italian as an alien; in spite of his learning, he spoke with the trepidation of a victim at the stake. Count Pietro Paleocapa,

another fugitive, Venetian by derivation, had charge of the Ministry of Public Works, an important post, for Cavour wished to push many improvements, and Paleocapa was an expert of tried capacity. Chevalier Luigi Cibrario, Minister of Education, a favorite of the King's, if not his nominee, possessed scholarly training of the earlier sort, and was a power at Court; his presence in a Liberal Cabinet might reassure many of his anxious fellow-nobles. Cavour himself was both President and Minister of Finance. The Ministry thus contained the best talents then available in Piedmont, men of prestige, men who belonged, in age or in tendency, to the new generation.⁴ Cavour would have given a portfolio to Rattazzi, but concluded that it would be more discreet to wait. The support of the Left Centre being reasonably sure, Cavour strengthened his position by showing that he could go ahead without taking its representative into the Cabinet.

Cavour's first important work was the defense in the Senate of the Civil Marriage bill. After July, when the bill passed the Lower House by an enormous majority, the Papal party, in Rome and in Piedmont, left nothing undone to block it in the Senate. The King was known to disapprove of it—he had, indeed, written secretly to Revel that if the majority were wise they would vote no.⁵ The great Church dignitaries naturally opposed it. In the final debate, La Marmora's brother Alberto, D'Azeglio's brother Roberto, with the leaders of the Right, Revel, Menabrea and Balbo, not less than the irreconcilable Blacks, such immovable "crows" as Della Margherita and De Latour, were massed against it. On December 16 in a half-hour's speech Cavour attempted to stem the tide. Disavowing competence as to theology, he nevertheless asked why, "if the separation of the contract and of the sacrament is contrary to dogma, the Church tolerates it in France, in Holland, in Belgium, in England, and in almost the entire American hemisphere? . . . Can the relations of man with God, which are essentially independent of time and space, vary when one crosses a mountain or a river?" As to those who appealed to ancient history, to the customs of Egypt, Greece and Palestine, to support the

⁴ La Marmora was born in 1804; Dabormida in 1799; Boncompagni in 1804; Paleocapa in 1789; Cibrario in 1802.

⁵ *Lettere*, II, 6, for King's letter.

Clerical view, Cavour remarked that the mere antiquity of an institution is a very uncertain indication of its value: slavery, for instance, would be the most respectable of all institutions, if antiquity were the criterion. So marriage was much less religious among the Jews and Egyptians than among moderns. Marshal de Latour had attributed the recent decadence of society to civil marriage. This, Cavour showed, was another unfortunate appeal to history. Contrast, he said, the horrors and excesses of the Revolution of 1793 with the comparative humanity of the Revolution of 1848: if the Marshal were right, the facts ought to have been reversed. For the men of 1793 were brought up "in a society in which there existed no trace of civil marriage; in which the secular power undertook to support the ecclesiastical power; in which the laws of the Church had their sanction in the civil laws. There you have the society which bred the France of 1793 — there you have the culprit. On the other hand, the generation which, in 1848, showed itself so full of humanity and religion, issued from a society in which the civil power had been accurately marked off from the ecclesiastical power. All the men who took part in those events were born under the regimen of civil marriage." "So, too," he said, "whoever would compare moral conditions, would find that they had improved. In religion, there had been a marked progress except in Italy, where the Church still maintained its demoralizing hold on purely secular affairs." Finally, he urged that the wishes of the large majority of the Piedmontese be respected by the adoption of a measure which would remove a medieval relic from their statute book and raise them to the level, in this regard, of backward countries, like Naples, which had long ago freed themselves. Such action alone could bring about that accord between Church and State which they all desired. "To establish that harmony the Church must effect certain reforms, the State others: this was one of the reforms pertaining to the State: if the State failed to do its duty, how could it expect the Church to fulfil her obligations?" At no point was Cavour more effective than where he exposed the pretense of Roman theologians that the dogmas of their Church are unvarying and universal.⁶ The defenders of the Papal claims did not reply to his question why Rome could not

⁶ *Discorsi*, vi, 132-48; Dec. 16, 1852. Artom-Blanc, i, 309-25.

tolerate in Piedmont what she tolerated elsewhere: but they voted stanchly. The first ballot proved a tie — 38 to 38: then the President sided with the Clericals and the measure was lost (Dec. 20). Two days later the Ministry withdrew the bill: for Cavour had promised the King not to make this a Cabinet test.

This withdrawal, and the publication by the Sardinian bishops of a warning that everyone would be excommunicated who should obey any law authorizing civil marriage, exasperated the Republicans. As usual, Brofferio served as their mouthpiece. He arraigned the new Ministry for betraying their trust. They had been chosen, he said, because the country believed that they would put an end to the humiliating subservience to the Court of Rome: had they done so? No. They had given the Civil Marriage bill their half-hearted support, and, when it was defeated, they withdrew it. They might press it again: or, if the Senate remained stubborn, they might create enough Senators to outvote "the turbid element." In suffering the Sardinian bishops to publish their threat, the Ministers were parties to a breach of the laws. Brofferio was the most successful of the flamboyant orators in the Chamber. He seemed to have taken Danton as his model, and to be always shouting to a Palais Royal mob, "Audacity! audacity! evermore audacity!" But his was a keen, if narrow intellect; and from his standpoint of literalist, he often exposed with telling effect the inconsistencies or shortcomings of his opponents. Cavour rather welcomed his attacks, for he had the art of causing Brofferio's rhetoric to shrivel by dropping a little irony on it; and he could use Brofferio as a warning of what the government would sink to if the Radicals should come into power. If the perpetual opposition, lacking perspective and occasionally mad in its untimeliness, annoyed or disgusted him, Cavour accepted it as one of the incidents of the parliamentary system.

Replying on December 28 to Brofferio's attack, Cavour first stated that the Ministry had no intention of abandoning reforms. But, he said, "experience and past times and the present have convinced us that the goal can be reached with greater certainty, when we proceed with energy not divorced from prudence. The only peoples that have succeeded in establishing their institutions on solid bases are those that have known how to pursue the

paths of reform with firmness and caution at the same time: they are the peoples that have refrained from hurrying their reforms too fast, and that took into account the great element needful for them, I mean time." "Opportuneness" — that quality which doctrinaires never possess — Cavour here laid down as essential to constructive statesmanship. As for prosecuting the Sardinian bishops for their illegal manifesto, he went on to declare that that would be most unwise. "When the Clerical party," he said, "sets itself to combat liberty, there is no means more efficacious for resisting its insults, than to confront them with the principles of tolerance and of liberty." And he cited recent examples to prove that Clericals, like other partisans, thrive best when they can pose as martyrs.

This speech, saturated with Cavour's principles, did not satisfy his critics, who pronounced it evasive, if not insincere. They were logical in their distrust: for the Opportunist can be justified only by results. Any politician can promise: only the statesmen perform; and they must be granted what measure they need of "the great element — time." Though Cavour faced Brofferio with a light heart, he did not underestimate the force of the criticism which an antagonist of another sort, Saracco, brought against him. For Saracco pertinently asked whether the country ought not to begin to reap some harvest from the reforms of the past three years. It had borne an extraordinary burden of taxes; it had seen introduced a system of free trade with several nations; it was being cobwebbed with railways and telegraphs — and yet the budget still showed a deficit, and the feeling of uncertainty, of transition, still prevailed. In reply to this valid inquiry, Cavour tactfully epitomized the gains of the past years, adding that the most urgent need was to reach a firm footing in finance; "because," he said, "that is for us, in a certain way, a life-or-death question." The Chambers showed no intention of overturning the Ministry untried, but the extremists, from either the Left or the Right, kept up an almost incessant fusillade.

Cavour had hardly had time to energize the various home departments, when an explosion from outside showed how precarious still was Piedmont's position abroad. On February 6, 1853, the Mazzinians attempted to start a rebellion at Milan and were immediately suppressed. The Piedmontese Government,

having got wind of the affair, stationed patrols along the frontier to prevent armed bands from going to aid the rebels; it arrested exiles who acted suspiciously, and it ordered some professional incendiaries to leave the country. Count Strassoldo at Milan and Marshal Radetzky at Verona proclaimed the state of siege,⁷ the natural instrument of alarmed despotism. Count Buol, the Austrian Foreign Minister, not content with punishing the conspirators already in prison and of terrorizing all Lombards and Venetians, whether they were concerned in the plot or not, bethought him of a way by which to strike a blow at those whose persons were beyond his clutch. On February 13⁸ he issued a decree declaring that the property, real and personal, of political exiles from Lombardy-Venetia was sequestered. This harsh measure was perfectly consistent. Why should Austria permit hundreds of her Italian subjects, living abroad on incomes drawn from their Lombard or Venetian investments, to use that money to foment rebellion? Some of these emigrants had been banished for complicity in the revolution of 1848; others had voluntarily gone into exile; none of those who could, had accepted the terms of the Emperor's amnesty. Merely to punish the poor tools who had been caught was easy, but inconclusive: the real culprits, who instigated those tools, must be smitten. Dry up the source of their supplies, and their power for harm would wither. Sequestration would paralyze the individual emigrants at whom it was aimed; it would also affront Piedmont — a purpose which Austria had most at heart. For free Piedmont, separated only by the Ticino from Lombardy, was a perpetual menace to her despotic neighbors. She was showing the world that she could maintain a constitutional government in a time of triumphant Reaction; and by welcoming the exiles whom those neighbors persecuted, she was coming to be recognized as the home of Italianism. Austria, the Dukes, the Pope and the King of Naples had decided that a government by constitution was impossible: but even the constitution had less power than Italianism to terrify them.

The news of the decree caused the utmost indignation in Piedmont, where a large number of Lombards — 20,000 families

⁷ Zini, II, 344, for Strassoldo's proclamation of Feb. 7; *ibid.*, 347-48 for Radetzky's of Feb. 9.

⁸ Text in Zini, II, 352-53; published at Verona, Feb. 18.

according to some estimates ⁹ — had taken up their residence. Among these were many victims of the sequestration, sympathy for whom merely fed the flame. There was also a group of *émigrés* who had renounced their Lombard or Venetian citizenship and become naturalized as Piedmontese: the King's government, therefore, was in honor bound to protect them not less than any of its native born citizens. Every Piedmontese felt that the edict was aimed at his country. In her treaties Austria had solemnly engaged to respect the property rights of her *émigrés*: now she brutally broke her solemn engagement, never dreaming that little Piedmont would dare to call her to account.

At Turin, in the first access of wrath, there were loud demands for reprisals, which the Cabinet seriously entertained; but it soon thought more soberly, for Massimo d'Azeglio wrote from London that such a petulant step would cost Piedmont England's sympathy. Before taking action, Cavour requested the Austrian government to state whether it intended to enforce the decree of sequestration against Piedmontese subjects. While waiting for a reply, he writes confidentially to D'Azeglio that the affair is very serious: that Austria's real motive is "to discredit our government, to degrade it in the eyes of Italy and of Europe." The sequestration, he says, has no precedents in modern history, because even the French Convention did not strike the *émigrés* whom it had released from French citizenship. "We must go back to the Middle Age, to the epochs of Guelf and Ghibelline, to find anything analogous." And he regards it as the duty of all civilized governments to protest against an act "so barbarically revolutionary." "As you can well believe," he adds, "we have no intention of risking a third war of redemption: the time of follies is passed." ¹⁰

Count Buol replied promptly that Austria adopted the sequestration as a legitimate means of defense. She did not acknowledge the right of any foreigners to exact from her proof of the guilt of this or that *émigré*: this was a measure of public safety, not a judicial affair. The Lombard Emigration, he asserted, had abetted the plots which disturbed the Empire, and

⁹ Kinney, writing from Turin, Feb. 12, 1853, an account of the "insurrection" at Milan, says that everyone deploras it as a "heedless riot." There are, he says, over 100,000 *émigrés* in Piedmont, 20,000 in Turin alone. *Amer. Arch.*

¹⁰ *Lettere*, II, 257-60; C. to D'Azeglio, March 4, 1853.

Piedmont had neither curbed her outrageous press, nor extradited those charged with high treason.¹¹ He divided the Lombard Emigration into three classes: (1) The poniarders. (2) Those who direct and subsidize them. (3) The rest, who keep a prudent reserve, and wait quietly to see whether the attempts of the forlorn hopes of the Revolution result favorably or not. General Dabormida lost no time in denying Buol's accusations. He very properly led the discussion back to questions of fact. Austria, he showed, had not only promised by treaty to respect the rights of those *émigrés* who had become naturalized citizens elsewhere, but she had gone even further and declared that she would class as foreigners those refugees who had failed to avail themselves of her amnesty or to get permission to leave the country. By the decree of sequestration she broke her oath, tore up a page of her civil code, and flouted the laws of nations. Count Buol must know that the seat of conspiracies lay outside of Piedmont; for the uprising of February 6 was planned by Mazzini, whose headquarters were in London. As to extradition, Piedmont would willingly extradite any criminal, but not one charged with political offenses. Freedom of the press was guaranteed by the Piedmontese constitution: the government, far from conniving at demagogic abuse, checked it, wherever this could be done, without injuring the spirit of the law; and Parliament by recent legislation had enabled foreign princes to secure redress in the courts.¹²

Count Buol had no intention of explaining why Austria should enjoy the special privilege of keeping or breaking treaties at will. In a final note he almost threw off the rôle of diplomat, which he had assumed with reluctance, and spoke out plainly, regardless of conventions. He declared that the *émigrés* named in Radetzky's first proclamation and the refugees who had refused the amnesty were merely "felons" in the eyes of the Imperial government and that Piedmont knew their character perfectly well. He repeated his insinuation that the recent plot had been encouraged by the Lombard *émigrés* "under the safeguard of a neighbor who, we must be permitted to remark, would decline the duty of watching them and of checking action which might be aimed at us. We behold them established on our frontiers, mak-

¹¹ Buol to Appony, March 9, 1853; text in Zini, II, 376-77.

¹² Dabormida to Revel, March 20, 1853; text in Zini, II, 379-84.

ing no secret of their hostile intentions against a government they have betrayed. We behold them in relations with a press which pours the most infamous calumnies upon us, which preaches openly revolt and regicide." Count Buol scoffed at the suggestion that sequestration should be enforced only after each suspect had been legally proved guilty; that they were *émigrés* at all, furnished sufficient proof of their culpability. And he concluded his lecture by insinuating that Piedmont had often confided to Austria the embarrassments and anxieties which these intrigues of the *émigrés* caused her! ¹³ Buol spoke in the tone of the chief minister of an empire of forty million inhabitants, addressing the cabinet of a kingdom having only four millions: the Empire apparently at the height of its power, the Kingdom not yet recovered from a crushing defeat.

But the little kingdom was guided by a man whom the Imperial giant could not intimidate. Realizing that war would be suicidal and retaliation foolish, Cavour devised how to turn the incident to the moral advantage of Piedmont. He instructed Villamarina, at Paris, and Emanuel d'Azeglio at London, to propitiate the French and English Governments; and, through indirect or unofficial agencies, he strove to win over public opinion abroad and to secure the goodwill of personages who could direct it. Count Arese labored with his old friend Napoleon III, whose Imperial rise had set no barrier to their intimacy. Massimo d'Azeglio, now marketing his paintings in London, could be counted upon to plead effectually with the English, who still welcomed him as the most popular of the Italians. Nevertheless, Liberalism was at a low ebb. Lord Clarendon, Palmerston's successor at the British Foreign Office, commended the dignified attitude of Piedmont, but could not be moved to bring pressure to bear at Vienna.¹⁴ The instinctive Tory preference, encouraged by the Court, was pro-Austrian.

Napoleon III, on the other hand, was an enigma. During the Roman episode he naturally regarded Austria as a rival, who might easily become an assailant: but as he relapsed into despotism, abandoning even the pretense of Liberal principles, he felt chiefly the need of fortifying himself in France. The old Powers

¹³ Buol to Revel, April 7, 1853; text in Zini, II, 384-88.

¹⁴ E. d'Azeglio's despatches, March 22, April 17, 1853; *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 134.

distrusted him as the product of the Revolution; he would therefore show himself to them as simon-pure an autocrat as any Hapsburg or Hohenzollern. He particularly coveted, as a parvenu covets presentation at court, the approval of Austria, which would serve to certify to his standing in the Absolutist set. After the *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851, Austria shrewdly counted upon him as a partner in the Reaction. He understood, nevertheless, that, although France had voted to make him Emperor, there were many Frenchmen who were still zealous Republicans, and that among the supporters of the Empire few would be satisfied with the strait-jacket despotism in vogue at Vienna. A Napoleonic régime might be dictatorial, but it must so gloss its betrayal of liberty as to be popular. But while dynastic interests thus drew him towards Austria, he had already a strong desire for England's friendship. France stood next to England, though at a considerable distance, in industries, in commerce, and in eagerness to adopt and to extend the new methods of civilization. They were the two great banking nations, and he realized how much his throne rested on a financial basis. At heart, too, he rather sympathized with the British ideal of political freedom, although he did not dare to risk offering it to his French subjects. Furthermore, England was solid — the one nation unshaken by political or dynastic cataclysms for more than a hundred and fifty years. On the other hand, since assuming the protection of Rome, Louis Napoleon had made more and more concessions in order to secure Clerical support in France. With this object uppermost, he frowned on Piedmont's struggle to separate Church and State, and as he advanced towards the *coup d'état* he displayed the usual Reactionist aversion for Piedmont's loyalty to constitutionalism. Having gained at last by revolution the crown he hankered after, he abhorred revolutions, and made it his business to stamp out the first symptoms of one. Throughout the year 1852 his Ministers showered threats and warnings upon Victor Emanuel's Government and demanded that the demagogic press, which literally wallowed in abuse of the Prince President, should be abolished. The Subalpine Parliament refused to establish a censorship, but it passed a Press Law which enabled a foreign prince, through his representative, to bring criminal suit against any libelous

journal. But as this relief was seldom or never sought, the abuse continued at Turin, and Paris continued to scold. A second grievance lay in the asylum which Piedmont gave to political refugees. Even Palmerston advised that, for prudence' sake, the most dangerous among them be expelled.¹⁵ The French Cabinet kept insisting, their minister at Turin repeated their threats, and Premier d'Azeglio actually ordered a few of the worst suspects to go. While Butenval, the French Ambassador, was thus successfully ousting these alleged plotters, he himself was plotting to overthrow D'Azeglio and set up a Reactionary ministry with Revel as its chief. Considering D'Azeglio's nature, which was brave and upright but not imperative, the wonder is that he held head at all against the combined pressure of Reactionary Europe.

The relations between Piedmont and France hung in this uncertain state when Cavour took office. The French policy seemed to be to keep Piedmont on the tenterhooks without actually permitting her slaughter. But Cavour disliked this uncomfortable position. He assured the French Foreign Secretary, Drouyn de Lhuys, that the King's Government would do all that it lawfully could to remove the causes of grievance, but that it would never violate the Constitution. To break the law would precipitate a reaction, and fling Piedmont into the arms of Austria. If this occurred, Napoleon could hardly be pleased: for it would leave the French in Rome without a friend in Italy, and it would deprive them of an invaluable ally in case circumstances should bring about war between France and Austria. If Piedmont were leagued with France, a French army could assail Austria on the Lombard frontier: but if Piedmont were Austrianized, Austrian armies could pour through Savoy into the heart of France.¹⁶ It was Cavour's way to suggest a tangible benefit. As his negotiations with Austria over the *émigrés* progressed, the French Foreign Office showed increasing sympathy for Piedmont. Napoleon himself offered his services as mediator,¹⁷ which the Piedmontese Government declined, because it believed that

¹⁵ Oldoini to M. d'Azeglio, Dec. 25, 1851; *Stor. Doc.*, vii, 92.

¹⁶ This last argument does not appear stated thus explicitly in any correspondence at present edited; but it is implied in Dabormida's despatch of Feb. 1, 1853: *Stor. Doc.*, vii, 123.

¹⁷ Letter of Napoleon III to Arese, March 20, 1853; *Lettere*, ii, 163 n.

it had done all that it honorably could do to persuade Count Buol to reconsider his brutal act.

Instead of posing as a suppliant, Piedmont drew up a Memorandum reviewing the case, and recalled Count Adrien de Revel, the ambassador at Vienna, after he had presented it to the Austrian Government. Count Buol, in receiving the document, said that he should make no reply to it, as he did not recognize that Piedmont had the least right to protest against Austria's internal affairs.¹⁸ But the Memorandum carried the protest over Europe, where public opinion had already condemned Austria; the influential newspapers generally printed and praised it; France openly approved it, and England, through Lord Clarendon's note to Marquis Emanuel d'Azeglio, gave it official support. Clarendon declared that the British Government could not admit Buol's pretension that an act which infringed the law of nations was a purely internal affair; and he expressed the hope that the spirit of justice would, in the end, prevail in the counsels of Austria. Meanwhile, he heartily commended the attitude of Piedmont, which had been firm but calm, dignified, and moderate.¹⁹

So the acute phase of the incident closed. Diplomatic relations between Turin and Vienna were broken. Austria had succeeded neither in intimidating little Piedmont nor in capturing the approval of Europe. She who had been foremost in preaching the sacredness of treaties, had shown no scruple in disregarding them. The brutal measure she adopted, instead of safeguarding her from further rebellious outbreaks, added many thousands of victims to the ranks of those who had a personal grievance against her. Piedmont, on the other hand, came out of the ordeal greatly strengthened, having upheld her free institutions, displayed pluck and tact, and convinced Europe that she was not, as her enemies had insinuated, the hotbed of political assassins. The governments which had eyed her suspiciously, now acknowledged that she stood for law, order and the maintenance of international compacts. She had made Europe

¹⁸ Text of Memorandum, written by Cibrario, in Zini, II, 395-405; preceded by Dabormida's despatch of April 14 to the Piedmontese Ministers at Paris and London, *ivi*, 389-95. Clarendon's note of May 16 is in *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 139-40.

¹⁹ Kinney reports that to Piedmont's protest against the breach of treaty obligations, Austria replied: "*La légalité, la légalité nous tue!*" Kinney to Marcy, Aug. 18, 1853. *Amer. Arch.*

tacitly admit that her independence was bound up in her liberty. Most important of all, judged by what came after, Piedmont had emphasized her leadership of the Italian cause, and predisposed France and England in her favor. Her risk had been great: for her Ministers fully realized, when they sent their Memorandum, that Austria might declare war;²⁰ but their skill in discrediting Austria, the fine conduct of the nation, and the attitude of the King, who, as usual, when personal or national honor was assailed, acted with chivalrous single-mindedness, transformed danger into victory. Cavour summed the affair up, when he said to a Lombard friend that the Austrian Government had made a gross mistake: "It has turned against itself the entire opinion and all the governments of Europe. Wishing to injure us, it has done us a great service. Never fear; we shall profit by it, and cross the Ticino all the sooner."²¹

But while the moral and diplomatic victory fell to Piedmont, Austria persisted in enforcing the decree of sequestration, which rendered so many of the *émigrés* penniless, that Cavour introduced a bill, which the Subalpine Parliament enthusiastically accepted, to grant pensions to the needy. This act, which enhanced Piedmont's popularity in Italy, made Austria more odious. Had a statesman of Cavour's tact been at the head of the Austrian Foreign Office in February, 1853, he might have succeeded in doing Piedmont the injury which Buol planned: for it was no secret that many of the Lombard *émigrés* encouraged hatred of Austria. The *Opinione* newspaper — to cite but a single instance — was supported by the highest Lombard nobles, — Duke Litta and his brother, Count Oldofredi, Marquis Giorgio Pallavicino, — and it printed articles, by Bianchi-Giovini and others, which reeked with abuse. If Austria had at least gone through the motions of a legal prosecution against individuals, she might have heaped up presumptive evidence against them, and so deprived them of popular sympathy. But to punish Monarchists for a conspiracy hatched by Mazzinians in behalf of Republicanism, was an almost comical blunder: and in smiting the innocent with the guilty, in assuming the air that

²⁰ La Marmora writing on April 16 to M. d'Azeglio, discusses the possibility of war. Piedmont, he says, could put 70,000 men and 120 guns into the field in a fortnight. "Our troops," he adds, "are very much better drilled and disciplined than in '48 and '49." *Lettere*, II, 22, 27.

²¹ Massari: *Cavour*, 93.

Piedmont was a naughty child whom she was under no obligation to treat with common international decency, above all, in claiming that she could break her promises, solemnly ratified in treaties, if they interfered with her internal arrangements, Austria forfeited the respect of Europe. There can be no doubt that, as Cavour asserted, Austria's main purpose was to destroy the Constitutional régime in Piedmont: for freedom there endangered despotism throughout the Peninsula.

The full reach of Cavour's victory, however, did not appear at once: nor did it lessen the virulence of his opponents at home. He pressed forward the reforms already undertaken, and introduced others. He was considering plans for establishing a great naval arsenal at Spezia; he sent to England for an architect ²² to design docks at Genoa, which he intended should be the chief commercial port of the Mediterranean; he proposed to grant a subvention to a transatlantic steamship company;²³ he watched with feverish interest the weekly reports of the extension of the railway and telegraph lines.²⁴ In the debate over military conscription, he drew upon himself the volleys of both Blacks and Reds, who charged him with inconsistency and opportunism, for wishing to exempt specified classes of candidates to the priesthood. He argued that since society required a certain number of priests to perform the offices of religion, it was for the general interest that these priests should be as well-fitted as possible for their duties. A scheme which interrupted their training by forcing them into the army would waste their time, and might deter many desirable youths from entering the priesthood at all.²⁵ As to opportunism, Cavour uttered one of his memorable opinions: "There are times," he said, "for compromises and there are times for decided policies. I believe that there is neither in history, nor in statesmanship, any absolute maxim. If ever the time for a resolute policy, and not for compromise, shall come, I shall be the first to adopt it; because I feel that I am by character

²² Randell: see Bert, pp. 447, 448, 459, 460, 462, 467, 470, 474, 508, 510, 515. Mayor, 61, 62, 102; Bianchi: *Politique*, 21.

²³ *Lettere*, II, 31.

²⁴ On Feb. 13, 1853, he writes to De la Rue at Genoa: "You will rejoice, as I do, that the line is open as far as Busalla (23 kilometres from Genoa). The trip to Genoa is no longer much, since it can be made between breakfast and dinner." Bert, 449. The line was completed in December, 1853. Cavour rode in the cab of the locomotive on the first through trip.

²⁵ *Discorsi*, VII, 383-93; May 21, 1853.

more inclined to it. But the wisdom of the statesman lies in discerning when the time has come for one or the other. Now I believe that we are precisely in the situation where we ought to abandon the policy of foolhardy counsels in order to cleave to that of compromise." ²⁶

On June 3, 1853, Cesare Balbo died. Although only 64 years old, he had become as venerable as a patriarch to his countrymen. His death served to illustrate the epochal change which a few years had wrought. Less than a decade before, Balbo had startled Italians by printing his "The Hopes of Italy"; only yesterday, as it might seem, he was the president of Piedmont's first constitutional ministry — the revered "first citizen," to whom, in any emergency, everyone naturally turned for counsel and guidance. But events soon outran him. In the vortex of revolution he was as ineffectual as a statue of Seneca amid an inundation of the Tiber. Two or three years had rendered him obsolete. And yet, as Massimo d'Azeglio wrote, "he was a living rebuke to scoundrels, and that counts for much in a new political order."²⁷ For much, truly: and Italy has done well in reverencing him as one of the twin precursors of her redemption. Gioberti, the other, — a man of far richer endowment, magnetic, persuasive, grandiose, — had died only the year before. The time had passed when a Christian Stoic like Balbo or a Romanticist philosopher like Gioberti, could be thought of as qualified to be prime minister of an intricate modern state.

In another way, Balbo's death marked the great change: for Marquis Giorgio Pallavicino Trivulzio was elected deputy in his place. As a youth, Pallavicino was implicated in the Milanese conspiracy, which sent him, Confalonieri, and others to the Spielberg. Released after 16 years' imprisonment, he lived in exile until the Revolution re-opened the doors of his home. On being forced to emigrate again, he settled in Turin, where he became naturalized. His election to the Subalpine Parliament was a practical retort, by Piedmontese voters, to Buol's order of sequestration. Pallavicino was destined to perform a great service to the national cause: for the present, by sitting in the Chamber, he advertised the fact the Piedmont was the refuge of Italian patriots.

²⁶ *Discorsi*, VII, 397-98; May 23, 1853. ²⁷ G. Tommasoni: *Lettere Inedite di M. d'Azeglio e F. Gualterio* (Rome, 1895), 182.

Cavour welcomed the adjournment of Parliament late in June. "It is time," he wrote De La Rue; "I was at an end."²⁸ And yet he had persuaded it to pass most of the bills which he deemed urgent. In the summer, a war cloud loomed up in the East. Of more pressing concern for Piedmont was the appearance of the cholera.²⁹ A bad harvest brought scarcity of grain; the price of wheat rose; and by October, the poorer classes began to suffer. Cavour's Radical enemies saw their chance to inflame the public against him. In their newspapers — Brofferio's *Voce della Libertà* worst of all — they vented their calumnies. The famine, they said, was not due to natural causes, but to the greed of the Prime Minister and his fellow speculators, who had bought up and were storing the supplies. Early in the evening of October 18 a crowd, surly in spirit and evidently steered by some persons with a definite plan, poured out of Piazza Castello and surged towards Cavour's palace. Castelli, Cavour's devoted disciple, happened to see them approach, and guessing their purpose, he ordered the porter to bolt the great door, while he himself hurried in search of the police. A moment later, the mob came up and when somebody shouted "Down with Cavour! Death to the starvers!" there was a throwing of stones, a rush for the door, a pushing and battering, from which it finally gave way. The mob, now thoroughly enraged, made a plunge for the broad staircase, which led to Cavour's apartment on the first floor, when four carabinieri appeared in the nick of time and drove them back by a vigorous slashing of swords. Reinforcements soon came up, arrested the ringleaders, dispersed the rest, and left a patrol to prevent further trouble. "By God!" Castelli heard one young fellow say, as he ran to cover; "we ought to have gone in quickly, and then we should have taken him by surprise." It happened, however, that Cavour, throughout the attack, was calmly presiding over the meeting of a commission at the Ministry of Finance. When he reached home at ten o'clock all was quiet there, but the news of the outrage was flying through the city. The next morning, accompanied only by Castelli and La Marmora, who had called to inquire for him, he walked as usual to the Ministry. Bows and congratulations

■ Bert, 458; June 19, 1853.

■ See Cavour's letters from Leri: *Lettere*, II, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289.

greeted him on all sides, but there was an occasional hiss. The Council of Turin, most of the deputies in the city and the National Guard lost no time in expressing their horror at the occurrence. They applauded the Prime Minister for his courage and wisdom in economic reform; they declared that, although the price of breadstuffs had risen owing to the scarcity in Europe, it was not high enough to warrant any general alarm. Many other municipal and public bodies passed similar resolutions.

Cavour's wealth could not escape being the target for malign insinuations. He had a genius for business; whether in organizing or in administering. Having proved himself a master of agriculture on a large scale, he went in for industries and commerce, being one of the first in Piedmont to foresee their rapid development. He showed his faith in new enterprises by investing in them and as the investments prospered, he grew rich. When he entered the Cabinet, he resigned his position as director in various companies, but this did not silence the demagogues. They hinted that his reform of the tariff and internal taxes was prompted by his personal interests. And now they made the mob believe him to be a heartless monopolist. Posterity, however, cannot be misled; for in the 400 letters ³⁰ which Cavour wrote to his banker friend, Émile de La Rue, we can follow during more than 25 years his business operations step by step, and judge of their integrity. "Laugh in the face of anyone who says to you that I take the smallest part in any speculation," he wrote De La Rue not long before the dearth.³¹ In the light of his career, there is a mingling of comedy and tragedy in the charge that he, who seemed to the world to be terribly absorbed in creating Italy, devoting his zeal and sacrificing his life for patriotic ends, was in fact busy only in trying to misuse his high position so as to get larger returns from his investments. It is as if Sir Perceval's quest for the Holy Grail should be attributed to the gold-hunter's greed.

At his friends' insistence, Cavour prosecuted for libel the *Imparziale* and the *Voce della Libertà* of Turin, and the *Maga* of Genoa. The two former were acquitted by the jury ³² on the ground

³⁰ The first is dated July 27, 1836; the last, May 28, 1861, the day before Cavour's mortal seizure. See Bert, *passim*. ³¹ Bert, 452; Feb. 27, 1853.

³² *Lettere*, v, ccccxii, n. 1, says that Brofferio's statements in regard to the Collegno mills were false.

that Cavour held shares in the Collegno flour-mills, which had a large stock of grain on deposit; the *Maga* was punished. Being absolved by the court, Brofferio printed in his newspaper a pæan of triumph, in which he declared that, by judicial ruling, Cavour was a hoarder of wheat and flour contrary to the precepts of law and morals; that under his government monopolists, cornerers, stock-jobbers, telegraphists and speculators on the public substance, grew rich dishonorably, while the masses groaned under the burden of taxes; and that the blood shed by the police who dispersed the mob, was a barbarous act, for which Cavour himself ought to be put on trial.³³ He added that, if Cavour had shown himself, the crowd would have been quickly pacified. But as Brofferio knew that Cavour was not at home at the time of the mobbing, what are we to think of Brofferio? He persisted in his falsehood, and in his interminable memoirs he said: "The populace, pinched by sufferings and impelled by indignation, gathered one evening under Count Cavour's windows, asking bread, help and work. The 'bread' which Count Cavour gave the people of Turin was the order to the cavalry and infantry to charge upon the passers in the public streets; the 'help' was the prison; the 'work' was the hospital."³⁴ Cavour's real treatment of sufferers, however, is sufficiently stated by De La Rive in a single sentence: "Whilst the famine lasted, this house, the object, during a few hours, of popular hate, was an office open to all misfortunes, and when the cholera raged in Turin, Cavour visited the hospitals regularly."³⁵

The mob incident did more than add "the Miller of Collegno" to the list of reviling nicknames which Cavour's enemies tried to fix upon him. On October 27, the *Official Gazette* announced that Urbano Rattazzi had been appointed Minister of Justice in place of Boncompagni. This completed the fusion anticipated in the Connubio. It was time that the Left Centre, which had been loyally supporting the Government, should be represented in the Cabinet. Having dispelled, during his year's premiership, the fears of those who predicted that he would be too rash, Cavour could now take Rattazzi as his colleague without raising a dread of revolution. Rattazzi himself had so successfully lived down

■ *Voce della Libertà*, Nov. 24, 1853: quoted in *Lettere*, I. c.

■ Brofferio: *Miei Tempi*, xvi.

■ La Rive, 237.

his past, that he had come to be regarded as a serious and safe personage. Cavour confided to De La Rue that he considered him "the most capable man in the Chamber";³⁶ and the King seems this time to have made no objections to the nomination, in spite of his former declaration that none of the 1849 Ministry should ever come back to office.³⁷ The public heard the announcement calmly. Cavour was more than ready to quicken the pace of the Cabinet, whose members had the fortitude which withstands a siege, but lacks the aggressiveness which carries the war successfully into the enemy's country.³⁸

Urbano Rattazzi, deputy for Alessandria, President of the Chamber, was born in 1808. Bred to the bar, he soon won reputation as a lawyer. With the creation of Parliament, he entered public life, where his quick and fertile mind, his legal expertness, and his skill at verbal fence made him at once a leader. He had those qualities which enable a lawyer to win cases against men superior to him in judgment, breadth and learning. He was hard to kill: whether because he was buoyed up by a cork-jacket of self-esteem, or because he philosophically regarded the politician's career as he did the lawyer's, not to be deserted at the loss of one suit or of several. Responsibility for the disaster of Novara would have damned most politicians: Rattazzi, instead of being even humbled, blamed his critics. It was because the Democratic program had not been supported by the nation, and not because it was mistaken, that Novara was lost. Certainly, Rattazzi's popularity did not suffer with his fellow-partisans: and when Parliament buckled down to the routine of legislative tasks, his keenness and energy kept him at the front. No other deputy except Cavour did so much during those early years to train the Chamber in transacting parliamentary business. Like the lawyer who, starting from a modest provincial home, comes to cut a great figure in the metropolis and to have the most powerful clients, Rattazzi was adaptable. The modest bourgeois attorney of Alessandria found it easy to take on the manners and the point of view of the magnates with whom he was thrown at Turin. The Democrat of 1848 was the Liberal Monarchist of 1850.

³⁶ Bert, 463: C. to De La Rue, Oct. 30, 1853. ³⁷ C. d'Azeglio, Oct. 25, 1853.

³⁸ "Rattazzi, invited to enter the Ministry, said to me (Castelli): 'I yield, because I cannot refuse my support to Cavour, unjustly suspected.'" Castelli: *Cavour*, p. 49.

Nobody charged him with perfidy, for it was plain that he simply listened to common sense, which told him that Piedmont could be saved by the Monarchy alone. Having chosen this side, he dedicated himself to its defense with all the zeal and resourcefulness of an able advocate who rejoices in his work. In the Chamber, he soon won a formidable reputation: even his political enemies conceded his power as critic or as strategist, and they felt the spell of his eloquence. But Rattazzi remained to the last a politician. He treated political issues as the lawyer tries a case: so that sometimes one suspects that, if he had happened to be engaged by the plaintiff instead of by the defendant, he would have displayed just as much adroitness, cogent reasoning and impassioned invective or appeal — on the opposite side. Rattazzi was an admirable example of the lawyer who may rise to be prime minister or president, may exert great power and enjoy wide popularity, but can never become a statesman.

In October, 1853, however, Rattazzi was the strongest of all the allies whom Cavour could attach to the Ministry. The autumn session opened (Nov. 13) unsatisfactorily, for the Senate, the resort of the Conservative coalition, continued to block the ministerial program. When Cavour saw that ³⁹ the National Bank bill, whose passage he regarded as imperative, was lost, he persuaded the King to dissolve Parliament. The new elections gave an increased majority for the administration. "The result," Cavour wrote to E. d'Azeglio, "is very satisfactory. In Piedmont the Reds and the Blacks have been completely beaten. Only the party chiefs have been re-elected, and even their success is due to the great moderation of which they made a great show. In Savoy, the Reactionists have won one or two votes. At Genoa, the Reds have won the same. These successes are more than compensated by the victories gained in Piedmont. To sum up, the new Chamber will be composed of the same elements that formed the old. Only, the parties will be more compact and better defined. It seems almost certain that Brofferio will not be re-elected. That will be a great homage rendered by the country to the principle of political morality.⁴⁰ . . . It is re-

³⁹ On Nov. 15; 28 ayes, 32 nays. Parliament was dissolved on Nov. 20.

⁴⁰ Brofferio was beaten at Caraglio. A few days later, his friends gave him a banquet at the Dogana Vecchia hotel in Turin, and displayed on the walls this epigraph: "To Angelo Brofferio, for having had the honor of not being elected ■

markable to see a country support a Ministry which has never for one instant let up from levying new imposts." ⁴¹

In preferring to appeal to the elections rather than to create a batch of Liberal Senators to force his measures through the Upper House, Cavour was wise. Since the general election of 1849 the country had had no opportunity to express its will, although the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the situation at home and the foreign outlook had all changed. If Cavour was to drive his policy forward, he must know that he had the nation's approval.⁴² This Piedmont now gave him. But he was still far from securing the confidence of the aristocracy to which he belonged. That witty correspondent, discreet gossip and shrewd observer, Constance d'Azeglio, wrote to her son Emanuel on Nov. 30: "Cavour seems to me a terrible man. He has so arranged matters that no one except him can get us out of the fix; and he exacts, as his price for remaining, that our destiny be wholly given into his hands. There is also the fear that, pushing as he is, he may in the end fatally compromise us; and when he finds himself embarrassed, he is the sort of fellow to take off his hat to us — and go and spend his millions elsewhere. That is the opinion we have of him, and it is not very encouraging." ⁴³

member of the *Carour Parliament*." Brofferio soon found this honor empty, however, and on Jan. 22, 1854, he was glad to be elected to the "Cavour" Chamber by the 2d College of Genoa. *Lettere*, II, 70, n. 2.

⁴¹ Bianchi: *Politique*, 22. The letter, undated, was written before the final returns.

⁴² John M. Daniel who succeeded Kinney as American *chargé d'affaires*, reached Turin in October, 1853. He was a Virginian, a fiery champion of slaveholding and secession, who did not always look sympathetically at Piedmont's efforts to establish a régime of freedom. His comments are, accordingly, all the more interesting. On Nov. 23, 1853, he writes: "Cavour is an able man, but does not impress me as being either bold or sincere. Hence his ministry is cautious and timid both in small and great things." *Amer. Arch.*

■ C. d'Azeglio, 478; Nov. 30, 1853.

CHAPTER X

THE REDS

AT the beginning of 1854 the partisan of Constitutional Monarchy in Piedmont had good reason to give thanks: for the elections had just confirmed his cause and he could no longer doubt that he possessed, in Cavour, a leader of first-rate ability. But the Kingdom of Piedmont counted less than a fifth of the population of Italy, and to Constitutional Monarchists the Party of Revolution was a rival whose strength could not even be guessed, because, from the very nature of the case, that party had to work underground. Its members, scattered over the Peninsula, differed among themselves in points of detail, but they held in common the belief that the existing governments must be overthrown and a republic set up in their stead. Republicanism was thus the cardinal doctrine of the Party of Revolution; Unitarianism, the ideal of uniting Italy in a single republic, was their second. The emancipation of Italy, as conceived by them, involved both a political and a social revolution. The aristocracy, for instance, might cordially desire to expel the Austrians, to sweep away the despots, and even to unify Italy under one constitutional prince: but they could not be expected to promote a Republican revolution which would abolish their own existence as aristocrats. And many a noble clung to class distinctions, not out of mere selfishness, but because he honestly believed that such a stratification of society resulted in the greatest good to the greatest number. The Italian Liberal usually took for his model England, where justice and political freedom flourished along with a hereditary caste, and court and crown. Democracy did not necessarily bring equal rights: witness the United States with their four millions of slaves.

Italian Republicans based their propaganda, therefore, not only on the need of national unity and independence, but on the process of democratization which was transforming European society. They built on a lower layer, on bed-rock, as they

thought. They denied that they were mere theorists. They insisted that monarchism, a played-out system, could no longer serve, even if its managers were wise and unselfish, which they were not. Human progress had reached a stage where the best monarchy was inferior to the worst republic. The new era demanded the new organ. The glamour of the Newness which has glowed around the origin of every religion, of every political reform, of every literary or philosophic movement, fascinated them. This glamour makes the New irresistibly alluring; it brings out and magnifies the defects of the Old. Mankind, like the individual man, lives by a mingling of hope and experience. When the volume of hope largely preponderates, we have periods and men of invincible optimism: the blunders and sins and failures of the past serve only to convince them that Tomorrow may be as lovely as Today seems hideous. When Experience predominates, the prevailing tone is sober, cynical, or pessimistic. For the Party of Revolution in Italy Republicanism still beckoned like the iridescent domes and minarets of Utopia.

The Apostle of Republicanism was Joseph Mazzini, the one great genius among the revolutionary reformers of the 19th century. He was born at Genoa, June 22, 1805, of intelligent and earnest parents, who lived in modest circumstances. As a child, frail in physique, high-strung in nerves, with precocious intellect and conscience, he seemed destined to write morbid poetry and fill an early grave. But he had an indefectible will-power, which, as he grew up, made his body, though never strong and often suffering, do his bidding. In 1821, the sight of persons begging money for the victims of the Piedmontese revolt, fastened his thoughts on the condition of Italy. He realized, he says, "that we could, and therefore *we ought to*, struggle for the liberty of our country." The moral obligation possessed him first: from it sprang a religion of patriotism which may be likened to the zeal of Cromwell or of the Covenanters. He studied medicine, his father's profession, but as he could not overcome the disgust of the dissecting room, he turned to the law, took his degree, and tried to apply himself to the routine of a young barrister. But his mission claimed more and more of his energy. He possessed an extraordinary gift of expression, which might have raised him, under other conditions, into the supreme group of literary

masters. He saw that the products of Art and Literature, to be permanently great, must be the exponents of a great people. A great people must have national independence and liberty. Wherever he looked, the duty of patriotism thus imperiously challenged him.

The police of Genoa early marked him as a young man of dangerous tendencies. The censors confiscated the journals in which he wrote his essays and reviews. His steps were dogged. But nothing daunted him. Burning to consecrate himself by pen, speech and example to the cause of Italy, he set himself to test what others had done. He joined the Carbonari, by whose activity, in spite of their almost ludicrous incompetence in 1820 and 1821, many Italian patriots still hoped that national salvation might be won. The young Mazzini, however, rightly judged that the Carbonari belonged both in ideals and methods to the Past and not to the Future. The lack of soul in their propaganda shocked him: they looked to Paris for signs and orders; they apparently believed that an insurrection which merely rippled the surface, could effect a permanent change in society. Mazzini also detected the flaw in the Carbonaro organization, which made it possible for one traitor to jeopard a thousand members, and he scoffed at its flummery and ritual, borrowed in part from Free Masonry. Whilst he was pondering over these things, a fellow Good Cousin betrayed him to the police, who arrested him, sent him to Savona and confined him there for several months.

In the solitude of his confinement, with the Bible, Tacitus and Byron his only books, and nothing visible from his attic window save the sky and the sea, he formulated the ideas which had been seething, shapeless, within him. He mastered the art of verbal clarity. His philosophy might not hang together; his reasoning, if pushed to the end, might baffle the logician: but each proposition was expressed so clearly, so forcibly, that those to whom it appealed had as little doubt of its truth as of its meaning. He was a doctrinaire in the same large sense that Calvin was a doctrinaire; and if he lacked Calvin's logic, he was at least Calvin's equal in making cold hard formulas burn as with divine fire. In the intensity of his zeal and in his moral honesty, Mazzini had also, on the private side, a sweetness and a tenderness which possibly did not distinguish the Genevan.

He planned a new society, which he named Young Italy — “the fraternity of those Italians who believe in a law of *Progress* and of *Duty*; who are convinced that Italy is called to be a nation, that she can become such by her own strength; and that the secret of power lies in the constancy and unity of forces; and these Italians united in association, consecrate thought and action to the great purpose of re-establishing Italy — One, Independent, Sovereign, Republican — a nation of free and equal citizens.”¹ “Young Italy proposes to adopt Education and Insurrection as the means for attaining its end. Education must ever be directed to teach by example, word and pen the necessity of insurrection. Insurrection, whenever it can be realized, must be so conducted as to render it a means of national education.”² But Mazzini’s vision was not content with a political improvement only. The political, he knew, is but one expression of life, which in its wholeness embraces also the social, the religious, the human. To ensure a durable change in the political state, society itself must be reformed. So he sought for new bases of religion and of the social order. He preached that Catholicism, the product of medieval ideals, among which superstition played too large a rôle, was dead: for it could no longer satisfy the religious cravings of intelligent men and women, nor did it serve even as an ethical check on conduct. A religion in harmony with modern knowledge and modern needs must supersede it. Assuming the existence of a personal God as an ultimate fact beyond either proof or doubt, Mazzini argued that God must have revealed his purposes in Humanity. God above, the People below, but forever striving upwards to God — such the simple, cosmic scheme. The Individual becomes godlike by living according to God’s laws, which are deducible from experience, and by exercising whatever special talent God has given him; but the individual is only a member of a group, or community, which will thrive in the same way; and the groups form a larger unit called the nation: and nations, in turn, make up the final unit — Collective Humanity. That groups held in subjection and divided, must achieve unity through independence, was therefore as plain a duty, as for each individual to secure those conditions in which alone, by developing his powers to their full, he

¹ Mazzini: *Young Italy*, 1831 (Venturi edit., I, 94).

² *Ibid*, 106.

could best serve God. Crude though this scheme may appear, when viewed thus in outline, it had, nevertheless, the elements which made it seem a new and higher gospel to myriads of Italians. The power of the appeal of a religion or cause depends on the susceptibility of its zealots, not less than on its own reasonableness. Youths fall in love, because youth is the season of love. In Italy many consciences had become sensitized, and when Mazzini uttered his call to self-consecration, insisting on duty, teaching the moral urgency of patriotism, they accepted him as a true Prophet.

Mazzini's personal fascination cast a spell over his disciples. John Ruffini, his earliest and dearest friend, describing him as a young man, says: "In his entire make up he seemed to me then the most perfect being I had ever seen, whether among men or among women, nor have I ever at any time seen his equal." The union in him of almost womanly grace with the intellectual vigor and masterful will of a strong man, made his followers' devotion a compound of love and of veneration. With the lapse of time and the habit of leadership, he became austere, taciturn, remote, even imperious, but not to his intimates, who to the last called him affectionately "Pippo," and found in him the personifier of the beautiful ideals of their youth.

Having been confined for six months at Savona, Mazzini was allowed to choose between exile and living under police surveillance in some small Piedmontese town. He preferred exile: went to Marseilles; drew round him his first little band of disciples; began publishing a journal and planting the seeds of Young Italy up and down the Peninsula. His letter to Charles Albert, who had recently come to the throne, led to his expulsion from France: it also gave him international fame as an audacious conspirator. True to his own gospel, he encouraged insurrection. Several small outbursts were quickly suppressed, but at the cost of some of his followers. From Switzerland he planned an invasion of Savoy, with the expectation that the country would rise at the first successful skirmish, welcome the volunteers of Young Italy as brothers, and force Charles Albert to proclaim the free constitutional government which they assumed he would proclaim if he could obey his own preferences. But the skirmish

* G. D. Ruffini: *Lorenzo Benoni*.

turned out to be a defeat, with tragi-comic if not humiliating accompaniment. Mazzini's enemies heaped ridicule upon him, accusing him of cowardice, or they denounced him as a most dangerous anarchist, without scruples and without honor. They charged him with ordering the assassination of a renegade in Lyons, and of inciting Luigi Mariotti, a hot-headed youthful enthusiast, to poniard Charles Albert. Beaten, discredited, cut off in his Swiss refuge from sympathizers, and physically fagged, he fell under the shadow of the Great Doubt, which at some point in their career has darkened the spirit of nearly all master-zealots, and is typified by Christ's temptation in the wilderness.

"There in that desert," he wrote long afterwards, "doubt confronted me. Perhaps I was wrong and the world was right. Perhaps the idea I was pursuing was a dream. And perhaps I did not follow *an* idea but *my* idea, the pride of my conceit, the desire of victory more than the intent of victory, the egoism of the mind and the cold calculations of an ambitious intellect, making arid the heart and denying its innocent spontaneous motives which merely pointed to charity practised on a modest scale in a small circle, to happiness bestowed among a few persons and divided, to duties immediate and easily performed. The day in which these doubts ploughed into my soul, I felt not merely supremely and unutterably unhappy, but like a condemned prisoner, conscious of his guilt and unable to expiate it. The victims shot at Alessandria, at Genoa, at Chambéry rose before me like phantasms of crime and of only too barren remorse. I could not bring them back to life. How many mothers had already wept because of me! how many more must weep if I persisted in the attempt to resuscitate the Youth of Italy to strong deeds, to the need of a common country! And if this Mother Country prove to be only an illusion? if Italy, exhausted by two epochs of civilization, were today condemned by Providence to remain without name and special mission, yoked to nations younger and more abounding in life? Whence did I derive the right to determine the future, and to drag hundreds and thousands of men to sacrifice themselves and all they held most dear?" "I suffered so much," he says, "that I was on the verge of madness."

⁴ Mazzini (Venturi edit.), III, 163-64. These and the preceding extracts, I have translated from the Italian original.

But he did not go mad. The belief in God, to which he always returned, brought with it the conviction that life is a mission, to be performed in the great Taskmaster's eye. Hence Duty, which had to do neither with pleasure nor pain, must be followed with absolute fidelity, in scorn of consequence. His own duty, the mission which God had assigned to him, was clear: he must consecrate himself to the regeneration of Italy, no matter who suffered. Only when we go down into the pit of his agony, and witness Mazzini's spiritual combats, can we understand the assurance with which, during his subsequent career, he pursued his course. He was a man who had been face to face with the Almighty, and heard the Almighty speak: that was his warrant, the meaning of the *Thus saith the Lord* tone which rang through his later utterances. Prophets seem to the world either visionary or self-willed, inspired fools or stubborn egotists; but their secret, if not their excuse, is, that they have been on Sinai.

Expelled from Switzerland, Mazzini took refuge in London, then the asylum of Europe's political outcasts, where he suffered homesickness, moral anguish, physical want. Even his overcoat went to the pawnbroker's. But gradually his condition became tolerable. His mother was able to send him regularly a small allowance.⁵ He learned English and wrote for the English reviews. He made staunch friendships. No longer tormented by doubt as to his life-work, he took naturally the leader's post; issued papers, tracts, manifestoes; conducted an immense correspondence; directed, as best he could from so great a distance, the revolutionary elements in all parts of Italy. The old secret societies had died out or merged themselves with Young Italy, with its concrete aims, and more sensible procedure, and with its insistence on unity and the republic. During the years of oppression between 1836 and 1846 the Mazzinians, and the Party of Revolution in general, organized sporadic outbursts which calm on-lookers regarded as symptoms of sheer insanity. So far as immediate gain went, they were pathetically futile. They seemed, indeed, to bring about just the opposite result from what the plotters intended: for after each abortive attempt, the Absolutist government redoubled its severity.

⁵ From 1852, after his mother's death, Mazzini's income was 4000 lire, about \$800; of which he gave \$400 away.

But Mazzini and the Revolutionists must be judged by the decade and not by the day. Mazzini's belief in insurrection as a means of education was sound. During a period when despots prohibited the mention of the word *Italy*, the existence of a body of conspirators numbering many thousands who could not be spoken of even by the police without using that word, counted for much. It counted for more that they kept the despots in a state of perpetual alarm. When the surface was most placid there would come a rumble from below, or a fitful explosion, to remind them that Old Truepenny was at work in the cellarage. But the greatest service rendered by Young Italy was through its martyrs. In one city after another, men mounted the scaffold in behalf of their country which was to be, and that scaffold became a shrine of patriotism. Hundreds of enthusiasts languished in prisons, but not forgotten. Their sacrifice stimulated the zeal of their comrades and attracted the attention, if not the sympathy, of the timid or torpid public. The smug conservative might feel inclined to exclaim, "Poor fool! Another of Mazzini's dupes!" but he could not dismiss the fact of the "poor fool's" devotion, nor could he deny that under the magic of Mazzini's evangel Italy had become a cause for which Italians cheerfully risked fortune, home and life.⁶ The dumb populace that watched a handful of zealots being led to execution or a coffle of heavily chained victims being driven like beasts to the galleys, could not fail to be impressed. And all the time exiles abroad were sending to their friends at home appeals to do something. An exile is usually disqualified by remoteness from knowing the true conditions in his country. As his information comes to him from the coterie to which he belonged before banishment, he mistakes their opinions for public opinion. He looks through the eyes of his desires and of his hopes. Impatient, suffering, heart-sick for home, wroth at the prosperity of his tormentors, he becomes now sullen, now desperate. His direct services may be slight, but indirectly, like a sick child in a household, he keeps everybody awake and anxious. Mazzini himself, with a marvelous network for transmitting news, was often tragically wrong in his reckoning: if, in-

⁶ Mazzini did not, however, believe in wholesale immolation. "Martyrdom," he said, "can never become the religion of a whole party. It is useless to exhaust in unsuccessful efforts the forces which may one day be of service." Mazzini: *Essays*, 13. From "Faith and the Future."

deed, we are to believe that he always believed that the chances of the success of a movement were as rosy as he represented them to his followers. The conspirator is by his trade a prey to delusions, the enthusiast to self-deception; Mazzini was doubtless not immune from either: and yet it seems more likely that he kept on launching foredoomed outbreaks because of their educative value, than because he expected any one of them to result in victory.

The rank and file of Young Italy was composed for the most part of earnest and patriotic young men, — no one over forty was eligible, — chiefly members of the lower middle class, whose consciences had been aroused. The masses, whom Mazzini had hoped to reach, were still too ignorant and cloddish or too priest-ridden, to respond to his call. As the organization expanded, its membership became more mixed. Men joined it from personal ambition, or in the hope of paying off a private grudge, or out of class hatred, or from a simple love of intrigue and adventure. Nevertheless, the average of character remained high, as is proved by the conduct of those of its members who were captured and punished, and by the record of those who lived to be citizens of the Kingdom of Italy.

In 1842, Gioberti published his "Primacy of the Italians," a book which gave an impetus to the Italian cause, and especially to Neo-Guelfism. For Gioberti proposed a federation of the States of Italy under the presidency of the Pope, the only ruler among them towards whom the others could feel no dynastic rivalry. Balbo's "The Hopes of Italy" (1844) defined the problem still further by showing how Austria might be content to give up Lombardy and Venetia, if she were compensated by equally valuable territory in the East. The next year Massimo d'Azeglio's fervent tract on "The Happenings in the Romagna" lent the weight of his name to a description of the abominations actually practised with the Pope's sanction: but he urged the down-trodden people to bear their burden in patience until the public opinion of Europe should force the Pope to reform. Gioberti, Balbo, D'Azeglio, and the lesser men who discussed their suggestions, all agreed in assuming that Italy's redemption was to be achieved by substituting constitutional for absolute monarchy and by preserving the old class distinctions.

Here opened a gulf between the Monarchists and the Party of Revolution. Mazzini could not be shaken in his advocacy of a republic: first, because he believed that Republicanism was the only system which favors the highest development of citizen and state; and next, because he believed that the actual reigning houses of Italy could never be transformed into liberty-loving rulers, nor the Italian aristocracy into patriotic and enlightened citizens. Such a solution would not unify, it would simply federate, leaving intact the old political divisions, and with them the old feuds, the old local weaknesses, the old antagonizing traditions. The Lombard would still be Lombard, and not Italian; the Tuscan would still be Tuscan, and not Italian; the Emilian, the Ligurian, the Calabrian would still cherish each his province and not Italy. Above all, a federation presided over by the Pope — by the head of the most retrograde institution in Christendom, the institution which had kept Italy divided for a thousand years, corrupted her morals and connived with foreign despots to hold her in servitude — such a proposition, he held, was fantastic in its unfitness.

As early as 1835 Mazzini replied to those who counseled delay: "You bid us wait, but for what? For circumstances? But what are circumstances ever except a particular disposition of the elements required to generate deeds? And whence can they arise save by your work? War? Between whom? Among those who are in perfect harmony, who have just concluded a new pact of brotherhood, who have the same end, the same enemies, the same fears? Against peoples prostrate and in the mire? War will not break out in Europe except from insurrection. *Coups d'état*? Only an energetic, stubborn struggle can make them inevitable. But how can this be sustained? By conspiracy? The preachers of patience frown at it, just as they frown at outbreaks. By the press? The governments slay it: you have everywhere laws which trammel, censors who torment the writers, judges who condemn thought and lock it up in prison. Can you rise above these obstacles? In France, perhaps. But suppose a country absolutely deprived of the press, without parliament or councils for debate, without literary journals, without a national theatre, without popular education, without books. Suppose that that country suffers, suffers tremendously,

in its masses and in its well-to-do classes from misery, from foreign and domestic oppression, from continual violations of its national principle, from the lack of every intellectual development. What can that country ever do so as to originate for itself the slow, gradual progress that you dream of?"⁷

Various outbreaks during 1843 and the Bandiera Expedition of 1844 — all unsuccessful and sternly punished — showed how little the Party of Revolution was dazzled by the Giobertian glamour, or put trust in the spontaneous ripening of public opinion. The fate of the Bandiera brothers and their companions excited sympathy throughout Europe, but it brought down on Mazzini a storm of execration. When he disavowed responsibility for it, protesting that the young enthusiasts made their dash to certain failure against his advice, the public did not believe him. Although the moral effect of the expedition tended to discredit Mazzini, it helped the Italian cause, by adding a new batch of heroic martyrs to the list of the victims of Tyranny, and by showing that their purpose was national; for the Bandiera were Venetians who died in Calabria in the hope of promoting the unity and independence of Italy. Mazzini was now the best hated and most feared man in Europe. Established governments pictured him as a monster who gloated over bloodshed, an enemy of society who hoped to overthrow the reign of Order and to set up Chaos and its saturnalia, a villain without the brute courage of villains, for he kept out of harm's way while his deluded followers went on his terrible errands. The wonder is that the despots, who were not above using methods which they attributed to him, did not rid themselves of Mazzini by assassination. And while the fictitious Mazzini thus stalked like a nightmare through the imagination of kings and ministers and priests, the real Mazzini was leading the life of a zealot in his obscure London lodgings, carrying up the scuttle of coal for his frail landlady, holding a night school for Italian bootblacks and organ-grinders, sharing his small income with unfortunates who had no claim upon him save that of humanity, and never permitting himself a moment's relaxation from the relentless service of Duty as he conceived of it.

⁷ Mazzini: *Fede e Avvenire*. See also translation by T. Okey: *Essays of Mazzini*, 33-34.

The election of Pius IX in June, 1846, followed by his immense popularity as soon as it appeared that he might lead the Italian cause, Charles Albert's conversion to constitutionalism, and the sudden competition among the other princes to rank as patriots, seemed to confirm the partisans of Monarchy and Federalism. Squarely confronted by the question, "Do you prefer your visionary Unitarian Republic to a possible free Monarchical Italy?" the Party of Revolution had not made a final decision when the astonishing events of 1848 upset everybody's calculations. All parties helped to drive the Austrians out of Milan and Venice, but Monarchists and Republicans at once began to dispute as to which should dictate the form of the new government. Mazzini hurried to Milan and undoubtedly gave comfort, by his presence and by his speeches, to the cause of the Republicans: but he conceded that, as the imminent need was to complete the expulsion of the Austrians from Italian soil, Republicans ought now to fight the common enemy and leave until the war's end the question of government. When the Monarchical Party, floundering for lack of a leader, voted the immediate fusion of Lombardy with Piedmont, and by so doing cut off further discussion, the Republicans had reason to complain that they had been betrayed: and they lent Charles Albert less than a half-hearted support during the rest of his campaign.

The disaster of Custozza marked the collapse of the coalition of the Princes in the War of Independence. Mazzini cannot have failed to exult at this confirmation of his constant prediction. The Princes had been tried and found wanting. They were not only incompetent, but treacherous. The Era of Monarchy was played out; the Era of Democracy was at hand. The People themselves must fight the battles of the People, must conquer for the People, must set up a government of the People. Multitudes of Italians now heard these doctrines gladly, and from the autumn of 1848 until August, 1849, Democracy made a desperate effort to recover and hold what the Princes had held and lost. A Democratic Ministry, presided over by Gioberti, actually ruled in Piedmont, only to hurry Charles Albert to destruction at Novara. The Democrats had their inning in Tuscany, at Venice, at Rome, and at Palermo. At Rome they proclaimed a Republic, of which Mazzini, Saffi and Armellini were the triumvirs and the

army was commanded by Garibaldi. During the three months of Mazzini's virtual dictatorship, the Eternal City enjoyed, in spite of the turmoil of a political revolution and the abnormal conditions of a siege, a better government than it had known since Marcus Aurelius died, nearly 1700 years before. The Republic's enemies tried to make it appear a band of cutthroats, schemers and knaves: but, after all allowances for black sheep, we cannot fail, on the evidence, to praise the devotion, the moderation, the courage, the desire to be just and the intelligence which stamped the short-lived Roman Republic.

Mazzini himself regarded his call to Rome as the fulfilment of a prophecy. From his youth up the idea of Rome had cast a spell over him. "I had in me," he wrote long afterward, "the cult of Rome. Among her walls the Unified Life of the world had twice been elaborated. Whilst other peoples, having accomplished a brief mission, had disappeared forever, and not one of them had held the lead twice, there life was eternal, death unknown. On the potent vestiges of an epoch of civilization which had had its seat in Italy before the Greek . . . the Rome of the Republic . . . had superimposed herself, to be concluded by the Cæsars; but following the flight of her eagles, she had furrowed the known world with the idea of Right springing from Liberty. Then, when men were weeping over her as the sepulchre of the dead, she had arisen again, greater than before, and arisen with the Popes (then as holy as today they are abject), the accepted centre of a new unity which, lifting law from Earth to Heaven, superimposed the idea of Right on the idea of Duty common to all, and the source, therefore, of Equality. Why should there not arise from a third Rome, the Rome of the Italian People, of which I seemed to see the indications, a third and vaster unity, which, bringing Earth and Heaven, Right and Duty, into harmony, should speak not to individuals, but to peoples, a common watchword, reminding the free and equal of their mission here below?" ⁸ "Rome," he says elsewhere, "was the dream of my young years, the ruling idea of my mind, the religion of my soul: I entered Rome at evening, on foot, at the beginning of March, trembling and half adoring." ⁹ Mazzini the Mystic, as he reveals himself in this worship of the Eternal City,

■ Mazzini, *Scritti*, I.

■ *Ibid*, VII, 185.

and in his dream of a Third Rome, must always be reckoned with. In his career as Chief Triumvir, he displayed an unexpected capacity for practical government, a capacity which, if not superlative, was not mediocre. His diplomatic papers gave scope for his impassioned logic, and were praised highly by Palmerston.¹⁰ But Julius Cæsar himself could not have saved the Roman Republic of 1849. Before it succumbed, it served to astonish the world by the bravery of its defenders; it proved that the Republican cause was the National Cause, for its legions were filled by volunteers from all parts of Italy; and it made the reputation of Garibaldi as an Italian hero, — a fact which was to exert a vital influence later.

Rome surrendered July 2, 1849; Venice, after the magnificent resistance which Manin guided, through cholera and famine until the last ammunitions were exhausted, succumbed on August 22; Palermo had already made terms with Bomba's troops. The Revolution was spent. Whatever glory it left as a bitter-sweet consolation belonged to the Republicans. They had endured longest; they had fought most gallantly. As they had struggled to the end, their enemies wished to disparage them by saddling upon them the responsibility for the final defeat. Then began mutual recriminations, which have been bandied to and fro down to our own day. The Republicans accused the Monarchists of perfidy; the Monarchists replied that the Republicans had ruined the movement by introducing party discord and sectarian ambition. If Mazzini were no longer to be gainsaid when he declared that Italy could never be redeemed by a coalition of her Princes, the Princes were undoubtedly right when they rejoined that the majority of Italians were not Republicans. So far as concerned the Princes, the thought of a free and united Italy was buried, even in Piedmont, under the avalanche of Reaction: but from that time forward those Italians who took thought for the independence of their country, were divided into two antagonistic camps — the Monarchist and the Republican, and the antagonism between them seemed irreconcilable.

The Restoration sent into exile thousands who had been compromised by their recent political activity. It left at home tens

¹⁰ Mazzini, ix, 16, n. 4. Mazzini's Letter to De Tocqueville and Falloux is a masterpiece of invective.

of thousands of their friends and sympathizers, for the police to watch. There being no freedom of speech outside of Piedmont, the Republican agitation had to be carried on by conspiracy: in Piedmont itself the D'Azeglio government neither gave asylum to avowed Reds nor permitted unrestricted freedom of meeting and press. From all parts of Italy Piedmont welcomed refugees who accepted her Constitutional Monarchical principles; and in this way she strengthened her position as the champion of Italianism: but to the Reds she seemed almost as harsh as the Austrianized States or the Bourbon despotism. The Reds charged her with hypocrisy, timidity, insincerity, selfishness. They said that she had forgotten the cause of Italy. They jeered at the suggestion that it would be suicidal for her to ignore the warnings of the Great Powers. But after the explosion at Genoa in March, 1849, they refrained from disturbing Piedmont. "Propaganda but not action," was their motto. For they saw now that, although the King's government would tolerate no Republican plots, and would proclaim no Italian policy, it nevertheless harbored those Republicans who kept discreetly quiet, and it allowed the Italian cause to be unofficially discussed. In its Parliament, too, it numbered Republican deputies who spoke their opinions without fear.

The exiles settled wherever they found an indulgent police. Sicilians and Neapolitans flocked to Malta; northerners to Switzerland, or Paris or London: a few, among them Garibaldi, even crossed the Atlantic. As the Reaction grew truculent, it forced Switzerland to expel many of her refugees; Louis Napoleon waded out all who were supposed to be active in France; England alone, although more than once tempted, refused to abandon the right of asylum. Mazzini, accompanied by his fellow-triumvir, Aurelio Saffi, and his faithful disciple, Maurizio Quadri, after precarious wanderings in Switzerland, made London his headquarters. The Party of Action had now two objects in view: they wished, first, to keep alive in every province hatred of the oppressor, and, next, to plan a general insurrection for the liberation of the Peninsula. The cruelties of the Reactionist governments intensified their hatred; secret societies, like the Italian Unity ¹¹ in Naples, went busily to work to plot local uprisings; but the general insurrection hung fire.

¹¹ The Italian Unity sect was virtually dispersed after its leaders' arrest

It soon appeared that, although Mazzini was still Generalissimo of the Party of Action, he was no longer universally accepted as its dictator. Men who had been leaders of their provisional governments during the recent Revolution naturally continued to dominate the councils of their fellow provincials. Inevitable conflict of views and personal rivalry sprang up. Most ominous was the fact that the Reds, besides differing with one another as to details, differed in their interpretation of the failure of the Revolution itself. They refused to admit that it failed because Conservative Europe was still too strong for it; they scoffed at the insinuation that the Revolutionists themselves, even if Europe should let them alone, were still too inexperienced to maintain a republic in Italy. They imagined, instead, that a slight reversal of non-essentials would have brought them victory. The example of Milan and Venice in the glorious Five Days, and of Venice and Rome in their long sieges, confirmed their reliance on insurrection and on the superiority of patriotic volunteers over trained regiments. Mazzini seems almost to have held that a raw peasant, with a scythe in his hand and devotion to country in his heart, was more than a match for French cuirassiers or the crack regiments of Francis Joseph.

In September, 1849, he began to publish at Lausanne *L'Italia del Popolo*, a monthly journal of rather uncertain dates of issue, in which he and his collaborators preached the gospel of Rome, national independence and unity.¹² They advised not immediate action but preparation. Mazzini organized a Central European Committee of Democracy, of which he was the head, Ledru-Rollin represented France, Arnaldo Ruge the Slavs, and Darsz the Magyars. It determined to scatter throughout Europe the principles of true Democracy, to bring the national groups together for concerted action, to show that the Peoples, however they might differ in language, race and traditions, had the same needs and were brothers. "The Peoples are the Individuals of Humanity. Nationality is the sign of their individuality and the guarantee of their liberty. It is sacred . . . it must put itself into harmony with the All, and work for the betterment of all,

¹² Mazzini: *Scritti*, ix, 10; see also *Ibid*, 16, 17. Mazzini's assistants were Saffi, Quadrio, Pisacane, F. de Boni, Montecchi, Agostini, and Buonamici, who acted as publisher. De Boni, with F. Dall' Ongaro and Cattaneo, compiled the *Archivio Storico Contemporaneo*.

for the Progress of Humanity.”¹³ The European Committee, however, had rather an Olympian remoteness to the men immersed in the concrete Italian conspiracies; they knew that it existed, and, upon occasion, they counted upon it to stir up brother Republicans, especially in Austria, so as to ensure the success of a rising in the Peninsula. Before quitting Rome, Mazzini, Saffi and Montecchi issued a manifesto (July 4, 1849) announcing the creation of a National Italian Committee to supervise the cause. This committee had authority to issue a loan of ten million lire, to be spent on procuring arms and promoting insurrection. As soon as the insurrection should prove victorious, “the Revolution, that is the Nation,” would hold a Constituent Assembly and decide upon a form of government. Mazzini’s deep-rooted respect for the Individual made him look forward to a form of National Unity which should not hamper the Individual. “Italy desires to be one Nation,” he said; “not of Napoleonic unity, not of exaggerated administrative centralization, which cancels the Liberty of the members for the benefit of a Metropolis and of a Government: but of unity of Pact, of an Assembly as interpreter of the Pact, of international relations, of armies, of codes, of education, of political unity harmonized with the existence of regions, circumscribed by local and traditional characteristics and by large and strong communes, participating as much as possible through the elections in the Central Power, and endowed with all the forces necessary for attaining the purpose of the Association.”¹⁴

These doctrines Mazzini kept hammering at with what his enemies might call damnable iteration. Reason, Logic, Conscience, and the Will of God as revealed in human progress, all supported Republicanism. Monarchists had no *principles*, only *interests*, that is, selfishness, behind them. But every Republican was working for Italy. The fatal delusion that the victory of the Milanese patriots in March, 1848, could be repeated, whetted the conspirators’ zeal. They assumed that Italy was in so surcharged a state that no matter where they applied the match, the explosion would be national. When we understand that this was the chronic state of mind of the Party of Action, we realize why their enthusiasm and certainty increased in proportion as

¹³ Mazzini, *Scritti*, VIII, 26; address of the Committee.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 32.

their chance of success, judged by disinterested observers, diminished.

While Mazzini and the National Italian Committee worked in exile to unite and direct the various groups, the men on the spot, less concerned with theories than with the concrete situation, proceeded to take counsel together. In Naples, the *Unità Italiana* was not originally Mazzinian, or even Republican; it simply proposed to overthrow the Bourbons; but it soon coalesced with Settembrini's remodeled Young Italy, having a similar object, with the Mazzinian Utopia in the background. In Lombardy, many of the upper nobles who had not emigrated, continuers of the Albertist party, cherished the hope of being annexed to Piedmont, but they did not conspire. Others, more daring, began to plot, both in Lombardy and Venetia, for the expulsion of the Austrians.¹⁵

In August, 1850, six middle-class Venetians — Scarsellini an educated butcher, Zambelli a painter, De Canal a writer, Paganoni a commercial agent, Meloncini a mechanician and Malaman an engineer, met at a café in Ruga San Pantaleone, in Venice, and discussed how to organize a revolt. Their chief, Scarsellini, who had already conferred with Giacomo Medici at Turin and with Mazzini himself in London, was supplied with shares of Mazzinian loans and with proclamations and tracts. The committee soon had a goodly number of adherents in Venice, and it affiliated with secret societies in Udine, Verona, Treviso, Mantua and other cities. There were two sorts of adherents — the "passive," who subscribed to the loan, or otherwise contributed money, and the "active," who conducted the correspondence, collected funds and arms, held meetings, enlisted friends, and prepared for action at the hour of open rebellion. The position of the "passive" conspirator was not, however, without risk: for he was liable to suffer the penalty of high treason if the police found any Mazzinian certificates or tracts upon him. At Mantua the head of the committee was Don Enrico Tazzoli, a much beloved priest and professor in the theological seminary, who considered it his sacred duty to work for the liberation of his country. He conducted the propaganda with much success, enrolled many

¹⁵ G. Visconti Venosta: *Ricordi*. Chaps. 12-15 contain excellent notes on the Milanese conspirators.

members, placed large blocks of the Mazzinian loan, and had close relations with other committees throughout the Austrian provinces. He saw the need of education. Some of his confederates, however, were possessed by the delusion that, if they unfurled their banner with a sudden brilliant stroke, the Austrian power would tumble like a house of cards. One enthusiast felt sure that they could capture the fortress of Mantua or of Verona — or both; and plans were secured of those citadels. Scarsellini, the Venetian, seriously proposed to kidnap Francis Joseph, who was soon to visit Venice. Nothing would be easier, he urged, than to rush into the Royal Palace and seize the Emperor, or to board his gondola as he left the Fenice Theatre, and hurry him off to the Fort of San Secondo. Once there, they would give him his choice between renouncing Austria's ownership of Lombardy and Venetia and being blown to atoms by the explosion of the powder magazine. They could not doubt which he would prefer. It all seemed easy, almost too easy. Thus they plotted and dreamed during fourteen months, and never a conspirator betrayed the secret, although the number of those implicated reached 3000. The Austrian police did, indeed, arrest on suspicion several persons who could have told tales, but who held their tongues: so that it seems probable that the police was unaware that a specific conspiracy existed.

As usually happens, chance gave the clue. In December, 1851, a silk-dealer named Pezzi was arrested near the Swiss border on suspicion of being a counterfeiter. The police found, in a pencil-case which he tried to conceal, instead of false banknotes, a share of Mazzinian stock.¹⁶ Asked, under threat of death, who had given it to him, he said, "Professor Ferdinando Bosio." A few days later (Jan. 2, 1852) Bosio was seized, and he, in a moment of weakness, betrayed Don Enrico Tazzoli. On January 27, Father Tazzoli was thrown into the Mainolda prison, the worst of the Mantuan dungeons, and subjected to every sort of torment: but he remained firm. Among his papers was a register in cryptogram of the accounts of the conspiracy, which contained the names of hundreds of persons who had contrib-

¹⁶ The shares read: "Prestito nazionale Italiano — per affrettare l'Indipendenza e l'Unità d'Italia — Buono per £25 — *firmati* : Mazzini, Saffi, Saliceti, Sirtori, Montecchi — *Il Segretario* ; Agostini." Facsimile in Luzio: *I Martiri di Belfiore* (Milano: Cogliati, 1905), I, 27.

uted or received money. Tazzoli, the soul of honor, had been led to keep this perilous record out of excess of delicacy — so many patriots had been accused of putting into their own pockets funds given to the cause, that he wished to screen himself from calumny; and he thought that, by using a cipher, he was guarding against the worst in case of arrest. Besides himself only two accomplices, Giovanni Acerbi and Luigi Castellazzo, knew the key. The Austrians sent the book to Vienna to be deciphered in the "Black Closet" of the Central Police. In April Don Enrico, remembering other dangerous papers which the police had not unearthed, wrote in cipher a note which one of the turnkeys, Stefano Tirelli, promised to deliver to the prisoner's brother. Tirelli was a sneak, who, pretending to be a patriot in disguise, performed clandestine services for the prisoners, won their confidence, and then reported what he learned to Casati, the head jailer. On this occasion, he did leave the note for Silvio Tazzoli, who had barely time to read it, before the police pounced upon him,¹⁷ and put him through a terrifying examination. He declared honestly that he did not know the cipher. Something he said casually, drew attention to Camilla Marchi, manager of the infant schools in which Don Enrico was interested. She also denied a knowledge of the secret, but admitted that Acerbi and Castellazzo had frequented the house.¹⁸ Acerbi had long since made sure by flight that no torture should wring from him the names of his accomplices; but Castellazzo, with criminal imprudence had remained in Mantua, and had even tried to carry out a plot of assassination against Rossi, a detested police commissioner. On Donna Camilla's hint, the police at once threw Castellazzo into prison.

Luigi Castellazzo, whom we must regard as either the Iscariot or the most cruelly calumniated scapegoat of the Mantua trials, was then 25 years old. His father, Giuseppe Castellazzo, had been for many years a devoted official in the Austrian police. Luigi was among the first to join Tazzoli's committee, and became its secretary. He did not hesitate to reveal to his associates the police secrets which his father confided to him — a trait which some of the conspirators rightly regarded with keen dis-

¹⁷ He was arrested April 9; released April 20.

¹⁸ She was arrested April 18; released, April 23.

trust, whilst others simply congratulated themselves on having a spy on their side who could penetrate into the enemy's holy of holies. After Castellazzo's arrest, it was commonly believed that he was subjected to torture, which he bravely endured, but that, having been flogged day by day until he had received ninety strokes, he lost his nerve and gave up the key to the cipher.¹⁹ On May 24 the interpretation of the register was sent from Vienna to Radetzky at Verona, but it was not till June 17 that a batch of important arrests followed. Many of the names which Tazzoli had entered had no incriminating clue attached to them; others were set down by initial only, or by pseudonyms. The delay might mean that the police were hunting up evidence. The sureness with which they finally took the ringleaders from every district, suggested, however, that they were guided by an informer. It was also gravely damaging to Castellazzo that he should be called on to confront comrades²⁰ who had persisted in stolid denial: that on more than one occasion, after he had wormed confidences out of a prisoner, that prisoner was quickly subjected to Kraus's inquisition; and that one of Kraus's common thrusts was, "It is useless to deny, Castellazzo has confessed everything." And yet, in spite of every effort to drag as many as possible to destruction, it seemed likely that the prosecution would secure only two victims — Tazzoli, the confessed head of the Mantuan conspiracy, and Scarsellini, who had Quixotically proposed to kidnap the Emperor. Marshal Radetzky hoped to have the trials over in September: perhaps he realized that the world might make unpleasant comments on the discrepancy between Austria's suspicions and the facts. Then, in October, Castellazzo divulged the plot in which Speri and Poma had engaged, to assassinate Police Commissary Rossi, but from which they had drawn back in horror. This led to more arrests — about thirty in all — a resifting of evidence, another harrowing of the prisoners, and finally, punishment on an imperial scale. In the later proceedings, Giulio Faccioli, a lawyer of Verona, vied with Castellazzo in betraying his fellow-conspirators.

¹⁹ The cipher used was the Lord's Prayer in Latin and the first three lines of the Fourth Canto of Dante's *Hell*. A numeral, beginning with 1 and following in order, was substituted for each letter. Thus A might be represented by 2, 25, 46, 52, 66, 74, 78, 98, 100, 118, 123, 153, 159, 210, 218, 233, 237, 239, or 242 in the Lord's Prayer. ²⁰ Among others Lazzatti, Rossetti, Finzi and Tibaldi.

The general charge against the prisoners being high treason, a special military tribunal conducted the trial; and as the purpose was not to do justice, but to discover new culprits and accomplices and to punish as many as possible, there was absolutely nothing judicial in the procedure. Treated as guilty from the start, the prisoner was thrown into an ordinary criminal's cell; with chains on his ankles; a sack of straw for his bed; black bread, black broth and water for his food (the bread often maggoty and the broth putrid); only a dim light and little air creeping through two small holes in the thick cloth which covered the grated window:²¹ in such a hell-hole, cut off from friends and from counsel, he was left a prey to his doubts and fears. One loyal soul, Pezzotti, dreading that his fortitude might give way, hanged himself with his cravat, the first night after his arrest.²²

As soon as the prisoner has had a taste of this savagery, he is brought before Lieutenant Kraus, a Bohemian, who bears the title of auditor and acts as chief inquisitor. Kraus is "a young man with hard face and deep-set eyes, a very piercing look and an infernal smile. He is now honey-tongued, now sarcastic, now threatening, ever betraying a soul dominated by implacable hate and by lust of blood. Lying, he pretends that the other prisoners have confessed, he invents accusations, he stirs up bad feeling between prisoners, he promises immunity to those who confess." Sometimes Kraus begins by saying bluntly that "as he has evidence to hang you, not once or twice, but ten times over, you must not confess your own guilt, but tell whatever else you know."²³ Such a declaration naturally throws the prisoner into an agony of doubt. This Bohemian probe leaves untried no ruse and no perfidy, and when all prove ineffectual, he threatens flogging and the gallows. "He examines his victim without witnesses, sets down and edits in his barbarous Italian the answers to suit his pleasure, or breaks off his examination midway, to resume it later when the victim may reply in different phrase and so be entrapped or confounded." After the hearing, days, perhaps weeks, of silent suspense elapse: or perhaps Colonel Reich-

²¹ From Finzi's account: quoted by Tivaroni, i. 45.

²² At Milan. The bar to which he fixed his cravat was so low that he had almost to kneel in dying.

²³ Tito Speri's account.

enau, "fat of face and swinish of expression," comes by order of General Culoz, commandant of the fortress, to bully or to vilify an obdurate prisoner. Sometimes the head jailer, Casati, ■ "renegade Italian," conducts the inquisition instead of Kraus. At the outset, he pretends to sympathize, and as a friend he advises the prisoner to act "reasonably." He describes how kindly those are treated who make a clean breast of it and throw themselves on the Emperor's clemency: how comfortably they live, several together in dry, light rooms, with books to read and permission to write to their friends, and the certainty of pardon awaiting them. If the suspect holds out against this tempting mirage, he is sent in chains to the Mainolda (he must himself pay the cost of the transfer, six lire) where he undergoes the horror of an imprisonment which aims at reducing him, by suffering, terror, and starvation, to the point of death.²⁴ To break the monotony "there is only Casati's visit towards evening once a week," says the indomitable Tito Speri; "a suggestive, diabolical visit, which at every word drives a knife into your heart; irons and hunger are nothing in comparison with this visit."

Yet in spite of the terrible strain, few of the six-score prisoners turn state's evidence, and of these perhaps only one is a deliberate traitor. The temptation to escape present torture and to save one's life is frightful. Many a distracted creature may have struggled against the casuistical suggestion that the weakness of his flesh and not his will would be to blame. And then the dread, as the starved victim finds himself growing physically weaker day by day, lest he shall be summoned again before the brutal Kraus! Scarcely less distressing is the inevitable distrust of one's fellows. Kraus does not hesitate to announce that one friend has confessed and implicated another.²⁵ Whom to rely upon? The cell companion, whom you believe to be as true as steel, may go down spotless to his ordeal, and in an hour come back to you an informer. The Austrian code offered an informer not only impunity but secrecy, and one ²⁶ at least of the victims, just before

²⁴ It is uncertain whether more than two of this group of prisoners were actually flogged. G. Visconti Venosta: *Ricordi*, p. 223. But most of them were threatened, and many had the preliminary visit of the physician, ordered to examine and report how many lashes the victim could stand. Orsini: *Memorie* (Turin: Degiorgis, 1862), p. 183, gives a vivid description of flogging.

²⁵ He did, for instance, in the case of Poma and Speri. Luzio, I, 185.

²⁶ Calvi: cf. Luzio, I, 334.

being led to the scaffold, was shown an imperial rescript containing a pardon for him even then, if he would confess. The long suspense, sharpened by hunger, might wear out the strongest resolution. Kraus and his underlings know well its value. They trust also to find clues in chance remarks: for a prisoner may innocently mention a fact which has no significance to him, but serves Kraus as the missing link needed to ruin another victim. The testimony against the brutality of Kraus and Casati is unanimous; a few of the minor officers, however, were humane.²⁷ That most of them were venal, appears from the great number of clandestine letters they carried to and fro. Casati winked at this deceit, if indeed he did not abet it, because by it he lighted upon clues. It would have been well, as Poma said, if the prisoners had never touched pen and ink.

Until October, they were hopeful. So much time had passed without a catastrophe that they began to infer that Austria would limit her vengeance to imprisonment.²⁸ They forgot that she had already shot the parish priest, Don Giovanni Grioli, on the charge of trying to bribe soldiers to desert.²⁹ But early in October another crisis gathered. Castellazzo's fresh revelations led to new arrests and to a re-examination. There was Faccioli, begging to be allowed to free what he mistook for his conscience by implicating more victims;³⁰ and there was Kraus, greedy to hear, and quick to profit. Speri came back from a terrible session with the auditor with the look of a lost soul. Poma, who had held out for five months against the horrors of the Mainolda, felt that his death-knell had struck. Tazzoli, the self-controlled, tapped on his cell-wall to his neighbors (Fario, Ghinosi, Savoldi, Bariola and Pedroni), "Castellazzo has ended by ruining us all."³¹

Throughout November, the gloom thickened. On the 13th of the month a council of war was held in the Castle of St. George. Some twenty Austrian officers, presided over by Commandant

²⁷ Especially sympathetic to the prisoners were Germini, the turnkey, and Kadunz. Cf. Luzio, I, 225-30.

²⁸ As Austria had done with Pellico, Confalonieri and their comrades 30 years before.

²⁹ Executed at Belfiore, Nov. 5, 1851. See also G. Visconti Venosta: *Ricordi*, 216.

³⁰ Luzio, I, 179.

³¹ Luzio, I, 379. But as late as Nov. 25, according to a note purporting to be by Tazzoli, he believed that Castellazzo had confessed only after suffering 90 lashes. Cavalotti read this note in Parliament on Dec. 11, 1884. Text in Luzio, II, 393.

Culoz, and seated in a semi-circle, awaited the coming of the prisoners, who were admitted one by one. As each stands there, like an early Christian in the arena, Kraus reads the deposition compiled by himself. To save time, he leaves out the questions, and gives the replies so confusedly, without pause or punctuation, that these mock judges could hardly understand it, even if they knew Italian, which most of them do not. On concluding, Kraus asks, for form's sake, "Have you anything to say?" But if the prisoner attempts to speak, to explain or qualify, Kraus cuts him off with a brusque, "It's all written here; sign and go." Before he goes, the court votes according to the auditor's instructions. Then it is known in the city and whispered through the prisons that Kraus has carried his documents to Verona, for Radetzky and Benedek to pass upon them. The grim Governor apparently communicates with Vienna, where it is credibly reported that the young Emperor himself, instigated by his implacable mother, Archduchess Sophia, desires that the severest penalties be exacted. Of the forty-one implicated in the Tazzoli case ten are condemned to death.

As soon as the sentence is published in Piazza S. Pietro (now Sordello) consternation spreads over the city. The news flies to Venice and Verona and Milan. Friends of the victims hurry to implore Radetzky to grant a commutation, or at least a delay: but his suite keep him as far as possible out of reach, and after all, his eighty-five-year-old heart is not likely to be touched. Prelates and nobles, on whom no breath of suspicion has rested, appeal for mercy. All in vain. The condemned are removed to the death chamber at Santa Teresa, where Monsignor Martini, noblest of prison chaplains, offers them religious consolation. Their families come to say farewell. On the morning of December 7 the five who are to die — Austria follows the Neapolitan rule of halving the death-list — are driven in carriages to the place of execution near the lunette of the Belfiore Fort. Tazzoli has been unfrocked — Rome as usual consenting to regard political conspiracy as a crime against religion. The five go bravely amid the mute stupefaction, broken here and there by women's sobs, of the populace. They mount the scaffold without flinching. Tazzoli kneels; they kneel around him, and he blesses them. Chaplain Martini, ever considerate, throws his cloak over Poma's

head, so that Poma, who is to die last, may not be unnerved by the sight of his comrades' agony. The Venetian, Giovanni Zambelli, is the first to offer his neck to the hangman's noose; he has taken care to dress as if for a reception, and he meets death gravely, calmly. Angelo Scarsellini comes next, a man of more emotional nature but of equal courage. As he climbs the ladder, he repeats impressively Doge Faliero's lines, from Verdi's opera: "The scaffold is for us a triumph, if we mount it smiling; but the blood of the valiant shall not be lost."³² Bernardo de Canal, another Venetian, follows Scarsellini, with the cry, "Long live Italy!" Then the hangman despatches Tazzoli, who, like Ugo Bassi, proves by his heroic sacrifice that an Italian priest can be also a patriot. Finally, Carlo Poma, the curly-haired blond physician, whose schoolmates had nicknamed him Cato, and who had translated Homer during the months of his imprisonment, is swung up, to die after writhing ten terrible minutes, alongside of his fellows. While the five corpses hang there throughout that winter's day, Mantua feels that a hideous crime has been committed. The five died as Catholics, confident that their death would serve the cause of Italy. They were all young. "But the blood of the valiant shall not be lost."

Having allowed time for the horror of this execution to soak in, Austria on March 3, 1853, issued another batch of sentences condemning 23 out of 27 prisoners to death. For all but three the penalty was commuted to imprisonment. These three were Bartolomeo Grazioli, the parish priest of Revere, "a cultivator of philosophical studies, of Socrates and of Plato" — a firm patriot, zealous Mazzinian, devoted minister to his parishioners, and a fervent conspirator. Count Carlo Montanari, a noble of Verona, "the most esteemed and beneficent" of its citizens (says one of his fellow-conspirators); an unquestioning Mazzinian; spotless in honor, brave, generous, and long-enduring. When his sentence, containing base charges against him, was read, he exclaimed: "They resort even to calumny to slay a man!" Tito Speri — the third victim — was the youngest; a son of Brescia, and worthy of that leonine city. Popular, magnetic,

■ Il palco è ■ noi trionfo,
Ove ascendiam ridenti;
Ma il sangue dei valenti
Perduto non sarà."

with a gift of leadership, Speri, like an early martyr, exulted in his ordeal and would have resented being deprived of the privilege of offering himself as a willing sacrifice to a holy cause. "I cannot permit," he wrote to his mother, "that in my name any request be made, no matter what fate may be allotted me." "I do not think that I have done anything meritorious" (in not betraying his fellow-conspirators), he wrote again; "but I rejoice at having done my duty as a religious citizen of my Italian mother country. God and Italy! This shall be my perpetual and supreme desire! The gallows may make my flesh turn pale, but my soul never — believe me: I do not say this to boast, but from inmost conviction, from true, spontaneous feeling." And he was not mistaken. He went to his execution as to a festival, light-hearted and steadfast, and in order to shorten his comrades' ordeal, he waited till the last. To the hangman who craved his forgiveness he said, "Certainly, I only ask you to treat me like a good friend; be quick and sure." Then having lifted his eyes and said, "I come to Thee, O my God, I come to Thee, O Jesus, receive me in Paradise!" he gave up his life. Count Montanari was serious and dignified, but not less courageous. "The Italians know how to die!" is said to have been the remark of one Austrian who witnessed the execution.

One more victim, Pietro Frattini, a lawyer's clerk, was executed on March 19. After hearing his sentence, he borrowed from Monsignor Martini a copy of the *Divine Comedy*, which he had never read, and spent his last two days with Dante. At the scaffold he too bore himself like a man. That same morning Marshal Radetzky issued a proclamation announcing that the Mantua trial was closed and the military council dissolved, and setting free those of the accused who had not already fled or been sentenced. As ■ superfluous hypocrisy, it was semi-officially reported that, owing to the courier's tardiness, a respite intended for Frattini arrived too late. In fact, however, the proclamation announcing Frattini's execution and the commuting of sentences had been set up several days earlier and distributed throughout the Kingdom, so that they could be placarded everywhere on the forenoon of March 19.

The net result of this terrible purge was nine dead, some seventy imprisoned for terms varying from four to twenty years,

and nearly forty fugitives.³³ Austria had, unmistakably, unearthed a wide-spread conspiracy and uprooted its ringleaders. Every government has the right to do that. But posterity condemns Austria for the way in which she did it: for her barbarous procedure; for her contempt for justice; for the brutality of her agents who, holding in their clutches prisoners powerless to injure them, baited and tortured and persecuted those victims with diabolical relish. An Imperial State which sent to a mother the bill for the rope used in hanging her son, forfeits every claim to the respect of civilized man. This was done in the case of Speri and of Scarsellini; while money which Calvi left with his jailers to pay a small debt, was kept by them to cover the cost of his execution and for their own spending.³⁴ In so far as Austria scotched that particular conspiracy, she gained her immediate purpose: but in doing so she heaped up against herself an immense store of hatred, which sooner or later would seek revenge. She thought she had rid herself of nine political culprits, and lo! those culprits became transfigured as martyrs; their patriotic example shone before their countrymen; their words were seeds; their heroism was an inspiration. "The Italians know how to die!" that indispensable lesson they had given. Against any man or woman who had attained to Enrico Tazzoli's complete self-mastery, sweetness, sympathy and courage, neither Austria

■ Thanks to the indefatigable Luzio we have the bills receipted by Peter Hellbock for the executions of Dec. 7 and March 3. The former is as follows:

For the execution on the 7th

Five at L30	150
Executioner's board from Dec. 4 to Dec. 7 at L6	24
5 small cords at L7	35
5 cords for the hands and other 5 for the feet at L3	30
5 large screws at L8	40
Shears for cutting	3
Total	L282

Hellbock's assistant, Antonio Reisinger, received only L15 per person and L3 per diem for board. Luzio, I, 298-99.

³⁴ Luzio, II, 5-18, gives a list of the prosecuted, from which it appears that 110 persons were under arrest at Mantua. Of these, 41 were condemned to death and 10 executed; 57 were amnestied on March 19, 1853; several had been previously released; Maggi died in prison; F. Montanari was handed over to the Duke of Modena; the rest remained in prison till the general amnesty of 1856. This list does not include Pezzotti, the Milanese who committed suicide, nor suspects arrested in Venice and released there after a brief detention. In these notes, I retain references to Luzio's *first* edition.

nor the powers of hell could prevail.³⁵ Austria, pursuing her war even against corpses, flung the bodies of her victims, uncoffined, into graves dug in unconsecrated earth near the gallows. And the place of their burial has become holy ground, a shrine where every visitor, be he Italian or stranger, is reminded that in some men there dwells a spirit of nobleness which nothing can destroy.

In her desire to be rigorous, Austria had overreached herself. She made the world shudder not at the proposed crimes of the conspirators but at her own brutality. Her examination simply served to show that her Italian subjects were irreconcilable. The conspirators were not criminals nor adventurers, but thoughtful, earnest men, including nobles, clergy and all grades of the bourgeoisie, inspired by the ideal of a free country, in whose behalf they gave their lives gladly.

³⁵ I have accepted, very reluctantly, belief in Castellazzo's treachery; one would prefer to hold the meanest wretch incapable of such baseness. Luzio has presented with great fulness the documents on both sides, and he has analyzed them keenly. Unless Kraus took down Castellazzo's revelations and these records (if still extant in Austrian archives) shall some day be published, the question can never be finally settled. But the circumstantial evidence runs overwhelmingly against Castellazzo. So many of his associates, men who proved themselves of spotless honor and most generous in their dealing with each other, could hardly have been unanimous, without due cause, in branding him as a traitor. Still, assuming his guilt, much remains to be explained. He was arrested April 22, yet only on June 17 was the first important haul of prisoners whose names had been deciphered in Tazzoli's ledger. Again, although Castellazzo had the key to the cipher, why were there many names and entries which he could not interpret? Why did he confess in dribblets, instead of all at once? — waiting, for instance, from April till October before incriminating Speri, Poma and Fratini? The suggestion that he began his confessions in order to save his father, is plausible: so is the theory that he first made his revelations confidentially to his father, who told them to Kraus; but it seems improbable that he was a spy from the first moment he joined the conspiracy, or that, if he had not been unexpectedly arrested, he would have turned informer. I set no value on his later "rehabilitation," because that brought to light no evidence to refute the long-standing, damning charges. That Castellazzo fought bravely under Garibaldi in 1859, 1860 and 1866 is an undisputed fact, and shows that he wished to retrieve his blasted reputation, but it tells absolutely nothing as to his betrayal of his associates in 1852; many an arch scoundrel has made a good fighter. Nor does the fact that some of Castellazzo's fellow Garibaldians declared that they did not believe so good a comrade and patriot could have been a traitor furnish any proof. Neither does the vote in the Chamber of Deputies (Dec. 11, 1884), when party considerations, far more than the question of guilt or innocence, influenced the result. When Deputy Cavalotti asks us to absolve Castellazzo because he has, "*on the honor of a soldier*," declared himself innocent, Cavalotti is either talking for effect or he does not understand the sort of evidence which sober minds require.

Between the execution of the first batch of the martyrs of Belfiore and the second, the Mazzinians made on February 6, 1853, their abortive attempt at Milan. The fate of Tazzoli and his companions spurred them on, and the seductive recollection of the glorious Five Days was always impelling them. They now plotted to seize the Royal Palace, the quarters of the Great Guard, and the Castle. To Mazzini nothing seemed easier. At five o'clock Governor Strassoldo, his generals and staff always dined at the Palace, where only a few sentries watched the entrance. At the most there would be not more than twenty-five soldiers to overpower; and this duty was entrusted to an old Garibaldian, named Fanfulla, who, with a hundred or more resolute men of the people, was to stampede those few guards and take the high officials prisoners. That would prevent the giving of orders to the Austrian troops and police, and hasten a general surrender. The storming of the Great Guard's quarters was more difficult, as 120 men and three howitzers were stationed there: but a brave plebeian — "whose name I am sorry to say I forget," says Mazzini — elected to accomplish it, with the help of a band of dauntless conspirators. The surprise of the Castle, however, "was the vital thing," for it contained 12,000 muskets besides those of its garrison. "Eighteen men, chosen among the most intrepid, and commanded by the head of the entire plan, were to rush suddenly, dagger in hand, on the eighteen soldiers set to guard the first court; and, at a given signal, two squadrons of plebeians numbering about 300, and commanded, one by Assi and the other by a master carpenter whose name I do not know, were to burst forth on the run from all the places where, in the neighborhood of the Castle, their chiefs should have stationed them just before the affair. The few remaining soldiers, dispersed in the great rooms, unarmed, and taken unawares, could not certainly have withstood that flood. . . . Whilst these surprises were being effected, 200 young men by twos and threes were to run amuck through the streets of the city and stab the soldiers and officers who, aroused by the noise, issuing from taverns, cafés and houses, should attempt singly to regain the various points of concentration. There would have been the Sicilian Vespers over again! ³⁶ . . . Everything had been

■ "It was an ugly parody of the Sicilian Vespers, because the great popular

thought of, and everything, as best might be, was provided for.”³⁷ If the struggle should be unexpectedly prolonged, barricades would be thrown up; the head of the gas-works had been won over, and, if expedient, he would leave the city unlighted; the Hungarian soldiers could be counted on to make common cause with the conspirators. By the next morning bands of patriots warned by lights on the spire of the Cathedral would begin to pour into Milan from all directions. Mazzini himself was at Chiasso, Acerbi at Pavia, Klapka at Lugano, Camozzi at Poschiavo. “Let Milan fight for two days, and all Lombardy would be in flames: so would Sicily, so would Naples, placed between two insurrections; Genoa, Piedmont would rise! Behold 1848 over again! If the movement at Milan succeeded, the Austrian troops must either evacuate the cities of the Centre to concentrate on the Po, or, showing fight, they could be easily overcome by the popular movement!”³⁸ With an imagination truly epic in its reach, Mazzini foresaw twenty revolutions spring up as fast as the news should spread that Milan had risen.

Cooler heads — Medici, Besana, Lazzati — said no; but Mazzini had so fired the local leaders with his own infatuation, that they decided to put the project to the touch. The personnel of the conspiracy consisted almost entirely of the lowest classes. When nobody could be secured whose name would have rallied the aristocrats and notables to them in case of success, Piolti di Bianchi, a well-meaning, middle-class young man, accepted the post of command. Mazzini seems, indeed, to have organized two parallel sets of conspirators, each getting its cue from him but not aware of its rival’s plans. The plebeians, whom he decided to send into the breach when the more influential, and

movements of insurrection are justified only when they are unexpected, spontaneous, general, as in fact according to the legend the affair of the Vespers did occur, and as that of Genoa in 1746 against the Austrians. But this was a pre-meditated, pushed-on affair, carried out by a few persons, who were the victims of the proud and sectarian spirit of Mazzini. . . . This act, far from procuring Mazzini new disciples, disgusted on the contrary all honest souls from following him, and those of whose desertion Mazzini complained, turned, wearily, their gaze towards Piedmont.” Minghetti, III, 21-22.

³⁷ Mazzini furnished 25,000 francs from the proceeds of the national loan; he sent the model for a primitive dagger, of which several hundred were made and distributed, and he smuggled into the city a few bombs — the earliest, it is believed, of the type which Orsini afterwards used.

■ Mazzini: *Scritti*, VIII, 209-28; “Il Moto del 6 Febbraio.”

sensible, group held back, counted many black sheep among them. In the autumn they had assassinated Dr. Vandoni, one of their members, for betraying a comrade, and they next killed a rascal named Corbellini, who threatened to betray Vandoni's murderers unless he were paid a large sum. They even considered poisoning the Austrian officials at a great banquet, but Piolti repelled the suggestion with horror. And just before the moment for action came the 5000 men who were pledged to expel the Austrians or die, struck for higher pay than the two francs apiece which Piolti had promised them. They reluctantly accepted that pittance, only when convinced that he had no more to give. Piolti exhorted them to regard the performance of a patriot's duty as their real recompense.³⁹

Five o'clock sounded on that Sixth of February afternoon, but the thousands of armed patriots came not. An hour later a few gathered before the entrance to the Castle, but that "old Garibaldian, Fanfulla," instead of leading them, had already taken to his heels, not to pause for breath till he reached Stradella. Another chief, Fronti, absconded with 10,000 francs. The gallant band ordered to kidnap the Governor and his staff, mustered barely a score, instead of the promised hundred, and as its leader failed to appear, it quickly dissolved, with the loss of one man wounded. A few barricades were thrown up, and at Porta Tosa there was a brief skirmish, bravely directed by Carlo Galli, the combmaker. The most effective patriots seem to have been those who went about in small knots stabbing unsuspecting Austrians. Within an hour, the bubble collapsed.⁴⁰ The next day Count Strassoldo declared the state of siege,⁴¹ and hanged seven of the prisoners, who had been arrested wholesale. Among the victims was a private tutor, innocent of the plot, but who, being lame, carried a cane. During the next few days, nine more went to the gallows, after a summary drum-head court-martial.⁴² On February 9 Radetzky proclaimed martial law, ordered Milan to

³⁹ *Rivista Stor. del Risorgimento*, II, 630-36. G. Visconti-Venosta, 237.

⁴⁰ G. Visconti Venosta, *Ricordi*, pp. 230 ff., gives a cool-headed account.

⁴¹ Mazzini gives the names of the 16. Their occupations show that the conspiracy was recruited from Mazzini's "common people" (*popolani*). There were 5 porters, 3 carpenters, a teacher of gymnastics, a hatter, a butcher, a dramseller, a shoemaker, a combmaker, a café waiter, a printer, and a milkman. Tivaroni, I, 86.

⁴² Zini, II, 344-45.

support the wounded soldiers and the families of the killed; announced his intention of removing all foreign suspects from the city; and levied a special contribution for the benefit of the garrison, which, he said, had been unusually fatigued by this occurrence. "I reserve to myself," added the practical Marshal, "the infliction on the city of Milan, according to the result of the investigations, of the well-merited ulterior penalty and contributions." ⁴³ Radetzky's matter-of-fact proclamation had a very different ring from the eloquent appeals of Mazzini ⁴⁴ and Kosuth, of which bundles were printed, but never distributed. Having restored order, and shed enough blood to show that it could and would be stern, the Government dealt so leisurely with the suspects under arrest, that July 18 came before sentence was passed on them. A score were sentenced to death and 46 others to imprisonment; the death sentences were commuted. ⁴⁵

The Sixth of February fiasco, with its sequel of suffering, discredited Mazzini in the eyes of many who had been his disciples, and it gave his opponents, whether monarchists or republicans, a strong argument against him. ⁴⁶ But he, in true prophet fashion, threw the blame on others. The populace did not fail, he said, but leaders failed the populace. Why did the leaders fail? Because they were not supported by the middle class. The materialist, sceptical bourgeois said to them: "Fight, since you wish to: after the first day we will join you." A noble like Emilio Visconti Venosta, fitted by position and ability to be at the head of the movement, grew cold and drew back, Mazzini alleged, because he was afraid of a popular victory. The upper classes did not contribute a man, nor a coin, nor a weapon. Not a broadcloth coat was seen among the patriots who fought in that fatal

⁴³ Zini, II, 347.

⁴⁴ Mazzini, IX, 1-4. "The authors of these proclamations no longer enjoy the confidence of the intelligent friends of reform in Italy," Kinney wrote to Marcy, Feb. 12, 1853. *Amer. Arch.*

⁴⁵ Tivaroni, I, 86-87, gives names and sentences.

⁴⁶ I give in epitome the plan as laid out by Mazzini, and his criticism on its failure, because both reveal, better than much description by others could, the secret of his strength and weakness. The details of the affair are variously stated, but there can be little doubt as to the main story. In the *Rivista Storica del Risorgimento Italiano*, II, 601-67 (Turin, 1897) Piolti di Bianchi's account is printed in full with notes by Angelo Bargoni. Piolti's naïveté in narrating the pathetically imbecile arrangements is almost a guarantee of his veracity. G. Visconti Venosta, *op. cit.*, confirms him. F. Orsini: *Memorie*; N. M. Campolieti: *La Mente e l'Anima d'un Eroe* [Carlo de Cristoforis] (Milan: Monaini, 1907) add sidelights.

twilight. And of the patriots themselves only five per cent came to the rendezvous.⁴⁷ As Mazzini had been preaching for years that the redemption of Italy could be achieved only through the lowest classes — “The People” — and as he had consistently berated the nobles and bourgeois, his critics had a right to remind him that at Milan he had the very combination he had been asking for, a “working-men’s revolution”: but it is both shallow and futile to taunt a prophet. And although Mazzini insisted publicly that the failure was due, not to the insanity of the scheme, but to the backsliding of those who ought to have supported it, he could not refrain in private from giving vent to his depression. “I am uncertain of myself and of everything,” he wrote Sophia Craufurd, “and in an abnormal state morally and materially. . . . The late events are sad for one who hoped for better and knows that we might have done better: as to the general results, for whoever was not on the inside of the preparations, they are good: they have given an impulse towards action that will help. I am not in the least discomfited as to my country’s cause; but personally I am exhausted and distrustful as to what I may now be able to do to aid this cause. In this kind of enforced pause, the bitter of my life has welled up within me from the depths where I have held it in check with an iron will, and it floods my veins: I see everything gray; and I am wearied with myself.”⁴⁸ To his most trusty disciple, Saffi, he confides that he is “in an unhealthy state, which he hides from everybody, in which, though he cannot explain it to himself, friendship, love, country, activity, inertia, life, all are poison and grief to him.”⁴⁹

In the Papal States, there had been, since the Pope’s restoration, an unintermittent course of arrests and punishments. Not even in Naples was there less justice. Prisoners under suspicion were confined for months or years without trial.⁵⁰ Common criminals, thieves, burglars and homicides were executed wholesale, and little care was taken to distinguish between them and the so-called “politicals.” The conspirators kept on burrowing.

⁴⁷ Mazzini, VIII, l. c. (Roma, 1905), pp. 63, 64.

⁴⁸ Mazzatinti: *Lettere di Mazzini ad Aurelio Saffi*

⁴⁹ Mazzini, ix, lxviii.

⁵⁰ For details concerning the Romagna and the Marches see Alfredo Comandini: *Conspirazioni di Romagna e Bologna nelle Memorie di Federico Comandini e di Altri Patriotti del Tempo, 1831-57* (Bologna, Zanichelli, 1899), a work of marvelous minuteness.

nevertheless, especially in Romagna and the Marches. At Bologna, according to Saffi, there were 3000 Republicans ready to rise the instant they got good news from Milan. Before this a dozen persons had been arrested at Ferrara on suspicion of belonging to a revolutionary committee (July, 1852). The police closed in on other victims, all of whom underwent a prosecution similar to that then progressing at Mantua. A ferocious Magyar cavalry captain, known as "Gran-Shak," conducted the persecutions in a way which Kraus might have envied.⁵¹ He resorted to flogging even more frequently than Kraus, and as a refinement of torture a prisoner would be taken to see his companion flogged in the hope that the sight of such agony would force a confession.⁵²

The inquisitors strained every nerve to discover the relations between Dr. Domenico Malagutti, a young physician, and the University students, among whom the patriotic leaven was working. They believed Gaetano Ungarelli, a law student, was Malagutti's confederate: but during a four hours' torture, when thirty-five blows were inflicted, he would reveal nothing. The next day, as he still held out, Ungarelli says, "they threw me down on the bench, and sent for Malagutti, whose tender friendship for me they knew of. They began to beat me in his presence, commanding him to name the person who had given him the letter, if he hoped to save me from flogging. . . . He stood as if thunderstruck; then, hearing the swish of the rods, he cried out: 'On me, on me those blows, if you wish to know anything from me! What infamy! He was far away. I could not give him the name of a person unknown to myself. . . . And you make me a spectator of this iniquitous torture?' But these villain judges, ordering the flogging to go on, said: 'Ah! It pains you to see your friend in torment. If you don't tell what you know, there shall be 50 blows, there shall be a hundred.' And as the torture proceeded, my poor friend, beside himself, rushed towards me, who vainly with my eyes was conjuring him to restrain himself. They held him back by force: and the auditor said, 'His turn now; afterwards, yours!' Malagutti, despairing of all help, and unable to bear the continuation of my agony, thought of a stratagem, and

⁵¹ Comandini also, *op cit.*, gives an account of Grantsàk, as he spells the name: see n. 1, p. 375.

⁵² Gennarelli: *Il Governo Pontificio*, pp. 539 ff.

remembering that a certain Signor Z. of Bologna had already sought safety in Genoa, he said that he had received the letter from him. Thus deceived, our tormentors ceased, and sent us back to prison." "And yet," Ungarelli adds, with proper scorn, "outside of Italy, and by not a few in Italy unworthy of their country, we are reproved for calling the Austrians *barbarians*." ⁵³

The Military Commission at Bologna, having reviewed the evidence without finding proof of high treason, passed comparatively mild sentences; whereupon Radetzky — although the accused were the Pope's subjects and the case concerned the Pope's courts — ordered a new trial. On February 17, 1853, the Austrian Council of War at Ferrara condemned ten of the twelve to death; and on March 16 three of these — Giacomo Succi, Domenico Malagutti and Luigi Parmeggiani — were shot, "for lack of a hangman." The others had their penalty commuted. ⁵⁴ Thus the Papal government permitted even its judicial functions to be usurped by its Austrian protector. "The Pope let them go ahead during the trial," wrote Ungarelli, "and on being implored to show mercy to the survivors, he replied that it was none of his business." ⁵⁵

The blood-money which abortive conspiracy had to pay at Mantua, Milan and Ferrara, did not, however, stagger Mazzini. He hid from the world the dejection which he confided to Saffi. "The web has been undone; we must begin to weave it afresh," was his motto. ⁵⁶ He stuck to his assertion that the fault lay in imperfect agents and not in conspiracy itself: a few able leaders and a larger campaign fund could bring victory. He issued two manifestoes, on "The Party of Action," and "The Duty of Acting," in which his vehemence, his moral fervor and his seductive logic (for those who were moved by him at all) showed no signs of flagging. In the face of the flat contradiction which the failure at Mantua, Milan and Ferrara had just given, there was something magnificent in his immediate unfurling of the old ideals. Thirsting to avenge their martyr comrades, patriots throughout the Peninsula impatiently waited for the word to rise. Mazzini found intrepid disciples who listened to his call.

■ Zini, II, 436-37.

⁵⁴ Text of decree, signed by the Austrian general Rohn, "commanding the city and fortress of Ferrara," in Zini, II, 368-72. Ungarelli's letter, *ibid.*, 431-39.

⁵⁵ Zini, II, 438.

⁵⁶ Mazzini, IX, lxxvi.

"We have read with enthusiasm your pages on the Party of Action," a committee of Romans wrote him; "and the truth which emerges from them has convinced us that, from the Alps to the sea, Italy is a powder magazine ready to start a conflagration, if a spark be thrown into it, and we have said: 'Let us march first.'" ⁵⁷

Late in the summer Pietro Fortunato Calvi undertook an incendiary mission into Friuli; was arrested in Cadore (Sept. 7, 1853) and hurried to Mantua, where for twenty-two months, he suffered the Austrian inquisition. On July 4, 1855, unperturbed and cheerful, he was hanged, the last of the Martyrs of Belfiore. The day before, he drew up a declaration in which he said: "Condemned to die for high treason, I suffer death gladly, proclaiming in the face of the scaffold that that which I did I did of my sure knowledge and conscience, ready to do it again, to drive Austria out of the Italian States which she has usurped without right, and holds under her dominion." ⁵⁸ While Calvi was risking his life in the Northeast, Felice Orsini, another Mazzinian, equally fearless, went twice on a similar errand into the Lunigiana, ⁵⁹ but meeting with no response, he made his way to Hungary, with the intention of enlisting in the Austrian army and of propagating sedition among the soldiers. But he was betrayed, arrested, and sent for trial to Mantua, whence he made a surprising escape.

Mazzini did not overlook Rome itself. The conspirators there had reached the verge of a schism, which threatened to split the party into two irreconcilable sects. Ever since 1849 a sub-committee of the National Association, headed by Mazzoni, had conducted the Mazzinian propaganda. In the course of time, however, a considerable number of the Roman revolutionists began to doubt whether Mazzini's plan were the best: distrusting action for the sake of action, they were willing to accept monarchy if monarchy would free and unite Italy. The Mazzinians, who now had Petroni, a lawyer, for leader, called themselves the

⁵⁷ Mazzini, ix, lxxx, n. 1. This address, dated Rome, July 6, 1853, is signed by Annibale Lucatelli, Augusto Bertoni, Cesare Tassi, Antonio Catenacci, G. B. Demiliani, G. B. De Camillis, Giacomo Pinaroli, and Antonio Palma.

⁵⁸ Text in Luzio, i, 344-45. Calvi's declaration is of kin with Ulrich von Hutten's "*Ich hab's gewagt mit Sinnen.*" Carducci, in his ode "Cadore," has immortalized Calvi.

⁵⁹ In the autumn of 1853 and early spring of 1854. See F. Orsini: *Memorie Politiche* (London: 1859), chaps. v-vii.

"Pure" or "Puritans," and dubbed the seceders, — guided by Mazzoni, Checchetelli and Piccioni, — "Fusionists" or "Constitutionals." ⁶⁰ After the Milan fiasco, the Mazzinian Puritans proposed a daring venture, but the Fusionists held back. Recriminations ensued. The Mazzinians charged their rivals with cowardice. The Fusionists replied that the moment was inopportune, and they issued, clandestinely, a manifesto in which they declared that they were ready to join any Italian, not merely a Republican, who would make his watchword, "Out with the barbarians." The Mazzinians, resolving to prove their right to leadership by moving without their former allies, arranged that a band of exiles, led by Ercole Roselli, should land on the coast near Civita Vecchia and hasten to Rome, where the Puritans would have laid the train for a gigantic explosion. Nothing less than the assassination of Pius IX would satisfy some of the extremists, ⁶¹ but that crime was frustrated by the more respectable among them. Finally, an imitation of the Milanese design was agreed upon — a surprise of soldiers and seizure of guard-houses and officers, with the inevitable capture of the city. That achieved, Pope and prelates would take to flight. The Mazzinians fixed upon August 15, 1853, for their triumph: it witnessed, instead, their squelching. Roselli's expedition, only eight strong, was quickly disposed of. The bands of insurgents which were to come trooping over the mountains never appeared. The impartial Papal police took Puritans and Fusionists alike, and lodged fifty-eight persons in prison, where they spent over a year before their sentences were pronounced. Tale-bearers and betrayers abounded and no means was spared for getting complete information. Fortunately, the plan to kill the Pope did not leak out. Petroni, Ruiz, Casciani, Romiti and Roselli, as ringleaders, were condemned to death, and most of the others to the galleys. ⁶² In like manner, Bologna, Ancona, Cesena and other Papal cities had each its baptism of blood, to prove that the Pope's tyranny, supported by French and Austrian troops, was detested by many of his subjects.

Although Mazzini did not slacken his activity, the Milanese fiasco marked a turning-point in his leadership. It broke up the

⁶⁰ Mazzatinti, *op. cit.*, 69-70.

⁶¹ De Cesare: *Roma*, I, 163.

⁶² Text of sentence in De Cesare, I, 167-68.

Italian National Committee, two of whose members, Sirtori the Venetian and Saliceti the Neapolitan, had already resigned. Now Montecchi retired "discouraged"; leaving Mazzini and Saffi alone. Saliceti, restricting his energy to his own region, plotted for Murat. Carlo Cattaneo, the Lombard, who was intellectually superior to all the revolutionists except Mazzini, a man of Cato-nic inflexibility of principles, and an unpersuadable doctrinaire, had split with his chief on the question of the final constitution of Italy: Mazzini insisted on a united republic, Cattaneo stood out for a federation. Sirtori at Paris, the refuge of Reds of all species, borrowed Mazzini's general theory of insurrection, but wished to direct it himself. Mordini, living discreetly in exile in Piedmont, and keeping out of active operations, served as a peace-maker. While he did not approve of Mazzini's Sixth of February venture, he nevertheless urged the various leaders to keep in touch with Mazzini and each other, in order that the forces of Republicanism might not be blasted by discord, or dissipated in separate local attempts.⁶³ Bertani, the soundest in judgment of all the Republicans, had always disapproved of Mazzini's infatuation for plots to go off at a given moment. He replied tersely to a friend⁶⁴ who urged him not to desert Mazzini: "Not men or systems: liberty, and, first, revolution." After the Sixth of February he proposed that Mazzini should be formally compelled to retire from leadership and should pledge his lieutenants to obey his successor.⁶⁵

By the beginning of 1854, therefore, Italian conspiracy entered on a new phase. Mazzini was still its head-centre, but in each province local conspirators were hatching their plots, with or without his help. In five years, conspiracy had made no apparent gain. Except at Milan, it had not even come into action, before being discovered and suppressed. Its practitioners who had not died on the scaffold were fretting in exile or filling the prisons and galleys. Not a single tyrant had budged. The unearthing of plot after plot, simply increased the severity of the repression. Neither the despots nor their underlings could be terrorized into kindness. Nevertheless, Mazzini — as if, like the

⁶³ Rosi: *L'Azione d'un Patriota* [Mordini] (Rome, 1907), 117–22. See also Tivaroni, I, 89; Mazzatinti, 69–71; Mazzini, VIII, 95, IX, lii, n. lxii.

⁶⁴ J. W. Mario: *Bertani*, I, 193; Bertani to Lemmi, June 10, 1852.

■ *Ibid*, 195; Bertani to Cattaneo, April 19, 1853.

Bourbons, he had learned nothing and forgotten nothing — boldly proclaimed that Action alone would redeem Italy, at the very time when Action had been proved to be criminal folly. Was he a half-crazed fanatic, or did he see further than his critics? Discredited among many of his former disciples, he was loathed by the Monarchists, who more than ever after the Sixth of February regarded him as self-willed, vain and blood-thirsty — a miscreant who would sacrifice any number of lives, whether of his dupes or his enemies, in order to display his baleful power.⁶⁶ They laid to his charge the fatuous attempt of Libeny to kill Francis Joseph, the assassination of Charles III of Parma, and the stabbing of several police commissioners, — sporadic crimes in which, so far as appears, he had absolutely no part. The Moderates, and indeed all who were beginning to look to Piedmont as the possible liberator of Italy, detested him because they feared that his mad or wicked outbreaks would ruin their cause. As Piedmont grew strong, Mazzini denounced her not less bitterly than the Austrians and the Bourbons: for she was showing the world that an Italian State could, under monarchy, be free and progressive, whereas he had insisted for 20 years that only the republic would serve. In its origin we need not attribute this hostility to personal pique or rage, at the thought that Italy might be saved without him, although even noble prophets have not always flung away ambition. Mazzini was rigidly consistent in trying to prevent the unification of Italy on a monarchical basis; for he defined monarchy as a compromise, a half-way house, and he believed that if the Italians were ever to acquire enough courage and virtue to free and govern themselves it must be as republicans.

The menace which Mazzini held over the Moderates is evident; the actual harm done by his abortive plots has been often stigmatized: much more difficult is it to allot to him the due meed of praise. Some of his admirers declare that without him Italy could not have been redeemed; some of his detractors, equally positive, reply that but for him she would have been

⁶⁶ Among many contemporary condemnations of Mazzini, two works may be cited as summarizing the beliefs of many sincere persons, viz: Jules de Bréval: *Mazzini jugé par lui même et par les siens* (Paris: Plon, 1853); and Nicomede Bianchi: *Vicende del Mazzinianismo politico e religioso dal 1832 al 1854* (Savona: Sambolino, 1854).

redeemed sooner, and spared the legacy of Republican venom. Between these extremists, where lies the truth? Mazzini preached that Italy could be regenerated only by her people: the event refuted him, for it was the upper and middle classes that wrought her salvation. And yet, ideally, he was right, because no country can be regenerate in which the lower classes, or any class, fail, through ignorance or indifference, to respond to the call of patriotism. Mazzini preached that as it was craven and immoral to wait on help from outside, Italians could and must free themselves: in this too, the event proved him wrong, and, yet again, this duty of self-reliance which he taught was indispensable. His Sixth of February attempt seemed folly: and yet it discredited Austria and glorified Piedmont more than the capture of Milan could have done. Cavour it was, and not Mazzini, who turned the apparently ruinous blunder into an Italian victory. The scores of martyrs on the scaffold, the hundreds of prisoners rotting in loathsome dungeons — all whose blood and sufferings lay on Mazzini's account, did not die or suffer in vain. Most of them had the satisfaction of feeling that their sacrifice would not be wasted. Mazzini was right: the test of patriotism is not rhetoric or rosewater, but life-blood. The example of each martyr outran calculation. The cause that brave men had found worth dying for must be worth living for. And the story of those martyrdoms was carried, like pollen, up and down the land. Every one heard how Antonio Sciesa, on being offered pardon at the scaffold if he would betray his companions, replied bluntly, "Let's go on!"⁶⁷ Every one revered Priest Grioli who, similarly tempted, said, "Show me where to kneel," and a moment later was riddled with bullets. Every one heard of the heroism at Belfiore. Admiration for the patriots brought inevitable loathing and hatred for their persecutors, for the despots who debauched Italy. All this Mazzini reckoned upon.⁶⁸

Conspiracy was strangely compounded, therefore, of visions and seeming follies and brute facts. Its votaries were saints and sinners, patriots, adventurers and egotists. After 1849 it kept alive in the restored despotisms the Italian ideals of 1848. But the rise of Piedmont, by giving asylum to Italians of every pro-

⁶⁷ "*Tiremmo innanz*," in Milanese dialect.

⁶⁸ Cf. Gutierrez. See also G. Visconti Venosta: *Ricordi*, 208.

vince and by opening a forum for free discussion, deflected and subsequently divided the movement. As the number increased of those who put their trust in Piedmont, the Party of Action became more and more uncompromising; and it seemed all the more formidable because its strength could not be known. Whatever estimate is set on the result of Mazzini's work, he himself in these years looms up larger and larger with the lapse of time. Posterity can hardly believe that one man should have been able, against odds so immense, to quicken the conscience of multitudes, to plant in their hearts such a passion for their country ■ men have sometimes felt for their religion, and to fit them for acts of heroism which are supposed to belong to the young and high-spirited, and not to a race enervated by centuries of corruption, cynicism and servitude.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Daniel writes Marcy, Aug. 12, 1854: "The Republican Party are disposed to ■ general attempt. I do not think they will effect any general movement. All rational hopes of a national revolution in this peninsula departed when Austria declared herself decisively on the side of the Western Powers." *Amer. Arch.*

CHAPTER XI

THE BLACKS

I ACCEPT with delight your offer of the daguerreotype portrait of our friend Mazzini," Cavour wrote to Emanuel d'Azeglio. "It may help us to welcome him as he deserves, if he ever dreams of making us ■ second visit. I am not uneasy on that score; for we are in the way of thwarting all his plots." ¹ These lines show how little Cavour feared Mazzini's power to harm Piedmont. Just as Cavour had turned Austria's decree of sequestration into ■ Piedmontese diplomatic victory, so he made capital of the Mazzinian failure at Milan by assuring Europe that such disturbances were to be looked for in the despot-ridden provinces of Italy but that under Victor Emanuel's Liberal régime they did not occur. In spite of his somewhat cocksure air, however, he took every precaution through the police and through spies at home and abroad to forestall the Reds, if they should attempt an outbreak in Piedmont, and he had always present in his mind the danger into which their activity elsewhere might plunge his far-reaching policy. They introduced an element of uncertainty which overshadowed every plan.

Over against the Reds, the fanatics of the New, stood the Blacks, the zealots of the Old: both equally hostile to the champion of Reason. The Reds, restive under all laws, would risk the leap in the dark, hoping to alight on a social and political Utopia; the Blacks not only would take no step in advance, but insisted on abolishing the results of much vital experience and on returning forever to a medieval condition. There is for the historian no more difficult task than to describe fairly the dissolution of the Papacy. The scanty documents which the Vatican vouchsafes to publish are sown thick with Scriptural texts and pious protestations, but the aim of them is unquestionably worldly and political. Acts declared to be wholly religious, do not differ by a hair's-breadth from acts which are elsewhere wholly political.

¹ Mayor, p. 82: C. to E. d'Azeglio, April 4, 1854. Bianchi, p. 23, gives the letter but suppresses Mazzini's name.

Cardinal Antonelli's methods — his guile, his craft, his itching palm, his alternate bullying and specious courtesy — resemble those of the average second-rate foreign minister of his time. Must we regard that as holy in Antonelli which is plainly deceitful or corrupt in Walewski? Each reader must decide such questions for himself: a common ground of agreement does not exist.

The Papalist by his very nature had to treat Spiritual and Temporal as interchangeable, and since he assumed the sole right of definition, he could confound the layman at will. What was yesterday Temporal might today be Spiritual. The impartial reader's decision is further complicated by the fact that the Papalists, though one in name and in apparent purpose, differed widely among themselves in sincerity. Among them there were many worldlings, who went into the Church for the sake of a living, or with the prospect of mounting high on the ladder of nepotism; they looked upon the institution as their spoils for the time being; they wore its livery without question and spoke its language without conviction. Skeptics or cynics at heart, they displayed a rigid orthodoxy in public. Interspersed among them were the genuine believers: some devout, with a passion for worship; some inherently good-natured but superstitious, like Pius IX himself; some with a theological bias, keen but narrow; others masters in casuistry, but impervious to the teachings of history: sincere in varying degrees, each according to his capacity. Very few of the simply devout reached the inner councils of the Vatican; few rose in the departments, clerical or secular; few, or none, shone in the congregations. The demand for practical ability, or the stronger pull of rivals, kept them back. No doubt there were many who saw that any curtailment of the already much shorn power of the Papacy would deprive them of their occupation, and they labored unscrupulously to save what was left. Their less acute colleagues had so long identified Temporal and Spiritual that they were not troubled by the juggle, even if they perceived it. Whoever could accept the Great Paradox — that a Church purporting to be based on the spiritual teachings of Jesus Christ had become a vast mechanism of ritual and forms, and that the Vicar of the simple Galilean displayed the pomp of an Oriental despot — whoever saw no incongruity in the primary Papal contention, was not likely to be shocked by its details.

The Italian opponents of the Papacy were by no means all either atheists or infidels. Their aversion to it was both moral and patriotic: their loathing was the inheritance of many generations. Those among them who looked at the Papal Question historically, would have drawn up a statement of which the following may serve as an outline.

The stages by which the Church acquired power and that worldly passion which nothing has subdued, were gradual, and very natural. Each new usurpation was not so regarded at the time, but may often have seemed a sign of general progress. The planting of abbeys and convents, the building of churches, the legacies of lands and treasure, forced temporal interests upon the Church. Possession and human nature did the rest. By the opening of the Middle Age the elements of a temporal State had been assembled. Hildebrand's magnificent dream of theocracy pictured the subjection of Temporal to Spiritual as a God-ordained arrangement. Who could gainsay him, since he alone was competent to declare God's purpose? The power of the Church attracted men of ambition, long before her wealth excited their cupidity. The Pontiff, though he might, like Hildebrand, be a fugitive, possessed a mysterious force before which emperors and kings quailed in the dust. An ordinary man, through the mere ceremony of consecration, was put in control of a spell potent beyond the utmost reach of sorcery or witchcraft. The later Middle Ages saw the culmination of the theocratic ideal. It saw also the formulation and exposition of Catholic dogma. Already in Dante's time the decay of the religious institution had gone so far that his implacable moral sense could not tolerate the hideous discrepancy between profession and practice. He deplored the pollution of religion, denounced the Donation of Constantine and the myriad subsequent gifts which turned churchmen from God to Mammon; and so he peopled Hell and Purgatory with popes and prelates who had been simoniacs, adulterers, barrators, and murderers. His *Divine Comedy* utters the judgment of the highest conscience of that epoch, and pictures more sublimely than all other books the Catholic Ideal at its zenith.

Before Dante died, personal rivalries, splitting up the central government of the Church, had driven the dominant sect to

Avignon: there was strong likelihood that Catholicism would cease to be Roman. The Western nations were consolidating each into a political unit: why should not each have its national church? Logic certainly pointed to that condition: but human evolution has not been consistently logical. Those Western nations coalescing into statehood were too busy with dynastic and political quarrels to organize their separate hierarchies. The Papal See was brought back to Rome and the Popes recovered some of their prestige as the religious arbiters of Western Catholicism, while they filled their place avowedly as temporal princes. The Sovereign of Rome became a temporal despot after the fashion of the Duke of Milan, or the King of Naples, and competed with his rivals in the scramble for dominion. He took indiscriminately with his temporal hand or his spiritual, and what he took, he kept. With Nicholas V, Humanism captured the Papal Court. The rapidity with which Humanism, which kindled the intellect and revived art, became the pander of vice, measures the degree to which Catholicism had ceased to influence conduct. Within half a century Rome became the wickedest place in Christendom, and the chair of Peter was filled by a succession of popes in comparison with whom the miscreants whom Dante had condemned to Hell were but apprentices in iniquity. The Papacy had its triumph; for at the culmination of the Renaissance it outdazzled all its rivals in Belial splendor: but its very worldly success, by limiting its influence to Italy, threatened to be the undoing of its religious institution.

During the 15th century the Church had suffered from intermittent schisms, whose promoters arrived, however, at getting control of the spoils rather than at changing the dogmas. The Reformation itself, which disturbed the orgies of Medicean Rome, began as a protest against clerical immorality and not as an attack on doctrine: but Catholic reformers soon declared that the abuses they attacked were a part of the Papal system, and so they amputated Papalism from their creeds. Local churches sprang up in Germany, Switzerland, England, Holland and Sweden. Thrown on the defensive, the Church rallied to her support the loyal Catholic Powers: in the clash of religions, the sense of a community of interests prevented the Catholics from splitting up into local churches, as the Protestants had done.

That saved *Roman* Catholicism, united Catholicism, which, at the Council of Trent, made answer to Protestant critics; inevitably, there was not one word of compromise, no wavering, but the medieval dogmas were re-affirmed with defiant bluntness and the practices which had driven half of its members out of the Church were not merely condoned but accepted with a sort of arrogant satisfaction as integral parts of Romanism. In such a crisis, when two hostile religions confront each other in battle array, it is certain that their spokesmen will accentuate the points of difference and fan the flames of hatred. Popery, the single word which sums up most of the practical objections of the early Protestants, weathered the storm of the Reformation, and although after the end of the 16th century the Popes sank in the scale of temporal princes to a low rank, even in Italy, they insisted, with more and more vigor, that the Temporal was both essential and inviolable.

The development of strong States, with centralized, despotic governments, and the slow springing up in those States, as a reaction from despotism, of the ideal of the subject as a political unit, or citizen, caused the Papal pretension to be received with varying emotions during the 17th and 18th centuries. The new epoch began to distinguish clearly between Church and State, between religious and secular; but the Church-Papacy dated from an age when no such distinction had been adhered to, — an age when the Church had as a matter of course discharged certain functions — those of education and justice, for instance — which were now seen to be secular. The Popes asserted their right to continue to control these secular concerns abroad, as stubbornly as they preached the sacredness of their temporal principedom at home. The ecclesiastical weapons which they had forged for their warfare against Protestantism, they now used with striking impartiality against reluctant Catholic monarchs. Venice, for nearly a millennium the steadfast defender of local independence against the encroachments of Rome, set the world an example of the way in which a Catholic State could resist Clerical domination in secular affairs. Her master statesman, philosopher and Christian, Fra Paolo Sarpi, exposed for all time the fallacy of the Papal claims and their promotion of irreligion. But Sarpi had only one life, while the Papal institution spans

many generations: and through its most efficient servants, the Jesuits, it clung to its ascendancy in most Catholic countries. If a monarch were at odds with his nobles, or with the third estate, he could easily be made to understand the value of the help the clergy could give him; but if, on the other hand, he were disposed to slight or oppress the clergy, he might find his nobles and people rise in their behalf. Every parish had its curate; every curate was primarily a Papal outpost in a foreign land: for the Curia took care that every priest, canon, bishop and archbishop should look direct to Rome, as the place to which he owed his allegiance, and as the source of his preferment. The ambitious ecclesiastic knew that the great prizes of the Church were to be won and enjoyed at Rome only.

Nothing proves the Italian genius in statecraft so completely as the unbroken grip which the Italians have held on the Roman Catholic hierarchy. The Church which assumed to be Catholic was, first of all, *Roman*. Since the Dutchman, Adrian VI, died in 1523, every Pope has been Italian; and although, by actual census, the nominal Catholics in Italy have never numbered more than from one fourth to one sixth of the Catholics throughout the world, yet the majority of Cardinals have always been Italians, and the chief offices at Rome have been filled by Italians. This small, compact, adroit body has been able, generation after generation, to persuade the faithful in all lands to contribute to its aggrandizement and wealth. For centuries, pope after pope amassed a great fortune to be bequeathed to his bastards or his kinsmen. Rome is dotted with palaces, each of which is a monument to the successful rapacity of some pontiff. Many of the collections of paintings and of sculpture were bought with the mites of widows and the oblations of devotees who had little idea that their pious offerings would be spent on pagan art or on pontifical luxury.

While the Renaissance thus left on the Papacy the stamp of unbridled worldliness, the exigencies of its struggle to maintain its control over secular affairs in other countries made it more and more political. In the 18th century it found in the Emperors Joseph II and Leopold — who could not be dismissed as heretics — adversaries to whom it had to yield. The concessions which those enlightened despots wrung from Rome, belied the Papal

assertions that Rome was immutable: they simply demonstrated that some of the principles which Rome declared eternal and universal would be abrogated or abandoned if the demand were backed up by sufficient force. The Austrian autocrats insisted that the Church should be the servant and not the mistress of the State, or that it should at least not meddle in secular affairs: and the Church, however unwillingly, accepted the situation. In France, at the end of the century, the Revolution swept the Church clean away, and wherever in Latin countries war was waged for Liberty, the Church was instinctively attacked as the inveterate enemy of Liberty and Progress. That this mortal hatred should exist, the Church had only herself to blame, since during a thousand years she had enjoyed the best opportunity to show by her actions that she was the champion of both Liberty and Progress. Napoleon's ambition, however, checked the forthright development of Liberal institutions. Dreaming of planting a dynasty, he allied himself with the elements which the Revolution wished to destroy. And so he came to terms with Rome, agreed to a concordat, and deceived himself by thinking that he was thereby strengthening his empire. After fifteen years of fugitive existence, the Pope reëstablished the Papacy at Rome, the Concordat flourished in France; but there was no Napoleonic Empire, no Napoleon. At the Restoration of 1814, everything conspired to increase the influence of the Church; with this increase the Papacy, its political half, regained its vigor.

In the great cataclysm, the Throne and the Altar had gone down together; now they must support each other. Monarchs willingly believed that, since the Revolution had been spawned on pernicious ideas, its recurrence could be prevented by controlling ideas through education and the press. The Jesuits everywhere reappeared as teachers and censors. The pre-revolutionary conditions were, as far as possible, revived. The Church insisted on her ancient privileges, rights and immunities. Nevertheless, only when they were weak did Catholic monarchs submit to Roman dictation in political and secular affairs. Austria, the citadel of Reaction between 1815 and 1848, still clung to Josephinism. Metternich, her Chancellor, employed Clerical aid wherever he thought it might stupefy the people into quiescence, just as the keeper of a menagerie doses his wild

beasts with opium; but he had no idea of being dosed himself, and he scolded the Clericals when their clumsiness produced nausea instead of torpor, and gave an excuse for the revival of agitation. In Piedmont, on the other hand, the Clericals had almost complete control down to 1845; whereas Tuscany, mindful of her Leopoldine heirloom, held them at arm's length. But after Pius the Ninth's disenchantment with Liberalism and after the collapse of the Revolution in 1849, the Papal claims were urged with greater arrogance than ever. If theocracy and humor were not incompatible, we might imagine that the politicians of the Vatican must sometimes have roared in secret as they reflected that, while they were boldly presuming to control political and temporal affairs in other States, they could not maintain the temporal sway of the Pope over his own subjects a single day, without the armed protection of France and Austria.

Thus had the Roman Catholic institution passed through three distinct phases. First the *religious*, which saw martyrdoms and missions, immense zeal, and the desire to save a world of sinners. Next the *theological*, the medieval phase, in which the best minds of the Church formulated its dogmas and set up theocracy as the ideal system. The last phase was the *political*, in which the Church, having developed the Papal or temporal side, was swallowed up by the Papacy and henceforth employed without qualms her spiritual weapons to make good or to extend her temporal power. The religious institution, having had eighteen centuries of experience, was saturated with human nature; it had lived not only through many layers of time but in many lands, among people most diversified; it had discovered how to appeal to minds in every stage of development; if they would accept authority without questioning, it could lift the burden of sin from the despairing, guide the zeal of the saintly, soften or scare the wicked to repentance. It is the consummate achievement of Medieval Man in Western Europe! In like manner the Papacy, though conceived in the medieval imagination of Hildebrand, came to its prime in the Renaissance, as an Italian institution, using the methods and holding the ideals of a statecraft which earned for Machiavelli, who merely described them, an immortality of odium. In proportion as the actual Temporal Power of the Pope dwindled, the Papalists insisted that Tem-

poral Power itself was essential, and they seemed ready to create a new dogma which the faithful must accept. Moribund institutions, whether lay or religious, usually press their most virulent claims: they also, like the Papacy, declare that not they, but the world, must bend. Now the only hope for the continued existence of the Papal State was that it should adapt itself to new political ways. The experience of 1848 proved that it could not do this: and every utterance from Gaeta and from the Vatican announced boldly that it would not if it could. The cornerstone of the Roman Church is Authority: the cornerstone of Modern political life is Liberty: the Papacy, the political offshoot of the Church, could not tolerate Liberty. The problem which confronted the Papalists after 1849 in Italy was this: How far could the Church, by using its religious weapons, preserve the Papacy in its temporal kingdom. Bound up with this was the need of clinging to every shred of political power which the Pope had acquired in the other Italian States. To concede an inch might cause the surrender of all.

To understand the contest which Piedmont waged with Rome, you must bear in mind that the historic phases here outlined, lay in the background of the consciousness of both parties. You must judge for yourself whether the concerns involved were religious, as claimed by the Papalists, or secular, as asserted by the Liberals. You must remember also that the Italians in general, taught by centuries of experience, discounted the pious phrases and protestations in which Rome indulged: for their long familiarity with ecclesiasticism made them instinctively suspicious, if not cynical. On both sides there existed the intuition that the struggle sprang from fundamental antagonisms which no compromise could unite. The Authority claimed by Rome, the Liberty championed by Piedmont, were and are and will ever be incompatible: but many devout souls still hoped that they might be reconciled.

Several causes contributed in the middle of the 19th century to a revival of Roman Catholic influence. Romanticism, seeking its themes outside of the un pitying glare of the Present, turned to the Middle Age upon which time and half-knowledge shed an enchanting glamour. Then flourished "the ages of faith," the saints, the zealots, the Catholic rhapsodists who built cathe-

drals, the worshipping artists who between prayer and prayer painted their holy pictures or carved their devotional statues. The Romanticists represented medieval life, not as it was, but as if the ideals of a few had been the practice of all. So Monasticism, the Great Orders, the spirituality of the Church, the visions of the Papacy, were glorified. Again, in the second quarter of the 19th century the Catholic Church, in common with the Protestant churches, felt the stimulus of that ethical and human awakening, which the creeds had not originated and no creed could exclude or bound. The fervor of a Lamennais, of a Lacordaire, of a Cœur, persuaded many to believe that within the age-hardened arteries of Rome new blood was flowing. Reaction from Rationalism sent others back to Catholicism. Weary, or baffled, or dismayed, they sought the repose and certitude which, if they asked no questions, the Church promised them. And, finally, social and political reasons rallied many who were but indifferent religionists to the support of an institution which had outlived countless revolutions, and seemed now to offer the best hope of stemming the torrent of anarchy. If the Church, medieval to the core, could stand erect, why might not Absolutism and Aristocracy, which also traced their origin to medieval conditions, continue to flourish beside it?

The Church welcomed these accessions, no matter what their source, and as usual she applied to the credit of the Papacy, forces intended for herself. But while the Church benefited in these ways from causes which she could not control, she was confronted by enemies far more formidable than any in the past. The first of these was the conviction that the universe is in progress of evolution, a conviction which, if accepted, undermined the Roman claim to immutability. Science was beginning to demonstrate the inevitable circuit of birth, growth, prime, decay and death, not only in every plant and creature, but in man and his institutions, in planets and suns and constellations. Creeds and theocracies follow the fated law: and on comparison, it was found that Catholicism and the Papacy had undergone structural changes like those of similar institutions in many lands and epochs. The critical study of history was another enemy. Dispassionate, tireless, unterrifiable, it sifted the evidence, and passed judgment on the frauds and forgeries, the misrepresenta-

tions, legends and miracles, as well as on the authentic testimony which Papal apologists advanced. It recognized that every institution takes the colour of its time. It traced to their derivation each of the elements which had become so strangely blended at Rome. And finally, there was the Spirit of Liberty instilling into men's hearts new ideals of political and social organization, — epochal desires, summed up in the words Democracy, Equality, Fraternity.

The first clash between Piedmont and the Curia came upon a question of legal jurisdiction. From first to last, Piedmont never criticized a Catholic dogma, nor denied the authority of Rome in religious practices. She simply demanded that certain functions, which the Church had usurped in days when rulers did not or could not uphold their secular rights, should now be performed by the State. As early as November, 1847, Count Avet, Piedmontese Minister of Justice, addressed a note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs pointing out the anomaly of exempting ecclesiastics from trial in the civil courts.² The constitution granted by Charles Albert in 1848, while recognizing Catholicism as the official religion, declared toleration for all other religious bodies. Rome did not dare to make an issue on this point, although in the Holy City itself no Protestant was allowed to worship in public. But the Constitution also declared the King to be the fountain of justice, and here the quarrel opened. For the Church still held in Piedmont ecclesiastical courts, right of asylum, and the registration of civil acts, besides entire jurisdiction over purely ecclesiastical and religious causes. Equality before the law was unattainable in the face of these medieval survivals. Although we have earlier outlined the first phases of this struggle, its importance warrants us, even at the risk of some repetitions, in carrying the story here continuously from the beginning to the end and in greater detail.³

In the spring of 1848 Charles Albert's conservative ministers, Balbo and Sclopis, loyal to the Constitution and fearing that in the exuberance of its début the Piedmontese Parliament might sweep away the rights along with the abuses of the Church, hastened to propose to the Curia the urgent need of revising the Concordat of 1841.⁴ Cardinal Antonelli received Marquis Par-

² Chiala: *Une Page*, 23.

³ See *ante*, chap. v, pp. 120-26.

⁴ Chiala: *Une Page*, 23-25.

eto, the Piedmontese envoy, cordially, but Cardinal Soglia, the first Secretary of State, promptly replied that the Holy See did not deem it necessary to alter the nature of the ecclesiastical courts to keep pace with the rapid political changes.⁵ This was at the end of June. The Minister of Justice at once appointed a commission to draw up a new Concordat. The Commission reported without delay, and Count Sclopis forwarded their report, together with a reply to Cardinal Soglia's argument, to Marquis Pareto at Rome (July 14). But the whirlpool of war and the check to the national cause, gave Cardinal Antonelli, who was already the real political manager at Rome, the opportunity he sought to gain time. Late in October, the Piedmontese Government made another attempt, by varying some of the details of its proposal, to induce the Curia to come to terms. But Antonelli insisted that in criminal cases the clergy should be tried in the ecclesiastical courts, that in their relations with their parishioners and with Rome the clergy should be absolutely independent, and that the Holy See should nominate bishops without consulting the Crown. The Piedmontese Government naturally rejected demands which were more exorbitant than the existing abuses.

The Pope's flight to Gaeta and Gioberti's premiership at Turin followed. Gioberti hoped to reconcile Pius by offering to restore him to Rome: but Pius was already in the hands of thorough-going reactionaries. A little later when D'Azeglio sent Balbo to Gaeta on a mission of conciliation, Pius smiled blandly and did nothing. The Liberals and Radicals in Piedmont began to grow impatient over the persistence of the unconstitutional courts. In September, Count Siccardi visited Portici to make a last attempt at persuasion. Pius and Antonelli, assured now that the Revolution was destroyed and assured also of their partnership in Reaction with Austria, gave the envoy a chilly reception. The Pope inclined to be pathetic over the wounds which Piedmont's cruel suggestion inflicted on his heart; the Cardinal simulated moral indignation and declared that in no Catholic country in the world was religion so unprotected and trammelled as in Piedmont. Nor did Siccardi find Monsignor Catterini, to whom

⁵ *Stor. Doc.*, v, 106, 111: Pareto to Soglia, June 15; for Soglia to Pareto, June 27, 1848, Chiala, *Une Page*, 25-26.

he was handed on to negotiate, more conciliatory, for Catterini laid down at the outset the proposition that the State had absolutely no right to judge a bishop's crime, even though that crime should assail the laws, or the very safety, of the State. After nearly two months of patient waiting, Siccardi informed his chief that further parleying was useless (Nov. 23). On his return to Turin, D'Azeglio appointed him Minister of Justice. On February 23, 1850, the Ministry introduced a bill to reform ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Three days before, D'Azeglio wrote the Pope that, although forced to proceed in obedience to the Constitution, he would still gladly treat with the Curia, if the negotiations were carried on at Turin. On March 9, by a vote of 130 to 27,⁶ the Subalpine Parliament passed the new laws, famous in history by the name of their sponsor, Siccardi. In the Senate, where the Archbishops of Turin and Chambéry were hissed, 58 supported the reform and 29 opposed it (April 8).

The Siccardi Laws abolished ecclesiastical jurisdiction in civil and criminal causes; required nomination to benefices to be submitted to the State; did away with the right of asylum in churches; limited the number of holy days that must be observed; forbade ecclesiastical corporations to acquire property without royal permission; and committed the Government to bring forward a bill to legalize civil marriage.⁷ Every one of these reforms was demanded as much by consistency, without which the Constitution would become a mockery, as by regard for the welfare of the people. Nothing more quickly destroyed reverence for the law, for instance, than the medieval custom of allowing a criminal to seek safety in a church. The Curia clung to this prerogative not because it cared any more for the criminal than for the society which he had injured, but because it wished the public to know that the Church, more powerful than the State, could interrupt at pleasure the course of civil justice and stay the hand of the civil police. So with holy days; the Church encouraged the observance of an inordinate number of fasts and festivals. This practice broke in upon that continuity of work without which the habit of industry cannot be cultivated; it promoted loafing and drunkenness; it fostered ignorance and superstition: but the Church, heedless of the effect its commands had upon the con-

⁶ Chiala: *Une Page*, 29-34.

⁷ Tivaroni, I, 312.

duct of the faithful, was reluctant to loosen its grasp upon a practice which enabled it, every two or three days, besides every Sunday, to display its power. For it compelled the people to give over labor, and to attend masses at the risk of severe penalties which the State must enforce. Thus the Piedmontese were reminded four or five score times a year, if not oftener, of the power of the Church, — which also entered into the life of every family at baptisms, confirmations, marriages, deaths and funerals; whereas they had only the festivals of the Statuto and the King's Birthday to remind them of the State in which they were citizens.

The passage of the Siccardi Laws brought a characteristic despatch from Cardinal Antonelli, silent till then. He counterfeited surprise that such an unholy attack should be made without warning on the Supreme Hierarchy of the Church. It was all so sudden! Why had Piedmont, whose rulers until recently had been devout servants of the Holy See, taken such a step without waiting to treat with Rome? He unblushingly asserted that Count Siccardi had had no authority to negotiate. He pictured the Holy Father, "at the sight of the sad and lachrymose condition in which the Church in Piedmont" was placed, as lifting his eyes to heaven and praying that just punishment might not fall on that misguided people; but pity did not blot out in the Pontiff's mind his duty as head of the Church, and he therefore protested in the face of God and men against the wounds aimed at her authority, against every innovation contrary to her rights, against every infraction of treaties.⁸ Whoever reads the Cardinal's note without knowing that 19 months of shilly-shally had preceded the presentation of Siccardi's measures to the Subalpine Parliament, might suppose that the Curia was most eager to satisfy the Piedmontese demands, and had a right to complain as if a bolt had been shot out of a clear sky.

On the passage of the law, the Papal Nuncio, Monsignor Antonucci, requested his passports and departed to Rome. Monsignor Frasoni, Archbishop of Turin, forbade his clergy, without his instructions, to obey the new law.⁹ After giving him

⁸ Zini, II, 176-78 for text; Antonelli to Spinola, Piedmontese agent in Rome, March 9, 1850, dated from Portici.

⁹ Text of Frasoni's circular of April 18, 1850, in Artom-Blanc, I, 62-65 n.

time to withdraw his seditious circular, the Government put him under arrest, tried him, and sentenced him to a month's imprisonment at Fenestrelle and to a small fine. Monsignor Marongiu, Archbishop of Cagliari, was arrested for similar cause, tried, fined and banished. This action drew from Cardinal Antonelli letters of protest, in which he threatened that, unless Piedmont gave speedy satisfaction, His Holiness might be forced to employ Church weapons of large calibre.¹⁰ Not content with sowing sedition in Piedmont, the Cardinal secretly urged the Austrian and French governments to bring their pressure to bear. They pretended to feel anxious lest the King's government, unable to hold out against the Vatican, should be driven to seek support of the Revolutionary party. In feigned friendliness, France wished to send De Corcelle, one of her diplomats, to act as peacemaker, and save Piedmont from the danger of falling into anarchy. D'Azeglio declined the offer, with the remark that M. de Corcelle ought to be sent to Rome and not to Turin, for Rome was the recalcitrant. "We shall never be able to understand," he added, "how the French Republic can and will exert on us a pressure which would tend to perpetuate in our country abuses which France herself refused to tolerate, and that she would have us give up obtaining from the Court of Rome concessions accorded to the other countries."¹¹ To Antonelli's protests, D'Azeglio replied straightforwardly that Piedmont's action did not affect the religious jurisdiction of the Church at all: it simply brought the country into harmony, on the secular side, with the standard of the times, and with its Constitution. This was so self-evident that the candid Premier would ask his Eminence this simple question: "Is it lawful for a State to change its political system without the consent of the Court of Rome?"¹² To this the Cardinal rejoined that Archbishop Franson had acted with perfect propriety, according to the laws of the Church and the treaties Piedmont had solemnly made. "Premising this," he added, "and granting that the matter in hand is ecclesiastical discipline, the proposition formulated by Marquis d'Azeglio and reported above, should be reduced to these more exact terms:

¹⁰ Zini, II, 179-181, 182-184; Antonelli to Spinola, June 26, 1850.

¹¹ *Stor. Doc.*, VI, 38; D'Azeglio to Pralormo at Paris, Aug. 24, 1850.

¹² Zini, II, 184-88; D'Azeglio to Spinola at Rome, June 3, 1850.

'Is it lawful for an *especially Catholic* State in changing its political system to injure the disciplinary rights of the Church without the consent of the Holy See?'¹³ By this juggle of words, the Cardinal misstated the point at issue, and then decided it in his own favor. He was writing, however, not for the eyes of the Piedmontese alone, but for those of European diplomats. He made it a practice to print, without authorization, confidential notes from Turin and his own despatches,¹⁴ if he thought that he could gain an advantage thereby: and if he were criticised for this breach of diplomatic etiquette he disavowed it without scruple.

D'Azeglio's government did not flinch before Papal threats or French displeasure. It was cheered by the approval of Lord Palmerston, who told the Piedmontese Ambassador at London that Piedmont had done right; that one could never take too great precautions to thwart the encroachments of the Church on civil affairs; and that the King must keep on in the paths of legality, assured that no foreign Power was likely to attack him.¹⁵ Still, the task was formidable. While the country supported the Ministry, it regretted the struggle. Austria hoped that the Papal intrigues would so shake Victor Emanuel's power that he would be scared into asking for Imperial troops to save him from destruction and to beg the Emperor to intercede with the Pope.¹⁶ Rome always had time on her side. Beaten today in the open, she would sow secretly a crop of discord, to bear fruit hereafter. But, happily for the Liberals, Archbishop Fransoni, through excess of zeal, raised a great storm of indignation against himself and the Vatican. Cavour's early friend, Pietro di Santa Rosa, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, died on August 5. A sincere Catholic, he confessed as his end approached, but the Archbishop refused to allow absolution and extreme unction to be granted to him, unless he recanted having voted for the Siccardi Laws. All day long the dying man faced the terrible alternative — Heaven, if he bowed to Rome, eternal damnation (if Rome could compass it) if he obeyed his conscience. Declaring that he had performed his duty, and that he could not leave a

¹³ Zini, II, 189-92: Antonelli to Spinola, July 16, 1850; the italics are in the original. ¹⁴ *Stor. Doc.*, v, 375. ¹⁵ *Stor. Doc.*, vi, 382, June 24, 1850.

¹⁶ *Stor. Doc.*, v, 377; Revel to D'Azeglio, from Ravenna, Sept. 12, 1850.

dishonored name to his children by violating his conscience,¹⁷ he died unshriven. Not on the scaffold only did Italian patriots display their valor.

As soon as the Archbishop's act was known (he even denied Christian burial to Santa Rosa's body¹⁸) all classes at Turin burned with rage. Crowds collected at the Church of San Carlo and Convent of the Servites — it was a Servite brother who had tortured the dying man — and but for the interference of the National Guard there would have been bloodshed. The Servites were expelled from the city, but when the Archbishop was sought, it was learned that that brave man had taken refuge in the country.¹⁹ On being discovered by two members of the Cabinet, Galvagno and La Marmora, he at first denied having given the instructions, but when the Servite's testimony confronted him, he tried to sneak out of responsibility by asserting that the decision lay, after all, with the priest. Alarmed for his own safety, he consented that Santa Rosa should have Catholic burial. An enormous multitude attended the funeral: Cabinet officers, senators, deputies, judges, professors, foreign diplomats, besides a throng of the middle and lower classes, showed in this way their horror at such a manifestation of Clerical cruelty.²⁰ The Government arrested the Archbishop, and found among his papers proofs that he was plotting a rebellion against the State. Cardinal Antonelli, evading the charge of the Archbishop's treasonable conduct, protested that the Piedmontese Cabinet were not competent to judge the action of the clergy in administering or withholding sacraments.²¹ His protest, however, did not terrify the Piedmontese judges, who sentenced Monsignor Frasoni to exile. He took refuge at Lyons, well satisfied that he had proved himself a martyr in defending the Papal cause.²² But he

¹⁷ Bersezio, v, 113. "Holy God!" the dying man exclaimed; "they require of me things which my conscience cannot bend to. I have four children: they shall not inherit a dishonored name from their father." ¹⁸ Bersezio, v, 113.

¹⁹ Anti-clericals like Gioberti and Pallavicino thought the Government made the mistake by this act of putting a "too easy martyrdom" within the ecclesiastics' reach. B. E. Maineri: *Il Piemonte nel 1850-51-52*. (Milan, 1875.) Pallavicino to Gioberti, Aug. 12, 1850; Gioberti to Pallavicino, Aug. 24, 1850; pp. 27, 32.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 114-15.

²¹ *Stor. Doc.*, vi, 369; Antonelli to Spinola, Sept. 2, 1850.

²² See *La Prima Settimana di Agosto nella Città di Torino* (Turin: Fontana, 1850) for a statement, evidently prepared under Frasoni's direction, of his version of the affair.

had overreached himself; so that the French Foreign Minister commended Piedmont, and even Vienna, Prince Schwarzenberg giving the keynote, admitted that the King's Government had done well.²³ D'Azeglio summed up the controversy several months later in a letter to his intimate friend, Rendu: "The negotiations begun in 1847," he said, "ended in a counter-project which demonstrated the impossibility of coming to an understanding, because it reserved to the Court of Rome in last resort judgment in criminal causes, the nomination of bishops, the administration of vacant benefices, etc. Assuredly, with this counter-project in hand, we could reply victoriously and say: 'We do not treat, because the Court of Rome renders every treaty impossible.' But we should have given a terrible blow to the religious sentiments of the country; for it is a sad document which proves an incredible blindness and tenacity to temporal interests. There is the key to the riddle."²⁴ The Holy See, said Guizot, does not sufficiently bear in mind that "God has not absolved it from the need of intelligence nor from the duty of wisdom."²⁵

It was now clear that Rome would concede nothing to Piedmont: not because she had not either granted similar demands to other Catholic States or accepted changes which they had established, but because she was now pledged to assist in strangling Liberal institutions in Piedmont. Like Austria, she could ill suffer the example which an Italian State, governing itself on principles of civil freedom and tolerance, set her own subjects. Although she had abandoned her ecclesiastical courts elsewhere, she insisted on their continuance in Piedmont, because they traversed the power of the State and were a visible token of Papal supremacy. The worldly-wise hinted that D'Azeglio was too honest a negotiator; had he not been, he might by arguments other than words have persuaded Cardinal Antonelli, who governed by "modern barratry."²⁶ Idle were those who argued that a Concordat can be dissolved or amended only by the consent of both parties to it. In this case, one of the parties refused

■ *Stor. Doc.*, vi, 382. So stanch an English Catholic as Lord Shrewsbury expressed his indignation at Santa Rosa's persecution. C. d'Azeglio, 412.

²⁴ D'Azeglio: *Politique*, p. 72.

²⁵ Chiala: *Une Page*, 34.

²⁶ The phrase occurs in Monsignor Liverani's *Papato* (Florence: Barbèra, 1861, 4th ed.), p. 38.

to move. 'Never mind,' said venerable but fatuous Cesare Balbo: 'let us try persuasion again and again: what matters a delay of two years or ten or fifteen, if we finally secure Rome's consent by friendly means?'²⁷ International law in 1850 recognized that a treaty lapsed when circumstances had so changed as to make it inapplicable to one of the contracting parties.²⁸ Rome herself, a hundred years earlier, had not hesitated to throw over a concordat with Piedmont, apparently without even pretending to parley.²⁹ But as Rome had a unique nature, she assumed not to be governed by common precedent.

Some critics who approved the Piedmontese reforms, nevertheless thought them untimely: others believed that if the Government had carried out the constitutional changes without negotiating and without parliamentary debate, it could have attained its end quietly. But both of these sets of critics were short-sighted. The conflict with Rome was irrepressible, for sooner or later the new line of demarcation between Church and State must be drawn. Piedmont's salvation as a Liberal Power lay in her courage to face the issue squarely and in her ability to uphold the claims which she professed were just. When an irrepressible conflict arises, through the antagonism of two civilizations or of two opposing ideals in fundamentals concerning the religious, political or social system, there is invariably the appeal on both sides to precedent. Each tries to justify itself by the existing code. But the historian who looks back, sees that there was no possible common code: the idea of a free secular State excluded the idea of Papal interference in that State as remorselessly as the ideal of emancipation excludes the ideal of slavery. Rome, the outgrowth of the mediæval past, would lay her dead hand on the present and future. The suggestion that she might in "ten years or fifteen" concede or compromise was ludicrous.

²⁷ Tivaroni, I, 312-21, prints Balbo's entire speech of March 6, 1850, on the Siccardi bill.

²⁸ H. Whenton: *Elements of International Law* (Philadelphia, 1836), p. 191, says: "Treaties, properly so called, or *foedera*, are those of friendship and alliance, commerce and navigation, which even if perpetual in terms, expire of course: (1) In case either of the contracting parties loses its existence as an independent state. (2) Where the internal constitution of government of either state is so changed as to render the treaty inapplicable under circumstances different from those with a view to which it was concluded." The second case was Piedmont's.

²⁹ Chiala: *Une Page*, 379-80.

The only compromise she could ever consent to would be that of the Yankee farmer who told his tenant that he might paint his barn any color he chose, so long as it was white. And in this the Papal politicians were supremely logical, ruthlessly consistent. They saw sooner and much more clearly than their ingenuous supporters of the Balbo type that no lasting compromise could be framed. And so they were aggrieved at being treated so brusquely; and, in proportion as their temporal interests were threatened, they threw over it the religious cloak, to lift the hem of which was sacrilege.

In her first encounter with Liberal Piedmont, Rome had lost: but Piedmont was too genuinely Catholic, and her statesmen, whatever their personal views might be, were too discreet, not to feel that a renewal of the attempt at conciliation was imperative. In the spring, soon after the passage of the Siccardi Laws, the Cabinet wished to send Count Sauli to Rome as a special envoy, bearing suggestions for a new agreement; but the Curia was in no temper to receive him. Early in the autumn, D'Azeglio despatched Pinelli on a conciliatory mission. He had several private audiences with the Pope and Cardinal Antonelli, but they refused to allow him to present his credentials, and after spending forty-eight days in the Holy City, only to hear the doctrines of Papal intransigence in their most virulent form, he returned to Turin. For awhile relations stood in this state of no-thoroughfare.

In January, 1851, having heard that the Curia was more conciliatory, D'Azeglio instructed Marquis Spinola to resume negotiations.³⁰ He found Cardinal Antonelli apparently friendly, it being his habit to put on in conversation an air of acquiescence which his acts rarely confirmed. He would treat, so long as there was no discussion of principles.³¹ The conference, limited at first to the question of abolishing tithes in Sardinia, soon extended to other reforms which the Piedmontese Government proposed to make. The Cardinal still seemed friendly. D'Azeglio unwarily promised that, although Parliament took up the matter, the King would not sign a bill until he knew that the Curia approved it; and he asked that the Cardinal should confi-

³⁰ *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 45; D'Azeglio to Spinola, Jan. 14, 1851.

³¹ *Ibid*; Antonelli's despatch, Jan. 25, 1851.

dentially set down on paper the friendly assurance he had given Spinola by word of mouth. Antonelli, of course, signed nothing: but D'Azeglio, still counting upon this confidential sanction, felt warranted in telling the Senate that no break existed in the religious relations between Piedmont and the Holy See. Thereupon the official organ of the Vatican denied that the Pope had changed his attitude since the outrages committed by Piedmont called forth his recent allocution.³² When Spinola asked Antonelli to explain, the latter replied that he knew nothing about the newspaper statement. Negotiations languished.

In the following autumn, however, D'Azeglio returned to the charge, by sending Chevalier Bertone di Sambuy as a special envoy to Rome. This new agent, a diplomat of tact and keenness, with special knowledge of history and precedents, judiciously studied the situation at the Vatican before he proceeded to parley. The Pope, who received him graciously, stated that he would welcome an agreement, provided Piedmont first acknowledged the rights of the Church and the inviolability of concordats. Cardinal Santucci, to whom Sambuy was referred, proposed that they should discuss, not merely the question of Sardinian tithes, but also the various interests on which the two governments were at odds. Contrary to Sambuy's advice, the Piedmontese Cabinet fell into Santucci's trap, and forwarded an outline of their intentions. The Cardinal rejoined by insisting on a concordat annulling the recent legislation, and conceding to Rome very nearly all the privileges she had enjoyed before the Revolution of 1848. Blocked, but not disheartened, Sambuy tried to lead the negotiations back to the adjustment of special differences. As usual, he had fair words and a rosy outlook, until he came to pen and ink: then Cardinal Santucci very naturally said that, as Piedmont had shown so little respect for the Concordat, the Pope must exact from her solemn guarantees that any new agreement would be kept. Sambuy avoided this pit; but before he had reached an understanding on even the Sardinian tithes question, the Subalpine Parliament began to discuss the Civil Marriage bill.³³

■ *Giornale di Roma*, March 18, 1851.

³³ The Clerical opposition in Piedmont, encouraged by Rome, was daily growing bolder. "You have no idea," M. d'Azeglio writes his nephew Emanuel on April 24, 1852, "how venomous, hydrophobic, fanatical, *codini* (male and female),

The Curia at once changed its tone. Sambuy learned to his astonishment that his predecessor, Spinola, had indiscreetly communicated to Antonelli his own recent instructions, in which D'Azeglio intimated that the Government would introduce no bill without previously informing the Holy See of its purport.³⁴ This was not a promise made to the Holy See, but an inducement which the Piedmontese envoy might, if the occasion seemed favorable, guardedly offer. As Rome, however, kept putting off a settlement of the other negotiations, the Piedmontese Ministry was driven by public opinion to bring forward the Civil Marriage bill, and the Chamber of Deputies passed it on July 5, 1852, by 94 votes to 35. When Cardinal Santucci demanded an explanation of the Ministry's apparent back-sliding, Sambuy could only say frankly that, in acting without authority, Spinola had not committed his Government. The Cardinal, however, insisted that every act of an accredited diplomatic representative was official and binding³⁵—a point of view which would not stand in international law: for it would be tantamount to the assertion that, if an agent betrayed his confidential instructions to a foreign minister, his government would be bound by his treachery. In Spinola's case there was amazing imprudence, but no suspicion of betrayal: he had simply been the victim of Antonelli's craft.

Aware of the infirmity of purpose of the Piedmontese Cabinet, the Curia was not so foolish as to abate its pretensions now: and it might well trust that the diplomats at Turin would aid it by further blunders. Its trust was soon repaid: for while D'Azeglio was recovering from an illness, La Marmora took his place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, like the blunt soldier that he was, he thought that by a vigorous stroke he could cut the tangled skein of negotiations. In diplomacy, however, the pen should not always be used as if it were a sword or a bludgeon. Victor Emanuel wrote an autograph letter to the Pope, protesting his filial devotion as a Catholic and assuring His Holiness that the King's Government had no intention of trenching on the religious jurisdiction of the Church. The letter by itself might

those have become who hoped to throw us down — and instead, they fail." N. Bianchi: *Lettere di M. d'Azeglio* (Turin: 1883), 184.

³⁴ Chiala: *Une Page*, 210-11.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 215.

have done good, if only as another evidence that Piedmont was most solicitous to placate Pius. But La Marmora supposed that it would add weight to include historical and legal statements by Boncompagni and Cibrario. When the despatch reached Sambuy, he saw at once that such a postscript to a private letter from one sovereign to another was both unusual and imprudent; for the ministers' briefs would give Antonelli fresh material for criticism. The prudent Marquis, therefore, hurried off a letter to La Marmora, to point out the danger: but La Marmora and the Cabinet, instead of being grateful, took umbrage at the presumption of their envoy, and directed him to deliver the letter and documents at once. Sambuy's prediction was quickly verified. Antonelli made public the King's letter, which could not fail to seem to Liberals far too submissive; Pius himself replied to the King, not as sovereign to sovereign, but as the head of the Church to a subject. He smothered the legal and political opinions of Boncompagni and Cibrario under an ecclesiastical decision, and set the stigma of his official disapproval on civil marriage. "Among Christians," he said, "conjugal union is only legitimate in the marriage sacrament, outside of which there is simple concubinage." The Holy See, he added, had never acquiesced in the laws adopted by Austria, France, Belgium and other States, which the King's ministers had cited, but its protests against these laws did not lessen its affection for Catholics who were obliged to submit to them.³⁶ Antonelli had previously written to Monsignor Billet, Archbishop of Chambéry, that the Holy Father rejoiced to see the Piedmontese clergy resisting the unholy bill, which wronged the Church and was unworthy of a Catholic State.³⁷ The Archbishop lost no time in publishing the letter, at which the Cardinal feigned surprise and innocence. "Oil thrown on the fire for a political and not a religious end," was the comment of Drouyn de Lhuys, the new French Minister of Foreign Affairs.³⁸ That any of Antonelli's subordinates should venture to print a line of his without his sanction is, of course, unthinkable.

In the autumn of 1852 Massimo d'Azeglio returned to the labors of the premiership, only to find that events had grown too

³⁶ Chiala: *Une Page*, 231-32; Pius to Victor Emanuel, Sept. 19, 1852.

³⁷ *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 61; Antonelli to Billet, Aug. 14, 1852.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

strong for him. Pope, Clergy and Clericals had been working upon the Senate to throw out the bill. The King was plainly disconcerted by Pius's personal chiding. The Cabinet, left without an aggressive spokesman since Cavour's retirement in May, lacked courage and cohesion. Piedmont had reached the parting of the ways, and unless she were driven forward by a strong policy and fearless pilot she would soon ebb into the stagnant waters of reaction. D'Azeglio resigned, and after Cesare Balbo, as we saw, failed to form a ministry from the Right, Victor Emanuel reluctantly summoned Cavour.³⁹ We saw also that Cavour's first duty was to defend the Civil Marriage bill in the Senate, where, through the single vote of the President, it was defeated. In her second encounter with Piedmont, Rome seemed victorious.

That the Pope, unable to maintain his temporal rule for a day without the foreign garrison in his capital, put forth exorbitant claims to Temporal Power, may seem indeed a display of cosmic humor. But on the ecclesiastical side he was equally aggressive. Pius accepted the Jesuits for his leaders in the doctrinal campaign as he accepted Antonelli in the Papal campaign. This choice was eminently logical. Three centuries before, the Company of Jesus, in the vigor and zeal of its youth, organized the Counter-Reformation, which checked the tide of Protestantism and prevented Catholicism from splitting up into local churches. The Jesuits have always been Papalists, although they have obeyed the commands of individual pontiffs only when it pleased them. Their Society can probably exist apart from the Roman system altogether: but it prefers to do its work through the Holy See when it can control the Holy See. We need not inquire here into the principles and methods of Loyola's disciples, which have made the word *Jesuitry* in every language the brand of what is most base, most unscrupulous, most deceitful and most sinister. That a body of devout men, bent only on practising the Golden Rule, should have been so misunderstood, without cause, by their fellow-men in all lands during ten generations, is incredible. We shall search history in vain for a parallel. The Jesuits may repel the verdict of the world; but the world cites their acts to

³⁹ C. d'Azeglio on Nov. 15, 1852 writes: "The King has not great sympathy for Cavour, but he thinks: Either he will succeed — and so much the better; or he will fail — and will be dragged to the bottom." P. 459.

refute their denial. They may repel as calumnies the political crimes charged to their account; but the world asks, "Was it by mere chance or cruel coincidence that the shadow of the black-frocked fathers flitted in the background where the taking off (not always successful) of William the Silent, Elizabeth, Henry IV, Sarpi, Joseph of Portugal, Clement XIV, and of many more was planned?" That the Society has always had among its members men of pious lives — men not permitted to look into its darker secrets — men honestly horrified at the suggestion of any evil methods, cannot be doubted; for it is the boast of the Society that it can discover and train each talent, and employ that talent in the work it can do best. Probably, Jogues among the Mohawks and Brebeuf among the Iroquois, heroically performing their missions, had no inkling of the intrigues which their brethren were engaged in at Paris or Madrid. But the innocence of the exceptional few neither explains nor exculpates Jesuitry in general.

Expelled from the Italian States by the Revolution of 1848, the Jesuits returned to most of their old haunts in the reaction of the following year. At Gaeta, whither they flocked, their leader, Father Curci, found Pius IX so willing a listener, that they held their ascendancy over him ever afterward. They set themselves a twofold task: first, the preservation of the Papacy, and, second, the defense of the Roman Church against modern ideas. They had earned the right to direct these perilous operations; for they had long been the brains of the Papal Party, and their trained will could be relied upon to execute what their judgment decreed. Their Order was fitly described as "a naked sword, whose hilt is at Rome and whose point is everywhere." To a fluctuating temperament like that of Pius IX their downright positiveness was a godsend. Timid minds might suggest compromise; minds sensitive to spiritual meanings might plead that the Church, before condemning some of the new manifestations of human progress, should examine whether these too might not be of God: but the Jesuits said simply, "Concede nothing, claim everything!" They established the *Civiltà Cattolica*, in which with agile logic they combated every argument of their opponents. Construing their title in its broadest sense, they spoke for Catholic Civilization in every field; they passed not

only theology, but politics, art, literature, philosophy and science through the crucible of Jesuitry. Non-Jesuit Catholics were amazed and alarmed to perceive that in becoming the Pope's advocates the Fathers were identifying orthodox Romanism with Jesuitry. They upheld by appeals to history and by Catholic theology the theory of the Temporal Power. The hesitation of the modern world to accept medieval doctrine, merely convinced them that it was expedient to insist on more instead of less. So they encouraged Pius in his desire to honor the Virgin Mary, and in due time, despite the objections of many churchmen, he promulgated the dogma of the Immaculate Conception (Dec. 8, 1854). "The Pope," wrote one of his Jesuit eulogists, "has defined this dogma independently, and of his own sovereign authority, and without the coöperation of a council" — which was equivalent to claiming Papal infallibility.⁴⁰

Common sense argues that, if your horse shies at a four-barred gate, it would seem unwise to put up two more bars. But the Jesuits, profoundly versed in the psychology of religious belief, knew that neither measure nor number nor logic enters into it. To him who has faith, it matters not whether his dogma teaches three gods in one, or one god in three, or a legion of deities such as peopled the heights of Olympus. Some natures have such a hunger of belief, that they can never be appeased. Others, having once laid their reason on the altar of supernaturalism, crave to have fresh impossibilities propounded in order that by believing, and so overcoming them, they may prove again and again their joy in self-obliteration. So far as the unthinking pious were concerned, therefore, the Jesuits had no cause to feel alarm lest their revival of medievalism, and even their new dogma, should be too heavy a load. They relied upon the principle of Authority to prevent a schism among reasoning Catholics, including archbishops and bishops and scholars of eminence. Up to 2.15 P.M. on Decem-

⁴⁰ Cf. Schrader: *Pius IX als Papst und als König*, 12. The Jesuits from the first had a peculiar desire to raise the theory of the Immaculate Conception to the level of dogma. In 1588 Ramon de la Higuera and other Jesuits of Granada produced their forged "apostolic testimony." Thenceforward, they pressed the matter from time to time until in 1847 Professor Giovanni Perrone issued a tract to prove that neither the Bible nor Tradition is necessary for the definition of a dogma. On Dec. 8, 1854, at the very last moment, Pius was hesitating whether to go down to St. Peter's and make the proclamation, when another Jesuit, Father Passaglia, besought him to go and do his duty. Cf. Nielsen, II, 189-90.

ber 8, 1854, the dissidents might question or reject the dogma of the Immaculate Conception; but from that moment on they included it in their belief; at least, they conformed outwardly, and Conformity, lip-service in default of heart-service, is what Authority accepts.

The Jesuits maintained their hold over Pius by a system of flattery compared with which the adulation of Cicero and the patriots of 1847 was as myrrh to honey. They hid from him the abuses at which his subjects and the civilized world cried out: and, as he seldom read anything except the official gazette, the *Civiltà Cattolica* and his breviary, it was easy to keep the truth from him. With an unusual equipment of superstition which shaded off into mysticism, he readily believed himself a man of destiny, ordained by God to restore the prestige of Mother Church in order to save mankind from destruction. He waited on signs and omens; he put his trust in prophecies. The Jesuits encouraged him to expect that Catholics would give to him an obedience as absolute as they themselves gave to their General. Small wonder that Pius sometimes used the words of Christ as if he were Christ. His confessor was a Jesuit: so was Father Mignardi, who confessed Cardinal Antonelli. Between the Cardinal and Jesuits there was rarely a conflict, because both recognized that they were pursuing the same end. They united to keep Pius ignorant and unworried. Antonelli organized pilgrimages of the faithful to the Holy City; he promoted the offering of Peter's Pence; he arranged frequent audiences, at which the bland and handsome Pope, whose voice was very moving and whose bright, beautiful eyes could be very benign, was worshiped with an exuberance differing very little from idolatry. The Jesuits carefully cultivated his ambition to shine as a religious wonder. They championed the dogma of the Immaculate Conception; they tempted him with the crowning glory of Papal Infallibility; they promoted Church ceremonies; they invented miracles; they kept him amused canonizing new saints. No mortal could resist such overwhelming seductions: least of all Pius, who by nature thirsted for approbation and the spectacular, and who, as Pope, set no bounds to the adoration which ought to be paid him. He believed that he was dispensing the infinite bounty of God: how could the faithful show too much gratitude

for that? Not in two hundred years had the Jesuits been able so completely to identify their interests with those of the Papacy-Church. With perfect consistency they worked for the Pope's aggrandizement; for if all the power, ecclesiastical and temporal, of Rome could be centred in a single individual, they saw how, as in the case of Pius, they might succeed in manipulating that individual. A Church Council, made up of many warring elements, might be much harder for them to manage.

Reaction being the dominant spirit after 1849, it was natural that the Roman Curia, the guardian of medieval ideals, should direct it. They forced the Grand Duke of Tuscany to sign a Concordat, from which his ministers struggled vainly to escape. Leopold thanked God that at last there was a censorship to stifle subversive ideas. He gave his conscience wholly into the Pope's keeping. Tuscany, the home for a century of an enlightened tolerance, became suddenly a field of intellectual persecution. One outrage called forth the indignation of Liberals everywhere. A certain Mudai and his wife, having been converted to Protestantism, read the Bible among their neighbors and tried to make proselytes. They were sentenced to four years' imprisonment, and it was only when Lord Palmerston threatened to send a British man-of-war to Leghorn, that they were released.⁴¹ The reprint of Muratori was interrupted, because his historical researches threw too much light on the early history of Papal pretensions and of the theory of the Immaculate Conception. Spain, too, and Austria were caught in the toils of a Concordat. The young Emperor, Francis Joseph, no match for the Archbishop Rauscher, gave away Imperial rights which all Austrian statesmen, from Kaunitz to Schwarzenberg, had arrogantly upheld. In return, he got the unofficial promise that Clericals would help to keep his miscellaneous tribes in order. But the bargain for Rome's support, like the blackmailer's silence, was never final: in the moment of need, Rome might have to be bought over again by additional concessions. In the German States, Baden and Wurtemberg, the Vatican likewise increased its authority. In France, the Ultramontanes encroached just as fast as Louis Napoleon advanced on the way to the throne. Having betrayed the Revolution, he was forced to seek support among the Con-

⁴¹ *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 44.

servatives; and he granted favors even to the Jesuits, the most Conservative of all. When through duplicity, massacre and the outrages of the Second of December, he emerged as Emperor, no scruples restrained Pius IX from congratulating him.

The most remarkable sign of the Papal forward movement was the re-establishment of the Roman hierarchy in England,⁴² where Newman and a few of his friends had recently been converted to Rome, while Pusey⁴³ and others were dangling between High Church ritualism and Romanism, and Wiseman was trying to make spectacular conversions among the peers. The gorge of England rose. "The thing itself, in truth," Palmerston wrote to his brother on January 27, 1851, "is little or nothing, and does not justify the irritation. What has goaded the nation is the manner, insolent and ostentatious, in which it has been done. The Catholics have a right to organize their Church as they like; and if staff officers called Bishops were thought better than staff officers called Vicars Apostolic, nobody would have remarked or objected to the change if it had been made quietly and only in the bosom of the Church. But what offended — and justly — all England, was the Pope's published Allocution and Wiseman's announcement of his new dignities. The first representing England as a land of benighted heathens; the second proclaiming that the Pope had parceled out England into districts, — a thing that only a Sovereign had a right to do, — and that he, Wiseman, and others were sent, and to be sent, to govern those territorial districts, with titles belonging thereto. This could not and would not have been done or attempted in any other country without the consent of the Government."⁴⁴

Outside of Piedmont, wherever the Pope looked in the early fifties, therefore, he beheld an astonishing expansion of his power. Men far clearer sighted than he were deceived into supposing that the Papacy had entered upon a new lease of life. Once more, the Jesuits displayed their unrivaled talents as defenders of Authority. True to the primal and profoundly wise purpose of their Order, they took control of education, knowing well that the men of tomorrow will put into action the teaching they re-

⁴² By Papal brief of Sept. 25, 1850.

⁴³ Pius IX remarked to some Puseyites: "You are like the bells that summon the faithful to church, you ring, but you remain outside." Macrone: *La Parole de Pie IX* (Paris: Sarlit, 1868), 149.

⁴⁴ Ashley, II, 173.

ceive as boys today. No other body of teachers has equaled the Jesuits, year in, year out, century after century; but what they mean by education does not necessarily imply intellectual or moral improvement. Their object is to ensure absolute obedience to Catholic Authority. Accordingly, they have learned what to teach and what to forbid. In lands where they long had full sway — in Spain, or Naples, or the Papal States, for instance — they aimed at giving the young nobles and middle-class youth little knowledge, but much discipline which should hold them faithful to the Church; prospective clerics they naturally drilled in Catholic erudition as interpreted by Jesuitry; from the masses, the common-people, the peasantry, they withheld even the alphabet. They found Ignorance and Superstition the most effectual text-books among the million. The peasant mind, just emerging from savage or brutish darkness, they could easily dazzle by the cruder forms of thaumaturgy. What need of patient demonstration of the truth of dogma, when a winking Madonna or ■ sweating image of Christ satisfied thousands of unthinking devotees?

In Piedmont in 1850, after thirty years of Jesuit control, out of five million inhabitants only one million could read and write, and a half million more could read but not write. In the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies the average of illiteracy rose still higher, probably to ninety per cent, while in certain districts only five persons in a hundred could read. From the Jesuit standpoint that was a still greater triumph, because it meant that ninety-five per cent of the population were out of direct reach of dangerous books and journals, and therefore personally docile to Clerical suggestion. The Jesuit ideal would be a world in which only Jesuits were educated, — and every one else, plunged in intellectual torpor, should be incapable of independent thought in science, politics, or religion. Unchecked Jesuitism would lead inevitably to the mental cretinization of the race. When forced to impart book-learning to the minority who could not be drugged by illiteracy, they displayed wonderful adroitness. No other pedagogues could equal their skill in leading pupils blindfold along the brink of doubt; or in chilling inquiry, while seeming to cherish it; or in sterilizing philosophy; or in plausibly distorting history; or in robbing science of its sting. And if we

measure success by the adjustment of means to end, the Jesuits were unapproached in their ability to get full value in educative discipline from what they taught. They sent their pupil, lay or clerical, into the world with a mind trained to think only as they intended. If Liberals, if the champions of Reason, would promote education with half the zeal and concreteness of the Jesuits; if they would understand the immense scope of discipline; if, instead of trusting to luck or to a helter-skelter scheme, they would realize that they must plant wheat, and not tares, if they hope to harvest a crop of wheat; if they would open, where the Jesuit shuts, illumine, where the Jesuit darkens, expand, where the Jesuit contracts, and have regard at all times for the interaction of knowledge and conduct, and for symmetry, they might in fifty years create a race of truly intelligent men and women to whom Jesuitry would appeal in vain.

Were their methods based on the highest aspirations of human nature, instead of on their negation, the Jesuits would long ago have held Catholic Europe immovable in their theological vise. But whenever they could not back up their teaching by persecution, they failed. At the beginning of the 18th century they dominated education in France; at its conclusion, they and their system were swept into the abyss: they had been powerless to gag the voices of Voltaire and Rousseau.

By the middle of the 19th century, they were confronted by a new theory of cosmic evolution which was to affect fundamentally man's conception of God and atom. Compared with this, the early conflict between Christianity and Paganism, the strife between the Greek Church and Roman, — the long warfare between Christendom and Islam, — the schism which resulted in the breaking away of Protestantism from Romanism, — and the quarrels of sects and parties within either church, were but episodes more or less fleeting, stages of growth, but not the culmination of growth. To this new conception the Jesuits opposed at first only a general condemnation, until they had time, in the Syllabus of 1864, to specify the errors in detail, and to fall back on the medieval assertion that teaching which conflicts with the dogmas of Mother Church is damnable. To deny evolution, which optimists interpreted as progress, to assert that their religion, supernaturally revealed, unchanging and incapable

of change, — although the historian can plainly demonstrate its changes from age to age, — is and always will be the only fountain of truth and the only way of salvation, was their final reply to the new interpretation of the universe. Looking back over the stream of human development we see here and there the ruins of a dam which partisans of a creed, or dynasty, or scientific theory, set up to hold in the stream forever: but by and by the water rose and overflowed the top, and swept resistlessly onward through the uncharted wastes of time. In 1850 the Jesuits erected the latest of these dams.

To realize the certitude which the Papal Reactionists felt that a Golden Age of Roman Catholicism had dawned for the whole world, we need only listen to Count de Montalembert's pæan of exultation, as he contrasts the situation in 1800 with that of 1852. Instead of proscription, faint-heartedness, obloquy, and decadence, he heralds everywhere triumphant growth. The Catholic countries are seething with zeal, the strongholds of Protestantism are toppling.⁴⁵ "Geneva, the metropolis of Calvinism, has beheld with a shudder Catholicism re-appear in her walls."⁴⁶ "Haughty and all-puissant England sees herself invaded, braved and vanquished by the invincible weakness of that Church which she so often thought to annihilate." Through the emigration of the Irish to the British Colonies and to the United States, Rome is subtly preparing a glorious future for her dominion among peoples who little suspect her silent and insidious encroachment. Prussia, Lutheran Prussia, has come to terms, almost as a suppliant, with the Church she has habitually trodden down. Holland awakes alarmed to learn that, in spite of her persecution, two fifths of her people are Catholics, whom neither intolerance nor the yoke can subdue, zealots who behold their courage and number increase day by day.

⁴⁵ Giacomo Margotti: *Le Vittorie della Chiesa nel primo decennio del Pontificato di Pio Nono* (Milan: Besozzi, 1857), should be read for an inspired statement of Papal expansion. Margotti's exultation reaches the point where he taunts the Protestant and Catholic opponents of Papalism as if they had been finally routed.

⁴⁶ Montalembert: *Des Intérêts Catholiques au XIX^e Siècle* (Paris: Lecoffre, 1852), p. 2. He adds: "St. Francis de Sales would not be less astonished than Theodore de Beza, if any one had told them that, two centuries after them, there would be a Catholic press in the city of Calvin, that one might see there two Catholic churches, and that these would be too small to hold the crowd of the faithful."

Mounting on the wings of his enthusiasm from countries to principles, Montalembert beholds, as in apocalypse, errors political and religious dissolve, and all other wicked enemies of Catholicism slink away. In France, he says, "there remains standing only one Catholic Church, more united, more subordinated to its head than at any other epoch of its history." ⁴⁷ He does not wish to lull Catholics to sleep through over-confidence, but in all sobriety he feels it his duty to tell them that of the forces in action in 1789 only two survive — the Revolution and the Church. Of the others, "Protestanism is no longer taken seriously by anybody." ⁴⁸ "Philosophy — let us not insult her distress; she holds herself on the defensive; she tries to cause herself to be forgotten." "Secular government — what more shaken and unsteady!" ⁴⁹ As for Liberalism, "it nourished the insolent pretension of replacing Catholicism after having overthrown it: behold it now, itself overthrown, replaced and buried!" ⁵⁰ With the Revolution, the Church can of course cope easily in open warfare, as light with darkness, nor fear the outcome. The Church will take her true position as champion of Liberty, which Democracy has betrayed and victimized. "For at bottom," says the eloquent Count, "Democracy is incompatible with Liberty, because it has for its basis envy under the name of equality; whereas Liberty, from its very nature, protests unceasingly against the tyrannical and brutal level of equality. In order to maintain itself, Democracy condemns every thing which wishes to live and act to renounce utterly personal value and to fall down in servile adoration before the phantom of the reason and virtue of the masses. It destroys in this way, logically and gradually, not only all traditions, all ancient and hereditary rights, but also all independence, all dignity and all resistance. And so it reduces the human race to dust; and, as Benjamin Constant has said, 'when the storm comes, dust turns to mud.'" ⁵¹ The Count praises Liberty in glowing terms, and cites in its praise eminent Churchmen, from the Monk Ambrosius, in Charlemagne's time, to the Archbishop of Moulins, in his own. But Montalembert's ideal of Liberty is the Ultramontane ideal — freedom to act as one chooses so long as one obeys to the letter every command of an omnipotent pope-king.

⁴⁷ Montalembert, 39. ⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 57. ⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 59. ⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 60. ⁵¹ *Ibid*, 79.

The Liberty of which the Great Charter and the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of Independence are documents, the Liberty of which the Reformation and American religious tolerance are monuments, has no kinship with the Ultramontane species.

Ultramontanism, which is merely the foreign form of extreme Papalism, was now fashionable, and soon became dominant among Catholics beyond the Alps. Quite naturally, they wished to curtail the power of the sovereign or government under which they lived, and this they could do by claiming the widest jurisdiction for their special monarch, the Pope. The critic may be puzzled to discover where Liberty comes in, if the Pope's will is omnipotent; but this contradiction did not trouble Montalembert, nor Cardinal Bellarmine, the great oracle of Papal absolutism, although the latter declares that it is lawful, under certain circumstances, to resist the Pope, but not to judge, punish or depose him.⁵² We must think of this paradox as not seeming a paradox at all to Montalembert, or to those who believed with him, if we would understand the state of mind of that large party whose zeal and intelligence made it hard for the political and ecclesiastical Liberals to win their way. Montalembert could repeat in all honesty the motto of the old Pole: "I have loved Liberty more than everything in the world, and the Catholic religion even more than Liberty."⁵³

If we find the obscurantism of the "Philosophic Catechism" too crude to seduce and its sophistries too transparent to deceive; if Don Margotti's venom has no savor of religion, and so cannot inspire religious enthusiasm; if the polemics of the *Civiltà Cattolica* seem devised to exasperate their enemies rather than to conciliate or convert; if the roaring *Univers* fails to frighten us into acquiescence: we must turn to Montalembert. His eloquence, his fervor, his apparent candor, his appeal to the higher emotions, explain not only his own popularity but also that of Ultramontanism among a Catholic public which did not relish Veuillot's bludgeonings and never read the diatribes of Father

⁵² Bellarmine: *De Romano Pontifice*, lib. ii, cap. 29. "Licet resistere pontifici invadenti animas, vel turbanti rempublicam, et multum magis si Ecclesiam destruere videretur, licet, inquam, ei resistere, non faciendo quod jubet, et impediendo ne exequatur voluntatem suam. Non tamen licet eum judicare, vel punire, vel deponere, quod non est nisi superioris."

⁵³ Montalembert: *Op. cit.* 189.

Curci and his disciples. Montalembert, far from being the prophet he imagined himself, was not even an accurate interpreter of the events which passed under his eyes. He dismissed the Revolution of 1848 as an affair of "puerile and dangerous extravagances."⁵⁴ He dubbed "MM. de Cavour, Brofferio and Company," as "very small boys beside the Ministers of Unlimited-Royalty of the 18th century";⁵⁵ the only progress they could achieve, he predicted, was that of the false soothsayers whom Dante described as walking with their heads turned back.⁵⁶ The Protestantism which he reported dead still survives; Philosophy, over whose supposed barrenness he poured sarcastic pity, has since brought forth a lusty family; Science, which he ignored, has forced the ablest Catholic theologians to fall back behind their medieval moats: secular governments, which to his eyes seemed tottering, have enormously increased their power throughout the civilized world, and have lopped off ecclesiastical interferences. But historical accuracy rarely gives such immediate returns as Montalembert reaped from his Ultramontane enthusiasm. To him, the coming back of the Jesuits was as the blessed rain to a drought-parched land, the revival of monkery was as the budding leafage in the vineyard after a long winter. He saw Reaction in the guise of Progress. He interpreted the sudden expansion of Catholicism and the swelling of Papal claims as proofs that God in His mercy wished to reward the Church for her fidelity and give the Earth into her keeping.⁵⁷

Such were the elements, the informing spirit and directing will, of the Clericals, the Party of Reaction, with which Liberal Piedmont had to contend. It must not be supposed, however, that even a majority of the Reactionists were primarily disciples of the Jesuits. In other times many would have denounced the insidious encroachment of the followers of Loyola, who now

⁵⁴ Montalembert, 192. ⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 166. ⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 163. Dante: *Inferno*, xx, 7-15.

⁵⁷ W. E. Gladstone, however, was not deceived by the apparent rejuvenation of Papalism. "Some things I have learned in Italy," he wrote Manning on Jan. 26, 1851, "that I did not know before. One in particular. The temporal power of the Pope, that great, wonderful, and ancient erection, is *gone*. The problem has been worked out — the ground is mined — the train is laid — a foreign force, in its nature transitory, alone stays the hand of those who would complete the process by applying the match. . . . When that event comes, it will bring about a great shifting of parts — much super- and much subter-position." Morley: *Gladstone*, I, 403.

bowed to Jesuit dictation because it came to them through the authority of the Pope. The voice was Jacob's voice, but the hands were the hands of Esau. Many who knew that the contention was political, tacitly assented when Rome declared it to be religious. Many, conservatives by nature, rallied to the Vatican as to the citadel of Conservatism. There were aristocrats who identified their personal and class interests with the preservation of the Old Régime. Probably three quarters of the clergy were retrogrades by training and conviction, and the peasants took their cue from their priests. But these various groups could give Reaction no dynamic coherence: this it got from the Blacks proper, from prelates like the overweening Archbishop Frasoni and from laymen like the intransigent Marshal de La Tour, men without doubts, scruples or relenting. From the morrow of Novara they set resolutely to work to overthrow the Constitution. So long as Parliament existed, they would use it to block every measure for strengthening or extending free government. They looked outside to build up their party. Owing their first allegiance to the Pope and not to the King, they placed the concerns of Rome above those of Piedmont; and, being unlimited partisans of Absolutism, they would not have grieved if Austria had interfered to put an end to the Liberal administration. In Parliament, they sat on the extreme Right, but not all of the members who commonly voted with them were Black. Ottavio di Revel, Menabrea, Salmour and perhaps a dozen others, usually supported D'Azeglio's general policy: but when Rome spoke, they obeyed. There were others, like Cesare Balbo, who, though true patriots and Liberals in theory, shrank from the dangers of a rupture with Rome, and so they opposed the Siccardi Laws and civil marriage.

The Blacks had their newspapers, the *Armonia*,⁵⁸ edited by Don Margotti, a young priest, who wrote incisively and could be trenchant or unctuous, arrogant or condescending; and the *Campana*, a scurrilous sheet, for which even its partisans might sometimes wince.⁵⁹ The method of Don Margotti, and indeed that of all the accredited Clerical organs, was to meet accusation by a general denial, unsupported by proofs; to be lavish in asser-

⁵⁸ Its full title was: *L'Armonia della Civiltà colla Religione*, "The Harmony of Civilization with Religion."

⁵⁹ Bersezio, v, 25-27.

tions of Clerical impeccability, also unsupported by documents; and to abound in personal abuse. Abuse was, in fact, so favorite a weapon with all parties, that it would be difficult to decide whether Margotti could out-slander Bianchi-Giovini, or Bianchi-Giovini could out-vituperate Brofferio. While such journalism ensures notoriety to individuals, it cannot serve principles. Since the core of the Party of Reaction was made up of nobles and clergy, and its mass of illiterate peasants, its newspaper organs had a small circulation. The *Civiltà Cattolica* sent about 1800 copies into Piedmont. When one of its issues was seized on account of seditious articles, Father Curci, its editor, proposed to print a special edition "adopting forms more moderate and polite than hitherto," that would not offend the questor; but in a regular edition it would say what it chose. "I do not think," wrote the unblushing Curci, "that the reputation of the Piedmontese government would gain thereby in the other States of Italy." Sambuy, to whom this blackmailing proposal was made, promptly rejected it.⁶⁰ Through the pulpit and the confessional, the Reaction worked more effectively than through the press; and it laid siege, as we have seen, to the King's Liberalism.

The struggle was on between Liberty, bent on lifting Piedmont up to the level of modern civilization, and Authority, striving to force her back into obsolescent medievalism. The Papacy, whose enemies declared it the most colossal perversion of a religious institution the world has ever seen, sought to save itself by convincing Europe that it and the Roman Church were identical. The lightning change, the politico-religious sleight-of-hand, the substitution at an embarrassing moment of the good for the wicked partner, had so often succeeded, that even now multitudes of pious souls would be deceived into regarding as sacrilege that which reformers knew to be progress.

A singular parallel can be drawn between the Papal Party in Italy and the Slave Party in the United States during the sixth decade of the 19th century. Temporal Power like Slavery, originally a mere accident, had been made the keystone of a system. Some of the greatest of Catholics — Dante, Savonarola, Sarpi — lamented the moral corruption of worldly sovereignty and prayed to see it abolished: in like manner great Virginians — Washing-

⁶⁰ For his letter and Curci's see Chiala: *Une Page*, 291-92.

ton, Jefferson, Marshall — deplored the evils of slavery and hoped that it would be peaceably outgrown. The supporters of the Papacy and of Slavery each insisted that theirs was a peculiar institution, not to be judged by the common code of right and wrong, or even by the common dictates of humanity. Both found also in the Scriptures texts that they construed as validating their claims. When new ideals began to undermine the civilization from which they had risen, both the Papacy and the Slaveocracy adopted a policy of no compromise. Both arrogantly proposed to extend their dominion at the very time when their doom was at hand. Both drew to their defense many men who were not primarily zealots of either institution, but who believed that they must preserve it, in order to perpetuate the social order on which their own lives depended.

In the following struggle between Piedmont and Rome, we must never forget that the Piedmontese reforms were political and administrative in their nature, and that no Piedmontese official questioned, however remotely, the religious supremacy of the Holy See, or cast doubt on any dogma of the Catholic Church; whereas Rome kept attaching a religious interpretation to concerns wholly secular and to those mixed interests which might raise the question of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but had no connexion with faith. We must remember also, that many sincere Catholics, quite irrespective of the cause of Italian Independence, yearned for the day when the Papacy, which worshiped Mammon, should fall, in order that the Church, free to pursue her spiritual mission, might devote herself to the worship of God.

Finally, we must remember that among both the Liberals and the Republicans there were many Catholics. Victor Emanuel, Minghetti, Ricasoli, Poerio, Balbo, Capponi, Manzoni, D'Aze-glio, not less than Bassi, Gioberti and Tazzoli, lived and died in the Church. But to them, belief in the essentials of the Catholic religion did not include submission to priestcraft or to Papal pretensions in matters of State. Rome, on her part, was suicidally logical in attempting to represent Italian patriotism as an outbreak of irreligion. In so doing she confessed her inability to share in the noblest regenerative influence modern Italy had known.

Between the Blacks and the Reds, therefore, between two fanaticisms, equally fierce, sleepless and unyielding, the course of Piedmont had to be steered. Her ship was new, her crew inexperienced, her port uncertain and remote: only her helmsman could be relied upon. He was both daring and careful, indomitable in spirit, resourceful, an adept in the principles of navigation, but unpractised. Hardly since the *Mayflower* dropt down out of Plymouth harbor and faced alone the wilderness of tempest-ridden sea, had Europe witnessed so fateful an enterprise. Piedmont was indeed a cockle-shell amid the ocean of Reaction: the only European craft which, after France hauled down her Republican flag, still flew the ensign of Liberty.⁶¹

⁶¹ This chapter was written before the manifestation of Modernism, which called out from Catholics a flood of books and pamphlets in which the Papal-ecclesiastical position is described in much more emphatic terms than I have used. The ablest summary I have seen on the side of the Modernists is "Mediævalism and Modernism," by the late Father George Tyrrell, S. J. (*Harvard Theological Review*, July 1908), whose learning and ability as a writer put him at the head of English-speaking Roman Catholics. The Vatican did not attempt to answer Tyrrell, Loisy and their friends. It issued the Syllabus, and excommunications. My object has been to indicate the general aversion of Liberals to the Blacks, and some of the clues to it: for the prepossession of one party for or against another party determines their interactions. The Jesuits always maintained that they were traduced by their opponents; but it is the fact that those opponents in Italy in 1850 believed the Jesuits to be sinister, and acted accordingly, which needs to be impressed on modern students of the Risorgimento. The tradition of aversion had been handed down, whether justly or unjustly this is not the place to discuss, for nearly three centuries. How violent that aversion was can be inferred from Gioberti's *Gesuita Moderno*, on one side, or Mazzini's tracts on the other; and from speeches, newspapers, private correspondence of Liberal Catholics in Italy and France. De Maistre, *La Voce della Verità* and the general utterances of the Sanfedists, the *Catechismo Filosofico*, *Civiltà Cattolica*, and *Univers*, and Margotti, to mention only a few specimens, should be read in order to understand the gospel of the Blacks against which Catholic Liberals rebelled. The Jesuit apologies are numerous and well-known.

CHAPTER XII

THE CRIMEAN WAR

THE year 1854 was a season of sowing seed for Cavour. The latest election showed beyond doubt that he had the majority of the country with him. Now he might go forward confidently to carry out his policy. Almost his first act was to persuade Parliament to abolish the tariff on cereals—a sufficient answer to the calumniators who had accused him in the recent dearth of cornering the wheat market.¹ Hard times, due to the poor crops and to the phylloxera among the vines, continued. The Eastern Question began to disturb European finance. Piedmont's receipts fell short of Cavour's estimates. The railways which were being spun like a spider's web over Piedmont and Savoy were still uncompleted, and could not therefore produce the revenue that was expected from them. With the return of hot weather, cholera renewed its ravages. Fortune certainly did not favor the intrepid innovator, in his attempt to replace the worn-out methods of commerce, industry and agriculture, by the most approved modern plant. His enemies, on the Right and on the Left, clamored for results. It was time that the immense amount of capital poured into the novel enterprises should begin to pay some dividend. Cavour devoted much of his energy during the first session of Parliament, therefore, to financial questions, all of which, in spite of opposition, were passed. He so thoroughly demonstrated the interdependence of his measures, that some of his critics unwillingly accepted them in detail for fear of endangering the system as a whole. Massimo d'Azeglio summed up the feelings of more than one Liberal when he said that the Ministry must be supported because there was no other to put in its place,² and nobody cared to inherit an empty treasury.

¹ To Scialoja, legal adviser to the Ministry of Finance, who had approved Cavour's plan of abolition, Cavour wrote: "To you more than to me Piedmont owes the happy application of a great idea—free trade in cereals." *Lettere*, II, 294. ² N. Bianchi: *Lettere di M. d'Azeglio* (Turin, 1883), p. 247; March or April, 1854.

Cavour never doubted that his system would justify itself ■ soon as it had fair play. He was like an engineer who, having planned a network of irrigation to fertilize an entire country, is delayed by a break in a dam or by striking workmen. He did not fret over accidents which he could not control: but he busied himself mightily to take advantage of every chance event. His statesmanship had two aims, which were really one: to make Piedmont strong, self-sustaining at home, and respected abroad; and to fit her to seize the first opportunity that offered to expel Austria from the Peninsula. His first object was attained: for Piedmont had withstood the confusion of reconstruction, the plots of Blacks and of Reds, the bullying of Austria, the fast-and-loose of France, the religious censure of Rome. She had secularized her courts, remodeled her army, introduced railways and telegraphs, and adopted Liberty as her guide in government and in trade. Cavour deemed that the time had come to venture into the stream of international diplomacy. Convinced that Piedmont unaided could never liberate Italy, — the enthusiasts of 1848 had been scourged for supposing that the Italians could work out their own salvation, — he wished to find an ally who would help Piedmont without exacting too high a price. He did not delude himself with the idea that Italy's redemption was near. The first step, the indispensable step, was to strengthen the ties between Piedmont and the Powers that were likely, in the great day of European re-adjustment, to stand for Progress. The Crimean War seemed to offer an occasion to do this.

To the eye of History, the Crimean War appears as one of those occasions when Olympian Zeus hands over to Momus, the God of Mockery and Upside-down, the temporary direction of human affairs. "A war to give a few wretched monks the key of a grotto," as Thiers described it,³ would be silly enough, unless we go behind its avowed reason and seek the real cause in the depths of racial antagonisms and in the spur of personal ambitions. Whether Latin monks or Greeks should be the door-keepers of the Christian shrines in Syria was only the pretext: the eagerness of the Czar Nicholas to possess Constantinople was the reality. Thinking that the "Sick Man" of Turkey was dying, the Czar wished to be beforehand in the settlement of the Sul-

³ Senior: *Conversations*, I, 212.

tan's estate.⁴ So he picked a quarrel with Abdul Medjid over the custody of the shrines, and insisted that Russia should be protector of Christians in the East. This roused Napoleon III, who could not afford to have it appear that he was unable to maintain the protectorate which France had long enjoyed. For a while matters drifted: the Sultan promising satisfaction, now to one claimant and now to the other; Nicholas growing more and more irritated. By the beginning of 1853 he secretly proposed to England to join him in expelling the Turk from Europe: Russia would take Constantinople, England should be compensated with Egypt and Crete. But England replied that she could not consent to the dismemberment of Turkey. She had at Constantinople Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, an able and aggressive diplomat, who had come to regard his opinion on the Eastern Question as final. He opined at the moment, that England must uphold the Sultan. Nicholas sent an equally masterful envoy, Prince Mentchikoff, to bring Abdul to terms: but he, fully aware of Stratford's friendliness and of Napoleon's purpose to keep the shrines, was unmoved. Mentchikoff stormed, Mentchikoff threatened, but Abdul remained impassive, after the Oriental fashion. Then Mentchikoff quitted Stamboul, breathing vengeance (May 21, 1853). Three weeks later, at Lord Stratford's instance, the English and French fleets assembled at Besika Bay. The summer passed amid the insincere and futile palaver of the Great Powers at Vienna. New complications arose to furnish a new pretext. Two facts, however, were emerging from the general confusion — Russia was becoming uncontrollable, and France and England, almost unawares, had formed a partnership for the preservation of Turkey.⁵

The situation was sufficiently grotesque. Czar Nicholas, possessed of a good healthy voracity, was bent on devouring Turkey, which he could easily have done but for the interference of the Western Powers. Sultan Abdul, as stolid as a scow on a mud-bank, relied, as a true Mussulman should rely, upon Kismet, especially since Kismet seemed disposed to take the

⁴ Earlier than this, according to Metternich, Nicholas talked with him about the "Sick Man." "Are you speaking to the physician or to the heir?" said Metternich. Vitzthum, i, 30.

⁵ For the beginnings of the Crimean War see B. d'Harcourt: *Les Quatre Ministères de M. Drouyn de Lhuys* (Paris: Plon, 1882), chap. II.

form of fleets and armies flying French and English flags. Napoleon III, whose Great Uncle's example gave him no repose, believed the time ripe for diverting France and solidifying his throne by a brilliant war. He wished to break up the political tradition which had prevailed in Europe since Waterloo. He dreamed of wiping out the disaster of the First Napoleon's Moscow campaign by humbling Russia. In the depth of his singularly undemonstrative nature he exulted at persuading England — who had destroyed the First Empire at Waterloo — to join him now in checking the Muscovite. As the ally of Queen Victoria, the personification of British propriety, Louis Napoleon — whose enemies called him a political adventurer, an unscrupulous massacrer, a libertine, a perjurer, a deceitful intriguer — seemed to receive a certificate of respectability which might atone for the Czar's slight. France herself had no important motive, whether commercial or political, for saving Abdul or for smiting Nicholas. Official England, on the other hand, had accepted the doctrine that the Czar must not possess Constantinople, because if he did, British interests in the Mediterranean would be damaged, and, moreover, any increase in Russia's strength might endanger England's possessions in Asia.

Although no one could challenge the plea of "British interests" without bringing on himself the charge of lack of patriotism, nevertheless, the conscience of England condemned the war. Even Lord Aberdeen, the Prime Minister, opposed it; but he was swept along by fight-lovers like Palmerston and Stratford Canning, who were playing Louis Napoleon's game.⁶ Prussia had absolutely no concern in the quarrel so long as Russia did not disturb the lower Danubian provinces: but Prussian sympathy turned to Russia as the model of despotism.⁷ Austria, on the contrary, blew hot and cold. The Czar counted upon her support, because he had, by putting down the rebellion in Hungary less than four years before, saved the Hapsburg Empire from disruption, and he could now hold out the hope that if Turkey were dismembered Austria might get some of the spoils. Gratitude, however, was a sentiment unknown at Vienna. "We

⁶ See, for instance, report of bragging speeches by Palmerston and Graham at the dinner at the Reform Club, March 7, 1854.

⁷ Prince Albert writes, Aug. 21, 1854: "The King [of Prussia] will always be ready to sacrifice even *Prussian interests for Austria*." Martin, III, 96.

will astonish the world by our ingratitude," Prince Schwarzenberg declared in 1850,⁸ when some one suggested that Austria was under a moral obligation to Russia; and Count Buol, the Austrian Foreign Minister during the incubation of the war-fever, carried out Schwarzenberg's promise. Russia urged in vain; Austria would sign no treaty of alliance with her, nor would she join the Western Powers, although they too hinted that she might expect substantial gains in the settlement which would follow the war.⁹

So the year 1853 drew towards its close. Then, on November 1, Russia declared war upon Turkey, and on November 30 the Russian fleet destroyed the Turkish fleet at Sinope. This aroused Western Europe: the peace-makers gave place to the war-lovers, and on March 28, 1854, England and France threw down the gauntlet to Russia. In June, Austria, still at her game of procrastination, made with Turkey a treaty so artfully framed that it did not necessarily involve sending an army against the Czar. In September, the Western Powers landed their forces in the Crimea: on September 20, 1854, they won the battle of the Alma; on October 25 the English were worsted at Balaclava; on November 5 at Inkerman they were saved from disaster by the timely arrival of the French. Winter set in, and the allied armies encamped round Sebastopol, gave the most shocking exhibition of military incompetence, corrupt commissariat and deficient sanitation that Europe saw in the 19th century.

But the military operations in detail do not concern us. The great fact is that the war itself, specious though its pretexts might

⁸ Fyffe: *A History of Modern Europe* (New York: Holt, 1898), III, 200.

⁹ Austria's position, ■ England saw it, is stated clearly enough by Lord Stanmore. "It is more than probable that the King of Prussia, who was bound by treaty with Austria to succor the latter Power with his whole force in the event of her being attacked by Russia, intimated to the Emperor Francis Joseph that he had entered into a similar obligation towards Russia should Austria be the assailant. To make war with Russia with the support of all Europe was one matter; to do so under such conditions as these now suggested was quite another. To resist at once an invasion of Hungary by Russia, and of Bohemia by Prussia, as well as the invasion (in such an event but too probable) of Lombardy, was more than the Cabinet of Vienna could prudently undertake, and her active support was, for the time at least, reduced to a benevolent neutrality." Arthur Gordon: *The Earl of Aberdeen* (London, 1892) p. 247. The best native statement of Austria's policy is given by H. Friedjung in *Der Krimkrieg und die österreichische politik*. (Stuttgart, 1907.)

be, indicated that Europe was reaching a new stage for which the formula of 1815 would not serve. Each country, on being drawn into the struggle, found it easy to justify its action both by morals and by logic. The Western Powers wished to assure prosperity to the world; and they easily persuaded themselves that they were fighting the battle of civilization. If Russia should win, the Cossack would overrun the West, and progress might be checked, as it had been after the invasion of the barbarians, for many centuries.

While potentates and statesmen were plotting, while generals and admirals were making ready, and while contractors were beginning to plunder on a colossal scale, the one man who was to profit most by the Crimean War was sleeplessly watching the course of events from an out-of-the-way corner of the world. Turin might seem to be as little concerned as Timbuctoo in the movements on the Black Sea; but Cavour knew that any war, like a leak in a dyke, may precipitate a wholly unexpected situation. During the first stage of the quarrel, he saw that Piedmont must remain neutral. If Austria, as he hoped, could be induced to join Russia, then Piedmont might safely ally herself with the Western Powers: but Austria pursued the more sagacious policy of sitting on the fence, a position which made her feared and desired by each antagonist. Just at what moment Cavour resolved that Piedmont should seek an alliance with France and England cannot be determined: we cannot even say that the suggestion originated with him. His niece, Marchioness Josephine Alfieri, reports that one day in the early spring of 1854, she asked her uncle: "Why don't you send 10,000 men to the Crimea?" "That would be a very politic stroke," said Lisio, who was present. Cavour started with emotion, a smile flashed over his face, and then he said with a sigh: "Ah! if everybody had your courage, what you have just proposed would already be done." ¹⁰ Castelli, writing his reminiscences nearly twenty years after the event, sets the date "towards the end of 1854." One day, when he and Farini were discussing the acts of the Great Powers, and the possible outcome for Italy, Farini startled him by inquiring: "What if Piedmont could take part in this war? what if a contingent of our troops should be sent?

¹⁰ La Rive, 251.

what should you think of that?" "I replied, considerably surprised," says Castelli: "'It would be a mighty fine thing — our flag amid those of France and England! Would to God it might be! But to tell you the truth, it seems to me just about as probable as if you and I were to propose to Rothschild to admit us — with our 20,000 lire — as partners in his bank!'" Farini burst out laughing, adding: 'And yet I believe the thing is not impossible: all would depend on launching it right.'" ¹¹ Chiala thinks this conversation took place in the autumn of 1853 — a likelier time. ¹² Massari leans to January, 1854. ¹³ But the important fact is not whether Farini, or Marchioness Alfieri, or Cavour himself, originated the suggestion: nor is its exact date of consequence: but all subsequent European history, including the liberation and unity of Italy, was moulded when Cavour, having once conceived of this project as a possibility, bent his genius to accomplish it.

Cavour could not, of course, discuss the plan openly. He at once laid it before the King, who replied: "If I cannot go myself, I will send my brother." ¹⁴ Victor Emanuel, in whose veins flowed the blood of many soldiers, both hankered for the activity and exhilaration of war and divined the political significance of Cavour's suggestion. To Baron Brenier, a special envoy from the French Emperor, he had already bluntly declared that Piedmont's relations with Austria were intolerable, neither peace nor war, and that he hoped that France would stand by him in his determination to safeguard Liberty from both Reaction and Revolution. ¹⁵ When France and England saw that a rupture with Russia was certain, they cast about to secure allies, in the hope of ranging all Europe west of the Dnieper against the "Colossus of the North."

Although Cavour believed the alliance desirable ¹⁶ at almost

¹¹ Castelli: *Ricordi*, 53. ¹² The most elaborate details concerning this episode are in Chiala's *L'Alleanza di Crimea*.

¹³ Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, 157. ¹⁴ Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, 157.

¹⁵ *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 163. Brenier was in Turin about Jan. 20, 1854.

¹⁶ John M. Daniel, writing to Marcy on Feb. 1, 1854, took the Piedmontese alliance with France for granted, as a political necessity. "France controls all its considerable movements, because France has only to withdraw its protection and Piedmont would follow Lombardy into the pocket of Austria." Piedmont "is too weak to be neutral." "The lamb prefers the friendship of the wolf to that of the hyena." On July 17, 1858, Daniel was promoted to be minister. *Amer. Arch.*

any cost, he intended, like a shrewd bargainer, to get as much as possible by it. If Austria would only join Russia, Northern Italy would follow Piedmont in fighting alongside of France and England; but the Western Powers took care not to alienate Austria. The French Foreign Secretary made it clear to the Government at Turin that the Italians must not seize this opportunity for worrying Austria. "If Austria comes to fight along with us in the Orient," he wrote, "we shall regard as a diversion hostile to ourselves every movement which the Revolutionary Party might provoke in Italy. . . . If the present crisis should result in a making over of the map of Europe in a congress, they [the Italians] may rest assured that, in striving for the preservation or re-establishment of the European equilibrium, we will defend the cause of these allies with a zeal by as much warmer as they shall have been careful to support frankly the efforts we are making to exorcise a common danger."¹⁷ Here were a threat and a half promise: the threat hardly needed to be addressed to a Cabinet none of whose members sided with the Reds; and yet who could tell how far that Cabinet might be driven if the Reds in Lombardy should succeed in rising and in making a stand against the Austrians?

Having declared war on Russia (March 28) and signed their treaty of alliance (April 10), France and England redoubled their efforts to bring the other Powers — especially Austria — into their league. Italians believed that, in order to entice Francis Joseph, Napoleon III offered not only to guarantee his possession of his Italian provinces and the integrity of Tuscany and the Duchies, but also to permit an Austrian garrison to occupy Alessandria, in case Piedmont furnished no troops to the Allies.¹⁸ From Florence, Rome and Naples, Sir James Hudson, the British Minister at Turin, received confidential news that Piedmont intended, at the first favorable moment, to proclaim a war of Italian Independence, in which Victor Emanuel might redeem the defeat of Novara and be recognized as the Sword of Italy. These insinuations, evidently inspired by Austria, Hudson communicated privately to Cavour, who told him that Victor Emanuel's government, far from having these intentions, might be

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, VII, 164–65; Drouyn de Lhuys to the Duke de Guiche, March 11, 1854.

¹⁸ Mariani, III, 119, n.

persuaded to send a contingent of 14,000 or 15,000 men to the Orient.¹⁹ Hudson welcomed this possibility, and seems to have urged Cavour to take formal action. The whole loaf being denied him, Cavour was ready to accept half. He would make Piedmont's acquiescence a means for forcing Austria to rescind the law of sequestration against the Lombard exiles. When he sounded his colleagues as to the main project, however, he found them unanimously opposed. One thought that Piedmont's contingent would be too small to signify; another feared that either the Austrians or the Reds might pounce upon the country as soon as its best troops sailed away; a third was staggered by the cost; a fourth hinted that they could adduce no reason, satisfactory either in morals or in law, for making war, unprovoked, on a friendly Power. Cavour, with regret, reported the situation to Hudson, and assured the French Ambassador, the Duke de Guiche,²⁰ that his personal desire for the alliance was not shaken, but that the prospect of having Austria as a partner increased the difficulties; since patriotic Italians everywhere would condemn Piedmont for seeming to have any transactions with the arch-enemy of Italy's national existence. Early in June, Guiche had an interview with Victor Emanuel, who declared that the project was his own, and not Cavour's; that he would gladly offer 30,000 men instead of 15,000 if he could afford to do so; and that he did not think Austria would enter the alliance. He spoke disparagingly of his Cabinet: "Only Cavour and I count," he said. "If it is necessary to change the ministers, I will change them. . . . When our soldiers have once mixed with yours, I shall laugh at Austria. And after all, we must do something. If we do not go to the East, we shall be hurried along by all those revolutionary screechers to commit some blunder in Italy."²¹ Guiche communicated this interview to the French Emperor; Hudson had already privately informed the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Clarendon, of Cavour's personal enthusiasm.

Unofficial exchange of views went on during the summer. Cavour looked eagerly for some favorable sign. England thought chiefly of the present need; she was too remote from Italy to

¹⁹ Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, 156-60. ²⁰ Better known by his later title of Duke de Gramont, to which he succeeded in 1856; the evil genius of France in 1870.

²¹ Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, 165-67. Massari says that this interview took place June 6 or 7, 1854.

fear being compromised by any service the Italians might render her. Napoleon, on the other hand, knew that Piedmont's motive, far from being disinterested or Quixotic, held in solution the interminable Italian Question.²² Was he prepared to hasten the day when that must be faced? A reorganized Italy might entail in France changes perilous to the Empire. He would settle with Russia before disturbing the situation on his frontiers, and as he certainly did not intend at present to break with Austria if he could help it, he saw with some anxiety that Piedmont, backed by revolutionary Italy, might harass Austria. While coquetting with the Allies, Austria signed friendly treaties with Prussia and with Turkey. Still, the Allies were unwearied in their attentions to her. "The tender things Lord Aberdeen said to Austria," Cavour writes, "did not give me an agreeable sensation. I hope to God that Napoleon will not take to flirting with that cursed enemy of ours."²³ But the Western Powers knew too well that as an ally Austria was worth seven or eight Piedmonts; and, in order to drive Austria to close with their bargain, they tried to induce Piedmont to drop the reclamations in behalf of the sequestered exiles, to muzzle her press, and to guarantee that there should be no attack on Lombardy. They hinted that, in return, the Duke of Genoa might be elected King of Spain, and that, on the day of territorial readjustment, Lombardy might be handed over to Victor Emanuel. To these proposals, Cavour made but one reply: Victor Emanuel's government would never consent to curtail the liberty of their country.²⁴

Winter again set in. After the battles of the Alma, Balaclava and Inkerman, the Allies at last understood that the war they had undertaken could not be won by a dashing cavalry charge. Encamped before Sebastopol, with no prospect of continuing the campaign for four or five months, they redoubled their efforts to secure active help. On December 2, Austria signed with them a characteristically evasive treaty, in which she did not engage to

■ Cf. Artom-Blanc, I, 390.

²² *Lettere*, II, 301 (July, 1850), after Aberdeen's speech in the House of Lords on June 19. *Hansard*, 3d Ser., CXXXIV, 331-32. Aberdeen was polite, but scarcely effusive. He referred to Metternich ■ "that able and veteran statesman."

■ The American minister, however, declared that "the Piedmontese statesmen from necessity are in ■ great measure puppets, whose wires are in the hands of England and France." Daniel to Marcy, Oct. 26, 1854. *Amer. Arch.*

make war on Russia unless Russia attacked the Danubian provinces. On December 13 two letters reached Turin from Lords John Russell and Clarendon urging Piedmont to join the league. England, already aware of her own military inferiority compared with that of France, did not wish to have the war go on to furnish glory to Napoleon only, as it was likely to do, in view of the much smaller number of her troops and the much greater incapacity of her generals. To offset the disparity she would gladly have hired 25,000 Piedmontese soldiers.

Cavour called a Cabinet council, which voted to join the alliance on condition that England should lend Piedmont two million pounds sterling; that the Allies should promise, when peace should be negotiated, to remember Piedmont's services; that France and England should pledge themselves to press Austria to rescind the law of sequestration, and that they should allow the state of Italy to be discussed at the congress. To the last conditions, which were secret, the King wished to add another binding the Western Powers to guarantee that their agreement with Austria contained no secret clause to the detriment of Piedmont and Italy. Cavour would not listen to the proposal that the Piedmontese troops should be hired out as mercenaries. If they went at all, he said, it must be not as Hessians but as men performing a patriotic service; they must pay their own way, have their own commanders, and move as equals among their allies. Cavour's colleagues were reluctantly persuaded to support the alliance: but when their terms reached London, Lord John and the Foreign Secretary declared that neither England nor France would attempt to interfere in the matter of sequestrations.

Shut out from the prospect of even half a loaf, Cavour wished to clinch the alliance without insisting further on the secret demands; for to him the treaty in any form compatible with honor was all-in-all. In this the King agreed. Diplomatic notes flew to and fro: but the Western governments were inflexible. To their great credit, Oldofredi, Mauri, Toffetti, and other exiles, speaking in behalf of the Lombard emigration and of the Milanese Liberals themselves, begged Cavour not to allow consideration for them to endanger the success of a project which might benefit Italy.²⁵ Some of his colleagues, however, would not

²⁵ Massari: *La Marmora*, 146, 151. Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, 170.

desert the sufferers. "As for me," said Victor Emanuel to the Duke de Guiche, "I believe we ought to ally ourselves in full trust, without restrictions or reserves, or not at all. . . . If we are beaten in the Crimea, we shall manage to get along somehow, and if we win, well, that will be worth to the Lombards more than all the articles which they wish to tack on to the treaty. . . . If [the ministers] won't go ahead, I will choose others who will: but we shan't come to that, for the country and the Chambers are of my opinion."²⁶ This interview took place on January 8, 1855.

The next evening, Cavour, Dabormida, Rattazzi and La Marmora held a final conference with Guiche and Hudson. The ambassadors again warned them that their governments would never yield. Dabormida, the Piedmontese Minister of Foreign Affairs, kept repeating that it would be suicidal for Piedmont to join a league in which Austria was a partner, unless she could thereby secure relief for the victims of Austrian cruelty. Seeing the deadlock, Guiche remarked that it was natural that Piedmont should conclude to remain neutral. This gave Cavour occasion to point out that, from the fact of their meeting that night, they were not and could not be neutral: their sympathy was with the Western Powers: might it not be possible, he asked, to put on record, at least in a secret protocol, Piedmont's desire to champion the Lombards' cause? While Hudson and Guiche conferred on this suggestion, the ministers went into another room. On their recall, the ambassadors had drawn up a statement satisfactory to Cavour and to his colleagues, except Dabormida.²⁷ At two o'clock in the morning Cavour reported to the King the result of the conference, and announced that, if there were further delay, he should resign. Victor Emanuel welcomed the end of a year's suspense, approved accepting the terms, and did not grieve at Dabormida's resignation. Two hours later, as Cavour returned from the Royal Palace to his home, he knew that a great possibility was dawning for Italy. Early that very evening (January 10) the preliminary papers were signed.²⁸

Cavour regretted Dabormida's loss, for the General was

²⁶ Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, 171-72. ²⁷ Text of protocol in *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 546-47.

²⁸ Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, 172-79. Bianchi: *Politique*. See *Lettere*, II, 66-68, for Dabormida's Diary of this affair.

steady in judgment and loyal in character: but at this crisis, individuals must be sacrificed. Cavour himself took the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. "I have assumed a tremendous responsibility," he wrote Count Oldofredi the next day. "Never mind: let come what may, my conscience tells me that I have performed a sacred duty." ²⁹ To Madame de Circourt he wrote, as usual, without reserve: "Events have led Piedmont to take a clear and decided position in Italy. This position is not without dangers . . . but it was imposed upon us by honor and duty. Since Providence has willed that Piedmont, alone in Italy, should be free and independent, Piedmont ought to use her liberty and independence to plead before Europe the cause of the unhappy Peninsula. We shall not draw back before this perilous task. King and country are decided to carry it through to the end. Your friends, the doctrinaires and the Liberals who weep the loss of liberty in France — after helping to smother it in Italy — will perhaps find our policy absurd and romantic. I am resigned to their censures, certain that generous hearts like yours will sympathize with our efforts to call back to life a nation shut up for centuries in a frightful tomb. If I fail, you will not refuse me an asylum amid the eminent vanquished who group themselves round you. . . . Receive this outpouring as the confession that all my life is consecrated to a single work — the emancipation of my country." ³⁰

Turin heard of this compact with "mingled stupefaction and incredulity." ³¹ Army officers sulked, supposing that they were to be sent as hirelings to fight England's battles; but when they understood that the war was for Piedmont and Italy, they begged to be chosen for the expedition. The merchants of Genoa protested against a measure which would injure their flourishing trade with Odessa. The Reds circulated among the troops an appeal urging them to refuse to support an anti-national war which would assure the maintenance of Austria's dominion in

²⁹ *Lettere*, II, 320; C. to Oldofredi, Jan. 11, 1855. ³⁰ *Lettere*, II, 320-21.

³¹ "So we shall be the allies of the allies of the ally," La Farina writes scornfully on Jan. 9, 1855. Again, on Jan. 19, he says: "Public opinion is very strongly opposed to this expedition." La Farina: *Epist.*, I, 525, 527, 530. Feb. 5 he reports that the *Voce della Libertà*, the *Diritto*, the *Gazzetta del Popolo*, the *Unione*, the *Armonia* and the *Campanone* howl against it, and the *Piemonte* and the *Opinione* support. He says that if he had been minister, he would have signed the treaty.

Italy. "Let us rise," they said, "let us swear not to fight except for the unity of Italy and for the peoples that aspire to avenge their nationality."³² Everybody who saw an objection — and the plan could be objected to for many obvious reasons — hurried into print or speech.³³ On the other side, Cavour and his followers strove to win over public opinion. That Parliament might vote against the treaty which the King had approved and his Cabinet accepted was a danger which kept them in suspense.

The military and financial conventions, signed on January 25, were submitted to the Chambers on the following day. On February 3 the debate began in the Lower House. Lanza, chairman of the committee to which the bill was referred, reported in favor of its adoption. His support counted for much, because, while originally a Radical, he was gradually coming to be one of the staunchest members of the Cavourian party. He took the ground that, since Russia's triumph would place the civilized world at the beck and call of a semi-barbarous despot, Piedmont must throw in her lot with the rest of Europe in a supreme effort to prevent this catastrophe. A freshet of oratory followed the presentation of the bill. Many deputies feared that their country was about to plunge into disaster, and they did their best to hold her back; others opposed the treaty because their trade was in opposition. Brofferio proved to his satisfaction that the treaty was neither "just, nor national, nor useful, nor necessary." He concluded, after his custom, with a high-sounding phrase. Let Piedmont, he cried, strike a league with the "peoples panting for liberty," with Greece, with Poland, with Hungary, with Republican France, and not with despots.³⁴ Eloquence of this kind cost nothing and helped nobody. General Durando, soldier rather than orator, defended the treaty in a speech which had the merit of seriousness; he was especially strong in stating why it would be suicidal for Piedmont to remain neutral. His conclusion made a deep impression: "Reflect," he said, "that in so great a movement of all Europe, when she opens her arms to you,

■ Artom-Blanc, I, 334-35.

■ Daniel writes Marcy, Jan. 22, 1855, that the treaty of alliance is regarded as very important in Europe, because it leaves Austria free to act. Piedmont will make a great hit, he says, if the war ends speedily; otherwise she will pay dearly for the privilege of being recognized as a European power. *Amer. Arch.*

■ Brofferio, VI, 685-89.

you repulse her; if you remain inactive, if you proclaim a policy of neutrality, in which nobody will put faith, you may perhaps live politically, but your sons, or your sons' sons will die unhonored at the foot of the Alps, and with them will be buried the last hopes of Italy.”³⁵ After Durando, Count Solaro della Margherita, the venerable spokesman of medieval methods in Church and State, declared that the project ran counter to the interests of Piedmont and to the traditional policy of the House of Savoy. Biancheri, Michelini, Sineo, Revel, and Cabella, Cassareto, Menabrea, De Viry, Pareto, Tecchio and Cavour's brother Gustavo opposed the treaty; Gallenga, Sonnaz, Farini, La Marmora, Correnti, Quaglia, and Rattazzi defended it. For six days the debate surged to and fro. Except in Correnti, the Lombard exile, and Durando, the defense found no strong supporters outside of the Cabinet itself, and in Farini and Lanza, who were practically unattached members of the Cabinet.³⁶ The Opposition, on the contrary, numbered not only the habitual extremists of the Right and the Left, but also recruits from the Centre, besides most of the influential newspapers, including the *Gazzetta del Popolo* and the *Opinione*.

The chief burden of the defense fell upon the Prime Minister, who, in three speeches, answered direct questions, replied to objections, and set forth with an eloquence to which he seldom gave rein the cause of the alliance. He knew, and most of his hearers knew, that the justification of the treaty, being founded in a great but vague hope, could not be demonstrated in terms of material profit and loss. Nevertheless, he was obliged to give reasons which would appease the intellect; and this he did with apparent candor. To those who asserted that the quarrel in the Orient in nowise affected Piedmont, he painted the result that would follow the Czar's possession of Constantinople: the Black Sea would become a Russian lake, from which Russian fleets would sail forth to compete with France and England in the Mediterranean. That would be equivalent to the renunciation by Piedmont of her aspirations for the future: because it would expose her to be the victim of Continental wars, which had been

³⁵ Brofferio, vi, 694.

³⁶ Lanza soon entered the Cabinet as Minister of Public Instruction. Farini, since his retirement in 1852, had been, both as journalist and deputy, the confident and mouthpiece of the Cavourian policy.

from time immemorial, the bane of Italy. He quoted Manzoni's lines — it was rare for Cavour to quote poetry —

“ Il nuovo signore s'aggiunge all' antico,
L'un popolo e l'altro sul collo ci sta.” ²⁷

He denied that Piedmont was being coerced into the alliance by the Western Powers; he denied also that the Cabinet had secretly promised to cede Savoy to France. To show what neutrality might mean, he reminded the deputies of what had happened to Venice in 1796, when she hoped to save herself by remaining neutral, while Bonaparte was driving Austria out of Northern Italy. Brofferio had charged him with shifting his position: he raised a laugh at Brofferio's expense by assuring the House that the policy of an alliance with England was in direct line with that belief in British constitutional ideals for which Brofferio had formerly ridiculed him, and hurled at him the nickname, “Mylord Risorgimento.” He explained to Revel, — who lamented that, if the treaty was to be signed, the money England furnished should not be a subsidy instead of a loan, — that to accept a subsidy would be to degrade Piedmont. Then he smote straight at Revel, giving a vivid sketch of his own political career since 1848, of the political considerations which led to the Connubio, of Revel's financial measures in the past and of his inconsistency in the present. His brusque sweeping aside of the leader of the Right was doubtless premeditated, although the occasion may have been fortuitous. As Revel had just been plotting to overthrow the Cabinet,²⁸ and to come in himself as premier of a Reactionist régime, Cavour felt that he could strengthen his own position by attacking boldly instead of by attempting to conciliate: and he succeeded. Revel, discredited, piqued at being caught in an unparliamentary use of a private conversation, quitted the Chamber and resigned forthwith.²⁹

The enemies of the alliance enlarged on the fact that it would bring Piedmont into partnership with Austria. To this Cavour rejoined that if in the course of events their flag should be not far from the Austrian, it would indicate that Austria and not Piedmont had changed her base. It would certainly be foolish for

²⁷ The new tyrant is joined to the old; one people and the other are about our necks.

²⁸ *Lettere*, II, 77.

²⁹ The next day, on the general request of the Chamber, in which Cavour joined, Revel withdrew his resignation.

Piedmont to throw over her league with the Western Powers — a league in which her welfare was bound up — simply because Austria had seen a new light. The alliance between France and England he regarded as “the greatest fact in modern history.” Self-interest urged Piedmont to participate in it; and not self-interest only, but solicitude for civilization, whose preservation called for the curbing of the Colossus of the North. Nor did Cavour hesitate to face the question which, whether announced or not, was always present in the hearts of Italians in that day.

“But how, I shall be asked,” Cavour said, “can this treaty ever help *Italy*? I will reply: in the only way given to us, or perhaps to any one, to help Italy in the actual conditions of Europe. The experience of the past years and of the past centuries has demonstrated — at least in my opinion — how little conspiracies, plots, revolutions and unorganized outbreaks have helped Italy. Far from helping her, they have been one of the greatest calamities that have afflicted this beautiful part of Europe. And not only because of the great number of individual misfortunes, which came from them, but because these continuous conspiracies, these repeated revolutions, these ill-ordered movements, had the effect of lessening the esteem, and, up to a certain point, the sympathy, which the other peoples of Europe entertained for Italy.

“Now I believe that the principal condition for improving the lot of Italy, the condition which overtops all the others, is to raise her reputation again, to act in such wise that all the peoples of the earth, rulers and subjects alike, shall render justice to her qualities. And for this, two things are necessary: First, to prove to Europe that Italy has enough civilized judgment to govern herself in orderly fashion, to rule with liberty, that she is in condition to employ the most perfect forms of government known; secondly, that her military worth is equal to that of her ancestors. In the past you have done this service to Italy through the conduct you have observed for seven years, showing Europe in the most luminous way how the Italians are able to govern themselves with wisdom, with prudence, with loyalty. It remains for you to do an equal, if not a greater service. It is the duty of our country to show that the sons of Italy know how to fight like heroes on the fields of glory. And I am certain, gentlemen,

that the laurels our soldiers shall win in the Orient will help the future destiny of Italy more than all those persons have done who thought to bring about her regeneration by declamations and by writings." ⁴⁰

The next day, February 10, on the roll-call, 101 members voted aye, 60 no, and one — Menabrea — did not vote. The secret ballot stood 95 to 64, a majority large enough to convince even the doubting that Cavour had the country behind him. The debate in the Senate was less fiercely contested, and ended in the approval of the treaty by 63 ayes to 27 noes. But among the Government's supporters many were moved more by a sense of duty than by enthusiasm. "I voted for the treaty," Massimo d'Azeglio wrote to his nephew, "and I would do as much if we had to begin over again. Nevertheless, I do not regard it as anything very gay." ⁴¹

Throughout Piedmont popular sentiment, which had supported the measure rather because it was urged by the Government than because it was desired, awaited its execution with misgiving. Reactionists abroad, however, discerned more quickly its significance. King Bomba exclaimed in a rage: "That Piedmontese Count has played us a fine trick this time." Count Usedom, the Prussian diplomat, remarked, perhaps not wholly regretfully, "This is a pistol shot in Austria's ear." ⁴² Rome viewed with apprehension the alliance which formally bound France to Piedmont. Those of the Reds whose motto was rule or ruin, exulted over the treaty, supposing that it would hasten the downfall of Kingship in Piedmont. Monarchy there, as the event of the past two years had taught them, was their chief competitor, or antagonist; and every inch it gained lessened the area of their own activity. So Guerrazzi could write (February 4, 1855): "The Republicans are happy over Piedmont's treaty, as over the battle of Novara, because, they say, this is the last disillusion given to the Italians by the monarchies, whether limited or not." ⁴³ Mazzini in an open letter to Cavour rejoiced

⁴⁰ For Cavour's speeches of Feb. 6, 7 and 9, 1855, see *Discorsi*, ix, 85-127.

⁴¹ D'Azeglio: *Lettere*, 267; letter dated April 22. On Jan. 29, however, D'Azeglio wrote: "I think this treaty the best title this administration will have to the gratitude of the country and to the esteem of the men of Italy." *Ibid*, 259.

⁴² Massari: *Cavour*, 113. ⁴³ F. D. Guerrazzi: *Lettere* (2d series, Leghorn, 1882), 183; quoted in *Lettere*, II, 85, n. 1.

that by this act the King's Government had at last deliberately announced, "We are with Austria."⁴⁴ In an address to the Piedmontese army, Mazzini instigated to sedition and to desertion. He told the soldiers that they were to be "deported," like criminals, to the Crimea; that they were being sent as far away as possible in order to reassure Austria and to enable her to spurn them as counterfeit "liberators of Italy." He besought them that, as they had sworn fidelity to God and to the country, and not "to a man," they should use the right of judgment which belonged to every citizen and demand of the King to dedicate them to the redemption of Italy.⁴⁵ Kossuth congratulated Mazzini on the treaty which, he said, clearly gave the direction of the National Movement to the Republicans.⁴⁶ Even men like Giorgio Pallavicino, who had begun to look to Piedmont to free and unite Italy, deplored the alliance as a great mistake: because, he said, it would render impossible the union of the Piedmontese army and popular insurrection — the two forces which gave the best promise of victory.⁴⁷ Manin, the noblest of the exiles at Paris, said sadly to Senior: "When I was willing to take the King of Sardinia as our Sovereign he had not become the ally of Austria. His desertion of our cause makes me dispirited as well as angry."⁴⁸ Some patriots there were, however, who like Poerio, languishing in his Bourbon prison, felt that their chains were lightened, when the rumor of this transaction reached them, because they instinctively foresaw that it portended a change which unfolded hope for Italy.

The opposition, the doubt, the half-heartedness even, among the supporters of the alliance were abundantly justified. Posterity looks back to it as one of the most brilliant strokes of statecraft in the 19th century. But contemporaries had every reason to distrust it as foolhardy. It called for the sacrifice of many brave soldiers; it added forty million or more lire of debt to the already overburdened Piedmontese treasury; it seemed to divert Piedmont's attention from Italy to the Crimea; it made her an associate of Austria, whose tyranny kept Italians divided, de-

⁴⁴ Mazzini, ix, 71-78.

⁴⁵ "Indirizzo all' Esercito Piemontese," *Ibid*, 79-85.

⁴⁶ Mazzini, ix, ci, n. 2; *Italia del Popolo*, Feb. 1, 1855.

⁴⁷ Pallavicino, ii, 123.

⁴⁸ Senior: *Conversations*, ii, 3; dated March 3, 1855.

pendent and servile. In return, it promised nothing tangible — not so much as a penny of war indemnity, nor an acre of territory: it merely gave Piedmont the satisfaction of knowing that in an issue of European importance she was consorting with the Great Powers that controlled the destiny of Europe. To minds of little imagination this was too vague an asset: to Cavour it opened the door of possibility, and that opening warranted the cost and the risk. He knew that, however the Crimean War ended, it must break up the system which had crushed Liberalism since 1815. Then reorganization would follow, and it would be fatal for Piedmont, both on her own behalf and as the champion of the oppressed Peninsula, not to take part in the new ordering. Convinced that Progress depended upon the extension of Liberty, and that Liberty's hope dwelt in England and in France, Cavour believed that Piedmont must be identified with the Western Powers, for they could not decently ignore the precedent of such a partnership. Just how it might be turned to direct advantage he could not foretell, but he would let no favorable occasion slip by.

The greatest risk, as we now know, lay in the possibility that Cavour might die before peace brought the day of readjustment: if that had happened, the venture might indeed have been lost. But he lived, to prove that his alliance was one of those acts where a statesman's best prudence lies in audacity. The event discredited all the chief promoters of the Crimean War. Nesselrode and Menschikoff, Buol and Thouvenel, Drouyn de Lhuys and Louis Napoleon, Stratford Canning, Aberdeen, and Clarendon get little sympathy and less praise today for their acts. Cavour alone, plucking the flower, safety, from the nettle, danger, is the hero of that conflict.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ The official Russian commentary on the War, probably supervised if not dictated by Gortchakoff, says pertinently of Piedmont's decision to send a contingent against Russia: "This act of hostility, without any declaration of war, was a strange violation of every principle of international law." *Diplomatic Study on the Crimean War* (London, 1882), II, 85.

CHAPTER XIII

THE CRISIS WITH THE CLERICALS

BY the expedition to the Crimea Piedmont affirmed her leadership of the Italian cause. The unthinking said that it cost too much: but Cavour knew that symbols are to be appraised not by their intrinsic value but by the value of the things they stand for. He owed his success first to his own tenacity and genius, and, next, to the staunch support of the King. At the very time when Victor Emanuel was throwing his influence on the side of the alliance, however, he was also busy trying to defeat another vital measure which his Ministers had brought to the front; had he defeated it, he must have wrecked Cavour and the Liberal Cabinet, blasted Constitutional Government in Piedmont, and perhaps even destroyed his dynasty and the monarchy itself.

The quarrel with Rome weighed on his conscience. His mother and wife, devout zealots entirely docile to their priestly advisers, implored him to make his peace with the Holy Father. Many of his courtiers, most of the old aristocracy, and the prelates who chiefly had access to him, seconded their entreaties. The hierarchy sowed as much dissension throughout the Kingdom as it dared. In Savoy and the Val d'Aosta the peasants, instigated by the Clericals, started a revolt (which was quietly snuffed out) with the war-cry, "Down with the Constitution; Down with Liberty! Long live the King!" In Turin itself, Count Revel seems to have engaged in a plot for ousting Cavour and forming a Reactionist ministry with himself at the head.¹ To be rid of this thorn, Victor Emanuel determined to deal directly with the Vatican. Accordingly, he requested the Archbishop of Genoa — his warm friend, the patriotic Monsignor Charvaz — and the Bishops of Maurienne and Annecy, to visit Rome, confer with Pius and discover the way to a reconciliation. On their return the prelates informed the King that the Pope and the Curia had welcomed them cordially, and that the Holy See, inspired as ever

¹ *Lettere*, II, 74.

by the Christian spirit of forgiveness, would renew friendly relations with Piedmont, provided, of course, that the long-standing grievances of the Church were settled to her satisfaction and that the new legislation, of which rumors had reached Rome, met her approval.²

The King's Ministry, despairing of breaking the deadlock, but still convinced that they must no longer delay the reform of religious corporations, which they had promised, introduced on November 28, 1854, a bill to that end. This bill, known by the name of Rattazzi, the Minister of the Interior, proposed to abolish all the religious Orders except those devoted to public instruction, or to preaching, or to aiding the sick; it prohibited any Order or Congregation from organizing without the sanction of Parliament; it limited the number of new regulars; it suppressed, with certain exceptions, the chapters of the collegiate churches and the simple benefices; it turned over to the State the revenue of these suppressed corporations, from which pensions and stipends were to be paid to the members of the disestablished Orders; it restricted the subsidies of the bishops and raised the pittance of starving parish priests. Apparently it saved the State 928,412.30 lire a year.

This economy, however, was almost immaterial compared with the great reform at which the bill aimed. Piedmont was overrun by religious corporations. The Church as proprietor, thanks to a tenure which originated amid medieval conditions, enjoyed privileges and exemptions incompatible with the new ideals. Just as the Siccardi Laws established one standard of justice for everybody, so the Rattazzi bill proposed to bring all property under a single code. Equality before the law was the necessary method of Liberty. And indeed the abuses themselves, had no principle of Liberty been involved, cried for correction. The Kingdom of Piedmont had at that time a population of 4,916,084 souls. There were 71 religious orders and 604 religious communities, with 8563 persons of both sexes. A fraction of the cloisters on the Mainland (200 did not submit returns) had a value of 12,928,931 lire, and their rural holdings were valued at 29,797,431 lire. The following tables show their revenues.³

² Text in *Lettere*, II, 75-76.

³ Tivaroni, I, 384-85. Artom-Blanc, I, 507-09. Gallenga, III, 398-400.

On the Mainland.

505	Communities of both sexes	1,866,826
30	Archbishoprics and bishoprics	966,235
30	Cathedral chapters	916,777
73	Canonical colleges	263,776
1100	Canonical benefices	472,235
41	Seminaries	814,891
14	Small seminaries	13,321
2551	Beneficed cures with stipend	1,973,018
1480	Benefices without stipend	2,910,976
9	Refectories	29,502
87	Abbeys	100,818
91	Sanctuaries and basilicas	138,630
7	Clerical foundations	12,865
18	Foundations for invalided parish priests	57,029
39	Establishments for religious exercises and missions	14,133
	Revenue of the <i>dotazione dell' Economato</i>	527,182
	Parochial tithes	219,245
	Life pensions charged to the State	150,000
Total, Lire		11,447,459

In the Island of Sardinia.

99	Communities of both sexes	416,025
11	Archbishoprics and bishoprics	46,546
3	Abbeys and priories	5,441
233	Canonicates	39,367
268	Benefices for chapters, etc.	13,088
369	Parochial benefices	4,358
11	Seminaries	58,816
12	Metropolitan churches and cathedrals	184,014
7	Collegiate churches	40,433
375	Parish churches	182,454
	Subsidy from the State to the clergy	751,409
Total, Lire		1,741,946

Revenues of cloisters, simple benefices, and all other institutions not included in the above tables..... 4,000,000

Total revenues of the Church from vested interests in the Kingdom Lire 17,189,405

This immense sum represented only a part of the actual income of a Church, which had learned, by ages of experience, how to levy toll for every service it performed. At baptism, at confirmation, at marriage, at death, it exacted, directly or indirectly, its fees. It sold its masses to whoever would pay the price. And not content with taxing the faithful at every step of his earthly pilgrimage from the cradle to the grave, it projected its rapacity beyond this mortal life, and by assuming to have power to lighten the burden of souls in Purgatory, it added another source to its

income. Human ingenuity, whetted by insatiable cupidity, could no further go. How much all these sources produced, together with the returns from special dispensations, indulgences, alms, oblations and gifts, can only be surmised.

The Piedmontese Ministers did not hint at questioning the right of the Church to charge what it chose for its sacraments and ceremonies, — that was an internal affair: they simply proposed to remedy abuses which, being external, affected the public. They showed that Piedmont had 23,000 ecclesiastics, or one for every 214 inhabitants, while Belgium — “priest-ridden” Belgium — had only one for every 500, and Austria one for every 610. Forty-one Piedmontese archbishops and bishops gave an average of one for every 106,000 inhabitants, whereas France, which was supposed to be well supplied with expensive hierarchs, had only one for every 421,000 and Belgium only one for 606,000. The 1313 canons, the 2774 parishes, the religious regulars were proportionally far more numerous than in other Catholic countries. But more shocking still was the disproportion between the immense revenues enjoyed by the archbishops and bishops, and the miserable stipend doled out to most of the parish priests: the former, with their 1,122,000 lire a year, received more than the archbishops and bishops of the French Empire, and ten times as much as the Belgian!⁴ Some of the Piedmontese archbishops had upwards of 100,000 lire apiece, that is, more than twice as much as the Archbishop of Paris!⁵ The Piedmontese canons’ income exceeded by a third that of all the canons of France; yet the population of France was seven-fold that of Piedmont.⁶ The open revenue of the Church exceeded 17 million francs, and that of the monastic orders two million francs. How much came indirectly could only be guessed at. But while the dignitaries and drones of the Piedmontese Church secured for themselves these exorbitant sums, 2540 parish priests received less than 500 lire a year apiece, to which the State added 380 lire,⁷ in order to prevent the scandal of seeing a poor servant of God die of starvation, while his superiors reveled in opulence.⁸

⁴ In 1854 Belgium had for a population of 4,550,000 — only 450,000 less than Piedmont — one archbishop and five bishops. For further statistics see Gallenga, *op. cit.*, iii, 398–400. ⁵ Brofferio, vi, 774. ⁶ In 1854 France had 35 million inhabitants. ⁷ Figures in Zini, i, i, 565. ⁸ On the other hand, 4031 parish priests had upwards of 4000 lire apiece. Brofferio, vi, 774.

To publish these figures was to indict the spirit which dominated the Church. With what sincerity could mitred hierarchs preach goodwill and brotherly love and equality in Christ, when they treated several thousand of their brothers in Christ with no more mercy than the sweat-shop proprietor treats his famished employees? Such a condition was simply another evidence that the Church in Italy, whatever might have been the beneficence of its youth, had sunk through centuries of unresisted worldliness into an old age of pride, avarice and hypocrisy. Grant that the water of life was divine, yet the vessels in which it was transmitted from age to age were human; and gradually the human had polluted the holy draught until its divine essence was destroyed.

Here again, however, the King's Ministers took care not to pose as reformers of morals. They let the statistics speak, knowing well that a part of the public, at least, would draw the proper inference from them. Rattazzi's bill was legal, not religious, in purport. It assumed that the State had jurisdiction over all property, whether civil or ecclesiastical, and over all corporations. The Clericals rejoined that as the Church held property by an authority higher than the State, the State had no jurisdiction. A mortmain once granted was inviolable forever. For the State to abolish mortmains, or suppress congregations, or appropriate Church property, or take over the management of Church funds, was spoliation and sacrilege.

On the introduction of the bill, the Clericals skirmished to delay its discussion: but the Ministry pushed on. Then protests from the bishops of Piedmont were presented. A Radical member opposed their reading, on the ground that, as other petitions had not been read, it would be unjust to favor the prelates, who were, like everybody else, only citizens before the law. Cavour, however, insisted that the protests should be heard, because they contained the best proof that the reform urged by the Ministry ought not to be put off. The Savoyard bishops argued that since, by the first article of the Constitution, the Catholic Church was the State Church, the State must accept it as it was, with its beliefs, dogmas and discipline, an indivisible whole, including its monastic institutions. Every measure which did not meet the approval of the Holy See would be revolutionary, anti-Catholic and truly schismatic. The Piedmontese bishops, after declaring

that the project had thrown them into the greatest consternation, proceeded to show that it was unjust, illegal, anti-Catholic, and anti-social; that it was conceived in ignorance of the great benefits which the religious Orders conferred on society; that it was ridiculous, violent and immoral; and that it would be thrice injurious, first, to the Holy See, by implying that the Church was indisposed to succor the State; next, to the House of Savoy, always a devout supporter of the Church; and finally, to the Nation, which was deeply and by a large majority Catholic. Two of the Catholic arguments deserve to be quoted. To prove that the bill was anti-Catholic, the bishops said: "Jesus Christ, in founding his Church, did not indeed establish a union of pure spirits, which need no temporal goods in order to live, but a union of persons who constitute a real society, to which the material means of subsistence are indispensable, in order to attain the sublime end to which it is addressed. Hence it is that the masters of natural and divine law recognize in the Church the faculty of owning temporal goods independent of the civil power, and of administering them according to the rules she prescribes." Further: "The bases of society are property, justice, religion. The proposed law, by attacking all three violently, could not be more disastrous to society itself."⁹

The ecclesiastics, it will be seen, used arguments which belonged to the medieval epoch in which no one would seriously have questioned the claims of the Church. But there was a new epoch, with new ideals of the relations between Church and State and of the tenure of property, and with the new view on the desirability of upholding the monastic system. Again the conflict was irrepressible: again the spokesmen of each side spoke a language which sounded strange to their opponents.

In defense of the bill, Rattazzi and Boncompagni defined the legal position. Boncompagni, a moderate in politics and judicial in mind, was especially effective. Where in Piedmontese legislation, he asked, was any record that the State recognized the absolute rights of Church or Pope to temporal property? The religious corporations were simply tenants, not owners. The State had equal jurisdiction over corporations and parsons: it could prescribe how property might be acquired, how it must be held, and how it could be transmitted. In respect to private ownership

⁹ Brofferio, vi, 776-80.

the State does not ask whether it be useful, just or opportune that one person rather than another should have a piece of property: but the case changes completely when chartered corporations are concerned. "When a citizen desires to withdraw his substance from free circulation, and to endow an institution in perpetuity, who is interested? The Government: therefore, it belongs to the Government to approve such a foundation. According to the present custom among free peoples, the withdrawing of a property, when there is no motive of public utility, is not permitted; and this was the motive for abolishing feoffments; if there be involved an institution of public utility, the Government must see whether this work corresponds to social wants and needs." ¹⁰ Because Boncompagni was so judicial and upright, his reproof of Clericals was all the more stinging. They dragged Religion down, he said, "into the field where an ignoble polemic was on; they identified her with the privileges, the prerogatives, the riches of her ministers; they turned back to honor the superstitious beliefs of the Middle Age; they merged the cause of the Church with that of the oppressors wherever extortions did not profit the clergy; they insinuated a contempt for Liberal ideals which are the soul and life of our institutions; they justify and praise perjury wherever perjury serves to destroy liberty; they have held up as a target for insults and calumnies the names of the most honored men who refused to bow to their most uncivilized doctrines; and thus they give occasion and a pretext for whoever chooses to insult religion and the Catholic Church." ¹¹

Such an arraignment, from a judge who was himself a Catholic, might well put the Clericals on the defensive: but most of them took the ground that Church, clergy, monks, and Jesuits, were so far above reproach that to criticise them, much more to level at them this atrocious bill, was impious. Among its opponents were Cavour's brother, De Viry, Francesco Pallavicino and the ever-unshaken Solaro della Margherita.

Brofferio made the most brilliant speech of his life in defending the bill. He reviewed with sarcasm the claims put forward in behalf of the religious congregations. He declared that monkery was neither useful, moral, nor just. He upheld Boncompagni's contention that corporations must be amenable to the State.

¹⁰ Brofferio, vi, 783.

¹¹ *Ibid*, vi, 784.

The priest himself, he said, is only a mortmain, without legal existence. Then he turned the flashlight of history on the origin and growth of ecclesiastical property-holding. He quoted Dante's cry against the Donation of Constantine, which planted in the Church that love of Mammon which was to pollute and stultify her. Brofferio next replied to those who insisted that the wishes of the dead, expressed through pious foundations, should be respected forever. He recalled that in pagan times priests had heaped up riches and guarded them with religious imprecations — "for priests are all alike, from Samuel to Tiresias, and from Calchas to Pius IX." But what had become, he asked, of the gifts, the funds, the bequests which the ancients lavished upon their oracles and shrines? Did the Christians respect the wishes of the pious Pagan benefactors? Far from it. They seized whatever they could lay hands on; and then they developed their own matchless system for amassing wealth. They showed by their conduct towards their Pagan forerunners that as times change, the wishes of the dead must give way to the needs of the living. By their avarice they brought down upon themselves the maledictions of Dante, who described Rome as the place where every day Christ is bought and sold. "And is this the piously acquired substance," Brofferio asked ironically, "which the clergy defends today with much holy wrath?"

The apologists of the monks had pleaded that they should be preserved because of the good they had done in early chaotic times by perpetuating learning. Give them what credit you will, Brofferio replied, but recollect that they protected learning not for mankind, but to increase their own power. They closed the doors of the cloisters on the world, in order to enjoy a monopoly of scholarship for themselves: and as soon as knowledge began to spread through secular investigators and teachers they persecuted it. The art of printing was quickly followed by priestly checks: in less than a century 20,000 books were placed on the *Index*. Wherever science lifted its head, the Vatican hurled its thunderbolts to destroy it. "Chemistry was proscribed, anatomy was proscribed, mathematics were proscribed, astronomy was proscribed; magnetism was proscribed, steam was proscribed, vaccination was proscribed; railways were proscribed, and scientific congresses, and normal schools, and even pauper

asylums: in short, they proscribed everything, down to works of beneficence, unless these were performed under their auspices and according to their usages. If the Inquisition had succeeded in destroying all the works it has proscribed, what, today, would be the inheritance of the human intellect? — Vacuity, ignorance, and darkness.”

Passing from generals to particulars, Brofferio cited the names of some of the great thinkers who were condemned by the Catholic Church, from Bacon, Pascal, and Locke, down to Kant and Rosmini; great men of science like Copernicus, Galileo, Buffon, Cuvier; great historians like Machiavelli, Gibbon, Sarpi, Hume and Sismondi; masters of literature like La Fontaine, Milton, Alfieri, Victor Hugo, Chateaubriand and Lamartine. And not content with damning the books of the light-bringers, the Church tortured and burned their bodies, when it could catch them: witness Arnaldo of Brescia, John of Prague, John Huss, and many more, including Giordano Bruno, “whose atrocious case merits special commemoration.” Not even as preservers of the monuments of antiquity, Brofferio declared, do friars and priests deserve our gratitude. They dismantled Old Rome to build their palaces and churches and convents; they allowed the Roman Forum to become the Campo Vaccino; *quod non fecerunt barbari, fecerunt Barberini*.

To the unblushing assertion that the Popes had been promoters of Italian Independence, Brofferio gave the lie. The Papacy, he declared, — and he did not need to quote Machiavelli for confirmation, — has been the cause that kept Italy disunited. “Here is the truth — the foreigners in Italy were always invited by the Popes. Who called Pepin? Stephen II. Who called Charlemagne? Adrian I.” And so of Arnulf, the Ottos, Henry II, Conrad, and Charles of Anjou — all called by the Popes. “What more? Who in these last years called Spaniards, Austrians, and French against Italian liberty, and had the Pantheon, the Capitol, even St. Peter’s, bombarded? It was the Pope — it was Pius IX.”

Brofferio chided those supporters of the bill who justified it on economic grounds. He denounced the suggestion that exception should be made of certain religious orders, especially of those devoted to education. “Your great error,” he proclaimed, “was

in protecting the teaching friars. Clerical education is the poison of society, because into the heart of youth, priest and friar can never instil anything except the maxims of the Roman Curia, maxims which are and will always be contrary to every sentiment of progress, to every patriotic zeal, to every affection for Liberty. In keeping the Preaching Orders, you keep the Dominicans, that is the apostles of the Inquisition; in keeping the Teaching Friars, you keep the Ignorantelli, you keep the apostles of the Loyolans; in keeping the Mendicants, you diminish in Piedmont industrious men and work, and, besides, you allow to exist the evil example of pauperism, which you condemn on your statute books." Nevertheless, though dissatisfied because the reform was not thorough, Brofferio said that he should vote for the bill. He concluded in a peroration which belongs among the best specimens of an eloquence which, while rhetorical, is vitalized by genuine passion. "There are 490 convents in the State," he said. "Does the Ministry propose to me to suppress them all? I will give it my vote with great exultation. Will it suppress only half of them? I resign myself, and vote for the abolition of 245 convents. Does it ask me to suppress 100? I vote for 100. Will it suppress 10? I vote for 10. I vote for the suppression of a single convent. Will it abolish one priest? I vote for the abolition of one priest. In politics, to refuse an atom of good because you cannot get more, is, in my eyes, a great error. . . . Therefore, I vote for this law; but I declare that I vote for it awaiting better times, better men, and better laws." ¹²

Brofferio's speech breathed the aversion and distrust which intelligent Italians had come to feel, after many centuries of intimate, bitter experience, for the Roman priestcraft. He would have destroyed it root and branch, without delay. But Cavour, having the statesman's instinct, knew that immature revolutions recoil into reaction. The best that he hoped for was to pass a law which, securing the support of the majority in Parliament, could be effectively carried out in the country. Hence his willingness to except from the list of corporations to be suppressed certain orders and houses having special claims to exemption. Even this seemed dubious, because a formidable obstacle sprang up in an unlooked-for quarter.

The King, who had hitherto stood loyally by the new régime in

¹² Brofferio, vi, 788-96. B. evidently mistook *John* for *Jerome* of Prague.

Piedmont, now seemed to waver. An extraordinary series of blows threatened to break his resolution. From the moment he received the letter of the three prelates he had no peace of mind. "Since I saw you this morning," he wrote La Marmora, for whom he felt more friendship than for the other Ministers, "I have received another letter from Monsignor Charvaz, with severe reproaches. I see clearly that the affair is becoming serious, and the person who is going to bear all the disagreeables is I; for, so far as you Ministers are concerned, when you are in a fix, I know well what you do; and I am left in the sauce. My mother and wife do nothing but tell me that they are dying of grief for me; you can understand what pleasure that gives me; now they will hear the rest. From what Rattazzi said, I thought that the affair would not present such grave difficulties and that there was a half-accord with the bishops and with Rome; but it is quite different. In a word, I do what I can. We shall see where it comes out."¹³ In spite of his good intentions, the King soon found it hard to withstand the direct entreaties of his mother and wife and the indirect manipulations of the Clericals. Revel was secretly plotting to overthrow the Cabinet, and the Duke de Guiche was sowing rumors in Paris of a ministerial crisis. Confessors, priests and prelates lost no opportunity to sprinkle over the King's already disturbed mind the most alarming suggestions.

The debate on the bill began in the Chamber of Deputies on January 9. The next day the Queen-Mother, Maria Theresa, died, and Parliament suspended its session.¹⁴ When it reconvened on January 21, it was officially informed of the death by puerperal fever of the Queen, Maria Adelaide, whose infant had not survived her. Three deaths in less than a fortnight were followed, on February 10, by that of the King's brother and very dear comrade, Ferdinand, Duke of Genoa, who died of consumption. Such a succession of losses might overwhelm anyone. In Victor Emanuel's case they meant more than bereavement. In the silence he could hear his mother and wife implore him to make his peace with the Church, as he hoped to meet them hereafter: and perhaps remorse for gallantries which had saddened his patient wife stung him and quickened the desire, natural to

¹³ *Lettere*, II, 76.

¹⁴ Daniel writes Marcy, Jan. 12, 1855, that Cavour's Ministry will fall unless the bill for the suppression of convents passes the Chamber in a few days. *Amer. Arch.*

all of us in the presence of the dead, to carry out her wishes. The Clericals, aware of the strain of superstition which the King inherited from many pious ancestors, boldly proclaimed that they saw in these calamities "the Finger of God," who was taking vengeance on him for permitting the Church to be outraged. In an allocution (January 22) pronounced while the Queen was not yet buried, Pius IX, after declaring null all the laws which Piedmont had passed against the rights of the Holy See, condemned the new bill in advance, and threatened with the greater excommunication everybody who was concerned in its passage or operation or who might simply give it a theoretic approval. The allocution was published,¹⁵ together with a statement by Cardinal Antonelli of the long negotiations between the Vatican and the Piedmontese Government. The Cardinal had no difficulty in producing such evidence as he required to show that the Curia had been uniformly right and always impelled by the most disinterested motives. Rome, forgiving, conciliatory and long-suffering; Turin, disloyal, treacherous, ruthless, wicked — such the easy antithesis which the Cardinal drew.

When Massimo d'Azeglio read this arraignment, he wrote a reply to it which is a model of vigorous but urbane rebuttal: a precious epitome, too, of the reasons for which high-minded Italians who were Catholics in religion, deplored and repudiated the Papal machine, which, in its greed for worldly power, made religion a mockery and had almost exterminated common morals. Dismissing Antonelli's charge of disloyalty, D'Azeglio described how as Prime Minister he had had the experience, similar to that of everyone else who negotiated with the Court of Rome, of finding that he must deal, not with pious, holy men, but with men who had transformed themselves into a political sect, and who stooped to adopt the passions, the forms, even the words of unscrupulous politicians. With regret he declared that "at Rome more than elsewhere the artificial conscience smothers the natural conscience, justice according to the canon law rubs down the sense of equity planted by God in the hearts of all." This artificial conscience of the Roman Curia injured not only those who had business with Rome, but the Curia itself, by taking away from it an understanding of the true and real world, as it existed in every civilized country: hence the amazing mistakes into

¹⁵ Chantrel, 210-12; Jan. 22, 1855.

which Rome often fell, supposing that to be useful which was often damaging to her. Coming to the history of the recent negotiations between Turin and the Vatican, D'Azeglio described how the new régime needed a reorganization of judicial and civic status: how the government honestly tried to effect this with the coöperation of the Holy See, because, if these changes were made by the Party of Revolution, the Holy See and the State must expect little mercy; and how to every overture Rome replied, "No, no, and forever no! let the State dash to its ruin, let it be torn by parties and by tumults, what do we care? No!" In conclusion, D'Azeglio made a simple statement of fact, to illustrate his criticism of Papal methods: "For several centuries," he said, "the Court of Rome has had the governing of some three millions of subjects. It exercises over them in their full extent the two authorities, spiritual and temporal. What has it made of these subjects? It has wrought so that it required four armies to restore the Papal Court to power, and it requires, and will always require, two foreign armies to keep it there."¹⁶

Antonelli naturally made no reply to D'Azeglio, who spoke so clearly the belief of millions of Italians.

The debate in the Chambers was resumed. The underhand struggle of the Clericals to capture the King went on. The time came for Cavour to defend the bill before the deputies. He had the difficult task of advocating the measure not on the grounds which would be most popular at the moment, but on those which he felt would, in the long run, best commend themselves to reason. He did not propose to abolish the religious orders because they were deservedly hateful and hated. He would not listen to the proposal to sequester their property. His friends begged him to make a clean sweep, but he resisted them. Brofferio and others had declared that to base so just a reform on a mere question of saving a million lire was sordid and unworthy: but Cavour, always cautious in these ecclesiastical affairs to avoid the semblance of acting as a critic of religion, held firmly to his purpose of defending the bill on economic, financial and social grounds. Well aware that Catholicism would continue to be the religion of the Piedmontese, he wished to make it as easy as possible for the officers of the Church to perform their functions after the State

¹⁶ M. d'Azeglio's letter is reprinted in Zini, II, i, 484-91.

should pass this reform. It was never his habit to sow gratuitous discord, or to stir up unremunerative hostility.

In the two speeches (February 17 and 23, 1855) which he delivered in the Chamber, Cavour embodied the historic spirit. After acknowledging the service which the Monastic Orders had rendered to society in the Dark and Middle Ages, he showed how, by remaining immobile in their rules while society progressed, they dropped out of relation with life, so that, instead of benefiting society, they had become an impediment to its welfare. All the fine purposes for which they once worked — arts, sciences, industry, agriculture — were now served much more efficiently by uncloistered men and women.

Monks, once devoted to labor, had sunk into miserable sloth. They glorified mendicancy — they would make holy a condition of pauperism which civilized society everywhere condemned and, when it could, punished. The hope of the masses, who must live directly by the sweat of their brow, was that this labor of theirs should be productive, a condition which involved the widest possible diffusion of true and solid instruction. But the monks neither promoted education nor increased the productivity of their lands — in most cases, on the contrary, they let them go to seed. Ignorant themselves, they were content if only the multitude was more ignorant. "These are not theories," said Cavour; "but truths confirmed by the most conclusive facts. Compare, for example, Spain and the Kingdom of Naples, countries in which monks survive, with England, with Prussia, with France: there has been for three centuries an absolute check to the economic development of the former, and, on the contrary, progress, and very rapid progress among the others." The Swiss Cantons and the Rhenish provinces, offer, he added, proof of the same truth.

Having shown that the Orders had no longer an economic justification for existing, Cavour warned those who pleaded that they ought nevertheless to be preserved because they were an element of the general religious system, that that was a dangerous argument. To demand that an avowed evil be perpetuated for the good of religion, must throw doubt on the quality of religion itself. He cited Savoy, the province of the Kingdom having the largest number of monks and priests, as an instance of

the detriment which monks worked to the legitimate influence of religion. He drew a laugh on Revel, the faithful champion of Papalism, by recalling that it was the Revel Ministry which expelled the Jesuits in 1848.

To opponents who attacked the inconsistency of excepting the teaching congregations from the proposed law of suppression, Cavour replied that, while he should not himself put a son under their instruction, it would be unwise to do away with them before secular teachers had been trained to supplant them. College faculties, he said, cannot be improvised to order; and parents whose sons got inferior instruction at a hurriedly organized secular institution, would both regret the teaching monks and priests and be prejudiced against secular management in general. Having announced that he would not consent to the State's taking over control of the property of the Church, he declared that the first question to be decided was, Is the measure opportune? He argued that it was: first, because the relations with the Curia were likely to grow worse and not better, since the "Ultra-Catholics," flushed by their recent advance in France, Austria, Holland and England, were grown arrogant; next, because the European situation precluded the possibility that the Great Powers would pay much attention to little Piedmont's quarrel over convents; and finally, because the country itself would be continually agitated, until this reform, which both justice and popular opinion demanded, should be carried out. Wisdom, prudence, statesmanship warned against the peril of letting the opportune moment slip by — a warning which he drove home by citing William Pitt's bungled treatment of Ireland.¹⁷

On March 2 the House passed the bill by an overwhelming majority, 116 ayes to 36 nays. This victory was only provisional, however; for the Senate, the stronghold of reaction, had still to be won over, and the decision of Victor Emanuel, on which the result hinged, became more and more uncertain. Throughout those weeks of hot debate, the heart of the bereaved King was the stage on which a drama of portentous significance to Italy was being unfolded. He listened to the tonic words of his Ministers; he listened to the doubts and menaces whispered by Clerical courtiers and artful prelates; he heard the spectral

¹⁷ *Discorsi*, VIII, 240-88. Artom-Blanc, I, 407-509.

voices of his dead mother and wife utter their solemn entreaties. He was showing ominously the effects of his long moral strain. "He is in a very pitiful state," wrote Constance d'Azeglio. "All who see him are struck by his thinness and paleness, and by the way he has become bent and aged. He has explosions of grief which wring one's heart."¹⁸ The Court physicians bled him:¹⁹ but although he attended to his official duties, he was not himself. By turns irascible and resigned, he was in no mood to make and hold a firm resolve. He cursed the fate which thrust him, a blunt, soldierly nature, into the vortex of an ecclesiastical conflict. "Happy are you, General," he said with a sigh to Giacomo Durando setting out for the Crimea; "you go to fight Russians; it falls to me to fight monks and nuns."²⁰ But if he seemed to waver, if there were moments when dread of Papal damnation or the desire to be rid of an intolerable problem, almost overcame him, he was confronted by the oath he had given to uphold the Constitution: his sense of honor, which was perhaps as superstitious as his religion, would not permit him to forswear that. Then would follow the reaction, when he felt himself impelled to beg his spiritual advisers to find a way for him to avoid the displeasure of the Holy See. So the weeks dragged on in an agony of suspense.

During this time the Blacks never reposed. By fair means or foul they would block the bill in the Senate. They showered down protests and petitions; their newspapers poured out abuse, threats and portentous warnings on the Liberals and urgent appeals on the faithful. The Roman Curia was in constant communication with the Piedmontese prelates; and there can be little doubt that the Blacks, both at Rome and Turin, sought advice from Austria. The frantic efforts made by the Curia measured the importance it attached to the proposed reform: and with reason, because the reform, if carried out, would indicate that in Piedmont the State was master. With supernal consistency the Papalists were fighting for the supremacy of the Papalized Church over the State. They cared nothing for the fact that the Monastic Orders had outgrown their usefulness; nothing for the charges of sloth, worldliness and sensuality

¹⁸ C. d'Azeglio, p. 497; April 9, 1855. ¹⁹ Mayor, p. 244; C. to Villamarina, April 3, 1855. ²⁰ Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, I, 185.

leveled against them; nothing for the immense sums enjoyed by the prelates; nothing for the 2500 poor curates famishing on their beggar's pittance. From the Pope down to his humblest Ultramontane supporter, the one principle that the Blacks fought for was that no privilege, no exemption, no temporality, were it worth but a farthing, should be taken from the Church by the State. To defend that temporal farthing, the Pope was prepared to launch every spiritual bolt in his arsenal. To be thwarted by little Piedmont at the very time when he had triumphantly proclaimed the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, had forced Austria to sign a concordat and France to truckle for Clerical support, would be too bitter a humiliation.

On their side, the Liberals were not idle. Cavour despatched a circular letter to the Piedmontese envoys abroad to interpret the Papal action in its proper light. He reprinted and spread broadcast Pius's allocution, which he declared was intended chiefly to terrorize the King.²¹ He encouraged counter-protests and counter-petitions. His colleagues were equally energetic. Their friends in Parliament never flagged. The Liberal newspapers defended the reform with varying degrees of zeal and logic. The Radicals, dissatisfied with the bill, assailed its enemies, denounced Papal arrogance and condemned monkery and all its adepts. The Radical press matched the Clerical in abuse.

With the public thus excited, the bill was introduced into the Senate, and referred to a committee of five, of whom two were lukewarm in its favor, two opposed, and one partly for and partly against.²² The debate, which opened on April 23, had progressed with vigor on both sides for three days, when Parliament and the country were amazed by an unexpected announcement. Monsignor Calabiana, Bishop of Casale, together with Billet, Archbishop of Chambéry, and Bishop Ghilardi of Mondovì, offered in behalf of the episcopate of the Kingdom and with the permission of the Pope, to contribute for the support of the underpaid curates the 928,412.30 lire which the Government counted upon saving if the bill were passed. They made this offer as a token of their loyalty to the Throne, and of their desire to put an end to the impious attempt to encroach upon the rights

²¹ *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 77-82.

²² Giacinto Collegno and Desambrois; Lodovico Sauli and Sclopis; Colla. See Artom-Blanc, I, 494-95.

of the Holy See. The Bishops' Bribe had been secretly proposed more than a month earlier, as a last resort by which the reform might be prevented. When the King, in his distress, privately asked Bishop Calabiana for help, the Bishop and his colleagues devised this specious compromise, and the Pope gave it his approval on condition that the Liberals could not be openly beaten in the Senate. That the bishops decided to resort to it, indicates that they feared to risk a vote. Having Pius's consent, they secretly laid the proposal before the King. Here was a way, they told him, by which he could escape from the wrath which God was visiting upon him for his sinful participation in despoiling the Church. On April 24 Bishop Calabiana submitted the offer to the King, who gave Cavour the "very grateful news" on the following day. Although he had had suspicion of the intrigue for some time past,²³ Cavour was none the less surprised. The King, buoyant at being relieved of an intolerable burden, expressed his pleasure that at last they had found a remedy for the quarrel between Church and State. Cavour, however, could not share this satisfaction. He pointed out that, by accepting the terms, the State would practically renounce the very rights for which it had been contending, rights on which, in fact, its independent authority rested. He doubted whether the Senate would adopt the proposal. He tried to make the King realize that the "Episcopate" had no corporate existence, and that to treat with them as an equal with an equal would humiliate Piedmont.²⁴ Nevertheless, if his Majesty commanded, the Senate should be informed. Victor Emanuel insisted.

That very day in defending the bill before the Senate Cavour cited some memorable historic instances of the ruin which had punished those who refused to accede betimes to legitimate demands for reform. "The guilt of the disasters of 1793," he said, "must be assigned not to the illustrious and unfortunate public

²³ The first letter from Rome was dated March 20. Cavour's secret agents soon informed him of the negotiations. On April 8, the *Opinione*, in an article inspired by him, disclosed the "Proposal of the Episcopate."

²⁴ Dina, I, 144-45; *Opinione*, April 8, 1855. But *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 84, asserts that Cavour himself was the first to hold tentative conferences with the bishops, and hoped to arrange without the knowledge of the Holy See until the bargain was closed. No accessible documents confirm this assertion. Some of C.'s opponents intimated that he instigated the proposal in order the more easily, at the proper moment, to discredit the Episcopate. *Lettere*, II, 108, n. 1, quoting the pamphlet *Cavour e l'Opposizione*.

men of 1789, — to the members of the great Assembly which proclaimed those principles of liberty which can nevermore be canceled from the code of the nations, — but in truth to the men who opposed every reform from the beginning of Louis XVI's reign, and to those haughty prelates, to those courtiers who accused Turgot and Malesherbes, as we today are accused, of being innovators and revolutionists." As to the doubt lest the proposed law would stir up agitation in the country, Cavour reminded them that "that was not the first time when a fateful struggle had been brought on between the Liberal principle, the principle of progress, and the principle of Reaction covered by the religious mantle." In the 17th century in England, he said, "the reactionary party, led by the Jesuits, declared war to the death on the ideas of Liberty and Progress: the result was the catastrophe in which the dynasty of the Stuarts went down. At a recent epoch, after the Restoration in France, an intelligent and prudent prince had succeeded in rewelding the chain of the times, in reëstablishing harmony and peace between the Old Régime and the New. But his successor, having surrendered himself wholly to the party which, under the pretext of favoring the interests of religion, combated every tendency to progress and to Liberty, engaged in a struggle which ended with the fall of the ancient throne of the Bourbons. I hope, gentlemen, that our venerable clergy, taught by history, will not choose to follow the examples which I have recalled." ²⁵ Perhaps Cavour had these words in mind during his interview with the King.

He arranged with the President of the Senate ²⁶ for the announcement on the following day (April 26) of the Bishops' Bribe. After Monsignor Calabiana outlined the offer which the Episcopate, in its desire to preserve harmony, and as a proof of its "unlimited devotion to the King," hoped would be accepted, Cavour acknowledged most courteously "the sentiments of patriotism" which inspired the bishops; but, as the proposal cut away the foundations of the legislation under discussion, he requested that the Senate adjourn in order that the Cabinet might confer. This was done. The Ministers agreed unanimously that they could not take the bribe held out to them. Cavour explained their position to the King and presented their

²⁵ *Discorsi*, VIII, 256-57.

²⁶ Baron Giuseppe Manno; *Lettere*, II, 328.

resignations. In the Senate he stated that while he and his colleagues recognized the benevolent purpose of the Episcopate, they would not be the proper agents to carry out the new policy which, if Piedmont accepted the offer, must be adopted. The announcement of their resignation threw all but the Clericals into a panic, for only the few on the inside could know the strength or weakness of the bishops' backing. The fact which most alarmed the country was that, if Cavour retired at this crisis, the cause not merely of Liberalism, but of the State against the Church, must fail. The sovereign's apparent surrender to the Reactionists increased the dread. With Cavour gone and Victor Emanuel controlled by the Jesuits, what hope for Piedmont?

The King, however, instead of summoning Count Revel to form a new Ministry, as that consistent leader of the Blacks and his friends expected, laid the task on General Giacomo Durando, Minister of War in the Cavourian Cabinet. The King hoped that, without sacrificing the dignity of the State, some way might be found to accept the bishops' offer. Even now he had not deserted his Liberal course. But the Clericals redoubled their pressure. "They tell me," he said, "that God has willed to smite me: that he has snatched away my mother, my wife, my brother; and, because I have consented to these laws, they threaten me with worse chastisements; but do they not know that a sovereign, who wishes truly to assure his own happiness in the next world, must make his people happy on this earth?"²⁷ Durando could not persuade anybody to undertake the policy of contradictions which the King, consulting his longing for peace rather than his common sense, had mapped out. The crisis was prolonged, and every hour the danger grew. Then, by a single human stroke, heroic but simple, the knot was cut.

Massimo d'Azeglio, who had deemed the Rattazzi bill inopportune, still supported it; and now he felt it his duty to tell the King the peril he was running. Twice he called at the Palace, and twice he was denied an interview. So he wrote this letter:

"YOUR MAJESTY, — In Spain it was forbidden to touch the King under pain of death. One there was whose clothes caught fire: nobody dared to touch him, and the King died burnt. But I, were I to risk my head or even to lose utterly your grace, would hold myself the vilest of men if in a moment like this I failed to

²⁷ Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, I, 186-87.

address you a word in writing, since your Majesty does not give me leave to speak with you. Your Majesty, believe an old and faithful servant, who, in serving you, has never thought of anything except your welfare, your fame, and the good of the country: I say to you with tears in my eyes and kneeling at your feet, *Do not proceed farther on the road you have taken.* There is still time. Go back to the earlier road. A monkish intrigue has succeeded in destroying in a day the work of your reign, in agitating the country, in shaking the Constitution, in darkening your reputation as a loyal King. You have not a moment to lose. The official declarations have not resolved the question in the last appeal. It was said that the Crown wished to seek new lights. Let the Crown say that the lights have shown it that the proposed conditions are unacceptable. Let them be considered as if they had not been made; and let things resume their natural and constitutional, earlier course.

“Piedmont bears everything, but to be put again under the priestly yoke. In God’s name, no! In Spain, see to what the monks’ intrigues with the Queen, to make her sign a shameful concordat, have reduced her! These intrigues ruined James Stuart, Charles X and many others. Your Majesty knows that the things I predicted have come to pass. Believe me, there is no question of religion, but of selfish interests. Amedeo II disputed thirty years with Rome and won. Stand firm, and your Majesty will win too. Do not be angry with me. This act of mine is the act of an honest man, of a faithful subject, of a true friend.”²⁸

Victor Emanuel had a very high sense of kingship, but this did not prevent him from prizing such from-man-to-man comradeship as D’Azeglio showed in his noble letter. The warning affected him, although for the moment he seemed unwilling to heed it. At the news of Cavour’s resignation, the Turinese grew angry. Crowds collected in all parts of the city, marched to the Royal Palace and showed sullen signs of disapproval. The King watched them for a while from a window, and then, turning to his trusty valet, Cinzano, he said impatiently, “I will soon put an end to these demonstrations.” To which Cinzano, with the privilege of an old familiar, replied: “But then, what if We were

²⁸ Text in *Lettere*, II, 107. This very day Cavour sent a note to D’Azeglio urging him to read to the King “some of the fine things the English are writing about us.” D’Azeglio’s letter seems to have been written after this note. *Lettere*, II, 329.

put an end to?"²⁹ At this time also the King sent one of his servants into the city to gather impressions as to popular sentiment. On returning, the man hesitated to speak. "Speak out!" said Victor Emanuel. "But, Sire, I have heard something shocking." "Never mind, tell it." "They say," ventured the servant, "that your Majesty is a great scoundrel" (*baloss*). The King uttered an untranslatable Piedmontese expletive, brought his fist down on the table, and said no more.³⁰ Troops were ordered out to disperse the throngs. Fortunately, no accident precipitated a fight: but when the battalions of the National Guard were called on to cheer the King they remained dumb. Even the Clericals began to be afraid of their delusive victory.

Durando meanwhile struggled to scrape together a Ministry which would undertake to reopen negotiations with Rome, without, however, pledging itself to accept the Bishops' Bribe. He found the task impossible. The deadlock had extended through six days, when, on the morning of May 2d, Victor Emanuel lost patience, and sent this message to the Clericals: "I will wait till three o'clock this afternoon for their proposals. If they have not come by that time, I shall turn again to the Pet Aversion" — the nickname (*Bête Noire*) by which the Blacks called Cavour.³¹ Three o'clock struck, but brought no response: the King summoned Cavour. At the opening of the next day's session of Parliament, General Durando, after briefly stating that his efforts to form a Cabinet had failed, announced that by the King's command the former Ministers had returned to office (May 3). Thus Piedmont outlived her most perilous crisis since 1849.

"Without believing myself indispensable," Cavour wrote to Lafitte, "I confess that in the actual circumstances, a change of ministry might have had unpleasant consequences: for our country, generally calm and moderate, is unmanageable on the Clerical Question. It would bear the yoke of the Austrians more easily than that of the priests. What has occurred proves this; for it was only necessary to have it thought that I was being sacrificed to that party, in order to cause the taxes and imposts with which I have burdened my countrymen to be forgotten and to make me exceedingly popular."³²

²⁹ Castelli: *Cavour*, 65, n. 1.

³⁰ Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, 188.

³¹ *Ibid*, 188-89.

³² *Lettere*, II, 267; C. to Lafitte, May 8, 1855.

The Senate immediately resumed its debate of the Rattazzi bill. The Clericals, dreading that the vote would go against them, resorted to procrastination and would have supported the suggestion of Senator Gallina that the discussion be adjourned till the following September so as to enable the Government to come to terms with Rome. To this Cavour flatly objected. "From negotiations conducted on such a basis," he said, "we shall never, *never* reach even the probability of arriving at an agreement; because, gentlemen, if you wish to negotiate with the Court of Rome on questions of principles, you will never come to any result. You may succeed in coming to an agreement on matters of fact with that Court, but on the principles which regulate the relation of the civil power with the ecclesiastical power — never."³³

But besides this reason, Cavour adduced another which made it imperative not to delay. Among free peoples, great questions cannot be adjourned until they are settled. Postponement adds fuel to agitation: and in proportion as times are difficult and circumstances grave, the policy of the government should be decided. There was no further talk of delay: but the Cabinet accepted an amendment, proposed by Senator Desambrois, which somewhat softened the harshness of the measure, without affecting its principles.³⁴ The bill as amended passed the Senate by 53 ayes to 42 nays (May 22). Being referred back to the Deputies, they accepted it as revised, — by 95 votes to 23 and one member not voting, — although Brofferio on the Left and Della Margherita on the Right joined in denouncing it (May 29). The King signed the law that very day, and the next he prorogued the session of the Great Parliament, which had voted for the Crimean Expedition and had upheld the sovereignty of the State against ecclesiastical encroachments.³⁵

Having carried through this reform and the Crimean project

■ *Discorsi*, ix, 279; May 21, 1855.

³⁴ C. writes to E. d'Azeglio on May 15, 1855: "The Desambrois . . . amendment has been voted by a majority of two votes. This is not brilliant, but it is much, considering all the intrigues employed to defeat it. . . . It is difficult to see the final issue, for a headache or stomachache, attacking some of the Ministerialists, or some of the Senators of the Opposition, might exert a great influence on the fate of the law." Bianchi: *Politique*, 69-70.

³⁵ *Lettere*, II, 108-13. Artom-Blanc, I, 499-507. Brofferio, vi, 445-49. Massari: *Vitt. Em.*, 189. Massari: *Cavour*, 124.

simultaneously, Cavour welcomed rest. The knowledge that Piedmont's foreign venture would be a mockery, if Reaction triumphed at home, added to his anxiety. Rattazzi, too, who had ably seconded Cavour in both measures, was much worn.³⁶ Soon after, in reconstructing the Cabinet, Cavour kept the portfolio of Finance but intrusted that of Foreign Affairs to Cibrario, in whom he had perfect confidence; Rattazzi remained Minister of the Interior; Lanza, a strong ally, took Public Instruction; Deforesta was head of the Department of Justice, and the well-seasoned Paleocapa continued to direct Public Works. Durando, another recent reinforcement, proved unexpectedly active ■ Minister of War and of the Marine. Both he and Lanza brought desired strength to the Cabinet's debating resources in Parliament.

By the Rattazzi Law 334 convents, involving 5506 persons, were suppressed. Of these convents, 186 belonged to the Mendicants, aggregating 3158 persons — to abolish over 3000 worthless beggars was indeed a stroke for progress. Of the total number dispossessed, 4308 were monks and 1198 were nuns. There still remained 21 orders, with 274 houses and 4050 persons.³⁷ Whoever judged the reforms from the standpoint of the social welfare could not charge it with being thorough; but it vindicated the principle that the Church, as holder of property and as organizer of ecclesiastical corporations, should not set itself above the law of the State. To achieve this victory without bloodshed and without planting the seeds of civil war, against the resourceful wiles of the Papalists, against the hidden ruses of Austria, and with the King's decision trembling so long in the balance, measured the soundness of the Subalpine Parliament, led by Cavour and his colleagues. Had the result gone otherwise, Piedmont might have ceased, for a time at least, to be the refuge of Constitutional Liberty. That would have been a terrible check to the Italian cause.

³⁶ See C. to Alfonso La Marmora, May 31, 1855; *Lettere*, II, 331-33. C. to Villamarina, June 2, 1855; Mayor, 292. C. to E. d'Azeglio, June 2; Bianchi: *Politique*, 75.

³⁷ Artom-Blanc, I, 507-09, gives a list of the suppressed and of the permitted orders.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CONGRESS OF PARIS

THE very week when the Bishops' Bribe threw the country into an uproar, the Piedmontese contingent began to embark at Genoa for the Crimea.¹ They numbered nearly 18,000 men, the best soldiers that any Italian State had put into the field since the Napoleonic Wars.² General Alfonso La Marmora commanded them. When he asked Cavour for instructions, the Prime Minister said simply, "Do your best."³ The troops departed amid conflicting emotions. Their friends felt that they were being sent on a wild-goose chase, if not to certain sacrifice. Only a few were buoyed up by a vision of the possible compensation. Misfortune seemed to pursue the expedition from the start. One of the provision ships, the *Creso*, caught fire and burned, causing the loss of 27 men and a great cargo of stores. When La Marmora reached Balaclava, he had to use all his tact in order to prevent his little army from being pocketed in an inconspicuous position. It had been stipulated that, though acting in concert with the Allies, he was to be in no sense a mere dependent. Napoleon wished to keep the contingent "out of sight at Constantinople as a reserve corps."⁴ Lord Raglan, the well-meaning but incompetent commander of the British, naturally regarded the Piedmontese, for whose cost England was advancing the funds, as under his orders. La Marmora, however, by firmness and frankness, both secured a post which he deemed worthy of his troops, and kept on cordial relations with the English generals.⁵

If the Piedmontese Corps had been used merely to fill in gaps, the purpose of the expedition would have been thrown away.

¹ The first transports sailed April 21, La Marmora April 29. Bishop Calabiana made his proposal to the Senate April 26.

² Tivaroni, I, 426. The force included 4500 horses and 36 cannon.

³ "*Ingegnati*," La Marmora reports Cavour as saying (*Un Po' più di Luce*); Massari (*La Marmora*, 160) gives C.'s reply, "Get out of it as best you can; *arrangez!*" ⁴ Cesaresco, 92. ⁵ *Lettere*, II, 346, 350. *Politique*, 80, 83.

They must keep their individuality; they must achieve some special exploit. La Marmora jealously guarded the former, but fate seemed to withhold the desired occasion for glory. Pitching its camp between the French and English lines, the little army set up an orderly small city of huts, to fend from the scorching heat. The men were cheerful, laborious, disciplined: and they felt their responsibilities, as Italians who must not be judged inferior to Frenchmen and Britishers in the trials of war. "You have the future of the country in your haversacks," Cavour wrote to La Marmora; "we do not forget it."⁶ Nor did the troops. "Out of this mud Italy will be made," said a soldier to his comrades, as they floundered in the trenches.⁷

The public at home longed for news of a victory. Instead of that, they heard first of inactivity, then of hardships, then of cholera. This scourge, attacking high and low, spread rapidly from tens to scores, from scores to hundreds, and from hundreds to thousands. At one time nearly a quarter of the corps was stricken. More than 1200 victims died, including Alessandro La Marmora, brother of the commander-in-chief, and organizer of the Bersaglieri, those swift, tough, alert and resolute sharpshooters who have had no superiors in Europe. Other officers succumbed: but the little army, in spite of this disaster, did not lose heart. Although Cavour's letters to La Marmora burn with anxiety, he nobly refrains from hampering the General. "We await with a cruel impatience news of a first engagement," he wrote on July 11. "But we recognize that you should be the sole judge of the moment when our troops ought to measure themselves with the Russians."⁸ A few days later, Cavour hopes that La Marmora "will have taken the Malakoff Tower by this time."⁹ The losses from disease, the swelling cost of the expedition, the delay of any success which would justify it in the eyes of the country, weigh heavily on the Prime Minister. Internal affairs are hardly reassuring. The Mazzinians choose this time for another stroke. The Clericals busily push their propaganda in Piedmont and a subtle campaign at Paris, to turn the Emperor against the King.¹⁰ The Blacks, Cavour writes, "are much more powerful and much more able than the Reds; they are also much

⁶ *Lettere*, II, 333. ⁷ Cesaresco, 93. ⁸ *Lettere*, II, 340-41. ⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 341; July 10. ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 340, 345; July 7 and 30; *Politique*, 79, 81; July 13 and 30.

more to be feared. They work underground, and gain ground fast. If this war goes badly, it is probable that they will succeed in overturning the Ministry and taking its place.”¹¹ The Pope, too, seized this occasion to launch a bull of excommunication against everyone who had been concerned in passing the Rattazzi bill. “He was driven to it by his entourage,” says Cavour, “but, at bottom, I do not believe that he wishes to lead to a complete rupture. In fact, he has just authorized his curates to receive the subsidies which the Ecclesiastical Bank is charged to distribute among them. Thereby, the clergy comes to recognize the law against which it protests. *When any one accepts money from you, he becomes your accomplice.*”¹² This contradictory action was characteristic of Pius. His bull had no effect in Piedmont, not even on the mind of the King. Cholera threatened the mainland and ravaged Sardinia. The outlook for crops, favorable in May, grew gloomy by midsummer. August brought diplomatic clouds. Still, “nothing from the army,” Cavour writes laconically. “It is most distressing.”¹³ He began to fear that the campaign might close before the Piedmontese could show their mettle. A brilliant feat was almost indispensable: nevertheless, he would not embarrass La Marmora with advice.¹⁴ At his office in the Ministry he waited late for telegrams. His face was careworn as he took his usual walk under the porticos of Via di Po—that walk which the Turinese were coming to regard as an institution. Among intimates, when he snatched a few hours’ rest at Santena, he did not disguise his anxiety.¹⁵

At length the clouds broke. At half past two on the morning of August 17 the Minister of War received a message from La Marmora, who announced that the day before, when 50,000 Russians attacked the lines along the Tchernaja, the Piedmontese, fighting to the battle-cry “King and Country,” lost two hundred men, including General Montecvecchio, and repulsed the Russians with considerable loss. “The French despatches will give the rest,” he added, with soldierly brevity.¹⁶ The French and English both agreed that the Piedmontese had fought

¹¹ *Lettere*, II, 345. ¹² *Politique*, 82; C. to E. d’Azeglio, Aug. 7. See also *Lettere*, II, 347, 349. ¹³ *Lettere*, II, 347; Aug. 9. ¹⁴ *Ibid*, 348; Aug. 14.

¹⁵ Massari: *Cavour*, 127, describes one gathering at which were present Cavour, Rattazzi, Hudson, Panizzi, Recchi, Minghetti, Farini, Castelli and himself.

¹⁶ Text of despatch in *Lettere*, II, 357.

"most valiantly." Within a few hours the news spread from the capital throughout the country. Cavour, never impassive under the sway of noble emotion, wept tears of joy.¹⁷ "Truly, we could not read the despatch, we all had a lump in the throat," wrote the self-contained Constance d'Azeglio.¹⁸ The little nation had hardly realized how intensely it had been watching the venture in the Crimea: the reaction of jubilation served as a gauge.

The Battle of the Tchernaja was neither Waterloo nor Gettysburg, nor even Chancellorsville: but it served. Like the skirmish of Lexington, or like the expedition itself, its significance lay in its moral effect. At last a corps of Italians, fighting side by side with the best troops in Europe, had proved themselves equal to the best in drill, courage and leadership.¹⁹ Cavour allowed no jot of this significance to be overlooked: the newspapers took the cue, and many of the opponents of the Alliance now applauded it.²⁰ Every one hoped that the Tchernaja might be the first of a series of military successes. In July the King wrote La Marmora that the war would last in the Crimea all that year, but that the next "we will make it where we have made it already."²¹ To shift the scene from Sebastopol to Lombardy, to confront the Austrians with the Allies, to conjure the liberation of Italy out of the Eastern Question, was the composite motive of the Alliance. Cavour felt very keen chagrin, therefore, when he learned that the Piedmontese had had no part in the fall of Sebastopol (Sept. 8), which occurred after the storming of the Malakoff Tower by the French, the English attack on the Redan having failed through the incompetence of officers and men.²² Still Piedmont assumed that her contingent had a right to share in the glory. "They all assert that they have been favorers [of the expedition] from the beginning," wrote Cavour. The foreign press spoke of Italy with respect.

As the fall of Sebastopol did not end the war, the Allies settled

¹⁷ Massari: *Cavour*, 128. ¹⁸ C. d'Azeglio, 498. ¹⁹ "You have there a jewel of an army," Marshal Bosquet said to Cavour a few months later. Massari: *Cavour*, 128. ²⁰ *Lettere*, II, 352. ²¹ *Ibid*, 117.

²² So great was the English collapse that the Cabinet proposed to supersede Simpson, the mediocrity who followed Raglan, by Charles Windham, who was only a colonel; this meant to pass a junior officer over the heads of a multitude of generals. As Greville remarked (*Journal*, III, 252) this would cast "a slur on the whole service in the eyes of the world." The Cabinet decided, however, to give the chief command to Codrington, a third-rate man, but a general.

down to another winter campaign of watching. Cavour had to consider laying new taxes in order to continue to maintain Piedmont's little army, which had already cost twice the original estimate. At the mere suggestion, there were hostile meetings, with threats of serving him as the Milanese mob served Prina. He was willing that they should howl all they chose against him, so long as they did not embarrass the Government. "When the war is over I shall go — but the taxes will remain." Victor Emanuel, who refused to follow his physicians' orders, or even to care for himself with a minimum of prudence, fell dangerously ill again. Cavour revived a plan which he had proposed in the spring that the King should visit Paris and London, as the guest of Napoleon III and Queen Victoria.²³ The trip would take the King out of his gloomy surroundings and remove him from reactionary tendencies; it would show him to the world as the ally of the sovereigns of the great Western Powers; it would create openings for personal acquaintance which might be of value later. To avoid giving "too political a character" to the visit, Cavour thought that it would be better for him not to go; he also did not want to run the risk of losing credit, if he should return without any apparent benefit secured. As a guarantee that Piedmont was not "infected by the revolutionary rottenness,"²⁴ he desired D'Azeglio to accompany the King. But both King and Ministers insisted that Cavour should go also, and so the two "rivals" set off together, to meet the King at Lyons.²⁵

At Paris, the Emperor welcomed Victor Emanuel with great parade. The public cheered the monarch of gallant little Piedmont wherever he appeared; they found him soldierlike, a quality then fashionable; they knew his reputation for honesty; they sympathized with his recent bereavement. Whilst Court festivities proceeded, Cavour busied himself with statecraft and finance. He had searching talks with most of the political chiefs in France, and especially with the Emperor, over whom he already cast a spell. No one thought then that the Turinese Prime Minister, with his off-hand manner and apparent spontaneity, was actually stronger than the impassive and impenetrable auto-

■ *Lettere*, II, 363, 365.

²⁴ *Lettere*, II, 359.

²⁵ The King and suite left Turin on Nov. 20 and went by sea from Genoa to Nice. C., to save time, crossed the Alps.

crat, who had captured the mercurial French people and was apparently their master, and who, as leader in a European war just closing, was looming up as the incarnation of destiny.

No celebrity in the 19th century was judged so variously as Louis Napoleon. It may never be possible to put together from the mass of contradictory opinions, a mosaic portrait of him that is life-like. An idealist who passed much of his time in day-dream-land, he was also, as Cavour saw him, the most "positive" of men. Although he did not scruple to abet massacre, he might shudder at the sufferings of individuals. Many accused him of personal cowardice, and yet he took great risks with supreme nonchalance. He had no qualms against breaking his word or against lying, or duplicity, and yet he might carry a promise on his conscience for years, and, when the moment came, fulfil it, cost what it might. Nobody in history reaped more than he from an impassive manner, which seemed to endow him with almost deific mystery. Men thought him unfathomably deep or subtle, crafty or clairvoyant. If he seemed on the surface to vacillate, they said that that was a trick for putting the world off the scent: for they believed that he had an elaborate policy, which he pursued unflinchingly. He would listen politely, even blandly; but his calm grey eyes betrayed nothing of his inmost feeling. His cousin, Princess Mathilde, whom at one time he was to marry, said: "If Louis were my husband, I would smash his skull open to see what thoughts, if any, are inside." Yet beneath his impassivity, he might cherish a compelling enthusiasm, a Quixotic zeal, possibly only a whim. In private intercourse he could appear simple, easy, ingenuous, familiar. He had the art of winning his guests by pretending to be absorbed in their interests. "It is very odd," said Queen Victoria, after her first visit to the Tuileries in 1855, "but the Emperor knows everything I have done and where I have been since I was twelve years old; he even recollects how I was dressed, and a thousand little details it is extraordinary he should be acquainted with."²⁶ No doubt Napoleon laughed inwardly at the ease with which he captivated so unsubtle, commonplace a nature as the Queen's; but he must at times have realized, and in realizing regretted, his own dulness in judging men. He could, indeed, pick out service-

²⁶ Greville, III, 246.

able tools to commit the crimes which made him Emperor, — Morny, Saint-Arnaud, Fleury, Magnan, Maupas, Persigny, what a rare brood of scoundrels they were! — but he had no eye for character or genius. A monarch who, after considerable intercourse, set down Count Bismarck as a “not serious man,” could never be safe in a world where Fate punishes errors of judgment as remorselessly as guilt.

This bastard Napoleon, who so imposed on his contemporaries by his Sphinxlike reserve, and puzzles even a later generation, possessed, nevertheless, certain marked traits which could be as plainly discerned in 1855 as they can be today. His ruling motive was, naturally, selfish: whatever he did had for its first object the strengthening of his own throne and the upbuilding of his dynasty. Next, he was almost hypnotized by the example of the Great Emperor, whom he wished to emulate in war and in peace.²⁷ By dating from the First Empire, he both shielded himself from the charge of being an upstart, and linked his name with the twenty glorious years of French primacy. Still, imitation had grave disadvantages, because it led him, in his mania for repeating the Napoleonic drama, scene by scene, to read into the present the conditions of the past. Now, neither France nor Europe in 1850 was reproducing the combinations of 1795, or of 1804. The Napoleonic earthquake itself made that impossible. Dazzled by his uncle, Napoleon III desired to shine as a mighty captain, but he had not a spark of military talent; he desired also, like his forerunner, to pose as a pioneer of progress, but he never dared to put his ideals into practice long enough to test their value for the French people. A conspirator in his youth, he was always liable to be upset or misled by casual events: for the conspirator, working in the vague, cannot get a true estimate of either his own or his enemy's strength. So Napoleon would propitiate those whom it would have been wiser for him to rebuff, and he was at the mercy of the rascally crew which, having raised him to the throne, levied blackmail on him.

Cavour, who could read men through and through, had already divined how to deal with the Emperor. He confirmed Napoleon's belief that he was the arbiter of Europe, and encour-

²⁷ In my *Throne-Makers* (Boston, 1899) there is a study of Napoleon III as imitator and reviver of the Great Emperor's policy.

aged his vanity and his visions. What he suggested seemed to have the prosperity of France and of the Imperial dynasty in view rather than the welfare of Piedmont. He hoped to convince Napoleon that the war must be prolonged: that would drive Austria to support Russia, and the Allies would have to back the Italians, with the Piedmontese army at their head, in Northern Italy. The Emperor, however, had already made up his mind for peace, and as, like a "positive man," he handled only one thing at a time, all his thoughts were pacific. The best that Cavour could hope for was a hitch in the negotiations. That France should prefer peace was natural: the war, never really popular, had now brought enough glory to the country and the dynasty to warrant stopping. England, on the other hand, was loath to have it end before she had retrieved her prestige. Austria, who had played throughout the part of the fox in the fable, feared that the continuation of the conflict might at last draw her into the field. She saw also her profit in extending her influence on the Danube, if peace could be made according to her wishes.

The outlook put Victor Emanuel into a very bad temper, which he hid, however, from the French. "I am extremely grieved," wrote Cavour, "but I do not know what to do about it." He was busy from seven in the morning until two after midnight. "I never led a more agitated life, and with little fruit; patience! When I apply for a retiring pension I hope that this trip will count as a campaign in my behalf."²⁸ The agitated days and nights were not, however, lost; thanks to them, he predisposed Napoleon in his favor — and that was worth a battle.

In England, the King met with an equally enthusiastic welcome.²⁹ Queen, Prince Consort and public made him feel that Britannic friendship, bestowed cautiously on a foreigner, is solid. At Guildhall, in reply to the Lord Mayor's speech, he read a graceful address written by Massimo d'Azeglio. At Windsor, the Queen conferred on him the Order of the Garter, — he was

²⁸ *Lettere*, II, 371, 373-74; dated Paris, Nov. 27, and 29, 1855.

²⁹ Cavour also pleased the Queen, who wrote a few weeks later to Clarendon, Jan. 9, 1856: "There is much truth in what Count Cavour says, and it must ever be an object of our interest to see Sardinia independent and strong; as a Liberal constitutional country, opposing a barrier alike to the unenlightened and absolute ■ well as revolutionary principles, and this she has a right to expect us to support her in." *Q. R. L.*, III, 204.

the only knight she knew, the Duchess of Sutherland declared, "who seemed as if he would have the best of it with the Dragon."³⁰ The *Times* praised him as a military and constitutional monarch. D'Azeglio, always popular in England, came in for a share of the ovations, which a raging toothache prevented him from enjoying. Cavour was busy on all sides. He conferred with the party chiefs; he made a particularly favorable impression on Clarendon, who then ranked only a little below Palmerston and Lord John Russell in knowledge of foreign affairs; he complimented the Queen, who had rather more than the proverbial woman's appetite for flattery; he consulted bankers, and studied, while seeming merely to flit through it, the great world which shaped British policy. He was on the tenterhooks lest Victor Emanuel's somewhat Falstaffian looseness of speech and his unconventional acts should shock the Queen, who embodied so many of the traits of the British Matron. But all passed off smoothly, and her Majesty was so well pleased by her guest that she rose at four o'clock in the morning to see him off. Cavour too was satisfied. "The King behaved himself like a perfect gentleman," he wrote Cibrario, after the Guildhall speech, and he added that the impression which the King had made on the English people would not soon be cancelled.³¹ One aspect of the stay in England illustrated the insularity of the English. Bible societies and other Protestant bodies, having heard that Victor Emanuel's Government had been quarreling with Rome, hailed him as a new Luther, the pioneer in a new Reformation! So strong is the Anti-Papist instinct in John Bull's vitals. Cavour did his best to benefit by the sympathy of Protestant England without giving grounds to anyone for accusing the King, or his advisers, of being disloyal Catholics.³²

On the journey home, the Royal party stopped a day in Paris, where the Emperor said point-blank to Cavour: "Write confi-

³⁰ Greville, III, 263.

³¹ *Politique*, 90. Greville, III, 263.

³² Greville writes (III, 263), Dec. 11, 1855: "His Majesty seems to be frightful in person, but a great, strong, burly, athletic man, brusque in his manners, unrefined in his conversation, very loose in his conduct, and very eccentric in his habits. When he was at Paris his talk in society amused or terrified everybody, but here he seems to have been more guarded." Malmesbury (p. 372) thought him "as vulgar and coarse as possible." La Marmora remarked later to the Queen that "Victor Emanuel will never say what he does not think, but sometimes he says that which it were better he did not say." *Q. V. L.*, III, 214.

entially to Walewski what you think I might do for Piedmont and for Italy.”³³ Cavour at once communicated this query to D’Azeglio, and desired him to draw up a reply to it, after they should discuss it together. Having in mind the program to be mapped out, he recrossed the Alps. The visit had exceeded his expectations. It was something for the public in France and England to see Victor Emanuel fêted as an ally by the Emperor and the Queen: it was much to impress the King himself with the fact that he was highly esteemed abroad, and to have him recognize that the Clerical circle which hedged him in at Turin cut little figure in the great world to which the Alliance introduced him. Above all, as Cavour said, “this journey has confirmed the constitutional system; it is the equivalent of ten years of life.”³⁴

On January 16, 1856, Russia, threatened at last by Austria, decided to negotiate for peace. Cavour and all Liberal Piedmont were grievously disappointed: for peace meant that the war against Austria, on which they had staked their hopes, would not be fought. “The moment is grave; I am depressed,” he wrote, “but not discouraged.”³⁵ War being denied, he turned at once to make the peace as profitable as possible for his country.³⁶ Even before the meeting of the Congress was fixed, he hurried off to Walewski, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, a reply to the Emperor’s question, “What can one do for Italy?” In this way he determined to forestall rival diplomats, by planting in Napoleon’s mind suggestions which might shape his conduct. His memorandum was a most practical document.

Assuming that Austria would not be required to give up any territory, because, “by a diplomatic fiction,” she was regarded as having rendered Europe a signal service in the Crimean War, he claimed that she must be forced, nevertheless, to treat Piedmont at least with justice, and to govern her Italian provinces less oppressively. Friendly counsel, on the part of France, he said, may accomplish this; but compulsion may properly be used against the King of Naples to bring him to show common humanity to his people, whether they be languishing in prisons or suffering

³³ *Lettere*, II, 376. The interview took place in the evening of Dec. 7, 1855.

³⁴ Bert, 503; Dec. 17, 1855. ³⁵ *Lettere*, II, 381; C. to La Marmora Jan 19, 1856. ³⁶ On Jan. 15, 1856 Queen Victoria wrote Clarendon that the Queen “cannot be for peace now. . . . She cannot bear the thought that ‘the failure of the Redan’ should be our *last fait d’armes*.” *Q. V. L.*, III, 207.

persecution outside. As to the Papal States, Romagna and the Legations are completely Austrianized: the Austrians must retire, the priestly government must be secularized, and either the Duke of Modena or the Grand Duke of Tuscany might be made their sovereign. Bad as both are, the rule of either would be preferable to the Papal régime. "What modern peoples tolerate least, what they detest most, is the mixing of priests in politics and in administration. . . . Everywhere, the rule of the sabre is preferred to that of the cassock. And with much reason, because the sacerdotal régime, seen near, presents every kind of inconvenience without any advantage." These suggestions, if carried out, would make a beginning in the work of curing the abuses which kept the Peninsula on the verge of an upheaval. Cavour insisted, also, that his plan was simply a return to the Italian equilibrium laid down in the treaty of Vienna—for that pact did not sanction the usurpation by Austria of the control of the States south of the Po. He intimated that it coincided with the Emperor's interests, and added that, if a congress were to meet without taking up the Italian Question, it would "sanction almost officially a state of things as deplorable for Italy as dangerous for the Occidental Powers."³⁷

This letter, which he despatched to Walewski on January 21, threw into the shade the tract on which Massimo d'Azeglio had been engaged for more than a month. No better example could be desired of the great gulf which separates the statesman from the political amateur than Cavour's seven-page brief and D'Azeglio's forty-page essay: one, swift, direct, concrete, the other, roundabout, vague, literary, theoretical: one, plausible by passing suggestion, the other by labored argument; one, immediately practical,³⁸ the other too dependent on contingencies.

And yet D'Azeglio uttered many truths. On two points especially, his criticism drove home. He deprecated the practice of the reactionary governments in misapplying the word "revolution" to the efforts of Italians to secure a political reform, which was perfectly just, and in harmony both with civilization and with the standards of other countries. His countrymen, he

³⁷ Text in full, *Lettere*, II, 382-88.

³⁸ "In politics," Cavour writes, "one must above all avoid the vague, and define as far as possible the line to follow at a given moment." *Ibid*, 383.

pointed out, were no more "revolutionists" than was Alfred the Great, or William the Silent, or the Spaniards who for eight centuries fought the Moors. "To make odious those whom you despoil, is the old stratagem of all the oppressors." "Let us not be deceived," he said: "it is in nowise the insurrections that Austria dreads in Italy; that would be ungrateful on her part. She dreads much more the good reforms which forestall them and make them impossible." The other weighty passages in D'Azeglio's tract referred to Rome. "The temporal government," he said, "this great hot-bed of corruption, has destroyed the moral sense in the centre and south of Italy especially. . . . The government of the Pope, his domination as temporal sovereign, ceased to exist from the day when it was shown that it existed only by virtue of a double occupation of foreign troops: and it is evident today that if this occupation were to stop, this government could not have a week's life." With a French garrison propping up the Pope in Rome, while an Austrian garrison screens Papal governors from the just wrath of their subjects in the Romagna, the Legations and the Marches, it "would be too bitter a derision," said D'Azeglio, to repeat the worn-out claim of the Papalists that "the Head of the Church, in order to have entire liberty of action must be at the same time a temporal prince."³⁹

With sure eyes, Cavour judged that D'Azeglio's memoir, though "magnificent," ran the risk, owing to its length, of being unread. Above all, it had "the disadvantages of not arriving at clear and precise conclusions." So it was not forwarded to the Emperor.⁴⁰ But from the first the Cabinet and the King regarded D'Azeglio as the proper representative to send to the peace congress, and he, protesting his unwillingness, accepted

³⁹ The memorial is printed in full in M. Ricci: *Scritti Postumi di Massimo d'Azeglio* (Florence: Barbèra, 1872) pp. 245-86; also in *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 568-98. Minghetti criticizes the memorial as a return to all the ideas of 1848-49. *Ricordi*, III, 86.

⁴⁰ D'Azeglio was piqued at having what Cavour had written in a morning substituted for what he himself had toiled over for a month. "They may call me jackass about everything else — amen! but about Italy, no! I have traveled over it so much, studied it, turned it over on all sides, that — in the name of the Devil! — How can it be that I don't understand it!" *Panizzi*, p. 260; March 15, 1856. D'Azeglio could not persuade himself that Cavour, who had never seen Central and Southern Italy, could know their needs better than he did.

the mission, on condition that the Piedmontese envoys should be received on equal terms with those of the Great Powers. Cavour and Cibrario, the Foreign Minister, led him to suppose that this would be the case. In fact, however, from the moment that the Congress was talked of, Austria worked stubbornly to exclude Piedmont, and while France and England did not wish to snub their ally, they had to acknowledge that precedents were against the admission of a second-class state.⁴¹ They even proposed not to invite Prussia, who had held herself aloof from the war.⁴² After much discussion, it was agreed that the Piedmontese should be allowed to take part in those sessions of the Congress at which questions directly affecting her were brought up. This point had been reached, when D'Azeglio, only two or three days before his departure, went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and insisted on seeing the formal agreement. On learning the truth, he burst into a fit of justifiable indignation against the deceit which had been practised on him — deceit which Cavour excused on the plea that he had hoped some "benign star" would change the conditions. D'Azeglio forthwith threw up the mission, declaring that he would not sit in the antechamber of any congress, to the humiliation of his country and himself.⁴³

This laid on Cavour the burden he had hoped to avoid.⁴⁴ He foresaw that, as Piedmont would get little material compensation or honor at Paris, whoever represented her would come home to be blamed. He did not dread personal unpopularity, but he knew that it would make less difference to the maintenance of the national policy if D'Azeglio and not he were the scapegoat, for D'Azeglio was neither responsible for the war, nor a member of the Cabinet, nor a trained diplomatist. Anger at his failure would soon blow over: the public would say that he had done the best he could; and, after all, there was but one Massimo, and his countrymen could not help loving him. For Cavour to fail, on the other hand, if construed as a condemna-

⁴¹ Gourdon: *Histoire du Congrès de Paris* (Paris: Librairie Nouvelle, 1857), p. 415. ⁴² Subsequently, however, Prussia sent Manteuffel and Hatzfeldt to the Congress. ⁴³ D'Azeglio: *Lettere*, 274 ff.

⁴⁴ On Feb. 7 Queen Victoria wrote Clarendon that she is "most sincerely anxious that he should stand up for Piedmont's admission to the Congress ■ she "has the greatest respect for that noble little country. . . . The Queen rejoices to hear that Count Cavour is coming to Paris." *Q. V. L.*, III, 216.

tion of the war policy, would damage his prestige as a statesman — that prestige on which the progress of Piedmont largely depended. But he could not hesitate. "It is possible," he wrote to Villamarina, the Piedmontese ambassador at Paris, who was to be his colleague, "it is even probable that this mission will be the last act of my political life."⁴⁵ Leaving Turin on February 13, he reached Paris on the 15th, and took up his quarters at the Hôtel de Londres.

His first move was to secure the admission of the Piedmontese envoys on equal terms with those of the Great Powers. The Emperor settled the doubt by saying to Lord Clarendon, the first British envoy: "I cannot conceive how it could be otherwise." Clarendon added, in reporting this to Cavour: "You have too much tact to take part in affairs which in no way concern you. You will be present at their discussion — and will think of something else. But in truth, I cannot imagine what the question might be which would not interest you."⁴⁶

Cavour acted with consummate success the rôle he marked out for himself. He would not sulk, he would not sue; he would state the claims of Piedmont in plain terms and not retreat from them, but without exasperating or boring. His rare social aptitude stood him in as good stead as his knowledge of men. He paid visits without number, attended dinners and evening receptions, showered notes everywhere, propitiated everyone. He intrigued at the Palais Royal, where the unsavory but able and influential Prince Napoleon — Plon-Plon — had his court. In order to win over the Emperor, he made a confederate of the ravishingly beautiful Countess di Castiglione,⁴⁷ and he did not hesitate to draw on the secret funds for douceurs to such persons as could be lured by such primitive means.⁴⁸ He arranged with Dr. Conneau, the Imperial physician and confidant, to serve for secret communications with the Emperor.⁴⁹ In his interviews with

⁴⁵ *Lettere*, II, 394; C. to Villamarina, Feb. 8, 1856; he accepted the mission the day before.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 394-95; C. to Arese, Feb. 20, 1856.

⁴⁷ "I inform you," C. wrote to Cibrario, a few days after reaching Paris, "that I have enrolled in the ranks of diplomacy the very beautiful Countess di Castiglione, inviting her to coquette with the Emperor, and, if necessary, to seduce him. She began her part discreetly at the concert at the Tuileries yesterday." *Lettere*, II, 396. Ideville: *Journal*, chap. 10, gives a trustworthy contemporary sketch of the countess. Loliée: *Les Femmes du 2d Empire* (1906) devotes a chapter to her.

⁴⁸ *Lettere*, II, 396, 397, 398.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 400.

Napoleon, Cavour quickly perceived that the suggestions in his recent note had germinated. He was especially worked up over Austria's occupation of the Romagna, although he admitted that for the moment he must treat Austria gingerly. Cavour attached the greatest importance to the Romagna project, because, if he could persuade Piedmont's allies to agree on the necessity of forcing Austria to withdraw her troops, he should have caused them to agree to the principle of the abolition of the temporal power of the Pope.⁵⁰ This would mean immeasurably more than the possible handing over to Piedmont of Parma and Piacenza, as an offset to Austrian aggrandizement on the lower Danube.

By favor of France and England,⁵¹ Piedmont had thus her place in the Congress: but what would this bring her, beyond a barren solace to her pride, unless she were allowed to speak for Italy? To that end she had sacrificed two thousand of her soldiers and 50 million lire in the Crimea. Yet Italy was the one subject which Austria had no intention of allowing to be broached. Cavour, therefore, adopted the tactics of discussing the Italian Question at all times in his personal interviews or private conversation, and of being ready to insinuate it into the official proceedings if a favorable moment should occur.

On Monday, February 25, the Congress of Paris assembled at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Count Alexander Walewski presided. Born in 1810, the bastard son of Napoleon I by the Polish Countess Walewska, he had passed his time in sufficiently obscure diplomatic missions until the sudden emergence of Louis Napoleon made his fortune, with that of other Bonapartists. Walewski was promoted in rapid succession from Florence to Naples, thence to Madrid, and finally to London. As French ambassador at London at the time of the *Coup d'état*, he adroitly profited by Palmerston's indiscreet approval of that act, and subsequently he negotiated the alliance which bound England to France in the Crimean War. Then the Emperor recalled him to Paris to take charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Blest with hardly

⁵⁰ *Lettere*, II, 390.

⁵¹ Gourdon: *Hist. du Cong. de Paris*, 414. "It was agreed, therefore, that the position of Sardinia in the Congress should be that of the other Powers, except for the reserve that MM. de Cavour and de Villamarina should deem it right to impose on themselves during the course of the deliberations, and as to which they were left to judge." P. 416.

third-rate ability,⁵² Walewski had the arrogance and stubbornness by which little men swell themselves out to fit the spacious positions into which they have unexpectedly fallen. Although he spoke officially in the name of the Emperor, yet he quickly let it be inferred that he and not his master was the arbiter of the foreign policy of France. His associate, Baron de Bourqueney, had been ambassador at Vienna since 1853, and judging by the ease with which the Austrian government pursued its own course, regardless of French insistence, both before and during the war, he could not be classed among the masters of his profession. Being one of the few respectable officials of the Bourbon and Orleanist régimes who seceded to the "Upstart" of the Second of December, Bourqueney enjoyed at this time a somewhat factitious prestige: but in his views he was "more Austrian than the Austrians."

The English envoys furnished a marked contrast to these men. The Earl of Clarendon was a noble example of the great British aristocrats who during the middle of the 19th century ably served their country in Parliament and in diplomacy. Born to the traditions of an ancient and distinguished family, he had learned what it was to be a peer before the Reform Bill, but had adapted himself to the more popular ideals of government which reform ushered in. Lord Cowley, too, though he lacked Clarendon's personal ability, was a thoroughbred — the nephew of the Duke of Wellington, trained in England's highest social and diplomatic ways, and with an impressive manner as a negotiator. Austria sent as her representatives men of mark, specially versed in the upper branches of international diplomacy, but they assumed an arrogant air which made them particularly offensive to all their associates. Count Buol-Schauenstein,⁵³ the Austrian Foreign Minister, seemed determined to create the impression

⁵² La Gorce, however, thinks that "despite certain blunders, M. Walewski had one merit, and it would suffice for his memory — it was precisely to have penetrated Cavour and to have invariably opposed him." II, 320.

⁵³ Bismarck said, "If I could be ■■ great for ■■ single hour as Buol thinks he is all the time, I should establish my glory forever before God and man." The Russians at the Congress detested Buol personally and thought him, as diplomat, fond of "shady and intricate paths." *Diplomatic Study*, II, 127. Pfordten, the Bavarian Minister, told Bismarck that Buol was like ■■ locomotive which "does not know whither it is running, and at every question gives out only steam and smoke." Friedjung, I, 11.

that Austria really controlled the Congress. "To listen to Buol," Russian Orloff said in a stage whisper to Cavour at one of the sittings, "you would suppose that the Austrians had taken Sebastopol." His second, Baron Hübner, though less truculent, did not try to propitiate any one. They had both been in Italy during Austria's brief eclipse in 1848, and they hated the Italians. Count Orloff and Baron Brunnow guarded Russia's interests with remarkable adroitness. Orloff, colossal in stature, the oldest by many years of the envoys, — he took seven wounds in the battle of Borodino before Hübner and Hatzfeldt were born, — played to perfection the part of the bluff, outspoken, even confidential old soldier. He frankly admitted that but for Mentschikoff's bad temper and the late Czar Nicholas's crazy rancor, the war need never have been waged: and all his open ways simply disguised an astute and alert negotiator, who seldom yielded. Brunnow, the disciple of Nesselrode, seemed to be the business member of the Russian pair, versed in the precedents and phrases as well as in the etiquette of diplomatic contracts: but he too, behind his mask of routine bureaucrat, saw how every move would affect Russia, and he defended her interests night and day. The Prussian envoys, Manteuffel and Hatzfeldt, came late and did little: they were solid men; stiff after the Prussian fashion; meaning to be affable, although, like the ramrod then in use, their Borussia nature did not bend easily; always strictly correct, they and their similars were quite unfathomed then and later by Napoleon and his intimates. The Sultan's envoys, Aali Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and Mehemed Djemil Bey, Turkish ambassador at Paris, were thorough Orientals, with a veneer of Occidental culture. Masters of craft in comparison with which that of a Metternich appeared callow, they could use it to little advantage here, where the Great Powers were determining not what Turkey preferred but what they thought best for her. Their red tarbushes served at least to remind the Congress of the ostensible cause of the war, and to add picturesqueness to its proceedings. Of Piedmont's spokesmen, Cavour we know. His assistant, Marquis Pes di Villamarina, ambassador at Paris, was as typical an example of the old progressive Piedmontese nobility as Cowley was of the English. He lacked edge to cut his way through opposing ranks, but he made a serviceable

lieutenant. He could be relied upon to obey instructions discreetly, and he had the gift, invaluable to a second or third-rate diplomat, of always appearing to be engaged in "enterprises of great pith and moment." Messages lost none of their force in being transmitted through him. So tactful was he and so efficient in performing his various duties, that Cavour found in him an excellent aide. Indeed, Villamarina had done much to smooth the way before his chief reached Paris.⁵⁴

The Congress met in the afternoons, usually from one to five o'clock, three or four times a week.⁵⁵ To avoid jealousy, the envoys were arranged in the alphabetical order of their respective countries: this brought the Austrians on the president's immediate right and the Turks on his left. Cavour and Villamarina sat next to the latter. Count Benedetti served as secretary and protocolist. Debarred from taking part actively in the debates, unless they specially interested his government, Cavour enjoyed ample opportunity to study the situation. Eager for peace, Napoleon did not wish to humiliate Russia, whose friendship might soon be useful. He was surrounded by a ring of boodlers and stock-jobbers — Morny, Magne, Fould, Rouher,⁵⁶ and other accomplices — who were reaping their harvest for their share in the *Coup d'état*. Their fortunes depended on the rise of prices which would come with peace. They were in collusion with the Russians: so was Walewski. Personally, however, Napoleon meant to keep on good terms with England. Although he had secretly connived with Austria only a few weeks before in an attempt to force Russia to consent to negotiate, he regarded the English alliance as his certificate of respectability. The English on their side knew that whatever they might gain at the Congress must come through him. "England is hated all over the Continent," Prince Albert wrote King Leopold of Belgium. . . . "Even in France it is the Emperor, and the Emperor alone, who is with us body and soul."⁵⁷ England insisted on checking, if not humbling, Russia, by strengthening Turkey and by destroying Russia's naval power in the Black Sea.⁵⁸ Russia hated Austria for her ingrati-

⁵⁴ F. Bosio: *Villamarina* (Milano, 1877), 106-10.

⁵⁵ There were 24 sittings from Feb. 25 to April 16, inclusive.

⁵⁶ Magne was then Minister of Finance and Rouher Minister of Commerce.

⁵⁷ Martin, III, 447; Feb. 16, 1856.

⁵⁸ England's position seemed very precarious during the early weeks of the

tude,⁵⁹ and for the likelihood that, without striking a blow, she would get control over some of the Danubian provinces. Austria, almost frantically set on peace, contended first to prevent any territorial change, or the recognition of any principle, which might jeopard her position in Italy or inflame her divers Magyar and Slavic subjects: reassured on these points, she was prepared to show cause why any territory for which a new owner was desired should be given to her. Turkey posed to perfection as an incorrigible spendthrift and debauchee, whom the benevolent John Bull insisted on protecting from his creditors. This John did, not because he loved him, but because he hated them; asking only that the Turkish Prodigal should trust to British generosity when he needed funds, and sign a pledge, to be shown to all doubters, as a proof that he had reformed. The Sultan lavished promises by firman, and announced that, in order to carry out his good intentions, means should "be sought to profit by the science, the art, and the funds of Europe."⁶⁰

Amid this conflict of national greeds, Cavour laid himself out to secure the good will of every nation except Austria. He sympathized with England in not desiring peace, but knowing that Napoleon dominated the situation, he took care not to appear offensively Anglomaniac at the Tuileries.⁶¹ He found the English envoys harmonious on one most important matter, the need of reforming the shocking condition of the Papal States; but he could hardly expect Napoleon to listen kindly to any suggestion of withdrawing the French garrison behind which Papal misrule in Rome itself went on. Under no circumstances would Napoleon consent to a move which might be construed as a blow to French prestige. Just at present, when he was begging Pius IX to stand as godfather for the child⁶² the Empress was about to bear, he had only blandishments for the Pope, and wished the world

Congress. On Feb. 27, the Queen wrote in alarm to Palmerston lest Russia should succeed in isolating England. *Q. V. L.*, III, 226.

⁵⁹ Czar Nicholas said to Count George Esterhazy, the Austrian Ambassador: "Do you know who were the two stupidest Kings of Poland?" Esterhazy could not guess. "Sobieski and I," replied Nicholas sarcastically. They had both helped Austria to their own undoing. Friedjung, 10.

⁶⁰ Foreign Office, State Papers, Italy, 1856, vol. 61; pt. xvii, p. 7. Turkey carried out her designs as far as the funds went. ⁶¹ *Lettere*, II, 382.

⁶² "The mania for conciliating the Pope and having him for godfather has spoiled everything." C. to Cibrario, March 4, 1856; *Lettere*, II, 406.

to remember that the ruler of France had enjoyed from time immemorial the title of "Eldest Son of the Church." That Europe's gravest diplomats, conferring on the peace of two hundred million souls, should be upset, or even affected, by an infant still in the womb, shows how Clotho spins all human lots of the same mysterious thread and what a plentiful vein of irony she has.

Next to inducing the Congress to discuss the general Italian Question, Cavour's chief desire was to bring about some change in the Duchies and Legations. This plan, which he broached to Napoleon during the King's recent visit to Paris, he had instructed Villamarina to harp on from time to time; he had hinted at it in his letter to Walewski, and was presenting it as alluringly as he could in his interviews with the Emperor, with Clarendon and with other friends of Italy. He explained that, by transferring the Austrian princelings from Parma and Modena to Moldavia and Wallachia, Austria would be ousted from the South bank of the Po, but would secure a large territorial compensation on the Lower Danube. A remodeling of the Legations must then follow, and it would involve, as we have already seen, the tacit abandonment of the doctrine that the Pope's temporal power must be upheld by foreign troops. In the rearrangement, Piedmont might get Parma, or at least Piacenza, which Austria held illegally, and was fortifying as a menace on Piedmont's frontier. Piacenza would be something tangible to offer to the Piedmontese, who asked for more than mere glory in return for their immense sacrifices in sending their expedition to the Crimea.⁶³ Cavour was too wary, however, to insist on territorial compensation. He realized that the smallest new province, gained now, might preclude larger annexations hereafter, and would certainly give color to critics who accused Piedmont of being engaged in a mere land-grabbing scheme.

Knowing Napoleon's susceptibility to the concrete, Cavour secretly wrote to Marco Minghetti, the foremost civilian in the Romagna, to draw up a petition, get signatures to it from Romagnoles of judgment and reputation, and bring it post-haste to Paris.⁶⁴ Minghetti complied, being forced, in order to secure a passport from the Papal prolegate, to journey by way of Belgium. He found Cavour, he says, ready to turn heaven and earth

■ *Lettere*, II, 387-8, 411-12, 414.

■ Minghetti, III, 91 ff.

upside down in order to have Piedmont stand forth in the Congress as the champion of Italian nationality and liberty. "It would be hard to describe that sort of holy fire by which he was possessed," says Minghetti, "and had to hide from the eyes of the world." ⁶⁵ In two days Minghetti, working with Cavour at his elbow, drew up two notes, in which he stated the actual condition of the Papal States, their history for a quarter of a century, the complete failure of Pius IX to keep the promises he made in his *motu proprio* at Portici in 1849, and the hopelessness of wringing any reform from the Reactionists who controlled the Pope. Minghetti went on to unfold a project for secularizing the government; for establishing in the Legations, Marches and Romagna a separate State under the suzerainty of the Holy See, but guaranteed by the Powers; and for withdrawing Austrian troops and influence from the North and the French garrison from Rome itself. By skilful suggestion, all this was made to appear almost a return to the principles of the First Napoleon and a carrying out of the Prince President's earlier suggestions.

These notes were submitted confidentially to Clarendon on March 13 and to Napoleon the next day. The latter returned them with comments, which Cavour embodied in them before they were made public. ⁶⁶ On the 16th, Empress Eugenie, after an unusually long and perilous confinement (during which the Emperor was in an almost hysterical state), gave birth to a son — the Prince Imperial. Before the event, Napoleon, pacing to and fro in great agitation, was heard to exclaim, "Certainly, something ought to be done for Italy!" ⁶⁷ This we may regard as a sign of the extent to which Cavour had possessed his mind. But although the Emperor listened in private to such proposals, he soon set them aside as unfeasible. Austria blocked the way. He advised her to take the Danubian Principalities and give up Lombardy and Venetia, — "the only reasonable solution of the affairs of Italy," ⁶⁸ — but Buol and Hübner very correctly declined to discuss the matter. And the Congress had more than enough to do in settling the Oriental problem, without undertaking to unravel the hopeless snarl of Papal sovereignty and Italian freedom.

■ Minghetti, III, 97. ■ The longer note was officially presented to Walewski and Clarendon on March 27. ⁶⁷ Minghetti, III, 106. ⁶⁸ *Lettere*, II, 438.

The English envoys also, though heartily in accord with Cavour,⁶⁹ had too fierce a contest on their hands in defending British interests, to venture into any Quixotry. They believed that Walewski was playing them false⁷⁰ by confiding to Orloff just what he must do in order to win his points; and there is nothing in Walewski's character to make their suspicion seem unwarranted. As president of the Congress, he was, in Cavour's opinion,⁷¹ a man "of gigantic incapacity." Clarendon, exasperated by Walewski, complained to the Emperor, who said that his Minister had given him to understand that he presided at the conferences in a manner unsurpassed in the annals of diplomacy.⁷² Napoleon himself, as all the plenipotentiaries discovered, was the real pivot of the Congress. They soon learned the way to his private study, where they poured out their complaints against Walewski, or hoped to placate the little man with the mysterious eyes and the affable but impenetrable smile.⁷³ Even Lord Clarendon, who went to Paris with instructions from Palmerston not to make peace, felt the spell. "But we reckoned without Napoleon," he told Vitzthum; "none of us can resist him when he tries to persuade us face to face in his own room."⁷⁴

Napoleon's position as pacifier in chief was most complicated. He could not throw over his English allies, yet he desired to become fast friends with their enemies, the Russians. He had to be polite to Austria, because Austria had forced Russia to consider peace, which was his first concern, yet he would gladly have seen the Austrians expelled from Italy, so that he might make French influence paramount there; but the Italians would never

⁶⁹ Minghetti (III, 107) epitomizes some of Clarendon's private talks.

⁷⁰ Greville, III, 297. Malmesbury, 378. Greville, who was visiting at the British Embassy, records on March 8: "Cowley's grief and disappointment are overflowing."

⁷¹ *Letters*, VI, 5. See also his letter to Ianza, March 25; *Lettere*, II, 419. To E. d'Azeglio C. reports on March 25 a stormy meeting at which Walewski enraged Orloff to the point of using unprintable language. C. himself refers to Walewski in terms which his editor deems "too lively to publish." *Politique*, 140. Prince Albert thought Walewski could be easily outwitted. Vitzthum, I, 195.

⁷² E. Fitzmaurice: *Life of Lord Granville* (London: Longmans, 1905), I, 123. Clarendon said that this was true, but not in the sense which Walewski intended.

⁷³ *Diplomatic Study on the Crimean War*. Russian Official Publication (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1882), II, 377. "In the course of the deliberations, whenever our [Russian] plenipotentiaries found themselves in presence of insurmountable difficulties, they appealed to the personal intervention of this Sovereign, and had only to congratulate themselves on the result."⁷⁴ Vitzthum, I, 182.

be satisfied to exchange one foreign master for another; and he knew that, in any reshuffling of the Peninsula, the Papal Question would have to be grappled. For some time past he had caressed the idea that a revolution in Naples might result in placing Lucien Murat on the throne his father had occupied: but here arose another complication, for Bomba was Russia's especial pet, because he had sea-ports which the Czar's fleet, if it should ever invade the Mediterranean, might find invaluable.

To meddle as little as possible in outside discussions, therefore, was the Emperor's true policy: but Cavour had driven his suggestion in so deep that the Italian problem haunted him, and on March 19 he consented that it should be brought before the Congress.⁷⁵ He stipulated, however, that the treaty of peace should be signed first, to prevent disputes over side issues from imperiling that.⁷⁶ The sum of Cavour's labors therefore was to be only an unofficial airing of Italian grievances before a Congress which had finished its work and was impatient to adjourn!

On Sunday, March 30, the treaty was signed.⁷⁷ Not until April 8⁷⁸ was held the session at which Walewski, "with a somewhat solemn air," remarked that although their definite tasks had been achieved, the French government thought it would be well for them to discuss, quite informally, some of the questions which might disturb the peace they had just made. He spoke first of the condition of Greece; then he referred to the occupation of the Papal States by French and Austrian garrisons — an occupation France and Austria had undertaken as a duty to the Holy Father, but which he hoped might soon be dispensed with. He felt sure that Count Buol would agree that Austria would withdraw her troops whenever this could be done without danger to the Pope. He wondered whether it were not desirable for

⁷⁵ On that day, C., accompanied by Clarendon, had an interview with Napoleon which lasted two hours and a half. "Clarendon was excellent," C. wrote to E. d'Azeglio. "He encouraged — pushed forward — the Emperor." *Politique*, 132-35. On March 24, the Emperor "said to Clarendon: 'Propose to the Congress to declare the Duchy of Modena revertible to the Duchy of Parma, and to give Parma to Piedmont.' Clarendon approves greatly." C. to E. d'Azeglio; *Politique*, 139.

⁷⁶ Minghetti, III, 108.

⁷⁷ The Queen wrote Clarendon the next day: "Much as the Queen disliked the idea of *Peace*, she has become reconciled to it." *Q. V. L.*, III, 235.

⁷⁸ And yet the London *Spectator* of April 5 printed from the *Times* a report that Cavour had already brought the Italian Question before the Congress.

certain of the Italian princes to abandon their system of despotic repression, substituting for it clemency and an enlightened tolerance. The government of the Two Sicilies especially ought to be warned that it was pursuing the wrong road. Such warnings, coming from the Congress, though they were strictly unofficial, could not fail to be heeded, to the great benefit of individuals and to the tranquilizing of the entire Peninsula. Count Walewski next called attention to the press laws of Belgium, which permitted journals to publish attacks, calumnies, and indecencies on neighboring governments and their rulers. He concluded with some glittering generalities which ought to have made the plenipotentiaries contented with their work. "The Congress of Westphalia," he said, "sanctioned liberty of conscience; the Congress of Vienna abolished the slave trade and sanctioned freedom of river navigation; the Congress of Paris might earn the gratitude of posterity by abolishing privateering."

Lord Clarendon spoke next. After touching briefly on the Greek troubles and deploring the excesses of the Belgian press, he turned to the affairs of Italy. The foreign occupation, he pointed out, was tending to become permanent. Although it had already lasted eight years, the time for its ceasing seemed as far off as ever. It virtually upset the European equilibrium. That was a question which vitally interested all the Powers at the Congress — a problem which they ought to take immediate steps to solve. He recognized that the conditions of the Pope's government were such as to render it unsafe to withdraw foreign support at once. That government, he said emphatically, must be reformed from top to bottom. Clarendon had been growing more and more heated as he drew nearer and nearer to the heart of his subject: now he threw away reserve and gave free rein to his indignation. His was not the flash-in-the-pan fury of a shallow or theatrical nature: but the indignation of a self-controlled English thoroughbred, a statesman and diplomat who was by training not less than by temperament disinclined to rant. He drew up a terrible indictment against Pius the Ninth's government, going into details which he had learned not merely from Italian Liberal sources, but from England's accredited agents in Italy.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Notably from Hudson. Several weeks before he had summoned to Paris, Lyons, the British agent in Rome.

He described with equal fire the corrupt administration and the misery and degradation of the people who were subjected to it. He declared squarely that the Papal government was the worst in the world — the shame of Europe. No Italian statesman, Cavour wrote the next day, could have drawn up an arraignment more powerful or more true: it sounded like the speech of a member of the Left in the Piedmontese Parliament.⁸⁰ Lord Clarendon not merely approved Walewski's tentative criticism of the King of Naples, but asserted that, in spite of his own reluctance to interfere in the affairs of other countries, he believed it to be the duty of the Powers to compel King Ferdinand to listen to the voice of justice and of humanity. They ought, he said, to make their warnings so plain that Bomba would be compelled to heed them.

With what feelings Count Buol listened to this onslaught can be imagined. He would have hurled back an angry denunciation, had he not deemed it more prudent to express his astonishment that topics had been introduced into the Congress quite foreign to its purpose. He had neither instructions to negotiate about them, nor even powers to discuss them. When he was told that he might telegraph his Court for advice, he replied peremptorily that he would never do that; and that he would urge his Emperor to refuse the request if it were made. President Walewski proved quite unable to soothe the surly Austrian, who had certainly taken a logical stand. When Russia's turn to speak came, Count Orloff said that, as he too lacked competence, he would say nothing. Baron Manteuffel, although also uninstructed, assured the Congress that Prussia was always ready to consult about questions which affected the peace of Europe: whereupon, he proceeded to complain against the abnormal condition of the Swiss Canton of Neuchâtel.

The word now fell to Cavour. At last, after nine years of tireless energy as publicist and statesman and after a life-time of unquenchable hope, he was to speak in behalf of Italy in a Congress of the European Powers. He had a hundred reasons for allowing passion to prompt his eloquence: the sufferings of his down-trodden countrymen and their needs; the insults, the thwarting, the defeats heaped upon his beloved Piedmont; the

dynastic aspirations of the King he served; his own ambition, which had been baffled and might at any moment be ruined by the truculence of Austria in league with the craftiness of Rome; the conviction that the struggle he was waging rose above personal or dynastic or even national interests and involved civilization itself, by substituting for an old-world order, grown corrupt and inefficient through age, new ideals, new methods for the uplifting of mankind — any of these considerations might have let loose a volley of invectives. And there nearly opposite, across the green table, as if to tempt him, sat Buol and Hübner, — taunting, defiant, supercilious, implacable, — the visible embodiment of that Austria who had cursed Italy for fifty years, had striven to exclude Piedmont from the Congress, and now waited impatiently for a chance to annihilate her.

Happily, Cavour listened to none of these promptings. Judging wisely that Lord Clarendon's volcanic explosion required no afterclap, he adopted a moderate tone, in which, while protesting formally against the conditions of Italy, he seemed to speak without rancor. Instead of vituperating the Austrian envoys, he began by acknowledging that they had a perfect right to keep out of this discussion, but he urged that it was most important for the welfare of Europe that the opinions of the Powers on the Italian situation should be publicly recorded. "The occupation of the Roman States," he said, confirming Clarendon's charges, "evidently tends to become permanent. It has lasted for eight years, and there is no indication to lead us to suppose that it will ever end. Indeed, the causes — or the pretexts — which brought it about, subsist with the same force as at the epoch when it was begun. The condition of the Romagna, instead of improving, has grown worse: which is proved by the fact that Austria feels obliged to maintain the state of siege at Bologna and to use the same rigorous measures as when she entered that town. Such a state of things, contrary to the treaties, destroys the political balance in Italy and constitutes a very real danger for Piedmont. In fact, Austria, buttressed by Ferrara and by Piacenza, — whose fortifications she is working to increase, — contrary to the spirit if not to the letter of the treaty of Vienna, dominates the entire right bank of the Po, and, stretching along the Adriatic, she is the actual mistress of the larger part of Italy.

The Powers in Congress assembled ought not by their silence to sanction such a state of affairs. Piedmont in particular, being especially menaced, must protest. For this reason I demand that the opinion of the plenipotentiaries of France and of Great Britain, as well as my formal protest, be inserted in the protocol." "Passing to the question of Naples," Cavour writes in his confidential summary of the debate, "I strongly supported what Lord Clarendon had said, adding that the conduct of the King, by discrediting royalty and making regular governments odious, strengthened the forces of the Revolutionary Party and constituted a veritable danger for the other Italian States."⁸¹

Baron Hübner did not miss the opportunity to retort that Cavour had spoken of the Austrian occupation of the Papal States as if it were unique: why had he neglected to mention the French garrison in Rome? And speaking of occupations, how about the Piedmontese contingent in the Principality of Monaco? Cavour, however, could not be silenced by this apparent home-thrust. He desired most heartily, he said, that every foreign soldier should be withdrawn from the Papal States: but he pointed out that there was a radical difference, so far as concerned the political equilibrium of Italy, between an isolated corps of French troops at Rome, and the occupation by the Austrians of provinces contiguous to Lombardy and Venetia. As for the Monaco affair, the Piedmontese "army" to which Hübner alluded consisted of fifty men; these he would willingly recall from Mentone and leave the Prince to the mercy of his subjects, provided "Piedmont is not held responsible for the ducking in the sea which the Prince would probably undergo."

After a few unimportant, scattering remarks from other members of the Congress, and an attempt by Walewski to sweeten its close by a spray of rose-water, the session adjourned. It took nearly a week of wrangling to draft the protocol. The Austrians fought to have every reference to the Italian Question expunged: the English and Cavour insisted that there should be no omission, and Walewski, instructed by the Emperor, sided with them. Still, as finally made public, the official report of that stormy meeting, from which dates a new era in the affairs of Italy, is

⁸¹ *Politique*, 153-54. C.'s despatch to Cibrario is printed entire as a footnote, 150-56.

colorless and emasculate. But the truth spread through Paris by word of mouth, and by private despatches to all the Cabinets of Europe, and was soon commented upon in the press.

Cavour, who refrained throughout from overestimating the immediate gains to be won at the Congress, wrote: "Nevertheless, two facts will remain, which are not without some importance. First, the stigma branded on the conduct of the King of Naples by France and England in the face of united Europe; and, second, the condemnation aimed by England at the Clerical government in terms as precise and energetic as the most zealous Italian patriot could have desired." Having realized early in the negotiations that he could secure no material benefit, Cavour did not repine that Austria had been too stubborn and France too hesitating to grant some merely palliative measure. He rejoiced that Austria's stubbornness, made more offensive by Buol's personal truculence, must have irritated Napoleon and convinced him, "as I have had the honor to repeat to him several times, that the Italian Question admits of but one real, efficacious solution — the cannon."⁸²

Cavour seems to have been so much encouraged by Clarendon's outburst that he determined to put the British sympathy to the test at once. He bade Emanuel d'Azeglio to tell every one in London, without trying to cause alarm, that Cavour, although so moderate in his attitude throughout the Congress, was capable of the boldest action. Palmerston in particular should understand that, in the plight in which the Congress was leaving Italy, moderate men like Cavour had no further hopes except in a general war, while the violent looked to a universal cataclysm.⁸³ Lord Holland and other influential Englishmen in Paris urged Cavour to go to London and confer with Palmerston.⁸⁴ But first he had with Clarendon an interview of which he sent epitomes to D'Azeglio and to Rattazzi.

"What has passed at the Congress," he said to Clarendon, "proves two things: First, that Austria is decided to persist in her system of oppression and violence towards Italy, and, second, that the efforts of diplomacy are powerless to modify her system.

⁸² For the session of April 8, see the official protocol in Gourdon, 108-23, and 529-31. *Traité de Paris du 30 Mars*. Par le Correspondant Diplomatique du Constitutionnel, 293-360, 515-31. *Politique*, 150-60. *Stor. Doc.*, vii, 265-76. *Diplomatic Study*, II, 384-85.

⁸³ *Politique*, 156-57.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 158.

As a result, the consequences for Piedmont are excessively vexatious. In the presence of the irritation of political parties on one hand, and of Austria's annoyance on the other, there are only two courses to take: either to reconcile ourselves with Austria and the Pope, or to prepare ourselves to declare war on Austria at a not distant day. If the first course were preferable, I ought, on my return to Turin, to advise the King to call to office the friends of Austria and the Pope. If on the contrary the second hypothesis is the better, my friends and I will not shrink from preparing ourselves for a terrible war, a war to death, 'the war to the knife.' Here I stopped. Lord Clarendon, without showing either surprise or disapprobation, said then: 'I think you are right: your position grows very difficult; I conceive an explosion inevitable; only, the moment has not come for talking aloud about it.' I replied: 'I have given you proofs of my moderation and prudence. I believe that in political affairs one should be excessively reserved in words, and excessively decided in deeds. There are positions where audacity is less dangerous than an excess of prudence. With La Marmora, I am persuaded that we are in condition to begin war, and, no matter how short a time it lasts, you will certainly be forced to aid us.' Lord Clarendon replied with great vivacity: 'Oh certainly, if you are in embarrassment, you can count on us, and you will see with what energy we shall come to your aid.'" ⁸⁵

■ *Lettere*, II, 426-27; C. to Rattazzi, Paris, April 12, 1856. The letter to E. d'Azeglio is dated April 11. In both C. says the interview took place "yesterday."

"'You see, my Lord,' said Cavour, . . . 'that Austria has decided to make no concession, and that Italy has nothing more to expect from diplomacy. That being so, Piedmont's position becomes exceedingly difficult. She must necessarily either make up with Austria and the Pope, or prepare prudently to wage war on Austria. In the first case, I shall have to retire to give place to Reactionists; in the second, I must know that my way of looking is not opposed to that of our best ally — England.' Clarendon rubbed his chin furiously, but he did not seem in the least astonished. After a moment's silence, he said to me: '*You are perfectly right. You cannot do otherwise; only, it must not be said.*' I continued: 'You must have seen that I am neither a babbler nor imprudent. But, at the same time we must have a precise end in order to direct our political march right. War does not frighten me. We should be resolved to fight it to the utmost, *to the knife.* Besides, however short it lasted, you would be forced to aid us.' Here Clarendon let go his chin and exclaimed: '*Certainly, certainly*, we should do so heartily and with the greatest energy.' I ended by saying: 'With La Marmora we shall give the Austrians plenty of trouble.' '*Yes, yes*, I am sure of it.'" Before they parted, Clarendon encouraged Cavour to visit the Queen, and he seemed to regard the probability of Italy's third war of liberation very favorably. *Politique*, 158-59. The italics are in the original.

Cavour goes on to tell Rattazzi that England is so distressed over the peace that she would welcome another war, especially as popular a war as that for the liberation of Italy would be. "Therefore," he asks, "why not profit by this combination and risk a supreme effort to fulfil the destiny of the House of Savoy and of our country? As this is a life or death question, however, we must walk very cautiously; therefore, I deem it timely to go to London to speak with Palmerston and the other heads of the government. If these share Clarendon's point of view, we must get ready quietly, make a loan of 30,000,000 and on La Marmora's return give Austria an ultimatum which she could not accept, and begin war. The Emperor cannot be opposed to this war; he desires it in the secret of his heart. He will certainly aid us, if he sees England decided to enter the lists. Moreover, before leaving I will make a statement to the Emperor similar to that addressed to Lord Clarendon. The last conversations I have had with him and his ministers were such as to prepare the way for a bellicose declaration. The only obstacle I foresee is the *Pope*. What to do with him in case of an Italian war? I hope that, after reading this letter, you will not think me overcome by brain fever, or fallen into a state of mental exaltation. Quite the contrary: I am in perfect health, and I have never felt more calm: nay, I have acquired a great reputation for moderation. Clarendon has often told me so; Prince Napoleon accuses me of lacking energy, and even Walewski praises my behavior. But truly, I am persuaded that we might with great possibility of success try audacity. As you may be sure, I shall make no engagement, either near or remote; I shall gather facts; and on my return, the King and my colleagues shall decide what is to be done." ⁸⁶

This astonishing letter has puzzled Cavour's biographers. In 1862, when Berti first published extracts ⁸⁷ from it after Cavour's death, the British public was so amazed that Clarendon thought it proper to offer an explanation in the House of Lords, although he "felt pain and repugnance in contradicting" a statesman of Cavour's eminence who could not reply. He alluded to his frequent talks with Cavour — talks so intimate that he did not deem it necessary even to refer to them in his despatches to the

■ *Lettere*, II, 428. ⁸⁷ See *Rivista Contemporanea*, January, 1862; vol. 28, pp. 3-46, for Berti's article.

Foreign Office. He described Cavour's chagrin at the failure of the Congress to do anything for Italy. He recalled how the invasion of Piedmont by Austria "was a fixed idea in Count Cavour's mind," and although he could not guarantee after six years' interval that he quoted his own words exactly, he had no doubt of the "spirit and scope" of his answers to hypothetical questions. "If you ask my opinion," Clarendon said to Cavour, "I should say that, if Austria invaded Piedmont for the purpose of suppressing free institutions there, you would have a practical proof of the feeling of the Parliament and people of England on the subject." But Clarendon added that "so wild a notion" as an Austrian attack on Piedmont "cannot have been entertained by Count Cavour himself." He declared that it was as natural for Cavour, with his enthusiasm for his own ideas and his desire to buoy up the spirits of his Piedmontese friends, to exaggerate or misconstrue Clarendon's remark, as it was palpably absurd to suppose that he, Her Majesty's Foreign Secretary, would make so nonsensical a promise without so much as consulting his colleagues.⁸⁸ The Clarendon of 1862, addressing the House of Lords in his own defense, said he thought that Cavour was simply putting forth "a hypothetical case," to which neither of them attached any importance. But the Clarendon of 1856, for many months after that conversation, proved by his action that he took Cavour's warlike proposal most seriously; for he continually warned the Piedmontese ambassador in London and Cavour himself, as a schoolmaster warns a pugnacious boy, that Piedmont must keep the peace or take the consequences. And that Cavour was aware how thoroughly he had impressed his devil-may-care purpose on Clarendon appears from the frequency with which, during the next year, he bids Emanuel d'Azeglio to assure the British Foreign Secretary that he need feel no alarm.⁸⁹

We need not suspect that either statesman deliberately falsified. In general, it is more likely that Cavour, writing within a few hours of an interview which made a tremendous impression on him, writing moreover in the strictest confidence, reported the words uttered much more accurately than Clarendon after six

⁸⁸ III Hansard, CLXV, 347-51; Feb. 17, 1862.

⁸⁹ *Politique*, *passim*, May-Dec., 1856.

years could give them in a public speech which he instinctively couched in guarded phraseology. On that 10th of April, when they met privately to talk as man to man, Clarendon "furiously stroking his chin," the little Piedmontese pacing emphatically to and fro, as was his custom, it is foolish to imagine that they addressed each other in the stilted, non-committal diction of diplomacy. Clarendon knew perfectly well that whatever he said could not be binding. "The most reserved and prudent" of envoys, he had just let himself go in denouncing the shocking government of the Pope, Bomba's atrocities and the generally intolerable condition of Italy. He had been so much incensed by Buol's speech—although his own must have sounded equally outrageous to Buol—that he sent Cowley to warn the Austrian plenipotentiary that it would excite widespread indignation in England.⁹⁰ We do not stretch probability, therefore, when we assume that he used expressions which Cavour eagerly caught up as signs that Clarendon, at least, would support Piedmont in a war against Austria.

With his fertility of invention, Cavour, like a great chess-player, always thought out alternative combinations six moves ahead for every possible play of his opponents; so now he ran over in his mind what must be done in case England proved willing to give material aid. Seeing in a flash the reasons why she should desire another war, he intended to make those reasons irresistible. He knew the power of suggestion, and since Clarendon on his own motion was disposed to go so far, Cavour by suggestion would make his retreat impossible. But as Piedmont also must be aroused, he outlined to Rattazzi his startling plan. All was contingent, however, on the endorsement by Palmerston and the English government leaders of Clarendon's view. If they officially consented, then Piedmont must "quietly prepare"; in any case, "we must proceed most cautiously." He was not crazy; he was simply planting in Rattazzi's mind a definite line of action, in case circumstances turned that way.

After Clarendon, Cavour saw the Emperor, to whom he spoke in similar vein, but in less heated terms. Napoleon was "benevolent." He had just been expressing to Buol his regret at Austria's attitude towards Italy, and Buol had protested that his Cabinet

⁹⁰ *Lettere*, II, 429.

desired in all things to please the French government. On the strength of this, Napoleon hoped to secure some concessions; but Cavour was incredulous. "Go to London," said the Emperor, "come to a thorough understanding with Palmerston, and see me on your return."⁹¹ Clarendon and Plon-Plon told Cavour that, in a long conversation with the Emperor, they too had discussed the intolerable position of Piedmont, and that he was much impressed. As if to leave no doubt of his own policy, Clarendon said brusquely to Buol, on meeting him in the Emperor's study: "You throw down the glove to Liberal Europe; be warned that it may be taken up, and that there are Powers which, although they may have signed the peace, are ready and eager to renew the war." Plon-Plon showed his antipathy by giving a banquet to the envoys without inviting the Austrians.⁹²

Before crossing the Channel, Cavour attended the final conferences of the Congress on April 14 and 16. He took care not to agree to a resolution in favor of the future arbitration of international difficulties, until it was explained that no such intervention was intended as Austria had practised in Naples in 1821. He also presented a formal note protesting against the condition of Italy. At parting, Orloff overflowed with good wishes, personal and political. Even Buol said that he trusted that, although their official relations had grown worse, Cavour would preserve a pleasant recollection of their personal intercourse. "He shook my hand affectionately," Cavour wrote, "saying: '*Allow me to hope that even in politics we shall not always be enemies.*'"⁹³

Amid such leave-takings, the Congress broke up. Its main work, the adjustment of the Eastern Question, has not concerned us here. It bolstered up for an indefinite period the abominable rule of the Turk in Europe;⁹⁴ it turned Russia towards Asia, without appeasing her hunger for the Balkans; it seemed to raise Napoleon III to an unshakable pinnacle of power; it flattered the self-conceit of Austria, leading her to persist in her suicidal arrogance; it left England's military prestige sadly tarnished and taught her the folly of meddling in Continental quarrels. To civilization, the Congress contributed its condemnation of priva-

⁹¹ *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 280.

■ *Lettere*, II, 434-45.

■ *Ibid.*, 419.

⁹⁴ England, France and Austria signed a tripartite treaty which bound them to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire. This compact the London *Spectator* of May 3, 1856, dubbed a "new Holy Alliance."

teering and its tentative, low-lisped word in favor of arbitration. Its deeper significance, however, included the virtual abrogation of the Treaty of Vienna; the burial of the Holy Alliance, long since defunct in fact; the collapse of the old theory of European equilibrium; the tacit recognition of the Revolution in the person of Napoleon III, who had kicked away the ladder by which he had risen. The treaty was rather the last testament of the preceding forty years of reaction, than a prospectus of the hopes and ideals of the new generation. And those who heard Walewski declare at the farewell banquet — "the peace must be durable because it is honorable" — must have felt the hollowness of his prophecy. The real questions, — nationality, constitutional liberty, the social problems, the abolition of the Pope's temporal power, — these the Congress dared not cope with: yet these were the questions which in the next few years would force Europe to political and social reconstruction.

The last shall be first. Little Piedmont had a place at the Congress much as a boy is allowed to sit at a party of his elders,⁹⁵ and Prussia was admitted late and very grudgingly, as a Power that could not quite be ignored but need not be much respected. Yet within five years Piedmont was the recognized cornerstone of United Italy; within ten years Austria was humbled; within fifteen years, France having been terribly beaten and the Napoleonic Empire swept away, the King of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor in the great hall at Versailles.

Judged by what he accomplished and what he prevented, with the great odds against him, Lord Clarendon ranked first among the framers of the treaty. Judged by final results, however, the hero of the Congress⁹⁶ was Cavour, whose immediate victories

⁹⁵ "Do you think it of slight account to be on a footing with the Great Powers?" Thiers asked Minghetti, while the Congress was in session. "Do you think it a small matter to have a minister held in great esteem and welcomed by every one? He is the Benjamin of the Plenipotentiaries, and on all sides I hear praises of his genius — and if you wish for more you are indeed not to be satisfied." Minghetti, III, 98.

⁹⁶ "If the ulterior results rather than the motive of a war are held to constitute its justification, Cavour stands out as the one politician in Europe whose aims in entering upon the Crimean War have been fulfilled, not mocked, by events. . . . His Crimean policy is one of those excessively rare instances of statesmanship where action has been determined not by the driving and half-understood necessities of the moment, but by a distinct and true perception of the future." Fyffe: *Modern Europe*, III, 248-49.

were to secure Piedmont's admission on equal terms and to compel the Congress to listen to the woes of Italy. By a wonderful stroke he made Walewski and Clarendon the accusers of Austrian, Papal and Neapolitan enormities: this gave triple weight to his own indictment and set Piedmont more clearly apart as the champion of the oppressed Italians. Cavour's personal triumph was also to have an immense influence. When the sittings began, few of his fellow-envoys knew him; but before the close, all of them and every cabinet in Europe understood that in the Prime Minister of Piedmont they had to deal with a master of statecraft.⁹⁷ They found him a man absolutely sure of his facts, inexhaustible in expedients, not to be rebuffed, now supple, now aggressive, capable of setting forth in propitiating phrase an unpopular principle which he would never abandon, capable too of giving vent to almost dæmonic indignation, but more often trusting to his invincible gift of irony and always directing his strongest appeal to reason. "Diplomacy is dying," said the aged Metternich ruefully, when the real results of the Congress of Paris began to loom up; "there is now in Europe only a single diplomatist, and, unhappily, he is against us: this man is M. de Cavour."⁹⁸

Cavour reached London on April 18. Lord Palmerston, owing to the death of his stepson, could grant him only a brief interview, but the Queen was cordial and insisted on his staying over to witness a naval review. Prince Albert, who wholly inspired the Queen's public acts, was also very friendly. The leaders of all parties showed their interest in Piedmont, and particularly in the redemption of Italy. "Lord Lyndhurst, who in spite of his 83 years is still the foremost orator of the House of Lords, is all on fire for us. He has promised me a speech," Cavour wrote.⁹⁹ These courtesies were precious, but it took Cavour only a few hours to realize that England had no intention of abetting Piedmont in a war with Austria.¹⁰⁰ If he had misconstrued Claren-

⁹⁷ "I have been *understood*, although I have not been listened to," Cavour said, playing on the French words *entendu* and *écouté*. Senior: *Conversations*, II, 78. ■ Mazade, 187. ⁹⁹ *Lettere*, II, 442; C. to Rattazzi, London, April 24, 1856.

¹⁰⁰ Minghetti, III, 107-08, thinks that for the moment C. confounded "his desires and hopes with true and proper assurance"; but that he immediately saw his mistake; recognized Napoleon III as the only possible champion of Italy on the battle-field; and thenceforth made the military alliance with France his guiding motive.

don's promises, or wilfully allowed his own zeal to infuse into them a meaning which Clarendon never intended, he now quickly recovered his poise. Cutting short his stay in England, he stopped over in Paris only long enough to pay his respects to Napoleon, and in the afternoon of April 29 he reached Turin. He drove at once to the Royal Palace to report to the King, who greeted him by clasping round his neck the Collar of the Order of the Annunciata.

During the ten weeks of Cavour's absence, his countrymen had waited for some definite return from his diplomatic labor. The unthinking supposed that the Congress would allot to Piedmont a large share of Italy in compensation for her aid in the Crimea. The more modest expected at least some small province as a sign of victory. As usual, the Radicals of the Left and the Reactionists of the Right joined in a dirge of disparagement. The *Diritto*, Lorenzo Valerio's organ, gave warning that Italy had nothing to hope at Paris, where her spokesman was Cavour, a narrow Piedmontese, infected with "municipalism."¹⁰¹ Such news of the proceedings as leaked out, seemed to confirm the croakers.¹⁰² The Piedmontese envoys might sit in the Congress, but they were evidently doing nothing. Cavour's unofficial activity could not be reported, nor even guessed. On March 30 the telegraph announced the signing of the treaty. Still not a word of the Italian Question.¹⁰³ Oldofredi, one of his secretaries at Paris, sent urgent messages to Dina, of the *Opinione*, to prepare the public to expect no territorial aggrandizement.¹⁰⁴ As late as April 14 Cavour's Cabinet colleagues had not fathomed the significance of the stormy session of April 8; they took literally his own description of its "miserable result."¹⁰⁵ The Paris *Constitutionnel*, Walewski's organ, persisted for a week in denying

¹⁰¹ *Opinione*, Feb. 13, 1856.

¹⁰² Daniel, the American Minister, writes to Washington on April 5: "The result of the Conference of Paris has been received without emotion or comment in Piedmont." "Cavour and his party will put the best face on the matter; but the truth is manifest, that Piedmont has gained nothing but the esteem of France and England." On April 12 he says: "It is probable that France and England permitted him [Cavour] to present those ideas to Europe because they are not unwilling to make use of them at some future day. . . . Some lofty project is always useful to keep the people in a good mood. A reorganization of Italy would be a fine bauble; and this may be the first step of a considerable movement and change in the Peninsula." *Amer. Arch.*

¹⁰³ *Diritto*; Dina, 178 n.

¹⁰⁴ Dina, 174, 179.

¹⁰⁵ *Politique*, 150.

that the word "Italy" had even been mentioned at the famous session, and it exultantly declared that the Memorandum of the Piedmontese envoys had not been received by the Congress.¹⁰⁶ Then Rattazzi received the very confidential summary of the talk with Clarendon, and Oldofredi began to give Dina hints which he promptly worked up in his paper, showing that something had been gained. The news spread. Rumor whispered of confidences which might not be printed;¹⁰⁷ shrewd inferences were drawn; private letters from Paris all agreed that Cavour had not only won a brilliant personal prestige but spoken nobly in behalf of Italy. Before he reached home, therefore, although, as he said, he did not bring "even the tiniest duchy in his pocket," popular opinion was prepared to welcome him. This favorable sentiment was somewhat checked, except among those who read between the lines, when the text of the Treaty of Paris was printed at Turin on April 27.¹⁰⁸ By the protocols it appeared that Cavour had spoken only four times at the Congress, and his remarks seemed rather tame.¹⁰⁹

Nevertheless, when he entered the Chamber of Deputies he was received with cheers (April 30). To afford him an opportu-

¹⁰⁶ *Constitutionnel*, April 16, 20. It was characteristic of the tangle of insincerities of Napoleon's régime that his Foreign Minister should be allowed to maintain an organ which attacked the Emperor's policy and the official utterances of Walewski himself, when they did not coincide with his real purposes. Although it was not formally received by the Congress, the Memorandum was received by the members individually, and it did its work among them. In diplomacy there is more than one way of whipping the devil round the stump.

¹⁰⁷ Daniel writes on April 20 that it is the universal dictum at Turin that there will be wars in Italy within a year. Piedmont especially desires to "get up a disturbance."

¹⁰⁸ *L'Opinione*, No. 114, said: "An ill humor reigns in Italy — an ill humor which the conferences of Paris have exacerbated without suggesting any remedy for it." *Il Cittadino*, of Asti, No. 59, said, "We are going afresh towards a revolution." *Il Tempo*, of Casale, No. 8, "Italy ought to hope for nothing more from diplomacy, nor for any more aid from the European governments to uplift herself." *Il Diritto*, No. 98, cried sarcastically, "If the Italians feel able to swallow this, let them do so; if not, let them rebel." *L'Italia e Popolo*, the Mazzinian organ at Genoa, No. 113, advised, "Let them rebel, and let them learn not to have any compromise with the power against which they rebel, under whatever form it may show itself" — a stab at the Piedmontese Monarchy. These quotations are in Artom-Blanc, I, 566.

¹⁰⁹ Pallavicino, II, 218, writing from Paris on May 3 to his daughter, says: "It is false, most false, that Cavour cut a poor figure in the conferences: on the contrary, he was the lion of the occasion; and Daniel Manin is the first to do him justice. Cavour, this time, showed himself *Italian*. Then why should one hesitate in giving him a token of esteem and affection?"

nity to define the results of the Congress in terms which he deemed most effective, he caused Buffa to interpellate him, and on May 6, in a speech which is another landmark in the history of the Risorgimento, he replied. He set in their true perspective the "moral gains" which Piedmont had won: the admission, contrary to the maxims of the Congress of Vienna, of a second-rate power to a European conference; the sympathy of France and England; the re-opening of friendly relations with Russia; the acknowledgement that the occupation of the Papal States ought to cease, and that the despotic governments must adopt a policy of clemency and justice; the rejection, in spite of Austrian unwillingness, of the principle of non-intervention; the defense by Clarendon and Cavour of freedom of the press; the demonstration that Austria's usurpations South of the Po, and her fortifying of Piacenza, destroyed the equilibrium of Italy, menaced Piedmont and contravened the Treaty of Vienna. Having made clear what these gains implied, Cavour was careful to point out that other means must be sought before the final victory could be won. "The great solutions," he said impressively, "are not decided by the pen. Diplomacy is powerless to change the state of nations — it can only sanction accomplished facts and give to them a legal character" . . . "We have gained two things," he continued. "In the first place, the unhappy and abnormal condition of Italy has been denounced to Europe, not by demagogues (*laughter*), by hot-headed revolutionists, by passionate journalists, but by the representatives of the foremost Powers of Europe, by the statesmen who are governing the greatest nations, by eminent personages, accustomed to consult reason much more than to follow the impulses of the heart. In the second place, those very Powers have declared that it was useful not only to Italy but to Europe to apply some remedy to the ills of Italy. I cannot believe that the judgments expressed, the counsels given, by Powers like France and England can long remain sterile."

Cavour did not close, however, without telling the Chamber that, as an inevitable offset, these gains brought more difficult relations with Austria. Although it had become perfectly clear that the principles followed by the two countries were mutually incompatible, he did not believe that the Subalpine Parliament would advise the King to change his policy, just when that policy

had enabled Piedmont to take a long a step forward. "For the first time in history," he concluded, "the Italian Question has been brought before a European congress and discussed, not indeed, as formerly at Laybach and at Verona, with a view to increase the ills of Italy and to rivet new chains upon her, but with the intention proclaimed to all of seeking a remedy for her ills and of making known the sympathy towards her of the great nations. The Congress is over; the Cause of Italy is carried henceforth before the tribunal of public opinion, to which, in the memorable saying of the Emperor of the French, belongs the final verdict, the definitive victory. The struggle may be long, the vicissitudes may perhaps be many; but trusting in the justice of our cause we await confidently the final issue." ¹¹⁰

Amid the general applause which greeted Cavour's guarded statement, two discordant notes were heard. Count Solaro, unflagging in his opposition to every symptom of Liberal progress, denounced Cavour's course at the Congress. "You have provoked a foreign intervention in Naples," he said; "and this is equivalent to approving one in Piedmont." Naturally, he expressed his horror that the representative of Catholic Piedmont should join with the representative of England, a Protestant heretic, in attacking the Holy Father's government. The Right having thus uttered its repudiation, the Left spoke through Brofferio, who indulged in an eloquent outburst. He treated sarcastically the suggestion that at the Congress Italy had for the first time got a hearing — as if, forsooth, Dante and Petrarch, Machiavelli and Alfieri had not been her spokesmen! As if Rienzi, Masaniello, Savonarola and all the other patriots had not been her voice! "No, no!" he said, "Italian Liberty will never arise out of diplomatic synods! No, the independence of Italy will never be the gift either of Prussia or of Russia or of France or of England; Italy will shake off the slumber of the tomb when the Italians awake her!" At this flight, the galleries applauded vehemently. Then Brofferio, to set a background of actuality behind his rhetoric, said that Piedmont had spent 75 millions on her Crimean enterprise, and got in return only pretty compliments; but by the Congress of Vienna, where she was not even represented, she had been awarded an indemnity of 24 millions. He

¹¹⁰ *Discorsi*, IX, 445-59.

left his hearers to infer how large ■ minus number would represent the value of Cavour's efforts. But this and other criticism influenced the House so little that a resolution to approve "the *national policy* of the King's government and the conduct of the Piedmontese plenipotentiaries at Paris," was carried almost unanimously.¹¹¹ The Senate passed a similar motion which Massimo d'Azeglio proposed.¹¹² At last, after his nine years' career as editor, deputy and minister, Cavour could congratulate himself on winning ■ great personal triumph in his own country.¹¹³

And not in Piedmont only. The greetings and thanks addressed to him by public bodies and private admirers came from all parts of Italy. Italian Liberals everywhere divined the meaning of his work at the Congress; and from Milan, Como, Modena, Rome and Naples, in spite of the police, went money to have medals struck at Turin in his honor. Tuscany presented him with ■ marble bust of himself, by Vela, for which Salvagnoli suggested the motto from Dante, "To him who defended her with open face."¹¹⁴ And in showering their laurels on Cavour, oppressed Italians wished to signify both that they would look to Piedmont for their salvation, and that in him the great cause which inspired them had found its leader. A people down-trodden or staggered or perplexed, is ready to see an omen in every event; and no doubt it often blunders, mistaking mirage for the Delectable Mountains, and hailing spectres as heroes: the

¹¹¹ On May 7. See *Lettere*, II, 130-34. Artom-Blanc, 568. Brofferio.

¹¹² On May 10, D'Azeglio still resented the deception practised upon him by Cavour before the Congress, but he frankly acknowledged that Cavour had done much at Paris. "It is better that he went," Massimo wrote to his nephew on May 16. "He is a man of finance, of the stock exchange, of railways — all matters of the first importance now. And in fact, he at once proved himself a man of ability. He is younger, stronger, and consequently more mischievous than I, and he rushed about more than I could have done. He has that petulance which especially at Paris is just what they want. It is true that I know Italy and her questions better: but this was not enough to compensate. In fact, one could n't hope for more than he has accomplished. Only one thing I could n't have done, precisely because I know Italy. I would never have proposed that mess of the separation of the Legations. He, never having been to Bologna, can't see the secret springs." So Massimo gives credit to the "rival," without, however, disparaging himself. D'Azeglio: *Lettere*, 279-80.

¹¹³ On May 7, C. d'Azeglio writes: "Here Camillo has greatly strengthened his position; he is the banner now." P. 506.

¹¹⁴ "Colui che la difese ■ viso aperto." *Inferno*, x, 92.

path of Italian patriotism was strewn with these disillusiones; but time proved that the trust which sober Italians placed in Cavour in May, 1856, was justified. That confidence would, of itself, have warranted the Crimean venture. The Congress of Paris marks a new epoch for Italy; but unless Piedmont had been admitted to that Congress — nay, unless Cavour had been her representative there — that epoch might not have dawned for many years. In politics, he said truly, audacity may be the greatest prudence.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ The only conspicuous historical writer who takes an opposite view is Tivaroni, who never disguises his Republican predilections and seems here to be betrayed by them. For he implies that Piedmont's participation in the Crimean War and admission to the Congress of Paris had no effect in leading up to the War of 1859, which resulted in the unification of Italy. "Napoleon III," he says, "would have made the war on Austria even without the alliance with Piedmont in 1855, because it was a part of his interests, his plans, and his traditions, and Piedmont would have made it in the same way." A few lines further on, however, Tivaroni declares: "But after all, Cavour obtained the sympathy of Europe, the probable future support of Napoleon, the discussion of the Italian Question in a diplomatic European congress, the open and decided hostility of Austria: all of which, by placing Piedmont at the head of the national movement in competition with the Revolution, supplanted all the other princes of Italy, and thereby put all rivalry at a distance." Tivaroni, I, 445-46. The laboriously learned Tivaroni had many virtues, but his reasoning faculty sometimes — as here — failed him. His summary of Cavour's achievements at Paris completely refutes his assertion that the war and congress were futile.

CHAPTER XV

PIEDMONT THE NATIONAL LEADER

IN the ebb-and-flow of the seasons, there comes a turning point when we say, "Yesterday was winter; today is spring." The change may have been long brooding, unexpected, almost un hoped-for; but we recognize it immediately. At a given moment, we are surprised to note a new feel in the air, to see buds peep forth on twig and tree, to find a new strange exaltation in the heart. When we looked last, the fields were stubble; now a delicate verdure is creeping across them. Nature, which for many months has seemed utterly absorbed by death, now pours life and more life into every nerve and fibre of the visible world. History too has its equinoctials. Such a seasonal divide was the Congress of Paris for the Italians.

At the outset, the result seemed too merely "moral" to satisfy persons who thought that Providence paid only in material coin. But soon it was perceived that the implications were of far more importance than the formal acts of the Congress. Europe had listened to Piedmont as the spokesman of Italy; the wrongs of the Peninsula were ventilated; Cavour, Piedmont's pilot, had suddenly acquired international fame and had sown in the minds of the statesmen of England and France his plan of redemption. Next to gaining their goodwill, he valued his achievement in holding up Austria as the irreconcilable enemy of Piedmont, the direct cause of Italy's terrible condition. To focus the patriotism of the Italians on the great enemy of Italy was indispensable; but it was far less simple then than it appears now: because everywhere outside of Piedmont, patriots of every party — Moderates, Radicals and Reds — still deceived themselves by thinking that local insurrections could do good. Untaught by the lesson of 1849, that Austria would step in to restore Absolutism in every province, they still cherished the delusion of 1848 — that no matter where the spark of revolution were dropt, it would light a fire that would sweep from Sicily to the Alps.

Cavour, on the contrary, saw clearly that Italy could not be liberated by the Italians alone, and that her salvation would never be valid unless the Italians contributed to it with all their might and main. Convinced by his recent trip to London that England would not give armed help, from this time on he bent himself to dispose Napoleon III to become the active champion of the Italian Cause. "Do not fret," Napoleon said to him before they parted; "I have a presentiment that the actual peace will not last long."¹ Cavour himself, it was whispered at Turin after his return, had confidentially predicted that there would be war within a year. To make Piedmont ready was comparatively easy, although it must be done under the pretense of guarding against Austrian aggression rather than as a prelude to a struggle for independence. The Party of Revolution, strongly Republican in its faith, hated the thought of being redeemed by a king. After their experience with all the other Italian rulers, including the Pope, they put no trust in princes. They argued, therefore, that, even if Victor Emanuel were sincere, and successful, he would convert Italy into a constitutional monarchy; if false, having rid her of Bourbons, Papalists, and Austrians, he might fix upon them a despotism which would be harder to overthrow than the existing ring of petty tyrants. The House of Savoy had pursued for three hundred years "the policy of the artichoke." Victor Emanuel's Liberalism, his sympathy for the oppressed Lombards, Romans and Neapolitans might readily be explained as subterfuges for accomplishing his dynastic ambition. Many worthy Italians honestly held this view, and interpreted every act of the King and his advisers by a selfish, if not sinister key.

Unable longer to press their old charge that he was a Retrograde in disguise, Cavour's personal enemies now accused him of being a "municipalist," a narrow Piedmontese, who aimed at aggrandizing Piedmont, regardless of the aspirations of all other Italians. A Piedmontized Italy excited no enthusiasm in them. They made much of the fact that he had never spoken out in behalf of a *United Italy*; whence they concluded — and partisans have repeated their argument for fifty years — that he did not believe in or desire a *United Italy*. They refused to understand that

¹ *Lettere*, II, 438.

Cavour's silence was a necessary means to unification. If he had announced, as Prime Minister of Piedmont, that his real motive was to create a United Italy, he would have aroused not only the Cabinets of Europe against that cause, but also every Italian ruler and every group of the Party of Revolution. Yes, the Party of Revolution itself would have risen to thwart him; for although Mazzini had for years preached unity with a prophet's iteration, he and his disciples cherished at heart the unity of a republic and no other. It would have been madness, therefore, in Cavour, as a responsible minister, to proclaim his purpose. He saw that, since the actual governments in Italy stood by the grace of Austria, so, if Austria could be driven out, they must fall. To drive out Austria was, accordingly, the first task: Independence must be secured before Unity could come within the range of practical discussion. Thus, by another path, reason forced Independence upon him as the next move. Multitudes would join in battling for this, who would not respond if Unity were the war-cry. Just as Abraham Lincoln, who refused to declare, until he could do so safely, that he was bent on the abolition of slavery, was abused and misinterpreted by Abolitionists, — although the whole course of his public career had proved his abhorrence of slavery, — so the Italian Unitarians abused and traduced Cavour. Zealots who attach chief importance to the public attestation of their faith; fanatics who free their conscience by manifestoes; and, in general, all persons who dwell in the world of rhetoric, where alone agitation can flourish, can never understand the immense potency of such silence as Lincoln and Cavour kept. The discretion which prompted it they call cowardice. It is time that the idle chatter as to whether Cavour desired Italian Unity should cease. There stands the letter, written in his youth in which he describes his audacious dream of 'waking up some day to find himself prime minister to the King of United Italy.'² From first to last he never abandoned that ideal.³

² *Lettere*, I, 280.

³ So Lincoln witnessed at New Orleans, in 1831, the horrors of slavery for the first time, when he attended a slave auction. "The whole thing was so revolting that Lincoln moved away from the scene with a deep feeling of 'unconquerable hate.' Bidding his companions follow him he said, 'By God, boys, let's get away from this. If ever I get a chance to hit that thing [meaning slavery], I'll hit it hard.'" Herndon: *Lincoln*, I, 67. Tarbell: *Early Life of Lincoln*, 112, rejects this story.

Being Piedmont's Prime Minister, however, his duty lay with facts, not dreams. He meant to draw together the elements in each of the Italian states that desired a change; but he would compromise neither with the Party of Violence nor with those who drew back from Constitutional Monarchy. He welcomed every act by which a despot made himself more odious and Piedmont, by contrast, more popular; but he felt both contempt and anger for the outbreaks of the Reds — contempt, because a child could see that they were futile, anger, because they threatened to check the sympathy of Europe which he had labored to cultivate.

To keep that sympathy alive was no easy task. The envoys had scarcely dispersed to their homes before the truth of Clarendon's epigram — "We have made a peace, but not peace"⁴ — began to appear. The old combinations being dissolved, new ones had to be formed. Cavour perceived that in allying Piedmont with France and England, he had hitched his wagon to a double-star, whose members were now swinging into different orbits. He must endeavor to keep in with both. But how? England accepted the treaty so reluctantly that Parliament would have censured Clarendon if all parties had not acknowledged that he had done his best. No longer stimulated by his daily duel with his country's enemies, and with his own diplomatic rivals, round Walewski's green baize table, Clarendon himself felt more and more keenly that if France had stood by him in the Congress, the outcome, from the English standpoint, would have been much more satisfactory. He had seen enough of Napoleon's entourage to put no trust in it. Convinced that the Emperor's ambition had not been satisfied, the British Foreign Secretary, in common with most of his countrymen, believed that England ought to look far enough ahead to cement an alliance which would be useful in case the ancient Gallic hatred against her should break out afresh. France was coquetting with Russia; England found it natural to resume friendship with Austria. The British Court had been almost continuously pro-Austrian since the days of the coalitions against the Great Napoleon: the British sovereigns for more than a century had been anti-Liberal, and neither Queen Victoria nor her political mentor, Prince Albert, was at this time

⁴ Vitzthum, I, 199.

an exception to the rule; the Tory aristocracy naturally sympathized with the aristocracy which supported the Hapsburg Empire. The friendship, verging just now on infatuation, which the Queen felt for Louis Napoleon personally, did not affect her approval of any policy on which, she was assured, British interests depended. Although Palmerston⁵ still held, in theory at least, his characteristic enthusiasms, England fell back in a surprisingly brief space into her traditional attitude towards the Great Powers. While she treated France circumspectly, as a friend who might at any moment turn into an enemy, France preferred to regard England as her ally, but she coquetted with Austria, and wished to lure Russia into a hard and fast alliance.

In this skirmish for position, Cavour had to save Piedmont from being either harmed or ignored. It quickly appeared that, however earnestly the Great Powers, and particularly Austria, desired to let the Italian Question slumber, it would not down. Clarendon took Cavour's recent warlike suggestions so much to heart, that for months he kept sending reproving messages to Turin. He chided Cavour for attempting to curry favor with the Tories, and Cavour freely admitted that in so doing he had been unwise: "for though he gained the powerful support of Lyndhurst, he did not, as the event proved, gain that of Lyndhurst's party. He learned that, in his effort to win over Englishmen of all sides, he had committed a breach of etiquette; for according to the rules of the game in London he must not have friendly dealings with both the Government and the Opposition at the same time. Therefore he bade Emanuel d'Azeglio to treat most delicately "our irritable friend with the tickling chin," "the irascible minister," the "hedgehog," "the old fox"; and he knew Clarendon well enough to distinguish between his personal resentment and his official displeasure. Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, working to tighten the bonds between England and Austria, had no scruples against lecturing Cavour for any occurrence in Piedmont which Buol did not like. Cavour always replied with perfect courtesy; but while he protested that Piedmont regarded England as her best friend and would gladly

⁵ Nevertheless, ■ early as May 24, 1856, the London *Spectator* reproved Palmerston for his ambiguous course, and for his apparent desertion of Piedmont. Vol. 29, pp. 555-56. ⁶ *Politique*, 183; June 2, 1856; 184; June 4, 1856.

gratify her, he let it be understood that Piedmont would never go back on her Liberal policy; and more than once he hinted that, if the Western Powers deserted Piedmont, or tried to coerce her into Reaction, there would ensue an upheaval which would shake all Italy and probably plunge Europe into a general war. Put in a nutshell, the argument which Cavour used now and repeated with increasing effectiveness at every subsequent crisis ran as follows: If the Reds rule, expect the deluge; if the Blacks rule, they will speedily cause all classes to revolt and the Reds will surely come out on top; therefore, the only hope for the maintenance of order in Italy and of peace in Europe, is to strengthen the Liberal Monarchy in Piedmont, — that government which has successfully held in check both Reds and Blacks and may be expected to encourage the oppressed States of Italy to seek relief by legal means only.

From Paris also Cavour received chastening messages, but he assumed in spite of them that the Emperor had not really changed heart towards the Italian Question. He divined that, no matter what transient issues might come between, Napoleon's next great undertaking would be the crushing of Austria. His own task was to keep a stream of anti-Austrian suggestion flowing into the Emperor's mind. When France and England disagreed over the new frontier prescribed by the Treaty of Paris for Russia on the lower Danube, both turned to Cavour, who wished to evade giving a decision on the ground that, at the Congress, he had not been consulted on that point. But Clarendon and Napoleon, and Russia also, insisted, and Cavour, after reviewing the evidence, decided in favor of the French contention, which happened to give a little wider scope to the play of nationality. "We cannot be Liberals in the Occident and Absolutists in the Orient," said he. His skill as mediator checked what threatened to lead to diplomatic rupture or worse; for it saved the English and French alliance, salved Russia's wounded dignity, and prevented Austria from getting either sympathy or spoils. He escaped the usual lot of the peace-maker, coming out of the affair with his own relations toward the disputants unchanged: if anything, Napoleon was more friendly and Russia more cordial. Even the English statesmen respected his sincerity, although they did not cease teasing him until the summer of 1857, when

the news of the Indian Mutiny distracted England from petty concerns. The attitude of the English Foreign Secretary, now offish, now severe, and that of Walewski, whose personal antipathy never cooled, harassed Cavour, and required ceaseless tact and forbearance on his part: but they never alarmed him. For he understood that neither France nor England would be rash enough, in the uncertain state of Europe, to drive Piedmont to desperation. They both wished to preserve peace, which they could not do by throwing a lighted brand into the Italian powder magazine.

On one side, on the side of Austria, however, Piedmont ran a great risk. Count Buol, with his overbearing nature, was not the man to submit resignedly to the stigma of odium which Cavour had adroitly stamped on Austria. Cavour's speech, which announced that the relations between Piedmont and Austria had grown incurably worse, and the publication, by Cavour's order, of the memorial of April 16 summing up the grievous condition of the Peninsula and Austria's responsibility therefor, goaded Buol to fury, which he vented in a circular note. He denounced Cavour's attempt to vilify Austria; he implied that the violent reaction since 1849 which Austria's enemies complained of might have been abandoned long since, if Piedmont, by her insensate policy, had not abetted incendiaries; he utterly repudiated the mission of spokesman and protector of Italy which Count Cavour wished to arrogate for Piedmont. The law of nations, he said bluntly, recognized only independent states in the Peninsula, and Austria, likewise, would tolerate no attempt by the Cabinet of Turin to infringe on their independence. Neither would she allow anyone to deny her the right of intervening in an Italian state when its legitimate sovereign requested her aid. Buol would scarcely deign to notice those critics who imputed to Austria's interventions a low motive. "History is there," he said with finely simulated indignation, "to show that in acting thus we have never had selfish intentions, and that our troops have retired just as soon as the legitimate authority has declared that it could preserve public order without foreign help." After hinting that Cavour's attack originated "in the need of a parliamentary victory," Buol gave warning that Austria would not be turned from her fixed course of seconding all

safe reforms in the Italian states and of opposing promoters of troubles and anarchists alike.⁷

From the Absolutist point of view Buol had logic on his side, that impeccable logic which theologians, diplomats and economists quote at each other, knowing very well that neither they nor their adversaries regard it as more than a blind to screen the real issue; that pitiless logic in which causes and institutions hastening to destruction, formulate their doctrines. The statesmen of the Great Powers said privately to each other that Buol had blundered — Manteuffel curtly dubbed his note a "tirade";⁸ but the princelings of Italy received it with obsequious satisfaction. Fired by it, Bomba wished "to castigate the scandal Cavour had raised"; while Baldasseroni, the aged lackey-minister of Grand Duke Leopold, having felt his blood freeze in his veins at Cavour's "bravados," now thawed sufficiently to announce that the question at stake was "territorial." The Duke of Modena wrote dutifully to the Emperor of Austria that "it was for their common interest and dignity to put a prompt check on Piedmontese insolence."⁹ Count Buol could fairly claim, therefore, that, whatever official Europe said, he had brought the Italian princelings to realize again that their salvation lay with Austria, and that they must more than ever abhor Piedmont as their enemy. So his note fairly offset Cavour's memorandum, which declared that Italy could never enjoy liberty and independence so long as foreigners — to wit, the Austrians — practically controlled the Peninsula. The line of division was now clear: if the small states were to be rescued from despotism, the Austrians, who kept them in it, must be driven out.

But an Italian patriot, in any of the gangrened states, might well ask himself, "Suppose the Austrians were to quit forever tomorrow — what next? If Bomba and the Pope and the Dukes do not reform there will be revolutions, in which, if need be, Liberals and Moderates will fight side by side with the Reds to win constitutional liberty and justice. Except Bomba, there are no rulers among them who could hold out for a day against popular wrath, and Bomba would fall within a week. With the Austrians gone, the princelings must either go too or adopt a modern régime. In any overturn where the Reds prevail, a republic will

⁷ Text in Zini, II, i, 561-65. ⁸ *Lettere*, VI, 21. ⁹ Bianchi: *Cavour*, 44.

arise; where the Liberals, there will be some sort of limited monarchy. Italy will then have half-a-dozen small states of different complexions, lacking not merely harmony, but even a general bond of union: for the Republicans will distrust Monarchists, and Monarchists will shun every compromise with Republicanism as a stride towards their own destruction. Italy federated on this plan would be but a mottling of antagonistic principles; it could not endure. Where does history show a lasting confederacy whose elements were half-monarchical, half-republican?" Thoughts like these were simmering in the brain of every intelligent Italian who had begun to consider what would happen after the Austrians had departed.

The diplomatic struggle between Cavour and Buol from 1856 to 1859 can best be compared to that between torreador and bull at a Spanish bull-fight. The Piedmontese, agile, fearless, resourceful, always smiling, plagues, goads, maddens the huge Austrian, who bellows with rage as he charges up and down the arena. When the huge brute crashes by, the torreador steps aside with a humming-bird's swiftness, then draws near and begins teasing again, and again the infuriated bull rushes at his tormentor but misses him; and so the sport goes on until, after many innocent horses have been gored, a single infallible thrust brings the monster into the sand, where his fury and his life pour out with his blood. The bull-fight is a barbaric spectacle, fit only for crowds that civilization has never reached or that have sunk back into brutality. But the three years' duel between Cavour and Buol is one of the most inspiring examples of a triumph won by superior intelligence and tact, by courage and audacity, over an adversary who possessed an immense advantage in physical force and position. The tragedy for Buol, and for Austria, lay in the fact that he failed to perceive that he was using obsolescent tactics against new and improved ones. So, sixty years before, Würmser, Beaulieu and Alvinczy, masters of the old art of war, went down in succession before young Bonaparte's innovating skill. This is the tragedy of Evolution — the supplanting of the lower by the higher.

Diplomacy, in which Cavour and Buol were matched as rivals, was a profession which still bore an evil reputation. In its modern form, it seemed to teach how to get by craft or guile

what could not be seized by the armed hand. Churchmen were the first modern diplomatists; and as they wore no sword, they naturally perfected the art by which the tongue, the most dangerous instrument entrusted to man, might prevail over the sword. At sword-fence, combatants had to face each other in the open; but at tongue-fence words take the place of thoughts, promises mean nothing, statements slide in and out, appear and vanish, at pleasure. Churchmen had not only the superiority of being trained thinkers and arguers at a time when few laymen could read and write, and even kings could scarcely sign their names, but also of being able to disguise their transactions with unction or sanctimony: thus before Diplomacy became secularized it was thoroughly steeped in guile. That remarkable group of monarchs who were their own ministers — Ferdinand of Spain, Louis XII of France, Henry VII of England, Emperor Maximilian and Pope Julius II — reached a pitch of unscrupulousness, of perfidy, of moral cynicism which has never since been equaled by any other group of contemporaries. From time to time proficient emulators — Olivarez, Richelieu, Mazarin, Alberoni, Frederick the Great, Talleyrand, Metternich, down to Bismarck, Disraeli, and Crispi — have kept alive their tradition.

But although Diplomacy, which is the art of conducting international political business, has this vicious pedigree and this bad reputation, we can trace an improvement in its practices, and still more in the principles by which it professes to be guided. In earlier days each nation regarded every neighbor as an enemy, to be attacked without warning if the odds seemed favorable; to be deceived, always; to be injured and cheated, whenever possible. The stranger was not entitled to be treated with the same justice, or even humanity, as obtained in his neighbor's state. The medieval Church, when it tried to make its interdict effectual, doubtless encouraged these practices. Gradually, however, as civilization advanced, war seemed more terrible; at least, a larger proportion of the population having devoted itself to industry, commerce and agriculture, it felt more keenly the havoc of war. Consequently, the disposition to negotiate, before plunging into the hazards of arms, increased, and the professional diplomatist sprang up. He was of necessity a special pleader, and as diplomatic procedure grew formal and intricate, he resorted

to every device for which a precedent existed in order to win his case. An ambassador was expected, in Wotton's witty definition, to lie abroad for his country's good: he would neither keep faith nor permit the rules of conduct which might govern his private life to interfere with his country's interests. For nations held, and still hold, the monstrous doctrine that although every one of twenty million persons is separately bound by the moral law, yet, if they be called collectively England, France or Germany, their government need have no concern with the moral law; and nations established churches to worship a God who had jurisdiction over individuals but was powerless over multitudes.

When we watch Cavour at his diplomatic work, therefore, however we may scorn or disapprove the quibbles, the indirectness, the puerile paradoxes, the immoralities of Diplomacy itself, we must in fairness judge him as we judge a masterly legal advocate, who avails himself of every device that the law allows. We must ask, not whether a given point is right or wrong, but whether he has fulfilled his duties as special pleader according to the code in vogue in his time: remembering that, thanks to the immoral doctrine that a State need have no conscience in its dealings with its neighbors, and to the tradition, so hard to outgrow, that nations are natural enemies one of another, the temptations which beset Cavour, both in kind and in intensity, were such as private individuals are happily never distracted by. Did he succeed because he was more unscrupulous than his rivals or because he was so much more skilful than they with the weapons which, by common consent, all were using? Did he leave Diplomacy on a lower plane than he found it? In weighing these questions we must discriminate between the system and the man, or our own verdict on both will be fatuous. To do less than this is to disregard historic perspective; to do this honestly will not land us in the Jesuits' Malebolge where moral distinctions disappear and the end justifies the means. Cavour used to say that he found telling the truth much more effective than lying, because ministers and diplomats were trained to expect only lies:¹⁰ from which irony we can infer something as to the standard of Diplomacy when he entered it and as to his own methods.

Austria realized immediately the drift of Cavour's and Claren-

¹⁰ Bismarck, years later, appropriated this saying.

don's onslaught of the 8th of April. She understood that she must destroy Piedmont, or run the risk of seeing her own supremacy in Italy shattered by a coalition which, soon or late, Piedmont might rally against her. Her first reply, made within three days, to the suggestion that she should withdraw her troops from the Duchies and the Papal States was to prepare to occupy the Southeastern Piedmontese frontier from the Po to the Apennines.¹¹ Her next public move was Buol's note of May 18, by which she hoped to persuade Europe to shun Piedmont as a political outlaw. Meanwhile, as we have seen, she both seized the offer of a renewal of friendship which England held out, and was quick to respond to the first signs of reviving cordiality in Paris. To isolate Piedmont, by cutting her off from the support of the Western Powers, was obviously the surest way to render her harmless. Austria withdrew her soldiers from Tuscany; not, indeed, out of deference to the advice given by the Congress, but in order that their departure might confirm Count Buol's assertion that Austria never staid longer than the sovereigns who asked her aid desired. She even undertook to urge the King of Naples to mend his behavior; but Bomba, whether because he suspected such advice coming from such a quarter, or because he knew that Austria did not wish him to follow it, or, simply because he was incorrigible, paid no heed to it.¹² At every rumor of revolutionary unrest, Buol threw the blame on Piedmont. Cavour retaliated by insinuating that the disturbances were encouraged, if not actually fomented, by Austria. In pointing to the ease with which Piedmont maintained order, he gave the best rejoinder possible to Buol's assertion that constitutional liberty and order were incompatible.

Every sign, no matter how trifling, that Piedmont was coming to be accepted by down-trodden Italians as their leader, irritated Austria. The Turin municipality erected tablets to the Tuscans who had fallen at Curtatone in 1848 — an act which Florence and Vienna regarded as impertinent. Worse still, Turin accepted a monument, "to the Piedmontese Army," subscribed by the Milanese. The city council voted its acceptance on the

¹¹ *Politique*, 161; C. to E. d'Azeglio, April 12, 1856.

¹² These negotiations went on during the summer and autumn of 1856. Hübner sent to Naples in September. *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 324-5.

very day and almost at the very moment when the Austrian Emperor made a triumphal progress through the streets of Milan. The insult could not be plainer, but how could Buol punish it? If an independent state has not the right to accept from the subjects of another state a tribute to the valor of its soldiers in a recent war, what becomes of its independence? Francis Joseph's imperial visit to his Italian provinces marked a change in Austrian policy. He determined now to try honey instead of gall. Even Austria, although she would not admit it, could not ignore the condemnation of European public opinion. The Emperor therefore journeyed to Venice, where he failed to rouse popular enthusiasm, and thence to Milan. He did his best to be gracious, a rôle which the Italians thought his Hapsburg blood and the difficulties of his reign scarcely fitted him for; but when he proclaimed a political amnesty and rescinded the law of sequestration, they assumed that he was sincere. A little later he announced that he had appointed his brother, Archduke Maximilian, as viceroy, thereby abolishing the old military-political administration, for Papa Radetzky, "the unapproachable prototype of loyalty and disinterestedness,"¹³ was now ninety-one years old and had earned his repose.

During the Emperor's stay at Milan, Victor Emanuel sent no one to salute him, a breach of courtesy which was excused by the fact that the Emperor had never taken notice, either officially or privately, of the deaths two years before of the King's mother and wife, although both were Austrian princesses. To make the slight more evident, Victor Emanuel lavished attentions on the Empress of Russia, who was wintering at Nice. This was a visible sign of the drawing together of the two countries which Cavour and Orloff had happily started at Paris. "We ought to be friends," said the Russian envoy, Stackelberg; "for we have interests which do not conflict — and a common ground of hatred."¹⁴ Austria — that common object of hatred — scarcely dissembled her rage at this comradeship.

Most offensive to Count Buol was Cavour's habit of going his own way without consulting Austria's prejudices. Buol knew that England, especially Clarendon, was constantly urging the Piedmontese premier not to irritate the enemy beyond the

¹³ Zini, I, i, 783.

¹⁴ Mayor, 333.

Ticino: yet Cavour seemed to act as if these solemn lectures never reached him. He ordered the fortifying of Alessandria to offset Austria's illegal fortifying of Piacenza;¹⁵ and when he authorized the opening of public subscriptions for one hundred cannon to equip the new fortifications, Italians all over the world poured in their contributions. Nobody doubted the direction in which Cavour was pointing, but his conduct was so correct, — and in diplomacy the cloak of correctness is like that of charity in a world of sinners, — that not even Buol could impugn it. In Parliament, Cavour hesitated no longer to speak as if Piedmont were the recognized champion of Italy against Austria.

Austria could not contain her rage. The Emperor flew into a "childish tantrum"¹⁶ and ordered Buol to discipline this tormenting little neighbor, who, simply by refusing to get angry and afford an excuse for a whipping, was maddening Imperial Hapsburg. Buol himself had lost patience. He saw too that Austria's proposed conciliatory policy towards the Lombardo-Venetians would be wasted, if Piedmont continued to flourish. Archduke Maximilian might be an angel compared with Radetzky; but under his régime, the Italians would not enjoy constitutional liberty, and they would still be subjects of a foreign master. Piedmont must be discredited, since she could not be destroyed forthwith. On February 10, 1857, Count Buol sent to Count Paar, the Austrian *chargé d'affaires* at Turin, a note for the King's government. In it, he pictured first the Trajan-like virtues and clemency of the Emperor, and then rolled up an indictment against the Piedmontese regimen. He denounced the newspapers, which were permitted (if not inspired) to print the most outrageous libels on his Austrian Majesty, on Austrian policy, on Austrian officials high or low, and even to preach insurrection and regicide as means for freeing Italy "from what one is pleased to call the foreign yoke." "In truth," Count Buol exclaims, "my pen refuses to tell all the turpitudes with which the journals swarm." He quickly recovered sufficient strength,

¹⁵ "You will take pains," C. wrote on July 14, 1856, to Jocteau, Piedmontese minister at Berne, "to show distinctly the difference which exists between the fortifications of Piacenza and those of Alessandria. The first constitute a flagrant violation of the treaties of Vienna and of Frankfort, an aggressive measure against Piedmont; while the others violate no treaty and wear the character of a simple defensive measure." Mayor, 380. ¹⁶ Cavour's phrase; Mayor, 506.

however, to draw up a bill of grievances, which included the subscription to the cannon, the welcome of deputations of Italians to applaud Piedmont's policy, and the monument to the Piedmontese army. Then he tried the well-known trick of affirming that the King's Government had often privately expressed its chagrin to the Emperor's Cabinet that it was unable to restrain newspaper excesses — a trick by which he wished to create the presumption that the Piedmontese administration was both impotent and insincere. He left it to Count Cavour to remove the painful impression which all these outrages had made on the Emperor's mind, and to prevent their recurrence. As if to illustrate that the Golden Rule did not apply in Diplomacy, that very day Buol inserted in the official gazette of Milan an article overflowing with vituperation of Piedmont. To this abuse, the official *Piedmontese Gazette* printed an immediate reply, limiting itself to enumerating several of the historic examples of Austria's perfidy from 1790 down to the Crimean War, and to giving warning that the statesmen of Piedmont, as rulers of an Italian State, knew that both the duty and the right fell to them of promoting in every honorable way the welfare of Italy, and that they would not be terrified by threats from Milan; for they had the sympathy of Europe behind them, and they knew that the issue of the great principles which they championed did not depend on size of armies or stretch of territory.

To avoid any suggestion of alarm, haste or petulance, Cavour allowed nine days to elapse before replying formally to Buol's note. As to the scurrilous newspapers, he simply repeated what he had said often before in Parliament and elsewhere: their excesses displeased him, but in a free country a free press was indispensable; its benefits far outweighed its abuses; and the law of Piedmont placed within reach of every person, native or foreign, who thought himself aggrieved, means of redress through the law courts. With irony Cavour remarked that, since the Austrian government prohibited the circulation of Piedmontese papers in Lombardy, it was difficult to see how they could harm Austria's Italian subjects. In Piedmont, he added, though newspapers were free to attack, their victims were also free to prosecute them: but in Lombardy, the targets of the official press had no chance to punish their libelers. And he hinted that Buol

himself had inspired the recent article which compared Victor Emanuel's Ministers to regicides like Cromwell and Robespierre.¹⁷ The tributes which Italians freely paid to the King, he continued, were the best refutation of the charge that Piedmont's policy threatened the monarchical principle; the impotence of the Republicans to cause even a ruffle of disorder in the kingdom, testified to the sound constitutional basis on which it stood. The monument of which Count Buol spoke had been accepted, not by the royal government, but by the municipality of Turin; it was to commemorate the valor of the Piedmontese army in the Crimea, and would bear no inscription — why should it? — referring to Austria. Cavour closed by remarking that, had he chosen, instead of sending this courteous explanation to Count Buol, he might have returned grievance for grievance — beginning with the law of sequestration four years before and coming down to the recent expulsion from Milan, without warning or justification, of a distinguished Piedmontese senator.¹⁸

Cavour certainly showed no signs of fright in this reply. But being never content to assume that because his plea was just, he need only state it and sit still, he exerted himself to restrain France, England and Russia from giving Austria any moral support. In instructing Villamarina and D'Azeglio to present the Piedmontese side as urbanely as possible, he bade them to make it perfectly clear, nevertheless, that neither Austria's threat to withdraw her legation nor her hint of war would cause Piedmont to budge an inch. He was relieved to hear that Lord Clarendon regarded Buol's note as ill-timed and unwarranted;¹⁹ and that at Paris, the Emperor and not Walewski being in the ascendant, friendliness towards Piedmont prevailed. Walewski himself had already listened favorably to the persuasion of the Austrian ambassador, Hübner, and ordered Gramont to bring pressure on the Cabinet at Turin; but Villamarina's audience with Napoleon caused an immediate reversal of instructions. Count Buol was informed, therefore, that the French Cabinet, regretting ex-

¹⁷ On Dec. 8, 1856, Agésilao Milano, a Neapolitan soldier, tried to kill King Ferdinand. The Republican journals hailed him as a patriot of the Brutus type. Hence Buol's assumption that the Piedmontese government abetted regicide.

¹⁸ Buol to Paar, from Milan, Feb. 10, 1857; C. to Cantono, Feb. 20, 1857; Zini, I, ii, 570-73, 576-82. Article from *Gazzetta Piemontese* of Feb. 11, Zini, II, ii, 573-75. Cantono read Cavour's note to Buol on Feb. 27. ¹⁹ *Politique*, 232.

tremely Austria's ill-considered act, gave its moral support to Piedmont. Subsequent interviews, in which Hübner tried to win over the French government, could not shake Napoleon's decision. Walewski, prompted from above, summed up by saying: "We shall never permit your soldiers to occupy Piedmont, just as we shall always be ready to oppose every revolutionary movement."²⁰

Russia naturally chuckled over her perfidious neighbor's irritation. Gortchakoff officially denied Buol's statement that he had approved the Austrian note: instead of approving, he replied sarcastically to the Austrian ambassador that the Viennese government allowed the very press abuses against Russia which it complained of in Piedmont; and he taunted Austria, who posed as the upholder of Conservatism, with having deserted Russia, the inflexible defender of Conservative principles. To sprinkle pepper on the cut, he reprinted Cavour's reply in the official gazette.²¹ Nor did Manteuffel at Berlin hide his contempt for the Austrian blunder. The diplomatic corps at Turin sided so cordially with Piedmont, that Count Paar confided to some of his colleagues that Buol had not wished to send the note, but had been forced to it by the Emperor.²²

At home, also, there was unusual agreement among the extremists in applauding the Ministry. Even Solaro della Margherita could not stomach the insults of the *Milan Gazette*. "The only Austrian partisans here," wrote Cavour, "are in the cellars of the sacristies."²³ He fills his despatches to Piedmont's ambassadors with strong counsel. They must not even hint, he said, at compromise or wavering: Clarendon must understand that "a single act of weakness would ruin forever and ever the Liberal party in Piedmont."²⁴ "We are perfectly masters of the situation," whether Austria insists on a diplomatic rupture or not. If she should go further and threaten to resort again to war, "we should not take the offensive, but we should be ready to give her a warm reception. . . . But I think we are still far from that extreme eventuality, and that Austria will hesitate a long time before firing the cannon-shot which must awaken in Europe

²⁰ *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 362-63.

²¹ *Ivi*, VII, 363-64.

²² *Politique*, 482. N. Bianchi, however, *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 357, regards Buol and not Francis Joseph as responsible.

²³ *Mayor*, 479.

²⁴ *Politique*, 228.

the great cause of Nationalities.”²⁵ “When you happen to speak of us,” he says to Count Oldofredi, then in Paris on special business, “tell everyone that we shall be prudent, most prudent; that we shall await events with supreme calm; but that if we are called upon to act, we shall show ourselves this time resolved to risk everything for the honor and salvation of our country. We shall be, if the emergency requires it, *enfants terribles*.”²⁶ “You know us well enough,” he adds, “to be convinced that I am not joking, and that I do not seek in saying this to impose on anyone.”

Count Buol was too stubborn to give way before the first rebuff of his policy of intimidation. Although he had failed to scare Piedmont, he hoped at least to save his own dignity. On becoming Austria's ally, England had suggested to her, as one friend might to another, the desirability of introducing milder methods into Lombardy and Venetia. Austria deemed it politic to accede: hence Francis Joseph's tour of conciliation, hence amnesty, fair words and the nomination of Archduke Maximilian as Viceroy. Buol assumed, therefore, that England could do no less than coerce little Piedmont, with whom she still had, ostensibly, an alliance. Clarendon undertook the work gladly, although he may have had his misgivings. Cavour listened to him courteously, and stood firm; until Buol, again losing patience, directed Paar to ask for his passports and quit Turin (April 16). Count Cavour, he said, had made no proper apology, nor even a satisfactory guarantee for future good behavior; but he had admitted the justice of most of the Austrian grievances. Under these circumstances, the Emperor could not allow his *chargé* to remain in Turin, but he would graciously permit the Marquis di Cantono, the Piedmontese representative, to continue at Vienna. Count Buol particularly singled out as a proof of Cavour's lack of good faith his granting to Modenese subjects an audience in which they presented him a medal and extolled Piedmont to the implied detriment of Austria.²⁷ The truth was, as Cavour explained at Paris and London, that the Modenese deputation consisted of two persons who had long resided in

²⁵ *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 641; C. to Villamarina, Feb. 21, 1857.

²⁶ *Lettere*, II, 480; C. to Oldofredi, March 19, 1857.

²⁷ Text of Buol's despatch in Zini, I, i, 583-87.

Turin; that they brought him a medal similar to those struck in many Italian cities during the preceding summer; and that their reception was so quiet that Cavour's colleagues in the Cabinet did not know of it for more than a month.²⁸

He listened without perturbation to Buol's note, expressed personal regret at Count Paar's departure, and gave directions to have his passports made out. Although the Austrian did not leave Turin for five days, the diplomatic break caused so little stir that the public took no notice of his departure. Cavour directed Cantono to close the legation at Vienna, without hurrying, and to return.²⁹ When Buol found that his ultimatum, instead of terrifying, had come as a relief, he pretended that he had not recalled Paar; but the publication of his note gave the lie to this pretense.³⁰ Then he held up Cantono's recall as proof that Piedmont wished to pick a quarrel with the Imperial government, which had left the door to reconciliation ajar. The diplomatic world, however, smiled an incredulous smile at Buol's tricks. "Austria has behaved like an idiot," Clarendon wrote privately to E. d'Azeglio, after the Modenese medal affair; "and Cavour ought to be most grateful to Buol for having so completely played into his hands."³¹

Nevertheless, while the English Foreign Secretary took a dilettante's pleasure in witnessing a fine stroke in statecraft, he could not let pleasure interfere with his duties. Austria kept pestering England with the demand that she should coax or compel Piedmont to apologize, and Buol made his demand more pungent by hinting that Piedmont's arrogance rested on Russian support. As Russia was England's nightmare, one way to annoy her would be to humble her protégé. England was willing to do her utmost to gratify Austria, whom she had now come to regard as her best ally against either Russia or France, and accordingly she urged France to join her in bending Piedmont to request Austria to resume diplomatic relations. France declined to serve as cat's-paw for Buol; but Clarendon and Palmerston were less wary. Both in London and in Turin they exhausted their powers of persuasion. Nothing more was required, they said, than to put on paper the assurance which Count Cavour had so often

²⁸ *Politique*, 235, 247. Mayor, 488-89.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 499, 501.

²⁹ Mayor, 492-96.

³¹ *Politique*, 238.

expressed, that "Piedmont did not wish to change the actual conditions of Italy by violent means." Such a statement would not offend Piedmont's dignity; and, being given without compulsion to a friend, that friend might, with perfect propriety, use it to restore harmony. Palmerston spoke in the tone of an elderly, benevolent godfather advising a headstrong youth, well-intentioned but inexperienced. The godfather had, of course, no personal interest at stake, but he sincerely regretted to see the youth blast his prospects by refusing to take good advice. Piedmont might nurse whatever patriotic aspirations she chose, — nobody could deny that she had shown many good qualities in managing her own affairs, — yet she ought to see that she could never get on in Italy if she persisted in making Austria her enemy. 'Be on good terms with Austria — then go ahead; if you won't do this, the English government has nothing to say. We have talked to you as a friend; I do not say that we should desert you in case of trouble, but I do warn you that by ignoring our advice now, we might find our ways to help you closed when you needed them.' Such was the substance of the British Prime Minister's argument.³² While he and Clarendon possessed many gifts that go to the making of statesmen, both of them lacked subtlety. Like most of England's notable foreign secretaries, they seemed to handle diplomacy ■■ only their second-best weapon — their first being wealth — wealth which could equip armies and fleets and keep replacing them until, no matter how badly they might be commanded, they would wear out the enemy's resources and win in the end. From Lord North to Lord Salisbury the characteristic British tone towards foreigners was that of men who felt sure that they could thrash their opponents in ■ fight, however they might fall short in debate; many of them, one suspects, would have preferred to dispense with the preliminary skirmish of words and to come at once to the real business of blows. No English statesman, appointed prime minister of little Piedmont in 1852, could have converted her, in nine years, into the Kingdom of Italy: for that was an achievement which called not for gold or brawn, but for infinite tact, finesse, patience, far-sightedness, judgment, poise.

Cavour resisted England's pro-Austrian pressure without

■■ For summary of his interview with E. d'Azeglio, ■■ *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 365-69.

hesitation, because he understood that, although her ill-will might be grievous, even the semblance of yielding to Austria must be suicidal. Throughout his career that was the one vital principle from which he never swerved. Wherever Austria attacked, there she found him fully armed and undaunted. Had Austria once succeeded in influencing a single parliamentary or ministerial act at Turin, constitutional liberty in Piedmont would have been endangered, or, more probably, destroyed, and Piedmont's hope of redeeming Italy would have been nipped in the bud. When the English statesmen failed to catch Cavour, by their transparent request that he should merely jot down the disavowal which he had often publicly uttered, they persuaded Count Beust, the able Saxon diplomatist, to go to Turin and reason with him. "I shall be charmed," said Cavour, "that the occasion presents itself of making the acquaintance of a minister whom I consider one of the most distinguished men of Germany."³³ That was all that came of this final effort. The diplomatic breach between Piedmont and Austria remained unbridged: henceforth necessary business was transacted at Vienna through the French embassy, at Turin, through the Prussian legation. Cavour remarked that the absence of an Austrian representative lessened the likelihood of friction: for Count Paar's chief duty had been to clip from the Piedmontese newspapers their offensive articles and to send them to Count Buol, in whose mind they rankled.

The outcome of more than a year's fluctuating diplomacy strengthened Piedmont's position at home and abroad. She had broken with Austria, thereby exhibiting Austria to the world as the real obstacle to Italy's freedom. She had successfully parried every foreign attempt to dictate or influence her internal policy. She had kept the friendship of France,³⁴ and won that of Russia; and although she had incurred England's displeasure,

■ *Politique*, 529; C. to Villamarina, June 3, 1857. Beust did not go.

■ "It is possible, even probable, that M. de Buol, counting on the support of England, thought to intimidate me," Cavour wrote Villamarina, Feb. 21, 1857. "He thought that, seeing myself deprived of the sympathy of the British government, I should not dare to resist him. He deceives himself strangely if he thinks me as timid an Anglomaniac as this. Whatever my sympathy for the English people may be . . . I have always put in the front line the support of France, or, to speak more correctly, of the Emperor. Provided Paris does not unite with Vienna, I shall not disturb myself at all over what may happen at London." *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 642. Mayor, 476.

there was no open rupture. For England's change of tactics was dictated by a desire to please Austria, and not by hatred of Piedmont; but in sacrificing the less to the greater, she showed that she would not go beyond verbal remonstrance. When Cavour discovered this, he felt a great relief. Scoldings which would not be followed up by acts did not alarm him. He was well aware, also, that in spite of the Foreign Office, English sympathy for the Italian cause had not grown chill, and that the Foreign Office itself preferred one thing above even the alliance with Austria — to wit, peace in Europe. So he pushed his policy of pluck to the utmost.

CHAPTER XVI

LEGITIMIZING THE REVOLUTION

WHILE defending Piedmont from foreign intriguers, bent on robbing her of the prestige he had won for her at the Congress of Paris, Cavour was busied with equally important negotiations with one of the great bodies of Italian patriots that had outlined a new plan for the redemption of Italy. The stability of the little Subalpine Kingdom was now fairly well assured; but Victor Emanuel's subjects numbered only five millions, against twenty other millions calling themselves Italians and parceled out among six detested rulers. How could the non-Piedmontese be brought to work together for a National end?

The first difficulty lay in the choice of a leader. The Party of Revolution, which, after 1849, the Mazzinians dominated, was Republican. When it split up in 1853, its dissident sections still clung to Republicanism, holding very tenaciously Mazzini's doctrine of unity. The groups outside of his influence either professed Unitarianism, or they limited their plans to local or provincial reform. The inveterate Italian sectionalism was tested in the recent revolution, when the wave of national enthusiasm quickly spent itself, leaving behind the old warring elements, amid which feuds as ancient as the days of Guelf and Ghibelline smouldered, and the old dynastic jealousies, and the discredited, terror-stricken princes still lived. And yet, every Italian who could analyze his deepest political sentiments recognized that it was the National Spirit which mysteriously impelled him to unite with his brother Italians, no matter what dialect they spoke or what differences had separated their ancestors from his. The hated Austrian might be driven out; the cruel and corrupt governments of Pope and Bourbons might be purged; each province might enjoy the best products of modern civilization: and yet the National longing would still be unrealized. Without that realization no political victory, no social betterment, could satisfy.

The Italians had reached the stage where the Spirit of Nationality, become for them the Spirit of Truth and Duty and Desire, exercised upon them such a compulsion as Religion, or Chivalry or Individualism had exercised upon other men in earlier epochs.

Independence and Liberty — two of the requisites of national existence — Piedmont possessed, and she had proved strong enough, in spite of crushing defeats and unceasing dangers, to guard and develop them. Piedmont, however, was not Italy, but the least Italian of all the provinces of Italy. The monarchical tradition bound its people and its sovereign together. Whenever the princes of Savoy cherished expansion to the eastward, they dreamt of aggrandizing Piedmont, not of creating Italy. Victor Emanuel himself, though he usually blurted out his opinions with little regard for discretion, had never whispered the Unitarian program. And now the Party of Revolution, which obeyed Mazzini, hated Piedmont as an obstacle to the Unitarian and Republican hopes: for Victor Emanuel's government was demonstrating that under a constitutional monarchy five millions of Italians were enjoying those very benefits which the Mazzinians declared could be secured by the Republic only.

Nevertheless, all except the hopeless doctrinaires began to ask themselves whether Piedmont might not become the agent of Italian Nationality. Gioberti, shortly before his death in 1852, pointed to the Subalpine Kingdom as the heaven-sent champion of the down-trodden Peninsula. Ten years earlier, he hailed a Liberal Pope as the spiritual guide and Charles Albert as the sword of Italian independence. The revolution blasted his Neo-Guelf dream, but not his trust in Piedmont. Gioberti had not been dead two years before a greater than he arose to be the prophet of Italian nationality.

This was Daniele Manin, the spotless citizen, the heroic defender of Venice, the dictator who preferred justice to victory, the man whom prosperity could not unbalance nor poverty embitter; Manin, who converted sorrow into spiritual incentive, and who allowed exile neither to cloud his vision, swallow up his hopes nor poison his heart. Since the autumn of 1849 he had lived in Paris, earning a precarious pittance for himself and his invalid daughter by giving lessons in Italian. He listened to the plans of his fellow-refugees, but held aloof from premature action:

for he had a most judicial mind, which men and their opinions could not take by storm. Of all the Italian exiles he was the sanest, just as he was the loftiest of all the leaders in the Revolutionary year. Like Cavour he felt patriotic enthusiasm more intensely than any other emotion, but it did not effervesce in dithyrambic eloquence; like Cavour, he was nobly practical, content to model in the clay of today the ideal which may be sculptured in marble tomorrow. He was too grave, too reasonable, to be popular in the meetings of the exiles at Paris: but the members of all parties treated him with profound respect; and he gathered round his hearth at No. 70, Rue Blanche a little flock of zealous disciples.

During the first year of his exile, he devoted himself almost entirely to watching the course of events; taking care, meanwhile, to establish intimate relations with several of the most influential journals in Paris, London and Turin. He preached the gospel of unity, discouraged spasmodic outbreaks, and permitted himself to hope, though still cautiously, that Piedmont might redeem Italy. On March 13, 1854, when England was trying by every device to persuade Austria to join the Western Allies against Russia, Lord John Russell said in Parliament that if the Italians, instead of revolting against the Austrian government could remain quiet, the time would come when this government would be more humane and would grant more popular privileges than Italy could hope to secure by insurrection. Ten days later Manin printed in the *Presse* of Paris the first of many articles which made the round of Europe, in so far as the newspapers under despotic oversight were allowed to quote or criticize them. "We do not ask," he said, "that Austria be humane and liberal in Italy, — which, after all, would be impossible for her even if she desired; *we ask her to get out*. We have no concern with her humanity and her liberalism; we wish to be masters in our own house." No declaration could be clearer than that, and it was final: for it placed the Italian aversion for Austria on the unarguable grounds of the hatred of a conquered people for its conquerors. Whether Austria were cruel or kind, despotic or liberal, was not the question.

Manin went on to utter this warning: "The end we set before us, and which we all, without exception, desire, is the complete

Independence of the entire Italian territory, and the *Union* of all the parts of Italy in a single political body. In that, we are all of one accord, we are unanimous. The different views which subdivide Italian patriots into several political parties (Republicans, Royalists, Unitarians, Federalists) concern secondary questions, about which we are ready to make all the concessions and compromises which may be required by circumstances. But, as to *Independence* and *Union* we cannot make concessions, we cannot compromise. . . . No, we will not remain quiet so long as we have not reached the goal we pursue, so long as we have not obtained the *Independence* and the *Union* of Italy. . . . Let the world take heed: the Italian Question is henceforth a European Question of the first magnitude. It must be solved in a way satisfactory to our indomitable aspirations of nationality. Till then, no matter what is done, we will agitate unceasingly; there will always be in Italy a hotbed of trouble, a cause of war, which will menace the repose of Europe and will not allow her to count upon a durable peace.”¹

His platform included *Independence*, which implied the expulsion of Austria; *Unification*, which, whether Unitarian or Federalist, would secure for all parts of Italy equal liberty; friendship towards France, no matter who ruled her, if she would attack Austria; alliance with Piedmont, if she stood loyally by the National Cause; hands off Rome, until France should withdraw her support of the Temporal Power. He insisted that Mazzini, for whose patriotic intent he had great respect, but whom he now regarded as a marplot, must retire from directing Republican conspiracies; because, whether Mazzini wished it or not, his presence, Manin candidly stated, always stirred up irreconcilable sectarian passions. The ultimate political form of Italy — Republican or Monarchical — ought not to be even discussed until independence and unification had been achieved.² By defining Nationality as the main issue, Manin attracted many to his plan; but when it came to deciding how the national cause could be won, differences of opinion cropped out. Few of the exiles possessed his patience. Most of them clung to their old belief that a local explosion, let it begin where it might, would touch off

¹ H. Martin: *Daniel Manin* (Paris: Furne, 1859), 373-75; quoting *La Presse* of March 22, 1854.

² *Ibid.*, 375-76. Pallavicino, II, 91-97.

the revolution which they all desired, nor could they easily put aside their distrust of the House of Savoy, which dated from the disastrous close of Charles Albert's career. For a moment, when Piedmont joined the Western Alliance, Manin himself felt "dispirited as well as angry," because he feared that Victor Emanuel had deserted the Italian cause.³ He soon perceived, however, that the Crimean Expedition was really a flank movement against Austria. Thenceforth, he redoubled his exhortations.

Manin's most energetic lieutenant was Marquis Giorgio Pallavicino, the Lombard noble who in youth expiated his complicity in a patriotic plot by fourteen years' imprisonment in the Spielberg. He bore his part in the rising of 1848, was banished when the Austrians returned, and found a refuge in Piedmont. Although hard hit by the law of sequestration, he still was rich compared with most of his fellow Lombards, and to Italy he consecrated his wealth and his own unusual talent for effective agitation. A devoted friend of Gioberti, he became Manin's confidant; but he retained with both of those great men his individuality. He criticized frankly, differed openly,⁴ and treated them as comrades rather than as masters. At Turin his rank and early associations gave him entrance to the highest circles. He was particularly drawn to the King; but towards Cavour he at first felt hesitation, suspecting both his methods and his Italianism. His own double rôle of aristocrat and democrat was so paradoxical that he found his best opportunity as a free lance. He had the doctrinaire's persistence, but an elasticity and a practical sense that saved him from the defects of his class. Having once been taught by Gioberti to believe in the "hegemony of Piedmont," he never ceased to assert that Italian independence could somehow be attained by that means. "I am infected by a folly which resists every treatment," he said.

In September, 1855, Manin published another statement, the pith of which lay in these words: "The Republican Party, so bitterly calumniated, again performs an act of abnegation and sacrifice in behalf of the National Cause. Convinced that before everything *Italy must be made*, it says to the House of Savoy: '*Make Italy, and I am with you! If not, not.*' It says to the com-

³ Senior: *Conversations*, II, 3; March 3, 1855.

⁴ For a typical case see his *Memorie*, II, 277.

stitutionalists: '*Plan to make Italy, not to aggrandize Piedmont; be Italian patriots, and not exclusively Piedmontese, and I am with you! If not, not.*'"⁵ The manifesto produced a deep impression. Its phrase, "if not, not," became a catch-word, and found an echo in many hearts. But Manin was grieved because the Liberals in Piedmont gave his proposition no welcome.

That they drew back from such an offer of support seemed ill-considered, if not impolitic; but they held, first, that since whatever gain had come to the Italian Cause had been secured by the royal constitutional régime in Piedmont, it was for that régime to determine what would best promote that cause in future. To bind itself to the guidance or dictation of the element which had continuously opposed the monarchy and engineered abortive but damaging outbreaks would be foolish. Again, many Piedmontese shrank from jeopardizing the existence of their little nation by competing openly for the Italian crown; some there were, indeed, who already dreaded the possibility that Piedmont might be merged in Italy, and would have rejected that consummation if it had been proffered to them. Finally, the Ministerialists were too wary to consent to an official connection with any group of the Party of Revolution: such an imprudence would at once alienate the goodwill of France and England and give color to the charge of the Italian Absolutists that Piedmont was in league with the conspirators.

Manin, though disappointed, was not discouraged. Throughout the autumn and winter of 1855-56 he printed his political epistles in the French and English papers, and Pallavicino and the Turinese editors translated and expounded them. He set up "Independence and Unification" as the watchword of Italian patriots, and acknowledged Victor Emanuel as the standard-bearer of the national cause. Cavour's achievement at Paris convinced him that the Piedmontese statesman, although he still appeared to be bounded by Subalpine rather than by Italian frontiers, could be depended upon. Cavour had several conferences with Manin, for whom he had great personal respect. "He is still somewhat Utopian," Cavour wrote to Cibrario. "He has not abandoned the idea of a war frankly popular; he be-

⁵ Pallavicino, III. 130. Letter printed in London *Times*, Sept. 15, 1855; in Paris *Siccle*, Sept. 20; in Turin *Diritto*, Sept. 24.

lieves in the efficacy of the press in stormy times; he desires the unity of Italy and other trifles; but nevertheless, if the practical issue should arise, all this might be made use of.”⁶

While official Piedmont, for common-sense reasons, held Manin off at arm's length, he was actively assailed from two opposite quarters: Mazzini deemed the time ripe for another Republican enterprise, and the promoters of Lucien Murat were getting ready to try their chance. Muratism, the offspring of French Imperialism, like its parent lusted for dominion. From the days of his presidency, Louis Napoleon had dreamed of making France paramount in Italy. His garrison in Rome served as an entering wedge. His friendliness towards Piedmont, involving jealousy of Austria, might lead to an unofficial protectorate over Northern Italy. The Crimean War made fashionable the discussion of territorial changes in the Italian Peninsula not less than in the Orient. Among the many suggestions of the map-modelers, two found especial favor at the Tuileries: one was that Central Italy should be patched up into a Kingdom for Prince Napoleon (Plon-Plon); the other was that Lucien Murat should occupy the throne of Naples. The first scheme had to be deferred until a victory over Austria should enable the French Emperor to expel the Austrian princelings from Tuscany and the Duchies and to take a part of the Papal States. But the sooner Murat organized his conspiracy, the better. He was a vulgar and disreputable fellow, without brains, courage, or character;⁷ but he had a name to conjure with, and Louis Napoleon, eager to rake out, revamp and gild every battered transmittendum of the First Empire, bestowed upon him a large pension and a princely title. Both the French Imperialists, who pushed him forward, and the Neapolitans, who took him up, regarded him merely as a symbol.

Bomba's ferocious suppression of the Liberals checked for a while active plotting in his capital and the neighboring provinces.

⁶ *Lettere*, II, 429; C. to Cibrario, April 12, 1856.

⁷ His quality is revealed in the following incident, which occurred several years after this date. Murat caused his valets to seize a bourgeois gentleman, M. Comté, with whom he had some dispute, and then he belabored his victim with kicks and cuffs. Comté applied for redress to the courts, but they declared that they had no jurisdiction over a member of the Imperial family. *Larousse*, XI, 698.

But the Neapolitan exiles in Malta, Paris and London kept busily weaving and unweaving their Penelope's web, and by 1854 they had reopened communications with their friends at home. As the government went from bad to worse, Bomba's subjects grew desperate. In their eagerness to throw off the Bourbon incubus, the old sectarian lines began to be blurred among them. Many Neapolitan patriots of the highest type — Poerio, Settembrini, Spaventa — were in prisons. Their comrades at liberty were tending towards Liberalism of the Monarchical Piedmontese sort: indeed, Massari, La Farina and other vigorous exiles from the Two Sicilies had found shelter at Turin, and were Cavour's followers. But the Mazzinians were still the most vehement, not to say efficient conspirators, and their creed was Republican. Murat drew recruits from both of these parties, because they thought that he would do something soon. He found favor among the survivors of his father's admirers and their children, who looked back to the reign of Joachim as to a Golden Age, when compared with what had come after it. He also enticed to his cause Bomba's courtiers and officials, a venal throng, who either accepted bribes outright or cast anchors to windward in order to save themselves in case their Bourbon King should go overboard in the coming storm. Just how far the Muratist undermining extended cannot be known. The party's headquarters were at Paris, where Neapolitan grandees like the Duke of Cirella and his brother, and exiles like Trinchera, Mazziotti, Stocco and Romeo declared their adherence to it. Aurelio Saliceti, ex-Republican agitator, ex-Royalist minister and pamphleteer, was engaged as tutor to Murat's sons and gave in return his pen and his influence as a veteran plotter to his employer.⁸ A pamphlet setting forth Murat's claims was attributed to him. Louis Napoleon ordered the pamphlet to be suppressed, — after it had been circulated so widely that its contents were generally known, — but he imposed no restraint on the Prince. The Muratists conspired openly at Paris, and the Claimant himself made no secret of his candidacy.

Muratism added a disturbing factor to the already intricate Italian Question. If it prevailed, it would upset the plans of

⁸ Saliceti's Muratism and later career were generally condemned by his former associates: Nisco, however, prints a eulogy of him. *Ferdinando II*, 406-07.

Cavour, Manin and Mazzini; whatever its outcome, it had to be reckoned with. As early as the spring of 1854, Cavour wrote to Oldofredi at Paris to follow the Napoleonic intrigues, which were aimed especially at Southern Italy. Count Pepoli, Murat's nephew, had just spent two months in Genoa, looking over the ground.⁹ The arraignment made at the Congress by Clarendon and Walewski of Bourbon misrule naturally gave a great impetus to Bomba's opponents, especially to the Muratists, who almost flaunted their hopes in public. Murat himself held conferences at Aix-les-Bains. A crisis seemed imminent. Although Cavour had no desire to see a "Napoleonid" replace Ferdinand on the throne of Naples, and convert the lower half of the Peninsula into a French dependency, he could not antagonize Napoleon III, on whom he counted, soon or late, to expel the Austrians. His first concern was Piedmont; his next, the liberation of North and Central Italy: as usual, he allowed nothing to divert him from his main purpose. For months he tried in vain to learn the Emperor's real intentions. Gramont declared that Murat had no Imperial sanction; but his official denial meant nothing, because French Ambassadors could not speak with authority unless they had their cue from the Emperor instead of from Walewski. Until the doubt was cleared up, Cavour directed Villamarina to say to Walewski: "We are for Murat if France desires him; but Murat, without the support of France, does not suit us at all."¹⁰ Walewski's reply seems to have been inconclusive;¹¹ and more time elapsed before Cavour finally learned that the Emperor would like Murat to be King of Naples, but that until a war with Austria should create a favorable occasion, he would not openly support the enterprise.¹² Thus relieved of the obligation of helping the Muratists, Cavour merely let them plot as they would in Piedmont, while he himself pursued other lines. He encouraged England, always jealous of French territorial acquisitions in Italy, to take umbrage at the proposed election of Murat. He hinted that, if the French got Naples, they must, at least, be kept out of Sicily, for which island, since the days of Nelson and Lady Hamilton, England had shown a peculiar interest. Cavour would have welcomed an English protectorate in Sicily then, because

⁹ *Lettere*, II, 296; March 27, 1854. ¹⁰ Mayor, 409; C. to Villamarina, Sept. 5, 1856. ¹¹ Mayor, 418. ¹² *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 329.

that would not only curtail the French power in Southern Italy, but introduce into the contest a rival of the first magnitude who might be pitted against either France or Austria in the coming struggle for Italian independence. He probably believed that it would be easier to deal with three foreign masters, mutually discordant, than with two. He saw also the chance that, if England should decline to occupy Sicily, Piedmont might be permitted to take it to counterbalance French aggrandizement. Sicily and Naples, natural antagonists for centuries, would be more comfortable if they could live under different rulers.

Immediately after the Congress of Paris, Marquis Antonini, Bomba's minister at the French Court, protested to Walewski against the hurling at the Neapolitan government of calumnies which had been manufactured in Piedmont. Walewski assured him that Cavour was not their author; and he advised the King to start the reforms which the outraged conscience of Europe demanded. King Bomba, far from being chastened, entered a protest against the charges, and against any attempt to interfere with his internal affairs, being satisfied that they were conducted according to the dictates of justice and conscience. He declared, further, that he would resist to the end, rather than compromise with the Party of Revolution which Count Cavour was abetting. Here is a striking parallel: Cavour warns Europe that Piedmont will perish rather than concede an inch to Austria; Bomba, with equal solemnity, vows Naples to destruction rather than suffer the pollution of Piedmont! Posterity reads the similar declarations with very different emotions.

To Bomba's curt message, Walewski replied that he did not suggest interfering, but that it would be well for the Neapolitan King to govern more mildly, and to accept the friendship of France, before England grew urgent. To this Bomba retorted, with the least possible diplomatic veneer to his words, that England and France might mind their own business and let him alone. Thus piqued, the Western Powers decided, after deliberations which dragged on from May till September, to employ the most stringent diplomatic means to bring Bomba to his senses. Their purpose, they advertised, was moral, inspired by a regard for humanity. Even on political grounds they justified their move: for Bomba's shocking government made his realm the

hotbed of conspiracies which threatened at any moment to shatter the peace of Italy and perhaps of Europe: such a calamity they, warders of peace, must prevent if they could. Nations or individuals, in order to produce an edifying "moral effect," must themselves be moral. In 1856, what nation had a record so spotless, a heart so free from guile, a policy so unselfish, that it could set itself up to administer moral reproof to its neighbors? Certainly not Imperial France, begotten by the Crime of December 2; nor Royal England, which had allowed a million Irish to die of famine and was busy in all parts of the world bullying and exterminating black, brown and yellow men to promote the sacred interests of British trade; nor the Republican United States, recently engaged in the immoral Mexican War and still responsible for five million slaves. Small nations upon which large nations were pleased to exert moral pressure could not fail to observe that when the giants dealt with each other they carefully refrained from mounting a high moral pedestal. That would have been too comic! But the pygmy states had to submit both to the overwhelming brute force and to the cant which it indulged in.

So the Western Powers in the name of humanity pressed Bomba closer and closer. There is no doubt that they had excuse enough for their interference. A large number of the most conscientious people of Britain, who had no selfish interest at stake, approved the action of their government.¹³ Likewise in France many noble-minded men longed to have an end put to the Bourbon horrors; but in France it was taken for granted that every public project had a dynastic aim. Bomba relied on the support of Russia, which did not fail him. He stood up firmly to his contention that he could not with dignity yield to the demands, for that would be equivalent, in his opinion, to surrendering to the Party of Revolution. He knew, of course, that at the very time

¹³ Vitzthum, I, 203, gives the easy cynical explanation for the English interference in Naples that Palmerston and Lord John Russell "sought and found in coquetting with the opinion of the day a means of tiding over the Session without a crisis. The means to this end was the 'Italian question.' They affected a valiant indignation at the tyranny of the King of the Two Sicilies. The ministerial lying prophets of the *Times* and *Morning Post* held up the 'modern Caligula and Tiberius' to the scorn of the multitude. Had the Neapolitan Government, with their native indolence, not rejected the railway schemes of English capitalists, nobody would have thought of saying a word against tyranny."

when France was promising to become his advocate against England, the Muratists, with French connivance, were plotting to overthrow his throne; and perhaps he believed those who attributed England's ill-will to the anger of English railway promoters to whom he had refused charters. The chasm opened, and neither party would bridge it. On October 21 the British and French ministers presented their ultimatum to Carafa, the Neapolitan Minister of Foreign Affairs, received their passports, and with little delay sailed out of the Bay of Naples on their men-of-war, which had lain at anchor in the harbor for some time past in order to intimidate the King. The Western Powers urged Piedmont to join in their diplomatic and naval demonstration, but Cavour, having sounded them and perceived that they intended to be satisfied with "milk-and-water measures," prudently decided to "hold aloof from their diplomatic imbroglio."¹⁴ Reactionists applauded Bomba for his "heroic resistance." Canofari, his diplomatic agent in Turin, wrote: "The noble figure of our august master becomes majestic and imposing above those of all his contemporary monarchs"; and Carini at Paris predicted that the time would come when the "Emperor Napoleon would thank the King of Naples for having saved the independence of the monarchical principle."¹⁵ Perhaps Canofari and Carini, being courtiers, exaggerated; still, the fact remained that Bomba, despite the threats of the Western Powers, had conceded nothing. Even the intrigues of the Muratists could not bend him. He was sealed to his idols as surely as Cavour to his ideals. The degradation of the ideal into the idol constitutes the real fall of man.

Whatever might come of Muratism, therefore, Cavour prepared against injury. He made no secret of his dislike of the Muratist project, nor of his determination not to traverse it so long as the Emperor gave it his support. But he did not hesitate to whisper in Downing Street that if France took Naples, the English ought to take Sicily, and he even suggested very privately to the Neapolitan *chargé d'affaires*, that if Naples would join with Piedmont, they two might control Italy, regardless of Mazzini, or Murat, or the meddling of foreign governments. To this suggestion Chevalier Canofari replied haughtily that it was not for his sovereign to retrace his steps towards Piedmont, but

¹⁴ *Politique*, 194; C. to E. d'Azeglio, Oct. 15, 1856.

¹⁵ *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 301

for Piedmont, by ceasing to be a hotbed of assassins, calumniators, and revolutionists, to return to Naples: another proof that the two governments could no more be brought together than the antipodes.¹⁶

The Muratist spectre caused Mazzini great anxiety. With Murat king at Naples and with Southern Italy virtually French, his dream of Independence and Unity would be dashed. Not only that — Austrian domination in the North would be so strengthened that Italians could not hope to shake it off. Mazzini, therefore, refused to parley with the Muratists at Paris, and frowned when upright patriots like Montanelli¹⁷ and Sirtori joined them. He believed that some of his own followers had also been coaxed over;¹⁸ and he was doubtless right: for in every sect there were conspirators who threw in their lot with the leader who seemed to offer the speediest occasion for action, and besides these, men of irresolute character, sharpers and turncoats even, could be purchased cheap. For such, Murat had the chief qualification — money. Mazzini finally crystallized his policy in a single phrase — “Whoever sides with Murat betrays Italy.”¹⁹

By a similarly logical course the venerable Venetian was led to declare war on Mazzini. Both stood for unity; both stood for independence: but Mazzini insisted that he could accept only a republic: whereas Manin, although a fervent democrat, recognized that in the Piedmontese monarchy lay the Italians’ best hope of national existence. The Mazzinians charged Manin with being unconsciously the dupe of the Italian princes, who used his “unhappy program” as a veil to their Federalist designs. ‘We can never have a United Italy,’ the Mazzinians said in substance, ‘so long as the several provinces are ruled by monarchs; the only genuine unity must be that of the Republic, before which the Piedmontese Kingdom will be swept away along with its monarchical neighbors. Manin proposes to keep royalist Piedmont,

¹⁶ N. Bianchi: *Cavour*, 46. In reporting to his government Cavour’s words, which he deemed unworthy of serious attention, Canofari added: “Piedmont at this moment is torn by parties, by the designs of the Powers, by influences of all sorts, by the hatred of Austria, by debts, by enormous taxes; her contact — because of bad religion and political principles — is too perilous for one not to conclude that, instead of there being something to hope for from closer bonds with Piedmont, there is on the contrary much to lose.” Turin, Nov. 24, 1856.

¹⁷ Pallavicino, II, 348.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 169.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 344; letter to the *Unione*, Nov. 4, 1856.

royalist Naples and the rest — a palpable absurdity!’²⁰ With unabated persuasiveness Mazzini still preached insurrection as the surest weapon. Manin agreed with him in this, but regarded insurrection as the only signal which would bring Piedmont and possibly France to the aid of the volunteers in their third War of Independence, while Mazzini expected by it not merely to drive out the Austrians but to constitute Italy a republic. As for stubbornness, Mazzini displayed on paper not less self-abnegation than Manin. “We, Republicans today as yesterday,” he said, “do not wish to impose the Republic, and we acknowledge the country to be the supreme arbiter; you, Republicans yesterday, wish today to impose the Monarchy: which of us is exclusive?”²¹

Mazzini was too able a disputant not to give his rival as good as he sent. In his replies to Manin, he tries not to forget that he is addressing a patriot who, though evidently mistaken now, fought nobly earlier and sacrificed all for his country: but an apostle cannot allow personal considerations to stifle his zeal. He freely admits that Italians must be friends, brothers, workers in a common cause, and that the questions which divide them must wait: and yet, so ingrained was the dictatorial spirit in him that it dominated even his conciliatory lapses. Mazzini was sincere when he protested his willingness to allow the nation, after its independence was won, to choose its form of government; yet when the moment came to concede or postpone, he remained intractable, thereby giving color to the charge that he wittingly deceived. Detailed evidence of his personal dealings with the leaders of other parties does not exist: we must judge, therefore, by the published correspondence and documents, generally written with publication in view, and accordingly not really intimate. The fact that his opponents, whether Royalists or Republicans, almost unanimously report between 1848 and 1860 that he attempted to carry out a rule-or-ruin policy, more than counterbalances his own protestations of good-will.

Manin hastened a crisis by sending (May 25, 1856) to the London *Times* an appeal to Italians to abandon the “theory of the dagger.” The “great enemy of Italy,” he said, “is the doc-

²⁰ For an able confutation of Manin’s program, see Sirtori’s letter to Mazzini, written apparently late in 1855. Mazzini, ix, cxix, n. 1.

²¹ *Ibid*, cxxi.

trine of political assassination," which horrifies decent persons everywhere and alienates from the cause of Italy the sympathy, the indispensable sympathy, of foreign governments. "Consider how much authority the Catholic Church has lost and loses," he urged, "especially in Italy, because in order to protect temporal interests it does not blush at employing means which the universal conscience condemns, and to avail itself of the work of so many of its perverted and perverting ministers. . . . Our hands ought to be clean. Let this be one of the principal signs for distinguishing the noble defenders of the country from the polluted instruments of her enemies. . . . Let us leave the theory of assassination to the Jesuits. Let us leave the dagger to the Sanfedists." ²²

Mazzini hoped to diminish the effect of this appeal by issuing three open letters ²³ to Manin, in which he denied that any group of conspirators adopted political assassination as a tenet. The fact of assassination existed, not because patriots were blood-thirsty, but because the rulers of Italy created an environment in which desperate remedies could not fail to be used. "The *theory of the dagger* lives," he said, "in the insane, incessant, savage persecution of thought, of the least suspicious acts, of the property, of the life of those who are guilty or believed guilty of love of country — in the rod, made the law in Central Italy — in the perennial insolence of foreign masters — in the feverish irritation caused by surveillance and shameless espionage — in the hatreds bred by purchased accusations — in the acts of violence performed, under the shield of an abhorred government like the Papal, by petty, tyrannical subalterns, known to every person in our smaller cities — in the absence of popular education — in the involuntary contempt for every existing institution — in the impossibility of finding justice against the frauds of oppressors — in the contempt of human life, the inevitable consequence of wholesale uncertainty concerning tomorrow — in a condition of things which has no basis save the will of the powerful — in the culpable indifference of official Europe for the thought of a common Country, for an immense aspiration, nourished and inexorably repressed for half a century." With such causes for fury,

²² Pallavicino, III, 225-27.

²³ The letters, dated June 8, June 30, and July 2, 1856, were printed in *L'Italia del Popolo*.

what wonder that occasionally some overwrought victim broke out into violence?

Mazzini stated that he could not find it in his heart to censure regicides. "In the hands of Judith," he wrote, "the sword which cut short the life of Holofernes was holy; holy was the dagger which Harmodius crowned with roses; holy was the dagger of Brutus; holy the poniard of the Sicilian who began the Vespers; holy the arrow of Tell. When and where all justice is dead, and a tyrant denies and blots out by terror the conscience of a nation and of God who wished it to be free, a man, innocent of hatred and of every low passion and devoted only to the religion of Country and of Eternal Right incarnate in him, rises up before the tyrant and cries to him: 'You torment millions of my brothers; you withhold from them that which God designed for them; you destroy the bodies and corrupt the souls; because of you my Country agonizes every day; in you an entire edifice of servitude, dishonor and guilt has its head and front; in destroying you, I overturn this edifice' — I recognize, in this manifestation of the tremendous equality between the master of millions and the single individual, the finger of God. Most men feel as I feel: I dare to say it. So that I would not, like you, Manin, cast anathema on those stabbers; I would not say to them, with patent injustice, 'You are cowards.'"²⁴

A zealot who thought in these terms, necessarily regarded political assassination as a mere accident, compared with the vast campaign of revolution which he was planning; and he might assert, with perfect honesty, that *he* did not teach the theory of the dagger; for he held the wickedness of despots responsible for their slaying. The point may seem casuistical to straightforward moralists; to Mazzini it was unanswerable. None of his enemies has brought sufficient proof to convict him of having directly connived at assassination: nor, on the other hand, did he himself ever express more than a lukewarm disapproval of it. An inflamed patriot, hesitating whether or not to kill a tyrant, would hardly have been deterred by Mazzini's words which we have just quoted.²⁵

Political assassination in the middle of the 19th century sprang

²⁴ Mazzini, *ix*, 197.

■ Still less by Mazzini's extenuation of the murderers of the traitor, Vandoni. *Ibid*, 136.

either from desperation, or from the desire to be rid of a cruel official, or from what we may call the Brutus motive. The example of antiquity had an immense hold on the young devotees of Liberty, who offered their lives to the cause, even when they did not hope by killing the tyrant to kill tyranny itself. They ignored the fact that ancient tyrants differed fundamentally from modern: the former were, indeed, individuals, so that when one of them was cut off, there might be a complete change of conditions; but the latter, whether Bourbon or Hapsburg, Romanoff or Papal, were but the figure-heads of a system which would survive their death. In no modern instance has political assassination accomplished a reform: almost every attempt has resulted in making tyranny more cruel. The Italian votaries of the dagger, against whom Manin inveighed, were for the most part impelled by the Brutus motive, and they are to be judged accordingly, and not to be confounded with the recent Anarchist enemies of society, who destroy for the love of destroying, or for greed, or for vanity, or for envy, or because they find the restraint of civilized life galling. Mazzini believed so thoroughly that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church, that he could not condemn a patriot who, having tried to rid Italy of a tyrant, paid for his daring on the scaffold.

But Manin's repudiation of the theory of the dagger produced a great effect. It had the advantage of filling only two pages of print, and of being widely copied by the European press, whereas Mazzini's replies filled thirty,²⁶ and were restricted to a clandestine circulation. The leading Liberal paper in Piedmont, the *Opinione*, significantly took issue with Manin on the ground that he wronged Italy by assuming that political assassination was a crime peculiar to Italians.²⁷

Nevertheless, Cavour welcomed in secret every indication that a large number of patriotic Italians, detaching themselves from the Party of Action, were convinced that the redemption of Italy lay in rallying to the banners of Piedmont.²⁸ Among the Sicilian

²⁶ Mazzini wrote also to Pallavicino in a tone of unwonted urbanity. Pallavicino, II, 285-87.

²⁷ Dina, I, 207-09. Dina calls Manin's letter "at the least an anachronism," and he asks sarcastically whether Manin had recruited his National Party from assassins whom he now disowns.

²⁸ Pallavicino writes Manin from Aix-les-Bains, July 5, 1856, that his wife has just seen Cavour, "who was perfect with me," she says. "I am wholly of [Palla-

exiles at Turin was Giuseppe La Farina, a vigorous writer who had made his mark as historian, editor and publicist. Once a Republican, he had learned that to be an Italian was the first necessity. Neither the habits of conspiracy nor the heart-burnings of exile had spoiled him. In August, 1856, he issued a pamphlet on "Murat and Italian Unity,"²⁹ which approved him both to the Nationalists and to the Liberals. A few weeks later he requested an interview with Cavour, who asked him to call "tomorrow, 12 September, in his house, Via dell' Arcivescovado, at six o'clock in the morning."³⁰ From that meeting dates a new stage in the Risorgimento. Although no written evidence of its purport exists, we can safely infer what each said. La Farina declared that the Nationalists would do their best to prevent the Muratist designs in Naples, if they could be assured that Victor Emanuel's government would not intrigue against them.³¹ Cavour must have replied that he had no liking for the Muratist project, towards which, however, while the Emperor backed it, he must, for policy's sake, remain officially neutral; but that he would not oppose the efforts of the Nationalists to defeat it.³² The two understood each other. La Farina came soon again; and before long he was given access by the private staircase, which only intimates used, to Cavour's little study and chamber. The interviews took place very early in the morning, in winter long before daybreak, and Cavour had La Farina's promise of secrecy. "Go ahead and prosper," he is reported to have said to his accomplice: "but if you fail, or if I am molested on your account by the Chamber or by Diplomacy, I shall be forced to deny you like Peter."³³

With this encouragement, La Farina devoted himself to organizing the Italian National Society. Manin was its prophet [vicino's] opinion," Cavour told her. "Manin is a very fine man, who has rendered us very great services, and will render us still more — especially, when the time for action comes: *we get on very well together.*" Pallavicino, II, 267.

²⁹ Reprinted by Pallavicino, II, 715-26.

³⁰ *Lettere*, II, 460.

³¹ La Farina wrote Cavour: "We do not ask open aid from the Piedmontese government, because we know that it cannot give it; we do not ask secret aid, because we know that it will not give it; we do not ask any declaration, either public or private, and we respect its decisions: but what we ask is that it shall either give no favor to the Muratist Party or shall give us fair warning." *Lettere*, II, 459.

³² Cavour said to Pallavicino "a little before" Aug. 10, 1856: "I do not think I have the right to oppose a Neapolitan revolution in favor of Murat." Pallavicino, II, 292, n. 1.

³³ Carpi, I, 323.

and Pallavicino its sponsor.³⁴ La Farina himself, its head and hands, wrote its correspondence, conducted its business, and served as link between official Piedmont and inchoate Italy. Evidence is lacking, but we may assume that he took no important step without consulting the Prime Minister as soon as Cavour felt sure that he could trust him.³⁵ At the outset, and indeed throughout the year 1857, La Farina and his associates believed that a revolution in the Two Sicilies was both feasible and necessary:³⁶ and to this end they worked to forestall the Muratists, but for good reasons, their plans hung fire. The National Society accomplished something much better in drawing into its fold many of the recognized patriots from every province of Italy. Above them all Garibaldi towered.³⁷ No one could suspect him of joining a party which was likely to be inactive or provincial. The Piedmontese government not only tolerated the Italian National Society, which ere long made no secret of its existence, but allowed it to organize after the pattern of the Corn Law League in England, to hold meetings, collect subscriptions and to agitate through the press. On December 27, 1857, the Society adopted a sound constitution, and established at Turin a central committee of which Pallavicino was president and La Farina secretary. Manin, worn out by his labors, had died three months before (September 22) at the age of fifty-three. His last patriotic duty was to sign the *credo* of the Society which La Farina drew up. Thus Venice, also, through her greatest modern son, had her share in creating free, united and independent Italy.

The National Society was the confirmation from within of

³⁴ Pallavicino, II, 410, calls himself its Croesus, and says that "this year (1857) about half of my income has been employed by me in patriotic works."

³⁵ Massari: *Cavour*, 159, thinks it necessary to deny that Cavour put himself wholly under the control of the Society and received his instruction from it. Massari published in 1873. Since then the publication of masses of material concerning the transaction has made the charge ridiculous.

³⁶ La Farina: *Epist.*, II, 16, 21, 26, 27, 28. La Farina warned his Sicilian accomplices that they must not rise unless they were sure of holding out until their friends outside the island could reach them. *Ibid.*, 29.

³⁷ Garibaldi wrote from Genoa, July 5, 1856, to Pallavicino: "Friend and companion in misfortunes of Foresti, martyr for our most holy cause, you have more than enough titles to my affection and confidence. I must tell you in two words therefore, that I am with you, with Manin, and with all of the good Italians whom you mention; do me the honor, therefore, to admit me to your ranks, and to tell me when we ought to do something." Pallavicino, II, 269.

Piedmont's claim to Italian hegemony as outlined at the Congress of Paris. It gave Cavour the assurance that a large body of Italians would support his national policy. It clinched the Unitarian ideal among the Monarchists and the Monarchical ideal among the Unitarians. Above all, it withdrew many desirable men from the ranks of the Reds, widened the line of cleavage between legal and violent agitation, and deterred from sporadic, futile outbreaks. The Society continued to preach insurrection, which Manin had urged as the means to be used when all the conditions were favorable: but as its leaders fell more under the influence of Cavour and understood the intricacy of the problem, they recognized that insurrection alone would not avail: and so they prudently postponed action. It must not be supposed, however, that the National Society deliberately adopted Cavour's program, or even consciously followed his suggestions. La Farina, Pallavicino, and perhaps a few others took counsel with the Prime Minister: but most of the members, who supposed that the Society pursued its own policy, chafed at delays. Cavour had always to be prepared for the danger that they might grow uncontrollably impatient: men who have once had the revolutionary fever, do not easily settle down to accept the slower methods of legality.

CHAPTER XVII

MAZZINI'S COUNTERMINES

IN these different ways Cavour laid his plans to render Muratism as harmless as possible, and to profit by the Nationalists: but with the Party of Action, now chiefly composed of the dwindling legion of Mazzinians, he neither could nor would come to terms. He had long before decided that it would be as suicidal to compromise with them as with the Austrians. Mazzini paid him back scorn for scorn in full measure. His later invectives, like those of a minor Hebrew prophet, gain in bitterness but lose in imperious zeal. We perceive now more plainly than ever the rotary motion of the incurable doctrinaire's mind. His arguments have short circuits. His petulance increases. He takes the tone of one who regards criticism as a personal insult and change of opinion as treason. Yet Mazzini never displayed more fortitude than during these years; never insisted with more uncompromising solemnity that there was only one way of salvation, one truth and, by implication, one guide. He was another

“Abdiel, faithful found;
Among the faithless, faithful only he,
Among innumerable false unmoved,
Unshaken, unseduced, unterrified,
His loyalty he kept, his love, his zeal,
Nor number nor example with him wrought
To swerve from truth or change his constant mind,
Though single.”¹

But although Mazzini falls nowise short of the Seraph in the quality of his courage and devotion, when we place him amid his actual human surroundings his likeness to Abdiel fades away. Though he would not see it, he was not the single faithful servant of God confronting the innumerable infernal host. For Abdiel, there evidently was no compromise; but many of the men whom Mazzini cursed as Satan's spawn were not less valiant, or upright, or unselfish, or patriotic than he: and their zeal, as the event

¹ Milton: *Paradise Lost*, v, 896-903.

proved, was to accomplish what his could not. More and more as Mazzini put off his prophet's robes and undertook the dubious tasks of agitator, politician and incendiary, his contemporaries forgot his prophetic gifts and thought of him only as a master conspirator. The wise Moses never displayed greater wisdom than when he died in Moab: had he lived to enter Canaan and to conduct the ordinary business of government, men might have doubted whether he had, indeed, once seen God face to face.

Mazzini's credit fell so low after the tragic fiasco at Milan on February 6, 1853, that there seemed no likelihood of his recovering his influence; nor did he ever recover it fully. But his indomitable will drew to him a fraction of the most restless conspirators, and the spell of his dictatorial charm held a few of his old colleagues — men like the sweet-hearted Saffi who lived in a world of illusion that nothing could shatter. The greater part of the Reds, however, abandoned him: some to busy themselves at local conspiracies; some to gravitate towards Piedmont; some to hold themselves in readiness to rush to the scene of the first outbreak. Most of the Party of Action did not mince words in harshly criticizing Mazzini. The nobler-minded repudiated but did not abuse him. "I admire his courage and enthusiasm," said Montanelli, "but experience is wasted on him. He is still a child: he will die a child."² Manin, too, spared the man though he smote his principles. Bertani and Medici went even further, and, out of their old feeling of loyalty, refused to throw obstacles in the way of attempts which they believed insane. They told Mazzini the truth bluntly, but they spoke with the heavy hearts of disciples whose affection for their master still survives after their eyes have been opened to his short-comings. None of his enemies, none of his critics, at this period have left such a damning indictment against him as Bertani drew up.³ The men best qualified to bear witness declare that from 1852 onwards Mazzini's knowledge of conditions in Italy grew more and more uncertain; that he relied with blind faith or immense credulity on a few deluded and on many lying accomplices; that he mistook the promises of a handful for the resolves of an entire people; that he was gulled by the tale that all Italy was a volcano, cov-

² Senior: *Conversations*, II, 130; April 25, 1857. ³ Mario: *Bertani*, I, 270-76. Letter written in January, 1858, and signed by Bertani, Medici, and Cosenz.

ered by the thinnest crust, which he could explode by a single revolutionary speech. "They make you believe," Bertani wrote with terrible straightforwardness, "that the centuries-long and sevenfold domination can be conquered by three men and four stones." ■

But the human heart, which hungers insatiably for many things, seldom relishes good advice: and a prophet would probably not be prophet, a character which implies self-confidence in a supermortal degree, if by heeding his followers, he allowed it to appear that they were wiser than he. Mazzini held to the end, we may say now once for all, that he was right and they wrong; and he had no difficulty in demonstrating that it was they and not he who deviated from his inflexible schedule. After 1852 his tireless efforts, scattered over many fields, had two general aims: first, to get back his ascendancy as dictator of the Revolution; next, to free Italy on Unitarian and Republican bases. In his eyes, the two aims were so completely merged, that he never separated the personal from the political. As soon as possible after the failure of February Sixth, he wished by a new attempt to encourage his friends and to announce to friends and foes alike that neither he nor the conspiracy was crushed. In the autumn of 1853 there were disturbances, quickly quelled, in the Lunigiana and the Parmesan. Mazzini denied being concerned with either; but he directed the laying of ■ train which should set off the patriotic insurrection through the Austrian provinces, Emilia and Romagna, in the summer of 1854. As usual, this proved a flash in the pan.

The Crimean War gave pause to conspirators of every sect; for they hoped to the last that Austria would be drawn into it in such a way that the Italians could swarm to attack her as they had done in 1848. After the Congress of Paris, Mazzinians and Monarchists alike looked to the Two Sicilies as a promising field. The conscience of England and France had pilloried Bomba as a monster; his kingdom was honeycombed with sedition; and except the priests, the corrupt nobles and the paid functionaries, everyone was longing for a change. So at least Neapolitan exiles in Paris and London, in Genoa and Malta heard from their correspondents at home. British officials scarcely took the trouble

■ Mario: *Bertani*, I, 273.

to conceal their relations with the Italians plotting against the execrated Bourbon. Sir James Hudson, the Queen's Minister at Turin, was actually in collusion with the men who fitted out the ship that was to rescue Settembrini and his fellow-prisoners from their island dungeon.

The rapid growth of the Muratist movement, as we have seen, spurred on Mazzini and Manin, and the various groups under or between them. La Farina believed that Sicily was ripe. The Bourbon government itself began to regard every ship flying the English flag as a privateer; and its spies had no difficulty in discovering symptoms of unrest. The first outbreak occurred in Sicily, where Baron Francesco Bentivegna of Corleone had for some time been secretly training a band of patriots. He misread his own people and miscalculated the support which, according to the enthusiast Fabrizi at Malta, he might count upon from the legion of exiles, and even from the English, as soon as he raised the flag of liberty. On November 22 he led forth his army, three hundred strong; but it melted ingloriously away when confronted by the King's troops. Bentivegna escaped, only to be betrayed, seized, tried and executed. Salvatore Spinuzza, one of his accomplices, met a similar fate. The incident created on the whole very little stir, doubtless because the government hushed it up as far as possible.⁵

On the mainland, what seemed a chance event gave definite shape a fortnight later to the widespread foreboding. On December 8, 1856, at a military review, Agesilao Milano, a common soldier, rushed with fixed bayonet at the King. The blow fell short, merely scratching Ferdinand on the haunch; Milano was overpowered; and the King showed such coolness that the attempted crime was not generally known until after the parade. In the course of a few days an access of terror overcame Ferdinand, who withdrew to his castle at Caserta, and hedged himself about with precautions. Milano underwent without flinching the torture prepared for him. Nothing could induce him to whisper the name of any accomplice. He declared that he had acted on his own motion to kill Ferdinand because he was a tyrant. "I wished to save my country and Italy at the sacrifice of my life; so that I was impelled to the crime without aid, without hope,

⁵ Nisco *Ferdinando II*, 449-50.

without expectation of honors, — on the contrary, with the certitude that it was my duty to die.” On December 13 he was shot. “Oh God,” he said at the end; “I die like a thief for Italy.” There was one spot in Bomba’s realm where the word “Italy” could not be suppressed: that spot was the scaffold.⁶ On December 17 a powder-magazine not far from the Royal Palace in Naples was blown up; and on January 4, 1857, an explosion destroyed the steam frigate *Carlo III*, with guns, ammunition and more than fifty persons. Consternation reigned. The military authorities and the police ruled the city with an iron hand: but their wholesale arrests brought no disclosures. The belief prevailed, but it could not be established, that these crimes were links in a chain of conspiracy.

If Milano and Bentivegna were amateurs, whose exploits were kept from the public, they still exerted a deep influence on the professional conspirators who during the winter of 1856–57 held heated discussions over the grand stroke to be delivered next. The most ardent could produce reams of testimony to show that the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, like a house of cards, needed only the push of a little finger to topple over. It soon appeared, however, that the leaders did not agree. Level-headed Dr. Bertani allowed the plotters to meet in his house, but he would not join them. Cosenz declined to coöperate. Medici, who never lacked courage and who, by temperament, relished a venturesome task, consented to serve as treasurer of the fund for ten thousand muskets to be raised in Genoa, but he refused to take part in, or even to sanction, the proposed rising. Garibaldi’s name was passed about, until he bluntly announced that he would not stir. The head and heart of the plan was Mazzini himself, who had many reasons for wishing to set off another explosion. Although Muratist activity had slackened after the autumn of 1856, he insisted that Murat must be forestalled. Manin and the National Society must be outflanked. Monarchical Piedmont, growing in prestige day by day and with every inch of growth lessening the expectations of the Party of Action, must be shaken or discredited. There was also a chance for Mazzini, by a spectacular success, to regain his leadership. It is improbable that he consciously listened to the seductions of

⁶ Nisco, *Ferdinando II*, 442–49. Also *Difesa di A. Milano*, n. d., n. p.

ambition: but he had long ago so completely identified his cause with himself, that he instinctively assumed that one could not conquer without the other.

After various schemes had been canvassed, half-agreed upon and then abandoned, it was finally decided that an expedition should be sent from Genoa to land on the Neapolitan seaboard, where it would be welcomed by throngs of Bomba's oppressed subjects, would march in triumph to the capital, drive out the Bourbons, proclaim the Republic, and, having taken breath, proceed thence northward to find Romans and Tuscans, Romagnoles, Lombards and Venetians in revolt against their despots. Adriano Lemmi, one of the few rich Mazzinians,⁷ urged that Leghorn be made the base of operations: but the wiser decision ruled that Tuscany could not give sufficient momentum to a national movement, and that Leghorn itself was too unpopular with Tuscans to be chosen to lead a rebellion which they would support. Carlo Pisacane, a Neapolitan duke, came forward, like Horatius, and begged to command the expedition. Under the Bourbons, dukes swarmed so thick in the Kingdom of Naples that their title almost ceased to imply distinction: and those who bore it were, for the most part, degenerates who added sycophancy to the ignorance, superstition and semi-savagery of the majority of the population. But Pisacane was an exception: he had conscience and accessibility to ideals; he was valiant, in an unshowy way; and having hearkened in youth to Mazzini's gospel of duty and patriotism, he gladly accepted exile as a means to work for the liberation of his country. Now he asked only for an opportunity to prove his zeal.

At the outset, the conspirators in Naples shook their heads. Giuseppe Fanelli, their spokesman, pronounced the conditions unfavorable: but he was contradicted by a red-hot enthusiast, Giacinto Albini, who reported that he had talked with an "infinite" number of persons all of whom said "that they were ready, and more than ready to rise." ⁸ Having made up his mind, Mazzini met subsequent objections or doubts with the fatalistic reply, "destiny must take its course." ⁹ So Fanelli and

⁷ He contributed 22,000 lire to this enterprise. Bilotti, 142. ⁸ Bilotti, 77. But later, having started the avalanche, Albini disapproved of the special plan agreed upon, and discreetly stood from under. *Ibid*, 103. ⁹ *Ibid*, 79.

his colleagues on the spot, who knew how matters stood, reluctantly prepared for the arrival of their Mazzinian colleagues. A conspirator cannot urge prudence after his superiors have decided upon recklessness; his caution may be too easily mistaken for lukewarmness or cowardice. To reinforce the descent on Naples and to double the chances of success, a simultaneous outbreak in Sicily was talked of. Fabrizi, the patriarch of Sicilian exiles at Malta, and Francesco Crispi — bold, decisive, and like Ulysses a man of many devices — took counsel as to a plan. With them was associated Rosalino Pilo, another Sicilian, whose ardor left too little room for his judgment. Presently, Fabrizi and Crispi withdrew, a sure sign that the situation in the Island did not warrant a rising, and Pilo had to content himself with a post of honor under Pisacane.

At the beginning of May, Mazzini reached Naples to direct the expedition. It was agreed that on June 10 Pisacane and his men should take passage on a steamer bound south; that they should coerce its captain and crew to change its course: that on the 13th they should land at Sapri in the Gulf of Policastro and begin their triumphant advance on the capital. Mazzini brought a large sum of money¹⁰ from the English Friends of Italy, and the Genoese and other Mazzinian committees contributed liberally. To disarm suspicion, Rosalino Pilo with some twenty companions was to hire a tartan, load it by night with muskets and ammunition, and set out secretly to intercept Pisacane's steamer off the island of Monte Cristo. Pilo carried out punctually the first part of his task; but he had hardly put to sea before a tempest overtook him. For many hours the tartan drove before the gale; her terrified skipper and sailor-men insisted on the cargo being jettisoned, and when the storm cleared, they found that they were only a short distance from Genoa, instead of near the rendezvous. There was nothing to be done except for Pilo to go back to the city and report the disaster. He arrived in time to prevent Pisacane's band from embarking.

Pisacane himself, however, borrowed a passport and landed in Naples on June 13: he wished to explain to the Mazzinians there the cause of the failure and to assure them that he and his men were eager to try again. He quickly saw that the situation was

¹⁰ Variouslly stated at from 50,000 to 90,000 lire.

not nearly so favorable as it had been painted. Among the conspirators, he said, a "too exuberant individualism" stood in the way of united effort. In the city of Naples there was no likelihood of a revolt unless the rising in the provinces were successful, and the provinces were evidently divided in counsel, poor in leaders, and ill-supplied with arms.¹¹ Nevertheless, Pisacane, on whom a fatalistic imperturbability had settled, would not back out. Having agreed with Fanelli that the expedition should reach Sapri on June 29, he returned to Genoa undetected on the 23d. On the 25th he and twenty-five companions, provided with false passports, went on board the Rubattino steamer, *Cagliari*, with tickets for Tunis. When they were well out of reach of land, they seized the ship and compelled the captain to obey their orders. During the night they kept an anxious look-out for Rosalino Pilo, who had sailed in another fishing-smack and was to bring a second cargo of weapons and his score of accomplices. But they watched, and signaled, and waited in vain. When day broke Pisacane and his men determined to go on, although they could not put into any port without being treated as pirates. Zealous but incompetent, Pilo's skipper had this time lost his bearings. When Pilo, under cover of darkness, crept into Genoa and reported the blunder, he distracted the Mazzinian camp. Mazzini himself was almost frenzied by anxiety. Ignorant of Pisacane's decision, he hesitated whether to send the preconcerted message to the Neapolitans. After two days' suspense a telegram from Cagliari stated that the steamer had not arrived there: this meant that the expedition had not been abandoned. Accordingly, Fanelli was warned to set the insurrection at Naples in motion.¹²

¹¹ On the other side, Jessie Mario, writing nearly 40 years later, remembered that everything was rose-colored. Pisacane returned from Naples "transfigured and radiant." "'We shall win,' he said; 'a spark is all that is needed. Everywhere the mine is prepared; communications are established; the leaders are full of audacity; the followers are sure. The Revolution is in the hearts of all the educated classes. The Neapolitan land will burst into flames. Muratism exists only in the brain of Napoleon and of Piedmontese henchmen. The army will be with us, the masses with whoever wins.'" Mario: *Nicotera*, 8, 7. Contemporary records and letters, however, do not confirm her rosy recollections, but show that Pisacane cherished no illusions as to the desperateness of his task.

¹² Pisacane and his followers signed on June 12 an address which has the tone of forlorn hope. "If we fall," they said, "do not weep for us. We say with the Bandiera Brothers: Our death will be more useful to the Italian cause than a life sterilely prolonged. If it is not granted us to see again our shores bathed by the sea,

Meanwhile, the *Cagliari* pursued its way to the island of Ponza, where on June 27 the conspirators had little difficulty in capturing the convict station. They set free over a thousand convicts, 322 of whom they carried away with them on their patriotic enterprise.¹³ It does not appear that either Mazzini or any of his lieutenants felt a qualm at employing convicts for what should be the purest of missions. Perhaps they argued that Bomba's justice was so atrocious that those whom it branded as guilty were presumably innocent: or perhaps they held that the vilest sinner might cleanse himself by patriotic service. The fact remains that, making what allowance we will, more than two-thirds of the Ponza contingent were common criminals.¹⁴ Having divided his force into three companies, Pisacane assumed the chief command himself, and appointed Giovanni Nicotera and Giovan Battista Falcone, two Calabrian youths, of daring and character, respectively colonel and major. In the afternoon of June 28 the *Cagliari* approached Sapri; by nightfall she had disembarked her strange passengers and had sailed away.

The liberators, or filibusters, had been assured that not less than two thousand patriots would welcome them on the strand: they found instead only the Bourbon police and little knots of country-folk who peered at them distrustingly from a safe distance. The Royal officials from Naples to Reggio had already been put on their guard by telegraph: for a boat had crossed from Ponza to Gaeta, where the King was residing, and had taken news of the looting of the convict station. This enabled the King to give his instructions to suppress the invaders half a day at least before their Neapolitan accomplices knew that the expedition had started. Pisacane strove to placate the natives and to win over the police in order to prevent them from spreading alarm: but both groups were wary. Not a voice responded to the liberators' cheers for Italy: not a cockade peeped out when they give an affectionate caress to the orphan children we leave among you; educate them in the religion of patriotism; grasp the flag which at our death will have fallen from our hand; and if, when Italy is free from the Alps to the sea, you shall remember your dead brothers, erect then, and not before, a tomb to those who have met death for their country. A tomb in a free land and by free hands will console our souls." Bilotti, 147-48. ¹³ Bilotti, p. 156, and Nisco, p. 456, say 323. But Bilotti, p. 452, gives the number as 328. ¹⁴ Bilotti, p. 156, classes 117 of them as "ex-militi," that is, ex-soldiers, the majority of whom may have been sentenced for supposed Liberalism in 1848. But this is not proved.

unfurled the tricolor flag; not a house in the little village opened for them; the few loafers gathered at the tavern eyed them suspiciously.¹⁵ Such was the warmth of Sapri's welcome! That night the expedition bivouacked on the beach.

The next day they began their march inland and halted at Torraca. Still no signs of sympathy from the people: on the contrary, occasional cries of "Long live Murat!" Officials and priests inflamed the peasantry by telling them that the strangers were a gang of escaped convicts bent on a piratical raid. Pisacane's proclamation, distributed copiously, failed to kindle the peasantry, not one in ten of whom could read. Nevertheless, he decided to push on, expecting to find the country inland alive with patriots. At Fortino he held a council of war at which Falcone proposed to retreat into the mountains of the Basilicata, where they might keep up a guerrilla fight indefinitely, and Nicotera urged turning south into Calabria; but the commander had been assured that crowds of patriots were awaiting him at Padula, and he accordingly pursued the road to that town. The ardor of many of his convict recruits was cooling; desertions were numerous; still no sign of coöperation from Naples. He could no longer doubt that the Government was on the alert: for Royal troops began to loom up here and there to reinforce the local police, and when the expedition reached Padula it beheld the neighboring heights occupied by several companies of cavalry. This blocked the advance; and already troops, landed at Sapri, were closing in on the rear. The Mazzinians repulsed the Bourbons in a brief but gallant fight: then they wavered, turned, and took to their heels. As if relieved that the destiny he foresaw had been fulfilled, thus absolving him from further responsibility, Pisacane wished to die in the rout; but his comrades hurried him away, and when, a little later, he discovered that nearly a hundred refugees were following, a gleam of hope flickered over him. The majority, however, could not escape. Part of them, rushing, terror-stricken, through the little town of Padula, plunged for shelter into a blind alley. There the gendarmes shot them down like rats, and when there was a pause three Padulese went in, turned over the bodies and prodding them with their bayonets forced to the surface the

¹⁵ The only man who joined them, an old conspirator named Mansueto Brandi, hailed from Torraca. Bilotti, 186.

few still alive under the heap, to be slaughtered in turn. Not content with killing, the blood-crazed victors amused themselves by smashing with musket-stock the skulls of the dead, and by mutilating and insulting the corpses in other ways. At Padula on that first of July nearly 300 filibusters were lost — 130 being killed.¹⁶

The next morning Pisacane and his fugitives approached the village of Sanza, only to find that the priests had roused the countryfolk against them by asserting that they were anointers bent on spreading cholera. Among a people sodden for centuries in the most depraving superstitions, it was easy to conjure up unreasoning terror. At almost every epidemic in Italy the legend was revived that the pestilence was caused by wicked persons who went about anointing the doorposts of their proposed victims with the essence of cholera or plague. So at the cry "Anointers" the peasants of Sanza seized their scythes, sickles, old blunderbusses, pitchforks, and cudgels, and swept down in fury upon the luckless band. Pisacane himself, hoping to appease them, gave orders not to fire, and stood unperturbed, a conspicuous target, till they should draw near enough to hear him. He had time only to call "Brothers!" when a ball struck him in the left side. To end it, he drew his revolver and sent a bullet through his brain. His companions might envy his sudden quietus, for although they apparently offered no resistance, they were hacked, hewn, beaten, shot. The bestialized peasants, men and women alike, encouraged by the priests who carried the images of St. Sabino and St. Anthony of Padua to incite them, gave way to an orgy of slaughter. Giovanni Nicotera, wounded and terribly beaten, was by accident left to live. Falcone, imitating Pisacane, turned his pistol against himself rather than fire on his assailants. A last handful of defenseless liberators were able to surrender to the police who had come up. The peasants gave no quarter. The

¹⁶ If these figures are correct they show that about 50 men had joined the expedition after it landed at Sapri. Pisacane's original band numbered 27; 323 or 328 joined at Ponza; 3 were left wounded on the *Cagliari*. Bilotti makes no attempt to harmonize these figures. On p. 280 he quotes De Liguoro's estimate — "about 300 between dead and prisoners"; on p. 281 he gives the official Bourbon report — "130 killed, 140 arrested, 13 doubtful." But on p. 452 he states the killed in the Ponza contingent as only 59. Bilotti's painstaking investigation is not likely to be superseded, and the discrepancy in figures, easily understood, need cast no suspicion on the general accuracy of his statements.

bodies of twenty-seven victims¹⁷ having been spat upon, pounded and otherwise abused, were piled together and burnt.

So ended, in unedifying horror, the most forlorn of all the Mazzinian enterprises. From first to last, not a ray of enthusiasm lighted it. Pisacane moved to his destruction without flinching, convinced at the outset that the expedition would fail, but resolved that fate should be fulfilled.¹⁸ Feeling that it would be ignoble not to make the trial, he consoled himself with the hope that the tree of Liberty might revive by the blood of a new batch of martyrs. The Expedition sank from blunder to blunder. Except in the ill-advised descent on Ponza, nobody concerned showed the least capacity for decisive action, or resourcefulness for dealing with emergencies. We all admire the patient fortitude with which the victims of incurable disease await their end in the sick-room, but that is not the spirit in which battles are won, rebellions triumph or downtrodden peoples are freed. "The people always side with the winner," Pisacane had said earlier: and he proved his maxim at the cost of his life. Fanelli did not neglect to send urgent appeals to the Mazzinian Committees throughout Naples and Salerno as soon as he had news of the whereabouts of the *Cagliari*: but it was too late, or the conspirators were too cautious. Virtually, no hand was raised to aid the liberators. Fanelli saved his neck by scuttling into exile, only to go crazy through the accusations of treachery heaped upon him. The genial Giacinto Albini, whose rosy-colored reports furnished Mazzini an excuse for launching the expedition, lay as silent as an egg in a nest while the danger lasted.¹⁹ Those of Pisacane's band who survived their wounds were brought to trial after many months' delay, and condemned to the galleys. To Nicotera, as the most conspicuous, was assigned a dungeon with incredible torments.²⁰

The descent on Sapri embraced, however, only a part of Maz-

¹⁷ Again it is impossible to make the various statements as to numbers agree. Bilotti says, p. 303, that 27 were with Pisacane when he was shot, and he gives the names of 9 who were killed; p. 304, n. 2. The Bourbon official report says 27 killed; p. 311.

¹⁸ Jessie Mario, however, implies that Pisacane was buoyant and confident. This seems an echo of her own sanguine youth, for Pisacane's recorded words have the ring of a man who felt himself doomed. ¹⁹ Bilotti, 297.

²⁰ For details, see J. W. Mario's *Nicotera*, 26. "Nicotera was put in a separate hole, still lower down, called the 'room of the heart of burden.' He could not stretch at full length except by lying across an open trench, full of filthy water,

zini's scheme. He actually proposed to seize the city of Genoa at the moment when Pisacane, if his venture prospered, should be marching victoriously on Naples. Mazzini justified his project by declaring that he had no intention of starting a revolution against Victor Emanuel, but only of holding Genoa as a base of supplies for the revolution which, touched off by Pisacane, would flash over the Peninsula from South to North. Having captured the magazines and got control of the port, he would ship arms and munitions to reinforce the pioneers on the *Cagliari*. The Piedmontese government would be compelled at last to join the All-Italy movement. In the twinkling of an eye Austrians, French and Bourbons would be driven out, and United Italy, free and independent, would stand before the world in her beautiful strength. Had Mazzini fed on hasheesh he could not have harbored a more preposterous dream. Most of his followers refused to be beguiled by it. Even the willing Saffi, usually as loyal to Mazzini as the needle to the pole, shook his head.²¹ Many of the Party of Action admitted that it would be base ingratitude to embarrass, perhaps to imperil, the only Italian State which offered an asylum to exiles, maintained a constitutional régime, and allowed considerable scope for the discussion of national ideals. Others took the more selfish, but sensible view, that if by their action they destroyed Liberal Piedmont, they would cut themselves off from their best stronghold. Others were simply amazed by the colossal folly.

But Mazzini acknowledged no reason for being grateful to Piedmont: he felt, on the contrary, that Piedmont, in proportion as her prestige increased, was all the more harmful to the Italy he dreamed of. She made Monarchy not only respected, but reasonable, attractive and popular — thereby giving a renewed

which overflowed also the floor. Scorpions, rats, mosquitoes, by millions, and utter darkness: a long stone bench served as bed, alongside the filthy place through which the sewage of the other prisoners ran. There he staid for five months, and was reduced to the point of death. Both the commandant of the fort [of Santa Caterina] and the doctor, alarmed at his condition on account of the fever which consumed him, the cough, the frequent bleedings at the mouth, besought him to petition the King to free him. The commandant brought the necessary writing materials, heading the petition, 'To his Sacred Royal Majesty, Ferdinand II, King of the Two Sicilies.' 'Write instead,' said Nicotera, 'to the ferocious wild beast, Ferdinand II, who is not yet satiated with tormenting mankind,' and he tore up the paper." P. 26. ²¹ Mazzini: *Scritti*, ix, cxxxv.

lease of life to the system which must be swept away before his republic could be established. In his talk, he spoke of the noble example which Genoa would set, by revolting not for her self-interest or to overthrow the government, but to perform a duty, which the rulers neglected, towards the downtrodden mother country. If the attempt failed, there would be no harm done: he might be abused, but what of that? he was proof against any abuse that might be leveled at him. Mazzini had reached that final stage in the evolution of a fanatic where he could no longer discriminate between the goodness or badness of his plans on the moral side, or between their validity or folly on the practical side. No doubt he believed that he spoke sincerely when he said that he did not mean by his projected seizure of Genoa to cause a rebellion in Piedmont: but there is plenty of evidence to show that his heart was rankling with hatred of the King's government, and that this hatred, although he might not avow it even to himself, had much to do in shaping his decision. He saw that a crisis was at hand. Piedmont had won the recognition of Europe as the champion of Italy; Manin and his disciples had drawn the great body of Italian patriots to look to Piedmont for salvation: but in Mazzini's dream the aggrandizement of Piedmont was not equivalent to the unification of free Italy. Wherever Piedmont went, she would take Monarchy with her: how could a Republican consent to that? If he probed still deeper, what was the lesson of the past seven years? It was that Cavour had solidified constitutionalism in Piedmont, welcomed patriots from all over Italy, and conciliated even former Republicans: but he had set his face against Mazzini and all his works and he had succeeded in convincing official Europe that Mazzini was Italy's chief enemy, a marplot, an ambitious headstrong egoist, an incendiary and assassin, who persuaded his deluded followers to commit the crimes he planned, and watched them suffer punishment therefor while he adroitly kept out of harm's way. It was hard enough to fail, bitter enough to see one patriotic dream after another fade away, unrealized, without having his failure charged to incompetency and his patriotic dreams branded as folly or crime. Never forgetting that he was a prophet, Mazzini may have regretted those happier days when she-bears devoured even the little children that mocked at a prophet.

He had spared Piedmont for seven years: now he would stam-pede Piedmont by his Party of Action. Either he or Cavour must prevail. If Genoa, the restless, un-Piedmontized city, could be held by the Reds for a week, the liberty, independence and unification of Italy would immediately follow. The Genoese, always jealous of Turin, nursed a special grievance against the Government, which had decided to remove the naval station to La Spezia. Taxes — a perpetual excuse for grumbling — were high. The forbidding of an open subscription for 10,000 muskets for patriotic purposes, had given offense to many persons who were not among the ringleaders of conspiracy, but regarded this as an unnecessary slap at the national spirit. Other reasons to justify the attempt seethed in Mazzini's fertile imagination. Not one of his lieutenants of former days stood by him,²² but he felt satisfied with the support of comparative novices like Pisacane and Alberto Mario.

Genoa harbored a nucleus of Mazzinians, held together by a secret organization, larger than elsewhere. Mazzini's organ, the *Italia del Popolo*, which Savi, Quadrio and Mario had charge of, was published there. The activity of a busy port gave easy contacts. The number of accomplices on whom Mazzini could rely cannot be stated, — he naturally saw thousands, where only hundreds or fewer existed, — and they were almost entirely artisans and day-laborers.²³ A few upper-class conspirators, — like Pisacane, Marquis Lorenzo Pareto and Count Pasi, — and a few intellectuals, lent the sect a semblance of significance. It won over a few soldiers and here and there an officer, on the supposition that it was going to declare a patriotic war in which every true Italian would be able to strike down his country's enemies.

On reaching Genoa, Mazzini was loyally secreted by his friends, at first in Alberto Mario's house. The police did not even suspect his presence: no spy unearthed him; no servant whispered indiscreetly. The leaders held their conferences with

²² Foresti wrote from Genoa on June 25 to Pallavicino: "Medici and his followers have not yet decided whether to give or withhold their signature to that Program of yours, but all of them, through him, have assured me that they will not second in the slightest degree the insensate projects of the ex-Triumvir of Rome." Pallavicino, III, 396.

²³ La Farina, now wholly anti-Mazzinian, writes on July 5 to Pallavicino. "Among the persons arrested at Genoa are the dregs of the emigration, and consequently none of our people." Pallavicino, III, 397.

almost reckless openness. Young and old made festival for their revered Chief. The young women decked his bed with flowers. Arms were smuggled in; bombs and fusees prepared; sacks of gunpowder procured. The agreement was that, while the seizure of Genoa should be independent of Pisacane's expedition, it should occur simultaneously, so that one might help the other; and further, in order to show that the Mazzinians were really national in aspiration and in power, Maurizio Quadrio was to head an outbreak at Leghorn.²⁴ The failure of Pisacane's first embarkation on June 10 caused a moment's hesitation. Then Mazzini, declaring that Destiny must take its course, fixed on the night of June 28-29 for the attempt. He arranged that Pasi should seize the Ducal Palace, Mosto the dock, Mario the Spirito Santo barracks where the artillery was garrisoned, Pittaluga and others the Diamante fort, others again the Sperone fort, others the Arsenal, and still others the Turri Palace where the arms of the National Guard were stored. This comprehensive plan, if it succeeded, would give the Mazzinians complete control of the city. Then they could hurry reinforcements to Pisacane, and, from the forts that towered far above the dwellings, they could bombard either the town itself or the port or any troops which might approach from the North. Like all of Mazzini's later designs, it was grandiose in proportion to its impracticableness.

But some one betrayed it. Early in the morning of June 28 the strengthening of the guards at the Ducal Palace and other objective points warned Mazzini that the Governor had wind of his plot. Not wishing to start a conflict between his men and the military, he passed the word to call the plan off: no doubt, a wise decision on his part, because his followers, if put to the proof, might have turned out as few and incompetent as were his Milanese on the Sixth of February. The counter-order did not reach the band at the Diamante fort, and, in apparent collusion with some of the soldiers, they rushed in, killed a sergeant, overcame the small garrison and occupied the fort, until they learned that the rest of the plot had been quashed.

The next morning the good people of Genoa shuddered to hear that such an attempt had been planned against them. The first

²⁴ According to the larger plan, Rosalino Pilo, after assisting Pisacane to disembark at Sapri, was to proceed to Sicily.

reports were of course exaggerated; for it seems improbable that, if Mazzini had carried out every detail, he could have duplicated the revolt of 1849, much less have held the city permanently as the capital of the Party of Action. Cavour was furious. His pride suffered an immense shock. For years he had been assuring European diplomats that Piedmont was too law-abiding to tolerate conspirators' attempts, and that her citizens repudiated Mazzini: yet here was the Arch-Conspirator working at will in the largest city of the Kingdom, as if no police, spies or troops existed. Worse still, the French government passed the word to Cavour early in June that Mazzini was in Genoa, making ready a revolution; and Cavour, relying on the statement of Rattazzi, the Minister of the Interior, replied that the French must be mistaken. "Try to persuade the Emperor and his Government," Cavour wrote to Villamarina, "that our country is sheltered from every revolutionary movement; the agitators know that it would have no chance of success. . . . So long as the Emperor shall live and keep down the revolution in France, we can sleep *on both our ears* without fearing that our sleep may be disturbed by Mazzini or his adherents." ²⁵

Now, at a single blow, Mazzini had exposed the hollowness of this assumption of security. But Cavour's wrath was not merely personal. He judged Mazzini's doctrine of salvation by conspiracy as contemptuously as the trained physicist regards half-baked visionaries who are always just going to discover perpetual motion. He believed, moreover, that although Mazzini knew that his efforts must be futile, he persisted in them through vanity and self-will. Cavour loathed a leader who, for the sake of displaying his malign power, continued to sacrifice hundreds of his disciples' lives in spite of experience and reason; no honorable man, he argued, would send band after band of his followers to destruction and save his own skin from a scratch. Above all, Cavour abominated Mazzini for wittingly imperiling the existence of Piedmont and the future of Italy by his mad schemes; he abominated him also for keeping alive sectarian feuds. No true patriot could do that.

The news from Genoa on the 29th of June threw Cavour into a rage. He saw that, though the conspirators might cause trouble,

²⁵ Mayor, 531; C. to Villamarina, June 17, 1857.

they could not overthrow the Monarchy. With order unbroken in Genoa, with multitudes of responsible Genoese of all classes rallying to the Government, and with public opinion throughout the Kingdom denouncing the attempt, Cavour felt that he might 'punish severely the Mazzinians, who, without being formidable, were very bothersome.'²⁶ He requested the French Emperor to send at once a detective who could arrest Mazzini — the Piedmontese officers did not know him, and they had proved their incompetency. If the detective "succeeds," Cavour wrote, "he can count on a handsome recompense, for we ardently desire to deliver Piedmont, Italy and Europe from this infamous conspirator who has become a veritable chief of assassins. If we catch him, he will, I hope, be condemned to death, and will be hanged on the Acquasola Place."²⁷ As Cavour intended the Emperor should hear what he wrote to Villamarina, he added that the Austrian police were supposed to know of the plot, if they did not actually connive at it; that a person bearing bags of *zwanzigers* had several times come across the Lombard frontier; that in any event Mazzini was Austria's best ally, and that Austria detested Napoleon as much as Piedmont.²⁸ Doubtless Mazzini received contributions from the faithful in Lombardy, but the surmise that the Austrian police winked at the transaction could never be proved.

Although the Genoese police arrested more than a hundred persons at Genoa, not even with the help of the Vidocq from Paris could they catch Mazzini, who remained in the city until early in August. Among the prisoners was Miss Jessie Merington White, a young Englishwoman whose soul had been stirred by Italy's wrongs. She came to Genoa an immutable Republican to whom Mazzini's gospel was religion; a woman of leonine courage, volcanic impulses, capable of heroic generosity and of equally uncritical hatred. To her young enthusiasm, every conspirator was a paladin, Mazzini a demi-god. She was already engaged to Alberto Mario, intellectually the keenest of the younger brood of Mazzinians. Being still a British subject, she conspired with apparent impunity; and the novelty and excitement of this occupation, together with the consciousness that she was devoting

²⁶ *Lettere*, II, 482; C. to W. de La Rive, July 2, 1857.

²⁷ Mayor, 536; C. to Villamarina, July 8, 1857.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 537.

herself to the holiest of causes, whetted her zeal. When arrested, she appealed to the British Minister for protection, but Hudson refused to interfere: nevertheless, Cavour deemed it politic, after two months' detention, to release her;²⁹ for the English Friends of Italy would not have allowed one of their number to be condemned to long imprisonment or to death for high treason, as on the evidence she would have been, without rousing a dangerous agitation in her behalf. In any event, the world, which seldom discriminates nicely, would not have understood how a foreigner, and a woman, whose only crime was an unmeasured devotion to Italian freedom, should be made a victim by the Italian State which posed as the champion of liberty and as the refuge of all those who were persecuted for Italy's sake.

Miss White's case illustrates the attitude of many Mazzinians towards Piedmont. While acknowledging no obligations on their part towards the Government, they insisted that it should treat them as privileged persons. As there was more liberty in Piedmont, they would simply avail themselves of it for their own purposes. But when they were caught in trying to seize Genoa, they claimed that they deserved to be crowned as patriots, not condemned as criminals, since they were unselfish zealots working for a great cause in which the capture of a city was a mere incident. And yet they were too canny to let slip any quibble or excuse that might save them from the consequences of their acts. Miss White herself pleaded her British allegiance. To read her account of the conspiracy you might imagine that it was a patriotic frolic, as harmless as a May-day party: and that the Government was wickedly unjust in punishing the irresponsible, high-minded souls who hoped merely to seize a metropolis, paralyze its police and government, seize its military stores and ships, and make it the base of a national insurrection.³⁰ It is one

²⁹ Signora Mario told me in 1895 that the immediate cause of her release was her resolve to starve herself to death in the hope of rendering the Piedmontese Government odious. She had already gone some time without food when the order came to discharge her. The Government knew enough of her forceful nature, to fear that she would carry out her threat.

³⁰ All Signora Mario's references to the Genoa Attempt are couched in the same terms. For a typical statement, see her *Nicotera*, published in 1894, pp. 10-11. Discussing the affair with her in her old age, I found her still unwilling to admit that Cavour's government in 1857 was justified in preserving order, even at the expense of the Mazzinians. "They were the patriots," she insisted: "they

of the inevitable defects of a sect, whether religious, political or industrial, that it ranks loyalty to itself as paramount, and absolves its members from treating those outside by the same moral code that they enforce among themselves.

Mazzini lingered in Genoa to help, if he could, the victims of his folly. His attempt at Leghorn proved equally fatuous. Quadrio beheld a squad of peasants march into the city, where they were shot down: he himself does not seem to have come within gunfire. Several weeks passed before details of Pisacane's tragic end could be verified.³¹ Yet these three failures, instead of chastening Mazzini, inflamed his pride, and he wrote "The Situation," that pamphlet which those who reverence him most wisely deplore most deeply.³² In it he repeats his old formula many times, throws the blame not on his impossible system but on chance and his enemies, denounces all who differ from him, and solemnly declares that by his way alone can Italy be saved. What distinguishes the pamphlet, however, is not these familiar generalities nor its doctrinaire narrowness, but the personal venom, the rancor, the spite, the bitterness. Mazzini employs all his skill at invective against the Liberals of Piedmont, and especially against Cavour. The Liberals or Moderates he dubs "Tepids," creatures who will neither succor Italy themselves nor allow any one else to work: a great, smug body, who have found how to prosper by avoiding risky undertakings, by truckling to France, by talking patriotism but not practising it, and by ever postponing their promised support of national independence. He ridicules the allies of this party in the unredeemed provinces. "I could name," he says, "the hundred, the fifty individuals who in Romagna, in Tuscany, in the Lombard cities constitute the active party which calls itself *Moderate*, and who whisper about Piedmontese monarchy, royal federations and Muratist possibilities."³³ Mazzini gloats over the fact that his explosion at Genoa has given the lie to the Tepids' assertion that Piedmont

knew best how Italy could be redeemed, and it was despotic not to give them a free hand." So too Saffi ingenuously remarks: "Scarcely two years passed by, and the *crime* of '57 became, in '60, national glory and virtue." Mazzini: *Scritti*. ix, clv.

³¹ The first news of the Sapri affair reached Turin late on July 4. Pallavicino, II, 397.

³² "La Situazione," printed in *L'Italia del Popolo* for July, August and September, 1857: reprinted in *Scritti*, ix, 260-341. ■ Mazzini: *Scritti*, ix, 323.

was orderly and was devoted to the Monarchy. In truth, he implies, a great part of her people are Republicans, who, if they were not rigorously repressed, would strike for their cause, as the Genoese hordes³⁴ have just done. He withers with scorn Cavour's statesmanship; he insinuates that the medals and addresses heaped upon Cavour after the Congress of Paris were got up by a few persons, perhaps instigated by the recipient himself.³⁵ Every line of this tirade is written in gall. The pent-up hate, distilling itself in venom, the Lucifer pride, the lapse from dignity, the delight in imputing baseness, reveal a sorely wounded moral nature.

Nevertheless, neither the excuses nor vituperation of the disgruntled prophet availed him. The mass of public opinion, even among the classes which generally opposed Cavour, sternly condemned this latest attempt, because it indicated that, in his invincible desire to rule, Mazzini did not even draw back from wrecking Piedmont, the refuge and hope of Italians.³⁶ He had not hesitated to plan an attack on Piedmontese soldiers who fought for Italy in the Crimea. He might argue that Monarchy in Piedmont was no better than Monarchy in Naples,³⁷ because both states were prosecuting the unlucky victims of his recent attempts, and Piedmont had actually supplied Naples with what information it could collect concerning Pisacane;³⁸ but this specious argument misled nobody. He might claim that the Sapri expedition had at least headed off a Muratist rising; yet even this is doubtful: because we know now that Napoleon III would not countenance Muratist activity until there should be

³⁴ A head conspirator, like a general, is not to be taken too literally when he gives the number of men under his command. Mazzini's multitudes at Genoa existed chiefly in his imagination. Jessie Mario, who was not likely to underestimate, says that one thousand of the "people" were enrolled. *Nicotera*, 10.

³⁵ "I could give the names of the men of the medals to Cavour; the five, the three who undertook to send to Turin addresses in the name of Florence and of Rome; the single individual who, with the money for the guns acquired for us and by us, subsequently sold by him out of terror of a foreign government, signed *in the name of many* Lombards, in Turin, for a large sum the subscription for the 100 cannon." Mazzini: *Scritti*, ix, 323.

³⁶ Pallavicino summed up the opinion of the non-Mazzinians in a single phrase: "The Genoa Attempt is parricide pure and simple." Pallavicino, iii, 407.

³⁷ Pisacane declares in his political testament that he sees no difference between Austria and Piedmont, and that between the simulacrum of liberty granted by Victor Emanuel and the tyranny of Ferdinand of Naples he preferred the latter for the good of Italy. Pallavicino, iii, 400.

³⁸ Mario: *Nicotera*, 15.

another war. He might storm because the Piedmontese Government branded him as an outlaw, while it winked at other conspirators who were busy sowing discontent; but, even if what he alleged were true, a fundamental difference ran between his case and theirs. The Government was scrupulously correct in its international relations: and when it chose to risk unauthorized projects, it had an unquestioned right to choose its accomplices. It rejected him: therefore he had no reason to be treated as if he were one of the chosen.

So Mazzini's threefold calamity in June, 1857, produced as a net result only the intangible vitalizing of his ideal, which came from the sacrifice of Pisacane and the rest, slain or imprisoned in the South, at Leghorn and at Genoa. The National Society, on the contrary, and with it the primacy of Piedmont, profited immensely. Mazzini had made, as it proved, a last desperate effort to restore his own prestige and to discredit Victor Emanuel's government, and he had signally failed. Obeying the oracle, Marcus Curtius leaped into the pit, which closed over him. But suppose that Curtius had sat down on the brink and by his eloquence had stirred many disciples to leap in, at first by twos and threes, then by tens and twenties, and finally by hundreds; and suppose, further, that after a quarter of a century the pit, instead of filling up or closing, yawned on, apparently insatiate and unfathomable: probably the Romans would have come to the conclusion that Curtius had misconstrued the oracle, and they would have sought a different remedy. The great majority of thinking Italians had now reached this opinion in regard to Mazzini. The time had past, as Bertani said, when Italy could be redeemed by three men and four stones.

Happily, Mazzini quitted Genoa without being caught: for if he had been hanged at Acquasola, as Cavour thought he deserved to be, his death would have made a martyr of him and raised up an implacable body of avengers.³⁹ If on the contrary

³⁹ Sixty-three of the persons arrested on suspicion at Genoa, were held for trial. After a slow procedure, the Court of Appeal, in the following spring, sentenced 6 to 20 years of hard labor; one to 13 years; 4 to 12 years; 3 to 10 years; and one to 7 years — 15 in all. There seems to be no doubt that their complicity was legally proved. In addition, Mazzini, Mosto, Mangini, Casareto, Lastrico, and Ignazio Pittaluga were sentenced, in contumacy, to death; and six others, who had also taken flight, to imprisonment. Mazzini: *Scritti*, ix, clv.

the French Government, having proved that he was accessory to Pianori's attempted assassination of the Emperor, which occurred two years earlier,⁴⁰ had secured Mazzini's extradition from London, and guillotined him in Laroquette Prison, the course of Italian independence would probably have run more smoothly; for the anger of the Mazzinian Reds would thenceforth have been aimed at the Emperor. But Mazzini returned to London with an ease which justified his contempt for the lynx-eyed detectives of both Piedmont and France.⁴¹

This desperate assault of the Reds on Piedmont, controlled by the Tepids, was followed, not unnaturally, by an assault from the Blacks. Extremes meet: a common hatred for Cavour inspired Mazzini and Solaro della Margherita to attempt a similar upheaval. In October a royal decree dissolved Parliament, fixing November 15 as the date of the new elections. The Government wished to bring forward several important measures, which might require more time than remained to the existing legislature.⁴² The country was now fairly tranquil; perhaps, also, Cavour counted on being able, if the new Chamber turned out to be strongly Ministerialist, to go forward more rapidly. Yet he had his misgivings as to the situation, for as early as August he predicted that the struggle would be keen, because the Clericals would deploy all their forces.⁴³ This they did in unexpected ways. Having denounced the Government for its weakness and incompetence, as shown by the Genoese episode, by the insecurity of life in the country, and by the decadence of national prosperity, Solaro arraigned it for persecuting the Church.⁴⁴ The bishops of the Province of Turin commanded the faithful to support only such candidates as were "devoted to the Catholic

⁴⁰ Pianori shot at Napoleon III on April 28, 1855.

⁴¹ The Genoese police twice searched the palace of Marquis Ernesto Pareto, without discovering Mazzini, who was hidden there. "The day of the second visit," says Saffi, "in the full blaze of noon, Mazzini, giving his arm to Cristina Profumo, issued quietly with her from the Pareto Palace, asking at the door of one of the guards who kept watch there continuously, for a light for his cigar; and having entered a carriage, which was waiting for him in a neighboring street, he arrived safely at Quarto, in a country house, rented for the purpose by Carlotta Benettini." Mazzini: *Scritti*, ix, cxliii. He quitted Genoa Aug. 8, passed the night at Rivarolo, took the first train the next morning for Arona, crossed Switzerland, descended the Rhine, and went straight to England. *Ibid.*, cxlv.

⁴² It had still a year of life. ■ *Lettere*, II, 68-69; C. to W. de La Rive.

⁴⁴ Artom-Blanc, II, 15-17.

Church, obsequious and obedient to its visible Head." The Democrats denounced the enormous burden of taxes as an indication of financial incapacity and a portent of national bankruptcy. A few Liberals split off from the main trunk of their party, and adopted the platform, "Constitutional Monarchy and Liberty in everything and for everybody." The Ultramontane organ, the *Armonia*, issued a manual for voters, in which it reviled the anti-clerical laws passed by the outgoing parliament and, by implication, the deputies who had supported them. These tactics were after all no more than belong to any heated political campaign. The Ministerialists appear to have deemed it sufficient to let their record speak for them.

But the Clericals were not content to agitate in the open. Priests and prelates worked by stealth to drill their voters to march in solid rank to the polls. Up to the last moment they withheld the names of their candidates. Nor did they hesitate to use threats of ecclesiastical punishment, in order to prevent any of their party from backsliding. They made the confessional a chair for indoctrinating voters of little faith. The priests were authorized "to draw largely on Heaven and Hell," Rome having by the Pope's precise wish opened for them an unlimited credit on the other world. Liberal prelates were forced to pursue the same methods as their most bigoted colleagues, who displayed an astonishing harmony and intelligence.⁴⁵ As a result, the country awoke on November 16 to learn that 65 Clericals had been elected: of these 40 were of the Margherita stripe and 25 were Conservatives. Margherita himself was chosen by four colleges; yet he was mild compared with such virulent Papalists as Don Giacomo Margotti and Monsignor Scavini, who, Cavour said, "consider the Inquisition one of the most salutary institutions."⁴⁶ With two exceptions, Savoy, the Vendée of the Kingdom, went solidly Clerical. Out of seven deputies, Genoa sent six Clericals: it would have been more logical if she had chosen Mazzinians. Sardinia was almost wholly Black. Half of the Cabinet, on the other hand, escaped defeat by only a narrow margin, while such valuable ministerial supporters as Buffa, Torelli and Cassinis "were left on the field of battle."⁴⁷ Several contested seats re-

⁴⁵ *Lettere*, II, 505. ⁴⁶ *Politique*, 261. ⁴⁷ *Lettere*, VI, 89. Some of the Ministerialists were successful at the second ballot.

quired a second ballot, at which the Liberals exerted themselves to recover as much lost ground as they could.

When the tale was complete, the Liberals had still a working majority in the Chambers, but they were confronted by groups of adversaries who, if united, might harass or even block their policy. "Far from being discouraged," ⁴⁸ Cavour wrote Boncompagni, "I seem to have returned to the outset of my public career, when I used to do battle every morning in the newspapers and every afternoon in the Chamber." ⁴⁹ Always quick to regard the past as past, and to search events, no matter how disagreeable they might be, to see what good he might extract from them for future use, Cavour congratulated himself that the Clericals had won in Savoy, Liguria and Sardinia, the three most ignorant and least national parts of the Kingdom, while Piedmont had stood firmly by Liberal principles. "Without Gianduja," he said, "we should have been roasted." ⁵⁰ One lasting benefit could be traced to the election. It had compelled the aristocracy, old and young, who had hitherto held aloof, to take an interest in politics. A dozen marquises, two dozen counts, a score of barons and knights innumerable would sit in the coming Parliament. "Although the larger part of these counts and marquises are personally hostile to me," Cavour wrote, "I rejoice to see them in the bosom of Parliament. Practical acquaintance with affairs will enlighten them, will moderate them and in a given time will transform them into Tories from the Clericals they are now." Cavour also rejoiced to observe that the King had watched the Clerical wiles sufficiently near to be thoroughly disgusted by them. ⁵¹

His own relations with Victor Emanuel, however, had never been worse. At a crisis when Reds and Blacks endeavored, from opposite directions, to destroy Liberal institutions in Piedmont, a private intrigue nearly overthrew the statesman on whose continuance at the helm the fate of those institutions depended. The affair was given a false construction and hushed up at the time; its details are still necessarily obscure; nevertheless, its moving

⁴⁸ Characteristic is C.'s remark to Villamarina: "I am ready for the struggle, and I count as much on the mistakes they will make, as on our own efforts." *Lettere*, vi, 92.

⁴⁹ *Lettere*, vi, 89.

⁵⁰ *Lettere*, ii, 505.

Gianduja was the popular embodiment of the Piedmontese countryman.

⁵¹ *Lettere*, ii, 506-07, 515. *Lettere*, vi, 89, 95.

springs are known. The King insisted on marrying Rosina, who had been his mistress for several years. Cavour regarded the plan as most impolitic, because it would prevent the King from contracting a royal marriage that might be of great service to the Italian cause and to the House of Savoy. The scandal of making a low-born concubine — Rosina was the daughter of a corporal — his wife, even on the morganatic terms which the Church approved, must also be avoided: because, although the public opinion of Europe treated with the utmost lenience the amours of royal profligates, it would not condone a breach of convention. A royal personage might have twenty favorites, and welcome; but if he proposed to rehabilitate one of these through wedlock, society was outraged. Cavour put these objections gravely; the King, who resented ministerial meddling in his affairs with women, was stubborn. As a last resort, Cavour proposed to furnish evidence very damaging to Rosina. He took counsel with Rattazzi, who, as Minister of the Interior, set detectives to work. Apparently, they found what they looked for: but the King, instead of being enraged against the mistress, flew into a terrific passion against the Ministers, whom he suspected of cooking up a plot. Rattazzi, who had professed himself not less eager than Cavour to prevent the marriage, seems now to have weakened: at least, he deserted Cavour and kept the King's goodwill. One of them had to leave the Cabinet. Victor Emanuel, stung to the quick as man and as sovereign, would gladly have dismissed Cavour forever: but after a little reflection, that sober second thought, which so often guided him in crises involving the future of Italy, led him to sacrifice his personal preference for what he believed to be a patriotic duty, and he retained the indispensable prime minister.⁵²

To explain Rattazzi's retirement, it was given out that his laxness before the late elections made his colleagues distrust his efficiency. A Minister of the Interior who failed to get wind of the Clerical activity in Savoy must be dangerously apathetic: for Piedmont, borrowing too closely the French system of centralized administration, assumed that it was the business of the

■ Ideville, chap. 8. Various inedited sources. The King, believing that he was dying, married Rosina in November, 1869, and created her Countess di Mirafiori.

Minister of the Interior to oversee elections, if he did not actually dictate their result. Then there was the Mazzinian affair at Genoa, which had taken the government so completely by surprise that Rattazzi's enemies whispered that, though cognizant of it, he must have allowed it to happen for the sake of his earlier Republican affinities. In the previous July, when the Clericals and some "imbecile" Liberals wished to drive Rattazzi from the Cabinet, on account of the Genoa affair, Cavour stood by him manfully, and, in order to give public evidence of his support, he walked with him daily under the porticoes of Via di Po.⁵³ Rattazzi formally resigned on January 13, 1858. Cavour, after a sleepless night, "the most agitated he ever passed," a night "which took more out of him than six months of parliamentary struggles,"⁵⁴ was ready to advance with a reorganized Cabinet in which he himself held the portfolio of the Interior, and Giovanni Lanza, the ablest of his recent allies, replaced him as Minister of Finance. He felt "gravely compromised in respect to the King, in the face of the country and of Parliament."⁵⁵ But he had survived the blows aimed at him by frantic Reds and reactionary Blacks, and in the clash with the King, over a personal and most private matter, he had, for the present, at least, secured his point. He might have been sacrificed, as many another statesman has been, for a royal mistress; but the King's patriotism spared the country this calamity. On January 14, 1858, the day when, having dropped Rattazzi, Cavour forged bravely ahead, there fell at Paris out of a clear sky a bolt which changed the course of the vessel bearing the hopes of Italy.

⁵³ Pallavicino, II, 399, 403.

⁵⁴ *Lettere*, II, 516-17.

⁵⁵ *Lettere*, II, 517. Writing to E. d'Azeglio on Jan. 17, 1858, C. says: "No political disagreement has ever existed between Rattazzi and his colleagues. Only, after the happenings at Genoa, Rattazzi had lost the confidence of the Conservative Party, and after the elections that of the Liberals. Having no further support in public opinion, he wished to retire, so that his personal unpopularity should not injure the ministry. Rattazzi, frank, loyal, energetic, by his somewhat dry manners had made himself a host of enemies, among whom to my great regret, I have to include Hudson, who, contrary to his colleagues in the diplomatic corps (who wrongly suspected him of Radical tendencies) did not consider him Liberal enough. I have concluded to take charge of the Interior in order that the color of the Cabinet may not suffer the least alteration." *Politique*, 266-67. *Lettere*, II, 518-19, where the date of the letter is given "Jan. 16," and Hudson's name is omitted.

CHAPTER XVIII

UNREDEEMED ITALY. 1856-1858

BEFORE we begin the narrative of those events which swept on in three years to the creation of the Kingdom of Italy, we must pause to survey the conditions of the States outside of Piedmont. Among the possibilities with which Cavour had to reckon was the reform of the despotic governments in the Peninsula. If the Pope, the King of Naples and the Grand Duke had seen fit to introduce a constitutional régime, they would have taken away the strongest single reason for striving for Italian emancipation, and all but an irreconcilable minority of their subjects might have accepted a rule of progress, which offered them the full rights of citizenship and allowed them to pursue untrammelled their material, social and intellectual welfare. National unification was at best a less pressing ideal than the securing of the every-day necessities of civilized existence. And with model, or even tolerable rulers at Rome, Naples and Florence some sort of federal unity might have been patched up.

Even in the Austrian provinces, where the strongest motive was the desire for independence, a treatment at once Liberal and generous on the part of their foreign masters, might have reduced the Lombards and Venetians to acquiescence. Although patriotism is the noblest passion which can stir a man in his relation to his country and his people, it is only in moments when collective enthusiasm prevails that large numbers of men and women are roused to the pitch of supreme self-sacrifice by which alone a nation can be either created or saved from destruction. So if the Northern Italians had been made to forget, as far as possible, that they were subjects of a foreign tyrant; if they had been granted home rule, free speech, fair taxation, accessibility to the agents of modern industrial prosperity; if they had been allowed to feel themselves as much partners in the Hapsburg Empire as the Bohemians or the Tyrolese were, they might have abandoned their yearning for independence as an impracticable dream.

Thus by whatever road we approach the Italian Question we are led straight to Austria. Her domination over the Italian provinces, her military and moral ascendancy in the Centre and her sphere of influence in the South, were the fated promoters of Italian patriotism. Against her, Italians of every tribe might again be massed, in union, as they had been massed in 1848. Nothing would have done more to paralyze Italian Liberals than the adoption by Austria of a friendly policy towards her subjects and the renunciation of her virtual protectorate over Pope, Bourbon and dukelings.

The first years after the suppression of the Revolution were marked everywhere, as we have seen, by stern measures of repression. Promiscuous arrests, interminable and shocking imprisonments, bloody assizes, tortures, atrocious executions and the even more horrible persecution of victims condemned to the galleys for life, served to punish or to terrorize the supporters of Liberalism. In bad government the Pope and the Bourbon seemed to compete with each other for the crown of upas leaves; but in awarding the prize history will not forget that the Pope's profession of holiness made ten times more shocking the evil methods which flourished under his name. Pius himself lived like a painted cherub amid a cluster of rose-tinted clouds. His Jesuit managers poured adulation into his right ear: Antonelli poured flattery into his left. The promulgation of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception confirmed his belief in his own preternatural wisdom and religious infallibility. From all parts of the globe crowds of pilgrims prostrated themselves at his feet. It did not trouble him that the faithful should pay to him, a man, the abject homage which in the Orient slaves paid to their masters, homage which, if the Scriptures are to be credited, Jesus Christ neither expected nor allowed. He was the idol of women, especially of fashionable women, who thronged his audiences, thrilled at the glance of his bright, goodnatured eyes, raved over his handsome features, his bland smile, his friendly address, and kissed with raptures his plump, soft-skinned hand, which suggested the sybarite rather than the ascetic. Those were the palmy days for foreigners in Rome — the days of the artists and their patrons and admirers — the picturesque days, when picturesqueness was secured at the price of filth and squalor and dis-

ease — the days when every winter brought troops of empurpled foreigners who walked the galleries and the museums, frequented the studios, picknicked on the Palatine and in the Forum, bought replicas of Domenichino's and Reni's popular paintings, and attended the numberless festivals, ceremonies and pageants of the Church. In that Golden Age, the Pope drove daily through the streets of Rome, the Jews were locked every evening into their Ghetto, and the great patricians gave from time to time levees at which you would meet the most cosmopolitan company in Europe — cardinals and prelates with their favorites among the aristocratic women, — foreign and native princes, — ministers and generals, grandees and bankers, from Northern countries, — artists, poets, prelates, and anyone else who for any reason could gain admittance to that variegated society. The casual spectator of the somewhat hectic display could never have guessed that beyond the Papal circle Rome harbored thousands of patriots who chafed for free institutions. Neither the ball-room nor the boudoir is the place in which to learn the vital aspirations of a people.

What shall guide the historian in his verdict? The great body of witnesses, whether native or foreign, outside of the Papal machine, testify unanimously against the social, industrial and moral conditions of the States of the Church in those years. The Papal apologists, among whom are to be reckoned some really devout zealots, describe, on the other hand, such a culmination of prosperity, such mild and loving administration, such affection on the part of the subjects and such benevolence on the part of the sovereign, as could not then be matched elsewhere on the earth and had probably never had a counterpart except in Dante's Terrestrial Paradise. The perfect happiness was marred a little, the apologists feel bound to confess, by the attempts of wicked men to disturb the Pope's government or to question his theocratic ideals: but these attempts resulted only in making more clear Pius's perfection and the Satanic nature of his enemies. When a traveler through Latium reported that the towns and villages were thronging with beggars, the Papal apologists dismissed him, if Anglo-Saxon or German, as a Protestant, if French as a Jacobin, from whom such calumny was to be expected. If this traveler described Rome as swarming with prostitutes and

with lusting priests and friars, he was branded as a sensual free-thinker. When the Papalist accused the witness of being a free-mason, further argument was unnecessary. Those were the three degrees in which the apologists of the Curia summed up the infamy of their critics. But Abraham Lincoln was a Protestant, Thomas Jefferson a free-thinker, and George Washington a free-mason: would they not be credible witnesses? Must an observer be a believer in the Temporal Power in order to mistake a crowd of tatterdemalion loafers for well-to-do artisans? Or must he be a Jesuit in order not to know the dissolute from the pure?

By far the most nimble of the Papal apologists was Don Giacomo Margotti, editor of the *Armonia*, and an adept in the art of dodging facts by a point-blank denial, or by labeling the critic "free-mason," "free-thinker," "Protestant," or by charging the accusers of the Papacy with the very crimes which they cited against it. His book on "The Victories of the Church during the First Decennium of the Pontificate of Pius Ninth,"¹ is the most readable of the contemporary replies uttered by Rome after the arraignment at the Congress of Paris. Margotti builds on a foundation of history. He finds in Julian the Apostate — "one of the most tremendous enemies of the Church" who fought her by "hypocrisy" — the prototype and master of her modern assailants, who attack her because she is virtuous, pious, the spouse of Christ, innocent, unworldly. Hence he argues that they are wicked, haters of religion, ambitious of worldly power, schismatics, friends of the Evil One. Protestantism is not to be explained on the supposition that certain persons wished to worship God in a non-Romish way, but on the supposition that these persons were depraved. Margotti has no difficulty in tracing Constitutionalism, Liberty and modern ideals of justice to the same Satanic source. And as England is the citadel of Liberalism, he proceeds to demolish the boasted progress and freedom of England. Naturally, he first disposes of Palmerston, the embodiment of the Demon of Revolution, by reviling him as "grand master of all the free-masons of the universe."² Then he denounces, specifically, England's overt acts against Europe's, and parti-

¹ Milan, 1857. In his *Roma e Londra: Confronti*, Margotti devotes 600 pages to showing up the wickedness of the English and the perfection of the Pope's entourage.

² *Ibid.*, 219.

cularly against the Pope's peace. This leads to a free use of the recriminative method of rebuttal. England accuses the Papal government of oppression, but how has she treated India, the Ionian Isles, and Ireland? ³ England alleges that criminals, beggars and vice-ridden multitudes abound in the Papal States; Margotti cites some unusually atrocious crimes committed in England and the latest census of English paupers, to prove the wickedness of the Queen's subjects. He even reproduces the annual budget, itemized, of the Queen's steward, by which it appears that some £60,000 were spent on the Queen's table — the table linen alone cost 78,250 francs — representing 782,500 table-cloths and napkins sent to the wash! — whereas Pius the Ninth's dinner never costs more than a scudo — four shillings and sixpence⁴ — and there is no record of his table-cloths and napkins. Compare this with the 90,825 francs' worth of poultry eaten by Victoria in a twelvemonth, and you will understand why England was the refuge of Europe's political outlaws, the abode of free speech and Protestantism, and the lair of the abhorred Palmerston. England censures the awful state of the Papal prisons; Margotti replies: "Go and visit Newgate, the most important of the London prisons, and what will you find? Huddled into the same room the condemned and the accused, whether they belong to the category of the most notorious malefactors or are imprisoned for merely trivial crimes: old men and children, debtors and even crazy persons all mixed up without any distinction. No police measure prohibits the introduction of liquors and of obscene works into this crowd of criminals, innocents and weaklings."⁵ And then Margotti reminds us that flogging is still the accepted punishment in English prisons and in the British army — one soldier flogged to death in 1855! — and that torture is commonly resorted to in the Queen's dominions.⁶ Having stripped John Bull of his vesture of hypocrisy and shown him in all his naked repulsiveness, Don Margotti does the same for Piedmont. Not content with proving that the very defects which blacken the indictment against Rome actually flourish under Cavour's régime, he grows sarcastic over the Boeotian

³ Margotti summarizes Bowyer's defense in the House of Commons of the Pope's administration; *Roma e Londra*, 268-73.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 536-37.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 396.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 397.

uncouthness of the Piedmontese. If these were to govern Rome, he asks, what would become of the fine arts? ⁷

To make your own exceptional or unique virtues appear habitual and your enemy's sporadic vices appear representative is the task which Don Margotti achieves to perfection. There is no doubt that every charge he brought against England or Piedmont could be substantiated. The youngest reader of Dickens could confirm all he alleged against the prison abominations, the law's delay, the misery and depravity among the paupers, the cruel lot of the children: and he needed only to follow the course of criminal legislation in Piedmont in order to know what abuses existed. When a law is passed to punish certain crimes or vices, we are justified in assuming that these exist. But defense by recrimination does not, after all, satisfy history. The badness of England and Piedmont tells us nothing about the actual condition of the Papal States. Don Margotti accordingly gives a survey in which it appears that the Pope's finances are flourishing; ⁸ that his donations in charity are enormous; ⁹ that only one per cent of the population are paupers, ¹⁰ and only 25 in every 10,000 inhabitants are in prison; ¹¹ that there are 16,905 secular and 21,415 regular clergy; ¹² that the professors and teachers number 5307 and the students 28,899. ¹³ These last figures are the only really vital ones, and, if correct, they mean that only one per cent of the Papal subjects attend the schools and colleges in Pio Nono's Kingdom. ¹⁴ Our ingenuous Don does not stop to explain this startling statement, but goes on to inform us, with pardonable pride, that in 1855, a year of bad harvests, the Papal States produced 11,340,319 hectolitres of cereals! ¹⁵ Yet we cannot help suspecting that if he had found that Piedmont had 37,015 ¹⁶ beggars and paupers and only 28,899 students and schoolchildren his sarcasm on Cavour ¹⁷ would have had a keener edge. Don Margotti's clinching proof of the prosperity, happiness, content and beatitude of the Pope's subjects is the fact that only 178,943 of

⁷ Margotti, *Rome e Londra*, 357.

⁸ *Ibid*, 361.

⁹ *Ibid*, 362. During the hard times of 1853 the Pope bestowed "the huge sum of 133,958 scudi" on the poor of the province of Ferrara alone. As the population was 24,452 this charity amounted to 2 francs 70 centimes, about 54 cents, per capita. ¹⁰ *Ibid*, 380. ¹¹ *Ibid*, 373. ¹² *Ibid*, 379. ¹³ *Ibid*, 380.

¹⁴ Margotti glides quickly over the subject of education, so that we can be sure of nothing except that he meant his estimate to be ample. ¹⁵ *Ibid*, 331.

¹⁶ The exact number he gives for the Papal States, p. 383.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 383.

them reside abroad — “an almost insignificant quantity,” he remarks, “when compared with the millionaire emigration of the British Empire and with that of the Protestant States of Germany. And yet these countries boast themselves flourishing and happy; and the Pontifical State is decried as wretched and unhappy! Thus is history written!”¹⁸

Don Margotti is a lively fencer, but his method of parrying criticism by showing up the iniquities of the Pope's neighbors does not convince us. The Czar of Russia could hardly absolve himself of the horrors committed in his name by reminding us that the Patagonians eat their grandmothers. A more serious apologist of Papal misrule is Rayneval, the French Ambassador at Rome. In answer to inquiries from Walewski, after the Congress of Paris, he drew up an interesting statement, in which he dismisses every charge made by the political and religious enemies of the Papacy. He sees only one vulnerable point — the employment of foreign garrisons: but this must be assigned to the temperament of the people and not to the incompetence of their rulers. The Italians are quick-witted, versatile, restless, critical: but they lack both manliness and solidity. They could never maintain a free government; like children, they must be held in check for their own good. In old times, when the riches of the Catholic world poured into Rome, the Romans never complained; but lately, when the States of the Church have had to depend on their own resources, the people blame the government for the change from prosperity to poverty. Still, the Papal subjects pay only 22 francs per capita in taxes, instead of the 45 francs paid by each Frenchman. Rayneval omits to add that the financial capacity of France is more than double that of the Roman States.

Critics cry out against priestly administration: but Rayneval asserts that, outside of Rome, there are only 15 ecclesiastics in office, and that counting the capital itself, the number for the entire kingdom does not exceed 200. Prelates there are, of course, but as they have not taken orders they must not be confounded with ecclesiastics. As to the administration, it is humane, well-intentioned and as enterprising as can be expected of a languid nation. The civil and commercial codes are “above criticism,” and the code on mortgages is “a model document.” Rayneval

¹⁸ Margotti, *Rome e Londra*, 379.

has inquired carefully, but has never had any evidence of judicial incapacity, bias or corruption. On the contrary, the Pope, he says, took no vengeance on those miscreants who overthrew his government. He neither imprisoned nor tried them, except in a few cases where the persons themselves insisted on being brought to trial, and, when sentenced, were merely furnished with a passport. "Flagrant conspiracies" have, of course, been justly dealt with; but the total number of Papal exiles for the events of 1849 cannot now exceed 100. Rayneval emphasizes the material improvements — the introduction of telegraphs and of gas, the concessions to railways, the new buildings. As to brigands, he has traveled the country over and never met one of them, although in the Romagna there are organized bands of robbers. The Pope's enemies are loud in condemning abuses: but Rayneval has never discovered any. Pius's government is the best possible under the circumstances — amazingly good, considering the quality of his subjects. The idea of secularizing the administration, or of establishing a Vicariate under laymen, is pure folly. If either were attempted, the result would be revolution, anarchy, the ruin of the Papacy. "If the sovereign of the Pontifical States were not at the same time the head of the Church, the maintenance or overturning of his power would matter little: but the cause of Catholicism is at stake in this affair." Therefore, all the friends of conservatism must rally to uphold Pius. For the Roman Question, Rayneval declares, no definitive solution exists. "All we can do is to ward off, by the aid of a kindly and careful protection, the dangers of a catastrophe, and to prolong the provisional state of things, which has at least the great merit of sheltering Europe from innumerable ills."¹⁹

Rayneval drew his statistics from Papal sources; for five years he had ardently supported Pius's policy, being, indeed, almost a pet of the Pope; but, after whitewashing the Papal government in this lavish fashion, he admits that the régime is at best only a makeshift, which could not stand a day without foreign garrisons. Still, it must be preserved, whether the Romans desire it or not, in order to ward off greater evils. So Rayneval leaves his client in dubious case. For a complete exoneration we must turn to Monsignor Balan, the official Ultramontane historian of this

¹⁹ Chantrel, 301; full text of Rayneval's despatch in Chantrel, 277-303.

period, who not only denies that there was any reason to criticize the temporal affairs of the Holy See, but that it was possible for anything within the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff to be less than perfect. Balan's history should be read if we would understand the state of mind of the extreme Papalists, those fanatics who created the environment in which Pius IX lived and were hurrying on the Papacy to its ruin. They offered no apologies: they were terribly logical, in consenting to no compromise between the Papacy, a medieval institution, and modern ideas of justice, representation, education, and liberty. And Balan copies them in asserting that every word, deed and thought of theirs was above reproach, while every suggestion from without must be inspired by Beelzebub. This state of mind renders it quite unlikely that the figures cited bore any relation to facts; except that we may feel sure that the Papal apologists did not underestimate their points of excellence.²⁰

In 1857 Pius IX made a pontifical progress through his realm,²¹ his immediate purpose being to show the world how dearly his subjects loved him, and that the stories of their discontent and wretchedness were calumny. Papal apologists report immense enthusiasm everywhere. Triumphal arches, crowds of kneeling or acclaiming people, respectful deputations, obsequious ecclesiastics greeted him on his journey; and he, with the affability which always beamed from him under the stimulus of adulation, visited the seminaries and schools, the hospitals and asylums, inquired into local needs, and distributed largess with the good nature of a Santa Claus. That his managers prepared the way and selected, so far as they could, the sights and conditions he should see, can no more be doubted than that they kept away from him troublesome petitions and persons whom they feared. Mere curiosity usually suffices to attract a crowd; and during the first part of Pius's journey the expectation that some great benefit was going to be bestowed assured to him a friendly reception.

²⁰ We are justified, for instance, in believing that there were not more than 29000 pupils in the schools and colleges, because Margotti cites that number as a proof of the great attention given to education under Pius IX. The Papal budgets are hopelessly entangled; and, furthermore, then, as now, much revenue went into the Papal exchequer of which no account was rendered.

²¹ For this journey see Zini, I, 857-71; De Cesare: *Roma*, I, chap. 14; Chantrel, 415-25; Balan, II, 63-69.

But when it appeared that no reform would be granted, the people grew cold. If he staid more than a day or two in a town, there was a tell-tale contrast between his entry and departure.

The foremost Liberals of the Romagna did their best to improve the occasion. Count Giuseppe Pasolini, upright, moderate and sincerely religious, had several interviews with Pius, who had held him in great personal esteem for a dozen years. Pasolini urged the need of a constitution. Pius shrank from the suggestion; the word Liberal meant for him anti-Christian: freedom of speech and of press would simply unleash obscene and blasphemous tongues.²² Marco Minghetti in two memorable audiences spoke with astonishing frankness. He deplored the foreign garrisons, which made Pius seem to be afraid of his own people; he urged the need of representation, at least for tax-payers; of education; of administrative reforms. He begged Pius to return to the standards of 1847 — a shrewd suggestion, which seemed for a moment to revive in Pius the enthusiasm of the first period of his reign. The Pope listened with uncustomary patience, but would not move. To Professor Antonio Montanari, another Liberal, he was almost effusive. Marquis Carlo Bevilacqua, who talked in a similar strain, thought that he had persuaded Pius to turn in the direction of reform; but His Holiness, after hesitating, replied, "I have not the courage."²³ He could not persuade himself that these men represented more than a handful of intellectual malcontents. The vast majority of his people, he said, were satisfied and loyal: and in proof, he added naively that he had conferred with the magistrates in every town and city, and that they had mentioned only local needs, but had never hinted that any governmental changes were desired. Pius accompanied Pasolini to the door, at their last interview, and said, weeping, "So you too, my dear Count, abandon me?" "No, your Holiness," replied the devoted Pasolini, much affected; "it is not we who abandon you, it is you who abandon us."²⁴ Thus did Pius, like that earlier pope on whom Dante branded the stigma of eternal infamy, through cowardice, make the great refusal: ²⁵ not, however, through conscious cowardice; for he had long ago given his judgment into the keeping of men stronger than he. Pius was no

■ Pasolini, 204-15.

■ Pasolini, 214.

■ Minghetti, III, 187. Pasolini, 215.

²⁵ Celestino V; *Inferno*, III, 59-60.

fighter; still less was he made of martyr's stuff. He loved ease, pomp, flattery. He had listened so long to the extravagant laudation of his entourage, that he had come to believe himself the demi-god they called him. The voices of Minghetti and Pasolini and Montanari, the friends of his past, sounded sweet in his ears, because they recalled the visions which fascinated him when his pontificate was young; but the remembrance of the nightmare of revolution followed quickly on the vision, and he drew back.

The Liberals of the Papal States felt that they had done their utmost to save Pius from the consequences of his reactionary policy. Henceforth, they could honorably look to Piedmont for national redemption. During the Pope's progress they attempted to put into his hands the petitions, or bills of grievances, which they drew up. His Jesuit managers had forbidden by law the offering of any such address to the Pontiff himself: to get round this prohibition, the Liberals gave their bills to the gonfaloniere or chief magistrate of each town, and requested him to report the contents to the sovereign; but the gonfalonieri were too timid.²⁶ Not to be balked, the Liberals sent copies of the addresses and a chronicle of the Pope's journey to the Piedmontese and French papers, some of which, in spite of the surveillance with which his keepers hemmed him in, may have reached Pius's notice. Cavour despatched Count Boncompagni to Bologna, with a message of respect from Victor Emanuel to Pius. By an arrangement, of which the Pope must have been cognizant, Boncompagni was received at the Palace half an hour before the Pope, from his balcony, was to bless the Austrian troops, drawn up in the Square below. Coming and going, therefore, the Piedmontese envoy had to pass between files of his sovereign's chief enemies, and he could compare the chill of his own reception with the warmth with which Pius and his court greeted the Austrians. A slight incident but symptomatic: for it showed that the men of the Curia were so far astray that they thought they could dispense with the courtesies common to diplomacy.

Early in September, Pius returned to Rome, probably satisfied with his journey, as he did not scrutinize too closely the pumped-up enthusiasm. He had seen many Papal officials, all

²⁶ Zini, I, 860, states that addresses were drawn up at Bologna, Ravenna, Ferrara, Faenza, Rimini, Forlì, and other cities.

obsequiously polite, had left little gifts of money to towns and institutions and had sown promises with every breath. Shrewd enough to perceive that his régime was only a make-shift, he yet lacked courage to alter it. Men whose wills were stronger than his controlled him, and it was so comfortable to be assured by them that whatever he did was right, and that whoever opposed him was wicked! "We shall concede nothing, absolutely nothing," said Cardinal Antonelli; "because there is nothing to be done."²⁷ There spoke the Minister who had no misgivings.

To Antonelli on one side and the Jesuit managers on the other, United Italy owes an immense debt of gratitude; because their intransigence, political and ecclesiastical, prevented the cropping out of another Neo-Guelf delusion. Had they permitted Pius to appear friendly towards the National movement, it would have been more difficult for Piedmont to carry through her unifying enterprise. But the Papal government was as hopelessly bad as the most fervent patriot could desire. It not only exasperated its subjects by alternating cruelty and incompetence, by unequal taxation, by ecclesiastical cupidity, by the confounding of civil and religious concerns, by the suppression of free speech, by the outrageous interpretation of political offenses, by the maintenance of martial law, and by the employment of French and Austrian armies of occupation, but it also continually annoyed them by petty impositions.

But a single act of inhumanity did more to enlighten the world outside of Italy as to Papal standards than all the rumors of political evils had done. On June 24, 1858, Edgardo Mortara, the seven-year-old son of Girolamo Mortara Levi, a Jewish merchant of Bologna, was seized by a priest, hurried to Rome and placed in the Seminary of the Catechumens. His nurse, it was said, had had him baptized in infancy, and now the Roman Church must bring him up in the true faith. The kidnapping of children had become so abominable a crime in the eyes of civilized peoples that even when practiced by ecclesiastics it found no excuse. Horror and indignation were expressed wherever the deed was known. That priests should dare, under the pretext of religion, to pluck a child from the bosom of its family, was regarded as an outrage on the most cherished essentials of humanity. The plea

that Pius wished to save one Hebrew soul from perdition, sounded hollow enough to those who knew in what a frightful condition he kept four thousand Jews penned up in the Ghetto of his capital.²⁸ But the camarilla that controlled Pius was impervious alike to international public opinion and to the claims of humanity. The Mortara boy remained in the seminary and became a Catholic priest: but the Mortara Affair burned deep into the conscience of right-minded men.²⁹

So Cavour had no reason to fear that a sudden passion for reform would convert the Papal government into a rival for leadership in the National cause. The little Austrianized States gave him no concern. At Parma, Duke Charles III, thoroughly detested, was stabbed to death on March 24, 1854. The crime was set down as political, but seems to have been committed by a saddler whose wife the Duke had appropriated.³⁰ The Duchess, Maria Louisa,³¹ assumed the regency; introduced decency into her court, and some regard for justice into the administration; and showed herself remarkably restive under Austrian tutelage. She even dared to resent Radetzky's interference, to withdraw from the customs union and to dismiss the Austrian garrison. These acts meant not that she had become a Liberal, but that she wished to govern according to the methods of enlightened despotism. Unfortunately, Mazzinian and other agitators worked busily in Parma, and forced her to repressive measures which seemed to belie her benevolent intentions.

Francis V of Modena persisted throughout his reign in the reaction which he adopted as a policy in 1849.³² Implacable towards political suspects, harsh, unsympathetic, narrow with everyone, inordinately conceited, he was one of those princelings of whom Providence sent many into the world to make the pretended divine right of kings equally ridiculous and despised. But Francis managed his finances with a certain shrewdness bordering on parsimony, and although he bound himself, body and soul, to Austria, he made a bluff at independence. He boasted

²⁸ See any contemporary description of the Ghetto of Rome.

²⁹ For the best modern account see De Cesare: *Roma*, I, chap. 15, where many documents are printed in full. For the Papal side, Chantrel, 453-64. Balan, II, 71. *Civiltà Cattolica*, series III, 12, pp. 585 ff.

³⁰ Tivaroni, 134. Malmesbury, 329.

Berri assassinated in 1820.

³¹ Daughter of the Duke de

³² See earlier, chap. 7

of being the only ruler in Europe who never would recognize Napoleon III as Emperor — a display of airs that cost him dear in the end.

Nor could Tuscany, under Leopold II, be the home of Italianism. His rule was the mildest of any outside of Piedmont, but he himself had no man's respect, because no man trusted him. There is no moral waste so damaging as unnecessary lies, and these the Grand Duke indulged in lavishly. He pompously announced that he gave his conscience for safe-keeping to the Pope at Rome: which may account for its absence in his daily conduct at Florence. He leaned on Austria for military protection, yet pretended, when the Austrian regiments left in 1855, to be glad to be rid of them. The Tuscans, ever more ready with the tongue or pen than with the sword, and somewhat skeptical, after the manner of over-intellectualized peoples, as to whether it was worth while to risk everything by an appeal to brute force, learned the trick of talking without rousing the police. The best men in Tuscany met in blind Gino Capponi's library and discussed, with an almost academic detachment, the flow of events. Ricasoli, the most virile of the group, lived aloof on his farm at Broglio, apparently forgetful of everything except his vineyards which bore the choice Chianti wine. Even the lancet-tongued Salvagnoli and the exuberant Peruzzi managed to keep well within prescribed limits. True to her rôle for four centuries, Tuscany was not daring but critical.

Next to the Pope, King Bomba was Victor Emanuel's chief possible rival. He had a kingdom of eleven million inhabitants, cut off, except by sea, from danger of invasion. He too made a show of going his own way without Austrian support. Russia, coveting a coaling-station in the Mediterranean, was his friend. Abjectly superstitious, and eager to promote superstition among his subjects in order to render them more subservient to his rule, he nevertheless resented Papal interference in secular affairs and he curbed the Jesuits. Had he set up a Liberal régime, he might have destroyed Piedmont's monopoly in patriotism, and, if he had not himself become the leader of the National movement, he would at least have commanded one half of the Peninsula. This suggestion, so easily made, could no more be carried out than the American negro problem could be suddenly solved unless a magi-

cian had bleached the skins of the blacks, altered their capacity, and changed the hearts of the whites. In the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies neither the King, nobles, bourgeoisie, nor peasants, if they had had the best intentions, could have organized and run successfully a Liberal government. The corruption of generations, embodied in Bomba and his people, blocked the way. A handful of really distinguished patriots, among whom were counted a few aristocrats, being in exile or in prison, could not leaven the immense lump. We speak of families running out, and we watch miserable extinction in some sot, debauchee or imbecile: to civilized observers the Neapolitans under Bomba had reached a similar pass. They seemed not merely unable to operate even a rudimentary political system, but incapable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, or honesty from corruption. The primal ties of family, the common appeals to a sense of honor, the idea that a fellow creature might be trusted, had little or no meaning for them. The city of Naples itself, with its filth and its barbaric noise, its 90,000 lazzaroni, its degenerate nobles, its sensual and superstitious priests, and its Briarean Camorra, was the most shocking city in Europe: for the Neapolitans seemed to have no sense of shame. Though they lived like rats, they laughed, as if unaware that human beings ought to do anything rather than laugh at their own depravity.

Bomba made no bid, therefore, for the favor of the Italian patriots. The damning criticism passed on him at the Congress of Paris simply hardened his heart. Assuming that, as an independent sovereign, he had a right to govern as he chose, he resented the dictation of France and England, just as Napoleon III or Queen Victoria would have resented his dictation had the tables been turned. He knew that foreign governments were abetting the conspirators who plotted in secret against him. The condemnation of his severity towards political prisoners troubled him no more than it troubles the most enlightened American mayor today to reflect that criminals are locked up, as they deserve to be, in the city jail; and to Bomba, the cruelty inflicted seemed natural, because it had always been practised. After 1856 he strove to gather into his own hands all the reins of administration: for he suspected everybody, and attributed the plight he was in, not to the wrong policy he had chosen but to the

incompetence of his ministers. He leaned more heavily on the Church for support, and even sought aid of the Jesuits — that infallible sign of a despot in distress. It was idle for him to insist on his legal right to misgovern, or to accuse other rulers of being as cruel as he, or to declare that the accusations were trumped up against him by enemies who coveted his kingdom; Europe tolerated him, as she tolerated the Sultan, because she saw no easy way to get rid of him.

Men are more stirred by one poignant example of heroism or of suffering than by a thousand abstract homilies against persecution. Just as Mrs. Stowe's "Uncle Tom's Cabin" brought home to the conscience of the civilized world the abomination of slavery with a vividness which twenty years of political agitation had not matched, so the living martyrdom of Poerio, Settembrini, Spaventa and their companions was proof for millions of foreigners of the barbarity of Bomba's régime. In spite of all precautions, the prisoners communicated from time to time with their friends; and in England and Italy plans were secretly laid to rescue Settembrini and his comrades.³³ Panizzi, Librarian of the British Museum, conducted the preparations in London. Some of the most distinguished Englishmen gave liberal subscriptions.³⁴ At Turin, the Britannic Minister, Hudson, was in the plot; so was Sir William Temple, Palmerston's brother, the Britannic Minister at Naples. The wary, discreet and fearless Bertani formed the link, at Genoa, between the accomplices in Italy and the British. Settembrini sent minute directions from his island prison of Santo Stefano. Garibaldi agreed to take command of the receiving party. Panizzi bought a steamer, the *Isle of Thanet*, and confided the secret to her captain. Everything was ready. But the steamer had hardly sailed from Hull, when a break in the machinery caused her to put back for repairs. She set out again, only to be caught in a storm and lost off Yarmouth (Oct. 25, 1855). The expedition had to be abandoned for that season; but during the following year Panizzi took it up again, and Bertani had arranged to hire a ship at Genoa, to enlist Garibaldi as captain and to go himself with Rosalino Pilo, Pisa-

■ Poerio and his comrades, being imprisoned near Naples, could not be reached.

■ And Englishwomen also: Mrs. Gladstone sent £100 herself and £200 collected by her.

cane and other dauntless souls. The second week in August was agreed upon for the rescue, when Panizzi sent word that Hudson and Temple had warned him, without explaining why, that they must again postpone.³⁵ One must read Settembrini's letters after he received news of this second failure, to understand the height of self-sacrifice and fortitude to which he had risen.

Bomba's apologists were justified in decrying these attempts, at which English public officials and even ministers connived, as a breach of international comity. But Panizzi and his supporters simply replied, like the Northern rescuers of the negroes after the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act, that they were obeying ■ higher law. There will always be men who stand by strict legality, because they believe that the habit of obeying the law transcends in importance the consideration whether a given law is good or bad. On the other hand there will always be others who, recognizing that the statute-book represents not what is right but what is legal, will risk their fortunes and their lives, if need be, in behalf of the ideal, however it may conflict with the statute-book. These conflicts are irreconcilable, and they are most frequent where two civilizations, a higher and a lower, are struggling for mastery. Law-breaking such as Settembrini's would-be rescuers were guilty of differed in kind and in motive from that of the ordinary anarchist or lyncher.³⁶

Exasperated by the condemnation passed upon him at the Congress of Paris, King Ferdinand at last decided to ship his political prisoners to Argentina, an expedient that would be easier than to cleanse the prisons or to do justice to the political victims. Settembrini and his companions would have welcomed this release, if they could have been sure that on landing in South America they would be set free; they strongly suspected, however, that they were to be sold into peonage.³⁷ But the Argentine government, to which Bomba made the offer, finally declined to ratify the treaty.³⁸ The King was so bothered by the evil repute

■ Mario: *Bertani*, I, 223. So far as appears, no explanation has been given.

■ For details of the expedition see Fagan, II, chaps. 17, 18, and 20. Panizzi, 238, 242-50, 252-58. Settembrini: *Ricordanze*, II, 365-75. Mario: *Bertani*, I, 211-24. ³⁷ Panizzi wrote: "They will be made slaves." Fagan, II, 147.

■ The treaty was signed Jan. 13, 1857. Tivaroni, I, 259. Settembrini writes from S. Stefano, Feb. 21, 1857, that none of the convicts at Ventotene would consent to go to Argentina. *Ricordanze*, II, 403.

which his persecution of these prisoners earned for him, that he was willing to liberate them, and allow them to go into exile, provided that they would petition him for pardon. This Poerio, Settembrini and others refused to do, although Panizzi urged them that their refusal was not firmness but foolhardiness. "There is nothing disparaging," he argued, "for a man who is bound hand and foot and has a dagger put to his throat, to ask to be released. Any man, however brave, will run away from a mad dog. If they were asked to acknowledge themselves guilty, they would be right to refuse, and rather die in prison; but it is sheer folly to refuse to ask to be let out. This is the opinion of *all* their friends here." ³⁹ Still, Poerio and Settembrini would not make the request. To do so, the latter said, would be equivalent to admitting that the Bourbon government had punished them justly, and that Gladstone and England, France, Piedmont and even Austria had criticized Bomba unjustly: the "highest considerations," therefore, persuaded him that a request for mercy would harm the public cause, and make him despicable in his own eyes. ⁴⁰

More than another year passed before Ferdinand ⁴¹ resolved to rid himself unconditionally of the political prisoners. Sixty-six of them were loaded into a Neapolitan frigate, the *Stromboli*, and taken to Cadiz, where an American sailing ship, the *David Stewart*, Captain Prentiss of Baltimore, was hired to convey them to New York. The frigate having convoyed them into the Atlantic, and turned back, they compelled the captain to change his course and land them at Queenstown, where they were enthusiastically welcomed (March 6, 1859). The English public subscribed liberally for their transportation to London, and maintenance. ⁴² Some of them remained in England, but the majority found a refuge in Piedmont, the outpost of free Italy. ⁴³ Through their sufferings, heroically borne, they had served Italy better than they knew. It was their persecution which raised Gladstone's

³⁹ Fagan, II, 48; Panizzi to Lacaita, dated London, Feb. 17, 1857.

⁴⁰ Settembrini: *Ricordanze*, II, 407.

⁴¹ He proposed at first that each prisoner should swear never to return from America. Poerio refused to accept this condition. Accordingly, on Jan. 6, 1859, Ferdinand offered to release 66 politicals, if they would go to New York.

⁴² £18,000, or above 450,000 lire. Tivaroni, I, 263.

⁴³ Settembrini: *Ricordanze*, II, 449-66. Zini, I, 897-90. Tivaroni, I, 262-63. Fagan, II, 164-75. *Q. V. L.*, III, 398. Malmesbury, 445-46, 468.

blast, their living martyrdom which thenceforward pricked the conscience of the civilized world. To Bomba they were an embodied Nemesis, a warning that, no matter how strongly tyranny, be it of church, state or army, may be entrenched, it can never safely neglect, despise, or crucify the righteous. "By their long memories, the gods are known."

"Incorrigible," therefore, summed up the Bourbon régime in the Two Sicilies. Strange to say, Lombardy and Venetia, the Austrian provinces, were the only section of reactionary Italy where reforms were attempted. In matters not political these provinces enjoyed more prosperity than the Papal and Bourbon states, because Austria had long before learned that by promoting agriculture and industries, not less than by maintaining order, she could best increase her revenues. She drew from her Italian possessions, as we have seen, a tribute out of proportion to their relative position in the Empire. But the suppression of political aspirations affected every sphere of life, not less by removing many of the natural leaders in economic as well as in civic welfare, than by checking the state of mind which begets enterprise.

The Congress of Paris had not long adjourned before there were signs, indefinable at first, that Austria might adopt a milder system in Northern Italy. What led her to this change still remains a mystery. It is hardly possible that she would have regarded the propitiation of the Lombards and Venetians alone as of great importance, because she had amply proved her ability to stamp out any disturbance they might raise. Her military officials cared no more than her police and civil agents to be beloved, or even respected, by the populations they held in subjection; indeed, they preferred to be feared, if not hated. What seems most probable is that the suggestion came from England, the only Power with which, after the Congress, Austria succeeded in forming a friendly alliance.⁴⁴ Queen Victoria's ministers may have advised that it would be well to lessen the antipathy of Europe by treating the Lombards and Venetians more humanely. Whatever the cause, the announcement was made late in the autumn of 1856 that his Majesty the Emperor was

⁴⁴ "Austria has no real friend except England," Rémusat told Senior, May 1, 1857. Senior: *Conversations*, II, 134.

graciously disposed to visit his Italian possessions. The Imperial governors began to prepare demonstrations of spontaneous enthusiasm in every town through which he was to pass. They issued orders to decorate the windows and balconies by day and to illuminate them by night. They sent invitations to the nobles and notables asking them to indicate whether they would attend the chief reception at Milan; and, when most of them declined, they resorted to personal insistence, with hints of favors to come. But despite every effort, when Francis Joseph reached Venice, he had only a perfunctory welcome,⁴⁵ repeated at Verona and Milan, which the glibbest courtiers could not deceive him into mistaking for genuine. Wherever he went, there were addresses, arches, cheers and attentions (at Como, even a sonnet!), arranged by his bureaucrats and by such Italians as deemed it prudent to pose as loyal.

The Emperor realized that more was needed. On January 25 he announced an amnesty for political prisoners. He abolished the sequestrations, revived the Noble Guard, released Venice from the debt of 13 million lire saddled upon her as a punishment for the revolution of 1849; decreed subsidies for sufferers by flood; granted considerable sums for public works, including monuments to Leonardo da Vinci at Milan, and to Marco Polo at Venice; restored the Central Congregations, and showered decorations on whosoever would accept them. The Lombards and Venetians, though still incredulous, began to manifest sincere satisfaction. When the Emperor placed Marshal Radetzky in retirement, they could doubt no longer that a new era was dawning: for the terrible soldier, now 91 years old, had been to them the symbol not merely of Austrian domination, but of hatred, of cruelty, of inhumanity. As a final proof of his apparent change of heart, Francis Joseph appointed his brother, Maximilian, Governor General of the Lombardo-Veneto.

The young Archduke (he was scarcely twenty-five) had rather more intelligence and much more affability than the average Hapsburg during the first half of the century. Late in the summer of 1857 he brought his bride, Carlotta, daughter of King

⁴⁵ At Padua, the podestà, from the first carriage, bade the populace cheer the third carriage, in which were the Emperor and Empress; and the populace, with characteristic wit, shouted, "Long live the *third carriage*!" Tivaroni, I, 104.

Leopold of Belgium, to Milan. Although only seventeen years old, she already displayed force of character; her face was attractive, if not beautiful, and her manner possessed charm. Both she and Maximilian were credited with a laudable desire to please, and both cherished the ambition of being promoted from vice-regal to regal dignity. They dreamed of a Lombardo-Venetian kingdom under the nominal suzerainty of Austria, but practically independent, which should be developed with a view to the welfare of its own inhabitants, instead of being squeezed for the benefit of the Austrian exchequer. Such a kingdom might well become the head of an Italian federation. It would at least deprive Piedmont of her monopoly of influence among the Liberals throughout the Peninsula. For Maximilian's government might adopt constitutionalism, and otherwise meet the competition of his most progressive neighbor, without involving the Austrian Empire in any reforms. The realization of this dream depended on two things — the consent of the Imperial Government at Vienna and the acquiescence of the Lombards and Venetians.

A few of the great nobles who had from of old accepted Austrian rule became Maximilian's trusty advisers. Chief among them was Duke Lodovico Melzi. Others, grown weary of patriotic intransigence or skeptical of ability to throw off the Austrian yoke, now joined the Archduke's party. Others again, believing that the best interests of the Lombardo-Venetians would be attained through a strong, united and progressive administration, such as they assumed he would give them, naturally set local welfare above the possible benefits of a visionary Italy. Maximilian won over a few supporters by tickling their vanity. Most conspicuous among them was Cesare Cantù, cursed with an extraordinary amount of one of the most ridiculous forms of this common weakness — vanity of the pen. By one means and another, the young ruler drew round him a body of native advisers who might be expected to popularize his scheme,⁴⁶ and he not only carried out the Emperor's promises, but considered what additional public improvements he could foster.

At Vienna the hard heads that shaped Austria's Imperial policy watched Maximilian's efforts with the incredulity of

■ Govi, for finances; Sampietro, for the communal system; Cantù, for education; Selvatico, for fine arts; Lanfranchi, for justice. Cantù, III, 157.

mature cynics who know that young men must dream dreams that will never come true. Their purpose was to prevent his dreams from doing harm. So far as he succeeded in conciliating his subjects, and thereby lessened the need of costly repressive measures, they approved, but they vetoed every suggestion of autonomy. Maximilian hoped to see his Italian provinces erected into a kingdom, but whether his ambition for himself and Carlotta, or his innate amiability, or both motives, guided him, can hardly be determined. The result appeared in his efforts to capture the goodwill of the upper-class Italians to whom the reforms gave back many of their legal rights. Desiring to introduce a better system of taxation, he sought advice of Pasini,⁴⁷ and he turned to Jacini to help improve the Valtellina:⁴⁸ both patriots incurred the suspicion of being renegades by unwarily talking to him on these matters. Although Maximilian tried to maintain a brilliant court, the nobles and distinguished professional and literary men, with few exceptions, would not frequent it.

The exiles who availed themselves of the amnesty felt no gratitude, and accordingly remained as anti-Austrian as before. They simply refrained from any questionable activity. But during the next two years the patriots carried on a subtle opposition to the Archduke. They quietly organized a social Fronde which deterred, by impalpable but effectual means, the weak or wavering from surrendering to the campaign of blandishment.⁴⁹ They met in the ladies' salons — most famous, that of Countess Maffei — where they encouraged one another in resistance, and communicated news from their friends in Piedmont and at Paris. They established so effective a social boycott, that anyone in their set who accepted the slightest viceregal attention was disgraced. When this failed, the young men challenged the backsliders to fight duels.⁵⁰ Two points they all agreed upon: Maximilian must be resisted in every way, and Victor Emanuel must be recognized as the standard-bearer of the Italian cause. The upper and middle classes were nearly unanimously Monarchists. If here and there an intransigent Republican like Cattaneo stood out, the Republican propaganda, which Mazzini had spread a

⁴⁷ Bonghi: *Pasini*, 725.

⁴⁸ G. Visconti Venosta, 405-08.

⁴⁹ The most intimate account of these years is given by G. Visconti Venosta, chaps. 21-25. See also Barbiera: *Contessa Maffei*, *passim*.

⁵⁰ G. Visconti Venosta, 401-04.

few years before, found no general favor, even among the populace: for the fate of the victims of the Sixth of February, of the Martyrs of Belfiore and of Calvi brought a terrible disillusion to the followers of Mazzini.

On the other hand, it was natural that the great Lombard emigration in Piedmont should inspire their friends at home with enthusiasm for Piedmontese leadership. Cavour welcomed every instance of Austrian tyranny, because it gave him occasion to call Europe to witness that Italy could never be at peace while such a condition lasted. He turned Austrian threats into aids towards national independence. When Austrian regiments were massed along the Piedmontese frontier, he began to fortify Alessandria, and he authorized the subscription for one hundred cannon, to which Lombards sent their quota, glad to realize that thus they could assist, if war broke out, in destroying their oppressors. They subscribed also for the statue at Turin to commemorate the valor of the Piedmontese soldiers in the Crimea, and by a coincidence which was not accidental, the cornerstone of the monument was laid on January 15, 1857 — the very day on which Emperor Francis Joseph made his triumphal entry into Milan. The speedy recall of Count Paar, instead of embarrassing Cavour, seemed to make it easier for him to irritate his overweening enemy. The reports which Piedmontese newspapers printed of the Emperor's progress and of the Archduke's plans differed widely from the flowery statements of the Austrian official organs. The one thing that Cavour dreaded being a reconciliation between the Lombardo-Venetians and their masters, he encouraged their refusal to accept any of Maximilian's advances. To Giulini, one of the staunchest of Lombard patriots, he said: "It is urgent that you cause Milan to be placed again under martial law."⁵¹ He whispered that in case of war, Napoleon III would support the Italians, but he counseled them to be discreet; for much depended on keeping the goodwill of Europe. Through his intimacy with the aristocratic exiles he thus strengthened the fortitude of their kinsmen; and through La Farina's National Society he saw the middle and lower classes being confirmed in their anti-Austrian antipathy.⁵²

⁵¹ G. Visconti Venosta, 394. ⁵² La Farina: *Epist.* II, 40, Oct. 28, 1857, writes that the National Society is spreading rapidly in Lombardy and Venice. July 8, 1858, he reports great progress in the Veneto, II, 72.

Whether Maximilian would have succeeded, if Piedmont had not been his neighbor, may be doubted: for Poland, Ireland and Alsace-Lorraine prove the tenacity of patriotic desire after every apparent excuse for hope has been blotted out. But the mere existence of Piedmont as a reservoir of Italianism enormously increased the difficulty of his task. And before a year had passed, he discovered that he could not make head against the official nonchalance of the Imperial government. Premier Buol, whilst allowing him to be as benign as he chose, took care to keep trusty instruments of the old order in every important post. Marshal Gyulai succeeded Radetzky as commander-in-chief; Baron Kübeck, who had never taken the trouble to learn Italian, was head of the chancellery; Count Bombelles, a bureaucrat of many years' service, and Count Hadig, his aide, were councilors of state; Bürger and Spaur, two Austrians of Metternich's school, were lieutenants-general of Lombardy and of Venetia. These men, all Transalpine by birth and sympathies, imbued with reactionary principles and trained in bureaucratic methods, needed only to follow their well-worn routine, in order to prick many of Maximilian's bubbles. He could not put his finger on a single act of disobedience, but he became conscious, before he had been six months in office, of silent, impalpable, persistent thwarting.

In the spring of 1858 he quitted Milan for Venice and went thence to Vienna, where he remained so many months that the Lombards began to infer that he had renounced his viceroyalty in disgust. At last he returned, however, bringing an Imperial rescript, which defined more exactly his powers and considerably extended them. Nevertheless, the invisible opposition of the bureaucracy continued to maim or nullify his well-meant efforts. He lured to his side a few of the ambitious rich or an occasional noble, but these were rarely men of the character that strengthen a state.⁵³ The bureaucrats, after their fashion, clung to the old ways. When Carlo Tenca refused to print eulogies of the Emperor, they suppressed his newspaper, the *Crepuscolo*. When Radetzky died (January 5, 1858), Lieutenant-General Bürger warned the podestà and the assessors of Milan that they must officially attend the funeral. But they reminded him of the

⁵³ Zini gives the list of recipients of decorations.

charge of "33 florins and 9 kreutzers," paid for ice and for the "rods used and broken" at the flogging of men and women in the Piazza di Castello under Radetzky's orders in 1849; ⁵⁴ and Bürger deemed it expedient not to insist. Throughout that year the friction between the Austrians and their subjects increased. Petty acts on both sides kept up a chronic irritation. If it were announced that the Archduke and Archduchess would honor ■ theatre by their presence, they found the house empty; if they came into St. Mark's Place, the crowds vanished, leaving them with their Austrian escort. ⁵⁵ Despite all his good intentions, Maximilian enjoyed less authority than his great-uncle Rainier, viceroy in old days, ⁵⁶ had wielded. His campaign of blandishment was not gaining ground. Nevertheless, it caused continuous anxiety to Cavour, who knew that, since Italy's independence could come only after a successful war against Austria, whatever tended to make Austrian rule in Northern Italy even tolerable, weakened the Italian cause. "Out with the Austrians!" was the one cry at which all Italian patriots would rally.

Thus among the old governments in the Peninsula, the Austrians alone seemed to heed the mutterings at the Congress of Paris; but the bureaucracy at Vienna was too rigid to make the experiment of conciliation sincerely. All the other rulers — Pius, Ferdinand, Leopold, Francis — had absolutely no policy, except that of blindly clinging to ancient abuses. When an individual ceases to react to the facts of life, we adjudge him insane. So when political parties and their leaders, instead of facing the present and finding a way to cope with it, curse it, turn their backs on it, and implore the past to return, they are drawing near to their extinction: provided always, that there exist in their country other men who have the future in their hearts.

⁵⁴ Zini, I, 960.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 961.

⁵⁶ Cantù, III, 160.

CHAPTER XIX

WINNING THE GRAND ALLIANCE — ORSINI — PLOMBIÈRES

AT half past eight o'clock on the evening of January 14, 1858, three bombs were exploded as the French Emperor and Empress drove up to the Opera House in Rue Lepelletier, Paris. A cordon of police, lancers and special guards had been unable to protect their Majesties. One hundred and fifty-six persons, including women and children, were killed or wounded, but, by what seemed a miracle, the Imperial couple escaped unharmed, although their carriage was blown almost to pieces. Recovering quickly from the shock of the explosion, Napoleon and Eugénie went with great composure into the theatre,¹ took their places in the Imperial box, and, as if nothing had happened, witnessed the performance. "Let us show these wretches that we have more courage than they," said the Empress.² A few scratches from flying splinters, and here and there a dab of blood that had spirted over Eugénie's dress, were the only outward signs they bore of the tragedy.

The police arrested suspects right and left, and before the next morning they had what proved to be the right clue in their hands. Shortly before the explosion, a sergeant happened to recognize in Rue Lepelletier Giuseppe Pieri, an Italian of bad reputation, whom the prefecture had sought since 1852. The sergeant who arrested Pieri found on him a bomb. Cross-examination of the prisoner and search in his room in the Hôtel de France et Champagne, led to the arrest of his comrades, Felice Orsini, Antonio Gomez and Carlo di Rudio. Investigation soon revealed Orsini as the leader of the conspiracy.

Orsini, now 39 years old, was born at Medola, in the States of

¹ Artom-Blanc, II, 663.

² Witnesses differ as to this composure, but the majority report that the Empress was the cooler of the two. On Jan. 16, Eugénie told the ambassadors that, after getting out of the carriage, the Emperor wished to go and speak to the wounded. "But I dragged him into the hall, saying: 'Don't be such a fool! We have had enough of farces like that.'" Hübner, II, 91.

the Church. From his youth he was fired by the determination to help Italy. He fell under Mazzini's spell, and during the brief Roman Republic of 1849, he distinguished himself at Ancona. After the reaction, he turned again to conspiracy, and undertook more than one desperate mission. Captured by the Austrians and shut up in the fortress of Mantua, he would soon have dangled on a gibbet at Belfiore had he not saved himself by one of the most remarkable escapes on record. He took refuge in England, where he earned a considerable sum by lecturing about his adventures.³ But the British nation was then absorbed in the Indian Mutiny and paid little heed to Italy's woes. Having broken with Mazzini,⁴ whom he found too dictatorial in manner, and whose plots he deemed criminally futile, Orsini revolved in his mind various projects. "Examining the political conditions of all the governments of Europe," he testified at his trial, "I became fixed in the idea that only one man was able to relieve my country from occupation by the foreigner: that this man was Napoleon III, who is omnipotent in Europe. But all his past convinced me that he would not do what he alone could do. I confess freely, therefore, that I considered him an obstacle. And then I said to myself that we must get rid of him."⁵ Orsini talked the matter over with Pieri, a fellow-refugee in England, and they concluded, "that the surest way to start a revolution in Italy was to foment one in France; and that the surest way to start the revolution in France was by killing the Emperor." Having caused five bombs to be made at the Taylor Foundry in Birmingham, Orsini engaged Gomez, a low-class Neapolitan, Pieri, an adventurer with a soiled record, and Di Rudio, a young Bellunese count, to assist in the crime. Procuring a passport, in which he figured as Thomas Allsop of brewing fame, he traveled by way of Brussels to Paris, where his accomplices joined him. There, at the first favorable moment, they made their attempt.

■ No effort was spared to represent Orsini as a common criminal of less than average ability. Anelli, iv, 12, says that he had "scarcely enough reason to raise a man above the brute." But whoever now reads Orsini's letters and reminiscences impartially, cannot fail to see that they bespeak a mind of uncommon ability; while his career as conspirator displays a Spartan fortitude, with adroitness, resourcefulness, and coolness, which it would be hard to match.

■ "To demolish Mazzini and to destroy the Mazzinian Party" became Orsini's aim from early in 1857. Franchi: *Orsini*, 463. "I was convinced," said Orsini at his trial, "that it is useless to expose 10 or 20 men to be shot, as Mazzini has vainly done this long time past." *Ibid*, 517. ⁵ Orsini, deposition at trial.

Napoleon sagaciously directed that the conspirators should be given a fair trial before a jury. Able advocates defended them, and their testimony was published broadcast. No other course could more surely render them and their act odious, and indicate that the Emperor was unterrorized. Orsini alone, who from the outset made no pretense of denying his guilt, came through the trial with credit. Pieri conducted himself like a coarse, loud-mouthed fellow of the typical bravo, or stage-villain, breed. Gomez pretended that he was merely Orsini's servant, ignorant of the plot; but when that would not do, he cringed and turned state's evidence. Di Rudio also, having vainly protested that he had been only an employee, confessed that he had been driven to the act by poverty. He had received 330 francs, — a paltry sum, as the judge remarked, to tempt a man who bore an honorable name into such infamy. Orsini, however, behaved with dignity to the end, denying nothing that concerned only himself, and revealing nothing that might injure any of his companions.⁶ He behaved as Brutus might, but with less fine talk and more backbone. His trial was a fashionable event for the Parisians. "All the Russian and Polish great ladies," writes Hübner, "who crowd the benches of the Court of Assizes, go crazy over him. They admire his beauty, his courage, his resignation. The Empress too is infatuated over this assassin with the yellow kids."⁷ He addressed two letters to the Emperor, who deemed it politic to have them published.

In the first,⁸ Orsini besought Napoleon to assist Italy to become independent, not merely for Italy's sake, but in order to preserve the existing European equilibrium. He did not ask for armed support for his countrymen, but merely that Napoleon should prevent Germany from going to Austria's rescue in the impending war between Austria and the Italians. "Remember," he said, "that the Italians, among whom was my father, shed

⁶ Saffi, in his introduction to Vol. X of Mazzini's *Scritti*, asserts that Orsini had no Italian accomplices except Rudio and Pieri (p. xv). This is incorrect. There were several others, although the name of Gomez only has been published. Rudio in *Resto di Carlino*, Aug. 5, 1908, insinuates that Francesco Crispi, then an exile in Paris, threw the third bomb. A review of the evidence leads me to believe that nothing has been proved against Crispi. His immediate release, after a stiff examination by the Paris police, counts much in his favor. See also *Corriere della Sera*, Aug. 7 and 9, 1908.

⁷ Hübner, II, 117; Feb. 26, 1858. ⁸ Dated "Mazas Prison, 11 Feb., 1858."

their blood with joy for Napoleon the Great, wherever he chose to lead them; remember that they were faithful to him until his downfall; remember that the tranquillity of Europe, and that of your Majesty will be a chimera until Italy shall be independent. . . . Free my country, and the benedictions of twenty-five millions of citizens will follow you through posterity." In the second letter,⁹ written two days before his execution, as if to serve as a sedative manifesto to the Party of Revolution, Orsini avowed that assassination was against his principles, — although he had been misled into it on the 14th of January "by a fatal mental error." He conjured his compatriots to cast assassination from their thoughts and to rely for the redemption of their country "on their own self-abnegation, on the constant unity of their efforts and sacrifices, and on the practice of true virtue." This exhortation seemed so meek that many persons doubted its genuineness. Wild rumors were afloat: Napoleon was said to have utterly lost his nerve, and either to have persuaded Orsini to write this letter under promise of pardon or to have caused it to be written in the hope of appeasing the believers in regicide. Threats of assassination poured into the Tuileries. Men brought to mind Napoleon's membership in the Carbonaria in 1830-31, and seriously alleged that surviving Carbonari had warned him that they would kill him unless he fulfilled the oath he had taken in his youth to free Italy. It was even declared that if they would release him from this oath he offered to let Orsini go.

Whatever terrorism the Emperor may have been subjected to, however, there is as little reason to doubt the genuineness of Orsini's letter as the sincerity of his regret.¹⁰ Orsini prided himself on his strength of mind. After the attempt, he became convinced that he had made a tremendous mistake in supposing that the removal of Napoleon III would benefit Italy; he saw, for the first time, that the Emperor might be Italy's savior: and his sole purpose thenceforth was to prevent other misguided enthusiasts from committing a similar blunder. His contrition was of the intellect, not of the conscience.¹¹

Almost equally startling was the speech of Orsini's lawyer,

⁹ Dated "La Roquette Prison, 11 March, 1858."

¹⁰ J. W. Mario: *Mazzini*, p. 384, n. 1, asserts that the second letter was "certainly apocryphal"; but she offers no proof.

¹¹ Pietri, Prefect of Police, told Kossuth that he had opened Orsini's eyes.

Jules Favre, who intimated that in devoting his life to free Italy, Orsini had simply followed the lifelong purpose of Napoleon I, and that of Napoleon III himself in his youth. Unconcerned to defend his client or to seek for legal quibbles to delay the course of justice, Favre wove for him a martyr-patriot's crown. The eloquence of his oration, not less than its audacity, created a sensation.¹² But the jury, properly heeding only the facts, brought in a verdict of guilty. The Court sentenced Orsini, Pieri and Di Rudio to death, and Gomez, in whose behalf "attenuating circumstances" were alleged, to the galleys for life (February 26). Di Rudio alone implored the judges for mercy; and he received it, for some unexplained reason, at the last moment. The Empress, who wished to visit Orsini in his cell, begged for his life, as a personal favor, for she too, she said, had been in peril from his bombs. The Emperor seems to have been equally solicitous to save him, and only abandoned his intention of clemency when the Privy Council and Cabinet threatened to resign forthwith.¹³ Shortly after sunrise on March 13 Pieri and Orsini were beheaded in the courtyard of La Roquette Prison. Orsini, taciturn and unflinching to the end, shouted "Long live Italy!" just before he was stretched on the shambles.¹⁴

Meanwhile the crime threatened the peace of three countries. In the first moments, Napoleon behaved with admirable courage and self-control. On the afternoon following the attempt, he and the Empress drove unescorted along the boulevards and visited the wounded in the Hospital du Gros Caillou.¹⁵ The populace cheered him; even his enemies in the salons were forced to admit that *Celui-ci* had heroic stuff in him. Sympathy was flowing in from all parts of France. The Empress was lifted by her beauty, her youth, her pluck, on a wave of enthusiasm such as had borne

¹² La Gorce, II, 240, does full justice to Favre's "veritable prestidigitation of eloquence."

¹³ Hübner, II, 125.

¹⁴ "The fashionable world," writes Hübner, "goes into ecstasies over the *dignity*, the *resignation*, the *greatness of soul* of the Assassin Orsini. One remarked above all the nobility of his gesture in putting aside his rich jet black hair, before giving himself over to the executioner." II, 125; March 13, 1858. For Orsini's Trial see the *Procès-Verbal* printed at the time and sold in large quantities. *Memorie Politiche di Felice Orsini*, edited by Ausonio Franchi (London, 1859, 4th edit.). *Lettere Edite ed Inedite di Felice Orsini* (Milan, 1862, 2d edit.). La Gorce, vol. II, bk. 13, gives the best recent French account, consistently anti-Italian throughout.

¹⁵ *Moniteur*, Jan. 16, 1858.

up Maria Theresa in her great peril. On January 18 Napoleon received the Senate and the Corps Législatif and addressed them with great dignity. After pointing out the legislative work which lay before them, he asked, "What is the Empire? Is it a retrograde government, hostile to enlightenment, desirous of checking generous purposes, and of preventing in the world the pacific radiation of whatever the great principles of 1789 possess that is good and civilizing?" To this question there was of course but one answer — "No!" — which he uttered amid great applause. Referring to Orsini's attempt he declared that assassination, which is always a sign of weakness, never attains its end, as the slayers of Cæsar and of Henry IV learned. "'If I die,' he added, 'the Empire will survive; France will rally loyally to support my son.'"¹⁶

His fine words and bright promises, coupled with his perfect demeanor, were all to be dashed on the morrow, when there came a change. A stream cannot rise higher than its source. The Second Empire was the product of a military crime: Orsini's attempt stripped off the garment of constitutionalism and the millinery of arts and elegance with which the Man of December had draped his government, and showed the Empire in its original form. The adventurers and conspirators who perpetrated the *Coup d'état*, and had enjoyed for six years the high offices and the honors and the opportunities to embezzle on a scale unknown in Europe since the days of Napoleon I, were stricken with dismay. They fell back on a military despotism as their only salvation, and by providing for a regency, in case the Emperor should succumb to assassins, they thought they were assuring the existence of the Empire on which depended their own hold on power, and their license to peculate. Accordingly, they at once placed France under martial law. The army was divided into five commands, each topped by a marshal — Magnan at Paris, Castellane at Lyons, Canrobert at Nancy, Bosquet at Toulouse, Baraguey d'Hilliers at Tours. Pélistier, Duke of Malakoff, went as ambassador to London in place of the hysterical Persigny, primarily because he was supposed to be popular with the English, but the fact stood out that he too was a marshal.¹⁷ The official press

¹⁶ Full text in *Moniteur*, Jan. 19, 1858.

¹⁷ This provided for all the marshals except the superannuated ex-King

chanted pæans to the army; in response, the colonels of the regiments breathed devotion to the Emperor and death to his enemies. The inner ring of Napoleon's advisers, — his partners in the *Coup d'état*, whom he would not or could not shake off, — Troplong, Baroche, Fould, the unspeakable Morny, Walewski and the rest, made no mistake in resorting to the military stimulus, which, as usual, threw France into a state of bellicose frenzy, under cover of which they carried out their scheme for perpetuating their domination. A military clique, like the beneficiaries of a high tariff, turns every event to its profit.

At their direction, Napoleon removed Billault, the Minister of the Interior, who, although an ardent Imperialist, recognized that even under despotic rule the people must be granted a little oxygen, or die. In his stead, swaggered General Espinasse, who had the manners of a barrack-room sergeant and the humanity of a Mameluke. In spite of the protest of a minority of usually subservient legislators, a law against suspects was driven through. Of 2000 suspects thrown into prison, 400 were subsequently deported.¹⁸ What this meant we infer from Espinasse's blunt remark: "The essential is not to *allow those who are deported* to be seen again."¹⁹ The Imperial ring did not undeceive the public, which supposed that the Emperor himself desired this reaction. They may have even circulated the rumors about his loss of nerve. Some visitors found him — Louis the Taciturn — particularly talkative. Queen Victoria, from reports which she accepted as trustworthy, pictured him as being in an "almost mad state of fear."²⁰ The Empress, who had behaved like an Amazon in the face of danger, was suspected of using her influence to persuade him to adopt measures to strengthen her son's succession to the crown.

Even to-day it is impossible to determine whether Napoleon acquiesced because he was too unstrung to resist the plans of the Morny ring; or was glad to seize any excuse for aggrandizing the army and for solidifying, as he thought, his dynasty; or because he was, and knew that in the last resort he must be, the creature of that ring. As to the reaction itself, however, Jerome, who was Honorary Governor of the Hôtel des Invalides; Vaillant, Minister of War; Randon, Governor-General of Algiers; and Reille.

¹⁸ La Rousse: Article "Félix Orsini."

¹⁹ "That makes one reflect," is Hübner's comment, II, 120.

²⁰ Q. V. L., III, 347, n. 1.

no one could doubt. Conservative Frenchmen, not excepting many Bonapartists, condemned its rigor as impolitic, because it implied either fear or weakness. Why make new laws, the mere discussion of which would stir up the wrath of the irreconcilables, if the existing laws would more than suffice to hunt down, punish or expel every political suspect.

Before this reaction was launched at home, its spirit was being flashed abroad in angry despatches. Walewski sent curt notes to Belgium, Switzerland and Piedmont, warning them to stop harboring conspirators and to gag their shameless newspapers. As soon as it was known that Orsini had hatched his plot in England, and that there, indeed, his chief adviser, a Frenchman, Dr. Bernard, was basking in the security which comes to plotters in whom discretion is more conspicuous than valor, Walewski addressed a note to the British Government, urging it to withhold its protection from "demagogues who violate the right of asylum." Count Walewski said: "It was in England that Pianori formed the plan of striking the Emperor; it was from London that, in an affair the recollection of which is still recent, Mazzini, Ledru-Rollin and Campanella directed the assassins whom they had furnished with arms. It is there also that the authors of the last plot have leisurely prepared their means of action, have studied and constructed the instruments of destruction which they have employed: and it is from thence that they have set out to carry their plans into execution. . . . No one appreciates and respects more than we do, the liberality with which England is disposed to exercise the right of asylum in regard to foreigners, victims of political struggles. . . . But . . . how different is the attitude of the skilful demagogues established in England . . . It is no longer the hostility of misguided individuals, manifesting itself by all the excesses of the press and all the violence of language; it is no longer even the work of the factious, seeking to rouse opinion and to provoke disorder; it is assassination, raised to a doctrine, preached openly, practised in repeated attempts, the most recent of which has struck Europe with amazement. Ought, then, the right of asylum to protect such a state of things? Is hospitality due to assassins? Ought English legislation to continue to favor their designs and their plans and can it continue to shelter persons who, by these flagrant acts, place themselves

beyond the pale of common right and under the ban of humanity?" ²¹

Lord Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, listened with what grace he could, while Count de Persigny read him this despatch. No consideration on earth, he said, would induce Parliament to pass a measure for the extradition of political refugees: but he added that the Government required no suggestion from abroad to carry out the existing laws for the punishment of assassins, and, if need be, to propose more stringent laws. On the assumption that Walewski had blundered in sending such a message to England, Clarendon thought it discreet to return no written reply: after all, what could he reply, until Parliament had acted? A more supple diplomat might have concocted a despatch which would have served as an acknowledgment, without provoking a rejoinder from Walewski or without committing the British Cabinet before Parliament had spoken. But among Clarendon's many fine qualities — tenacity, patience, courage, and honesty — suppleness was not included. The French continued to rage. The many among them who had relucted from the British alliance, rejoiced at this opportunity to decry Perfidious Albion. Worse still, among the felicitations which the army colonels — at a hint from the Tuileries — addressed to the Emperor on his escape, there were several that breathed fire against the "assassins' den" and urged that they might be allowed to go and destroy it. These angry outbursts, being printed in the *Moniteur*,²² took on an official color, which the Emperor could not expunge by declaring that they had appeared through inadvertence, and

²¹ Walewski to Persigny, Jan. 20, 1858: for full text see *Correspondence*, 1857-58, vol. LX.

²² Here are a few specimens from the *Moniteur*: On Jan. 22, the 5th Lancers regret that friendly powers cover with their protection conspirators and assassins. On Jan. 28 the 82d of the Line prays that, if his Majesty "needs to strike these men even in their lair," the 82d be permitted to form part of the vanguard. On Jan. 28, Gen. Gudin, commanding the 2d Military Division, prays that "the infamous den where such infernal machinations are hatched may be forever destroyed. The country demands it with loud voice, and the army would shed for it the last drop of its blood." On Jan. 29 the 1st Engineers are chafing at being forced to witness, immobile, plots launched abroad. On Jan. 30 the 12th Artillery regrets to see a friendly nation, "whose soldiers were recently our companions in arms, shelter a gang of assassins." On Jan. 30 the 22d Infantry declares, "it seems to us monstrous that demagogues of the worst sort can find anywhere in the world a refuge." The London *Spectator* of Jan. 30 quotes Gen. Gudin's heated imprecation and simply remarks, "Louis Napoleon must be unwell!"

that they reflected neither his own views nor those of his ministers. Napoleon was trying to ride two horses: in France, he encouraged every manifestation of Chauvinism which might inure to his personal benefit; in England, he wished to preserve the alliance, but he would go as far as he possibly could to make the English appear to bend to his demands. To humble England, if that could be done without war, would immensely magnify his prestige among Frenchmen. Orsini's crime also gave Napoleon an excuse, which he seized, for attempting to purge his reputation of the last traces of his career as a revolutionist. Having secured a foothold among the conservative monarchs of Europe, he would propitiate them by being as reactionary as Frederick William of Prussia or as Francis Joseph of Austria or as Alexander of Russia.

England too was passing through a cloud of reaction. Prince Albert's determined efforts to aggrandize the powers of the Crown, ably conceived and pushed with German doggedness, were bearing fruit. At that juncture, a King of England could hardly have succeeded in this; a Queen, whose every thought and act were either suggested, modified or controlled by her Consort, could and did succeed. "What has not my beloved and perfect Albert done?" Victoria wrote the King of the Belgians (Feb. 9, 1858). "Raised monarchy to the highest pinnacle of respect, and rendered it popular beyond what it ever was in this country!"²³ Prince Albert, though devoted to his adopted country, had a truly Teutonic notion of royal prerogative. He had also much of the drillmaster quality to which Germany has owed her pre-eminence in militarism and education. Through him German ideas prevailed at Court. By a paradox, Queen Victoria, whom her subjects regarded as the most typically English sovereign since Queen Anne, used the German language in the household, kept up a correspondence in German with "Dearest Uncle Leopold," to whom she imparted without reserve the affairs of the British Government, and from whom she received advice; and at the same time Prince Albert was disclosing state secrets to his old German mentor, Stockmar. Had any member of the British Cabinet been suspected of such subserviency to foreign suggestion, he could not have held office for a day.

Napoleon had always taken care to reckon with the pro-

German bias which showed itself in the British sovereign and her Court. He captured Queen Victoria's personal favor by flattery ²⁴ long before he secured the respect, not to say the confidence, of any of her ministers except Palmerston. And after the Crimean War, when official England, at the secret urging of King Leopold and with the open advice of Prince Albert, turned again to the Austrian alliance, Napoleon wished to counteract this, as far as he could, by keeping the Queen's goodwill. The French colonels' blunder, which was, after all, a natural ebullition, was intended to warm up the army's enthusiasm for the Empire, rather than to insult England. So Walewski's despatch, ill-judged as it seems in the retrospect, was written more for the French than for the English, and if it could have been limited to causing a gratifying palpitation of the Gallic organ of pride, probably Walewski himself, and the reactionists who with him were pushing the Emperor to despotic extremes, would have been content. The most blatant among them could not have been mad enough to care to risk a war with England. The English military incapacity in the Crimea had been so notorious that lively French colonels might long to lead their sleek regiments against British troops; but older Frenchmen remembered Waterloo, where, although the Prussians brought the decisive aid, the English reaped the glory; and sober Frenchmen knew that England had money and tenacity to offset many blunders, a stable government, a united people and the most formidable navy in the world. England might lose one battle or ten, and yet be able at last to muddle through; but a single check to the Emperor's army would mean perdition for him and his empire. War, therefore, did not lie in Napoleon's intentions: but in allowing his officers and entourage to vent their angry passions he was signally imprudent: for no one who fans such a flame can be sure that he is not kindling a conflagration.

Walewski's despatch, stripped of the feverish conditions which created it, poses a question of perpetual insistence. Granted that liberty to speak and to act should be the normal attributes of rational human beings, where shall the line be drawn between liberty and license? Under the pretense of upholding freedom,

²⁴ Beaconsfield's remark is well-known: "Other women you flatter with a teaspoon; for the Queen, you lay it on with a shovel." He spoke from long experience.

shall a government permit fanatics, criminals, miscreants — call them what you will — to preach and plot assassination and actually to manufacture bombs and whet daggers? Since finite man can do nothing absolutely, so he can never apply liberty to all cases. There comes a point where the good of the many may require the curtailment of the liberty of the individual: but only a doctrinaire will presume to fix that point. In practice, society obeys the instinct of self-preservation, and makes its laws to justify its practices as best they may. The great statesman is he who, while loyal in carrying out the law as far as it will go, acts on the highest motives in that region beyond the law where passions and conduct create perplexities, contradictions and collisions, to solve which a new formula is required.

Although Palmerston's Government believed too honestly in the large benefits of freedom to dream of abridging it, even at the risk of affording scope for would-be assassins of foreign rulers, they introduced a bill making of conspiracy to murder a felony²⁵ instead of a misdemeanor. The bill passed its first reading on February 9 by 299 votes to 99, its passage being lubricated by the Prime Minister's announcement that Count Walewski had just assured Lord Cowley that his despatch of January 20 had been intended not as a menace but as an appeal from one friendly nation to another, and that the Emperor regretted the publication of the fire-eating colonels' addresses.²⁶ But the House of Commons felt more and more the pressure of British public opinion, which persisted in assuming that the Government was really knuckling under to foreign dictation. The Opposition kept berating Clarendon for not formally answering Walewski's despatch. Palmerston's enemies were numerous and alert. On February 19, when the bill came up for the second reading, Milner Gibson offered a crafty amendment, written by Lord John Russell, expressing horror at the attempted assassination of the Emperor, and willingness to amend the British criminal law, if it could be proved defective, but censuring the Government for not replying to that despatch. While Palmerston's party, not expecting any important motion that evening, was rather

²⁵ La Gorce mistakes "felony" for "high treason."

²⁶ Prince Albert regarded the colonels' irritation as "absurd." He forgot that England, under less provocation, sometimes sent punitive expeditions against feeble offenders.

sparsely represented, his opponents flocked in from all sides. Lord Derby, watching, with the eye of a veteran, the turn of the debate, hurriedly sent out for recruits. Peelites and disgruntled Whigs, with Bright and Gladstone, went into the division with the Tories, and Gibson's amendment was carried by 234 votes to 215. Only a few evenings before, Attorney General Bethell, walking home from Westminster with Palmerston, after an immense majority had supported the Government's India Bill, remarked jokingly that the Premier ought, "like the Roman consuls in a triumph, to have somebody to remind him that he was, as a minister, mortal."²⁷ The reminder, which came sooner than anyone had foreseen, indicated that Parliament and the British public were weary, for the present at least, of the Great Pam. The Sepoy Rebellion, the China War, several minor quarrels and this affront from France had occurred during his recent administration. England had been buffeted, dared, insulted; yet was not he, above all others, the statesman who claimed to hold her honor highest?

Palmerston resigned at once; Lord Derby, a politician of high character and mediocre ability, ruled in his stead. Lord Malmesbury, a solid aristocrat, with that solidity which suggests heaviness, became Foreign Secretary. The Chancellorship of the Exchequer fell to Benjamin Disraeli, who if transfusion of wits were practicable could have supplied their lack in half a dozen of his noble colleagues' brains, and yet have kept enough to outglitter them all. The new ministry found no difficulty in coming to terms with France, for the Emperor and Walewski were wholly bent on preventing a rupture of the English alliance. Walewski reported that the Emperor had declared in January: "It is not a question of saving my life, but of saving the alliance."²⁸ The Chauvinists had made all the capital they possibly could out of the surly demonstrations in January. By March 11 Malmesbury was able to present to the House of Commons a "frank and handsome" despatch from Walewski, which happily terminated "all the misapprehensions which unfortunately existed for a short time between the two countries."²⁹ The Conspiracy Bill was

²⁷ Ashley, II, 353.

²⁸ Cowley to Malmesbury, March 8, 1858; *Parl. Papers*, 1857-58, vol. I X.

²⁹ *Parl. Papers*, 1857-58, vol. LX, p. 125; III Hansard, CVLIX, 166.

dropped; and even the acquittal of Dr. Bernard, tried before a London jury as an accessory to Orsini's crime, caused no further official friction. Bernard's guilt was indisputable, but his attorney, Edwin James, cutting loose from the evidence and the law, practically asked the twelve freeborn Englishmen who sat in the jury box whether they would submit to foreign dictation, — whether they would allow the Emperor of the French to intimidate an English jury, — and they promptly voted that the wretch Bernard was not guilty. By being blindfold, Justice is spared the sight of many unsavory performances that go on in her courts: when demagogues like James harangue, she must wish that she were also deaf. Bernard's acquittal, Walpole remarks, "was the answer of twelve plain Englishmen to the addresses of the French colonels." ³⁰

When the first meagre news reached Turin on January 15 that miscreants had attempted to kill the Emperor, Cavour exclaimed, "I hope to God they are not Italians!" ³¹ The redemption of Italy hung on the French alliance, which depended absolutely on the Emperor's goodwill: how could Napoleon befriend a people who raised up assassins against him? A few hours later, the names of Orsini, Pieri, Di Rudio and Gomez — all Italians — were flashed over the wires. Cavour remembered that less than a year before he had received from Orsini a letter, ³² offering his services to Piedmont, or to any Italian government except the Papal, which would strike for national independence. Cavour had prudently not replied, because, he said, "I should have had to pay Orsini compliments, which I judged not very proper." ³³

The tempest soon broke. Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, the new French Ambassador at Turin, ³⁴ read to Cavour a despatch from Walewski ³⁵ who exulted in this opportunity for scolding Piedmont. He accused her of being the shelter of the enemies of European society. He covertly taunted the King's government with permitting Mazzini to visit Genoa at pleasure and with impunity to rekindle the zeal of his adepts, who were not mere political partisans, but the upholders of savage and antisocial doc-

³⁰ Walpole, I, 124-25.

³¹ Massari: *Cavour*, 215.

³² *Ibid*, 215-16; dated, Edinburgh, March 31, 1857. ³³ *Lettere*, II, 535.

³⁴ Appointed Aug. 16, 1857 to succeed Duke de Gramont, who went as French Ambassador to Rome.

³⁵ Dated, Paris, Jan. 22, 1858; text in *Politique*, 273-74. See also *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 659-60.

trines, professing openly regicide and assassination. "Such men place themselves outside the pale of every political or social order, and have no right to invoke its protection, when they deny all its laws." Walewski protested that he did not intend to threaten, but he made it very clear that Piedmont, if she knew what was well for herself, would suppress her incendiary newspapers, and especially the *Italia del Popolo*, Mazzini's organ at Genoa. The French Ambassador, whom the King in his resentment dubbed "a scoundrel" ³⁶ and Cavour, less vehement and probably more accurate, wrote down "a timorous fellow, feeble rather than bad," ³⁷ was not the sort of envoy whose conscience suffers him to soften a rasping message in the delivery. He reflected accurately the temper that prevailed at the Tuileries during the first fortnight after Orsini's attempt.

At Paris, Villamarina was obliged to listen to similar recriminations from Walewski himself, who talked quite in the tone of the Holy Alliance.³⁸ At the Tuileries, the Papal Nuncio, in congratulating the Emperor, said: "Here we see the fruits of the revolutionary agitation fomented by Count Cavour." Villamarina knew also that the Austrian envoy had asked whether it was not time for Austria and France to unite and compel Piedmont to give up tolerating the machinations of the exiles and the excesses of the newspapers.³⁹ General Della Rocca was the target of an embarrassing tirade when he presented Napoleon an autograph letter from the King. The Emperor accused Piedmont of being powerless or unwilling to suppress the enemies of society to whom she offered an asylum. He bade Della Rocca remind his sovereign that in 1855 France and England were Piedmont's allies; that now England had turned to Austria; that in case of difficulty England would certainly not help the Italians, who, if they wished Napoleon's friendship, must do what he desired. The Emperor expatiated on the immense demonstrations of loyalty he had received — every regiment of his great army had given thanks for his escape. That army, he added, "was ready to rush to whatsoever spot it had pointed out to it as the refuge of assassins." ⁴⁰

³⁶ *Lettere*, vi, 164; "scélérat," Victor Emanuel to Della Rocca, Feb. 7, 1858.

³⁷ *Ibid*, vi, 176; "un pauvre sire, plus faible que méchant." The fair-minded Mazade, p. 202, calls the Prince "homme bienvieillant, éclairé."

³⁸ *Lettere*, vi, 182. ³⁹ *Stor. Doc.*, vii, 391; Villamarina to Cavour, Jan. 17, 1858. ⁴⁰ Della Rocca, i, 387-88. *Stor. Doc.*, vii, 397-98.

Trusty Della Rocca returned to his apartment in the Hôtel du Louvre, wrote down a full report of this interview, and despatched it that very night to the King.⁴¹ Victor Emanuel boiled with indignation at the Emperor's charges and innuendoes. Within twenty-four hours, Courier Roveda was speeding back over the Alps with a reply which, the King said, Della Rocca might "commit the imprudence" of reading to Napoleon.⁴² Whilst Della Rocca did so, the Emperor listened seriously, especially to the conclusion, which ran thus: "After what I have just said to you, my dear La Rocca, the Emperor must be thoroughly persuaded of my good intentions, and see that the things were attended to even before he asked them. If he were to wish me to use violence here, let him know that I should lose all my strength and he all the sympathies of a generous and noble nation. If the words which you send me are the textual words of the Emperor, tell him in the terms which you shall deem fittest, that this is not the way to treat a faithful ally; that I have never suffered insults from anyone; that I pursue the path of honor always without stain, and that as to this honor I hold myself responsible only to God and to my people; that it is now 850 years since we have carried our head high, and that nobody shall compel me to lower it; and that in spite of all this, I desire nothing else than to be his friend." "That is what it means to have courage!" exclaimed the Emperor, at these words; "your King is a brave man — I like his reply."⁴³

Assuredly, that letter was the kingliest utterance credited to any monarch in the 19th century. There rang through it that tone of kingship which made Victor Emanuel first trusted and then revered by his people. Politically, it was a splendid audacity. We can imagine the feeling with which Napoleon III — the anxious occupant of an unstable throne — the parvenu among European sovereigns (as he called himself) — heard that reference to the House of Savoy, holding its head high for 850 years. We cannot doubt the sincerity of his admiration of Victor Emanuel's courage and candor. But what most influenced him was his instant recognition that he had gone far enough in badger-

⁴¹ Della Rocca, I, 388-89. The interview took place at the Tuileries on the evening of Feb. 5. ⁴² Cavour writes to Villamarina, Feb. 9, 1858: "I should not see any harm if La Rocca committed the indiscretion of reading it to the Emperor." *Lettere*, II, 534. ⁴³ Della Rocca, I, 391-92.

ing Piedmont. Victor Emanuel, he knew, would fight to the last ditch and then abdicate rather than surrender. A revolution in Piedmont, whether it set the Blacks or the Reds in power, could not benefit the Bonapartist Empire in France.

Della Rocca committed this historic "imprudence" on February 12, and before quitting Paris nine days later he read other letters from the King and from Cavour,⁴⁴ which brought back Napoleon's benign smile. He instructed Della Rocca to tell Victor Emanuel, confidentially but most positively, that if Piedmont had war with Austria, he would lead a powerful French army to aid his faithful Subalpine ally. "Say also to M. de Cavour," he added, "to correspond with me direct, and that we shall certainly come to an understanding."⁴⁵

But before this friendly state was reached, Cavour had been passing through a crisis which tested his diplomacy, his ingenuity and his physical endurance. For Walewski followed up his general reprimand with several specific requirements. He demanded, first, that political refugees should not be permitted to write in the newspapers. This, Cavour told Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, was absurd: how could government stop the pen of Farini, Mauri and many others, "who are more conservative than we"? Walewski demanded the expulsion of Bianchi-Giovini, certainly an unbridled and irritating journalist; but Cavour declined to forget that he had been almost the only writer who dared to attack Mazzini and the Revolution in 1848-49, and that he was now a loyal supporter of the French Empire and its head. To expel him to please the French Foreign Minister would be most impolitic from the point of view of the French alliance. Walewski demanded the suppression of the *Italia del Popolo*, Mazzini's organ at Genoa, and "the monitor of assassins." Cavour replied that this would be equivalent to a *coup d'état*, for the law did not permit him to suppress a journal; but that, on complaint of the representative of any foreign ruler who deemed himself aggrieved, the government would at once prosecute. Duke de Gramont, the former French Ambassador, had availed himself

⁴⁴ Dated, Turin, Feb. 16. Text of both in *Lettere*, vi, 163-71.

⁴⁵ Della Rocca, I, 396. His last interview was Feb. 20. Cavour writes on Feb. 13: "The King has received by telegraph the announcement that Della Rocca has been received by the Emperor, and that the result of the interview was favorable." This implies that the reading of the King's historic letter was on Feb. 12.

of this provision: but his successor now refused to do so, because he wished to embarrass the Piedmontese Government and force it to pass a more stringent press law.⁴⁶ Walewski further demanded the prosecution by the State of attempts against foreign sovereigns. Cavour felt that, if this could be granted without infringing the Statute, it might be politic to try it.⁴⁷ Walewski hoped to hurry Piedmont by asserting that England, Belgium and Switzerland were eager to satisfy the Emperor's just demands. France would regret to place Piedmont in a state of isolation, Walewski said to Villamarina, using the approved diction of Diplomacy, which utters its platitudes and untruths without a smile: "but be warned that we are determined to resort to extremes; and in the countries from which conspirators and assassins are not driven out, we ourselves will go and hunt for them with our own hands, even in the bowels of the earth."⁴⁸

Cavour had thrust upon him the double task of maintaining the honor and dignity of his country, and of saving the French alliance. If he should yield a hair's-breadth to French pressure, he would debase Piedmont in the eyes of every Italian who looked to her as the national leader, and he would forfeit the respect of France. And yet the prospect of losing Louis Napoleon's coöperation in the great struggle for Italian redemption, towards which Cavour had been looking for years, was maddening. As usual, he dealt with the most important matter first. He made it perfectly plain to Walewski and Prince de la Tour that neither threats nor coaxing would cause him to lower Piedmont's dignity. When Walewski sneered at the inefficiency of the Piedmontese police, Cavour remarked that neither Savary, in the time of the first Napoleon, nor Pietri now, had demonstrated that any precautions could avail against assassins for whom death had no terrors. When Walewski referred tauntingly to the ease with which the Mazzinians had plotted at Genoa during the previous spring, Cavour reminded him that Mazzinians were then actually plotting at Marseilles, although the French police had been informed six months before. When Walewski attempted to scold Piedmont for not expelling all political offenders, Cavour re-

⁴⁶ *Lettere*, vi, 153-54; C. to Villamarina, Feb. 6, 1858.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, ii, 527-32; C. to Villamarina, Feb. 5, 1858.

⁴⁸ *Stor. Doc.*, vii, 394-95; Villamarina to C., Jan. 30, 1858.

minded him that in Paris alone there were more Italian conspirators than in all Piedmont, and he remarked that they apparently plotted there undisturbed. The use of the mote and the beam analogy by a pigmy nation in its dealings with a giant may not persuade the giant, but it relieves the pigmy: in this case the giant was affected by it. Cavour did not exaggerate the influence of the *Italia del Popolo*, which "does us more good than harm," he said; "I would pay Mazzini to write for it," he wrote confidentially to one of the government prosecutors in Genoa; "but its fall is necessary in order to procure a legitimate satisfaction to the Emperor, and to prevent very grave complications."⁴⁹ But in appearance at least the suppression must be legal.⁵⁰

Added to political perplexities was anxiety for the King's safety: for warnings came from several sources that assassins had marked Victor Emanuel and Cavour as their next victims. "As for myself," he wrote, "I laugh, because, if I should die under the blows of a cutthroat, I should perhaps die at the most opportune point in my political career. But if an attempt against the King took place, though it were to fail, it would have the most unfortunate political consequences. . . . The Liberal Party would receive a blow, from which it could only with great difficulty recover."⁵¹ Cavour seems never to have taken personal precautions against assassination, or to have been worried by threats. He had not merely physical courage, he had that higher philosophic temper which habitually regards death as a negligible quantity, because no human foresight nor entreaty can cause it to turn aside. "If it be now, 't is not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if it be not now, yet it will come; the readiness is all." Cavour's enemies have insinuated that he invented the story of the plots against the King, in order to render the Reds still more odious and to justify his harsher conduct towards them. There is no doubt, however, that warnings were received, nor can it be denied that, as Cavour said, if the violent Reds succeeded in killing Napoleon III, Victor Emanuel would

⁴⁹ *Lettere*, vi, 161-62; C. to P. O. Vigliani, Feb. 10, 1858.

⁵⁰ Nevertheless, he told D'Auvergne that he had written to "the Intendant General of Genoa to wage a war to the death on that journal, without bothering himself too much over the perfect legality of the means he employed to attain this end." *Lettere*, vi, 137; C. to Villamarina, Jan. 25, 1858.

⁵¹ *Lettere*, II, 523; C. to Rattazzi, Jan. 26, 1858.

be logically their next objective: because his growing power as head of the only patriotic Liberal monarchy in Italy was becoming more and more an obstacle to the Party of Revolution. "Mazzini knows this," he wrote the Piedmontese Ambassador in London. "It is not surprising, therefore, that he should apply to him [the King], as to the Emperor, the doctrine of assassination. In the presence of such a danger, we must redouble our rigor and neglect nothing that can acquaint us with the secrets of these wretches, who do more harm to poor Italy than ever Radetzky and the Austrians have done."⁵² Cavour was fully aware that some of the informers probably seized the occasion for making what they could: but he held that it was better to pay ten lying spies and be duped, rather than to miss one true revelation which might avert a catastrophe.⁵³

To Villamarina at Paris, who had to bear the brunt of Walewski's personal harshness and to breathe a chilling air at court and in society, Cavour sent heartening messages and resolute instructions. Villamarina was to maintain an unflinching front; to show neither alarm nor worry nor ill-humor; to be perfectly polite, without suggesting that his government would by any possibility back down. "I repeat to you," Cavour wrote, "that I took the portfolio of the Interior to combat Mazzini and the Revolution; I am resolved to do this with the greatest vigor, but at the same time I mean to remain faithful to my principles. I would quit the Ministry a hundred times, sooner than betray them. It may happen that by force of pressure the French Government may oblige me to quit office; but let it think of the consequences of this insensate act. It will lose a friend who is not without value. Instead of persons friendly to the Empire, power will be in the hands of Legitimists more or less disguised. The edifice of the French alliance raised with so much difficulty will be thrown down. The prestige of the Moderate Party will be destroyed, and the influence of Mazzini will be augmented to an immense degree. If that is what the Emperor desires, he has only to follow the inspirations of Walewski and De La Tour d'Auvergne."⁵⁴

⁵² *Politique*, 269; C. to E. d'Azeglio, Jan. 27, 1858.

⁵³ See, for instance, *Politique*, 268-69, 272; *Lettere*, vi, 139, 143, 162.

⁵⁴ *Lettere*, ii, 531-32; C. to Villamarina, Feb. 15, 1858.

Victor Emanuel's "imprudent" letter left no doubt that Turin would not be intimidated by Paris. When Prince de La Tour read another peremptory despatch from Walewski, Cavour replied with a quizzical smile: "But all is settled; yesterday the King received a letter from the Emperor that settled everything."⁵⁵ But he soon found his mistake: for, as usual, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was pursuing his own policy, with or without the Emperor's knowledge. Critics who regard Louis Napoleon as capable of every duplicity, may plausibly argue that the maintenance of two diametrically opposed policies was a shrewd sort of statecraft, because it permitted him to disavow either when it turned out inconvenient, or to sanction whichever seemed to promise the best results. Cavour understood, however, that when Walewski stormed, it was well to soothe him, if this could be done without sacrificing essentials; and, after all, he had every desire to propitiate France, Piedmont's ally. So when a Turin court failed to convict Ausonio Franchi — a defrocked, strident priest — who printed in the Radical newspaper, the *Ragione*, two articles justifying Orsini's attempt, Cavour saw his chance, and introduced into Parliament a bill to sharpen the law against newspapers which preached or abetted political conspiracy. The jury system, which had proved defective, he proposed to reform on the English model by deputing the municipal authorities in each place to draw up a first list of two hundred jurors.⁵⁶ One difficulty was to frame a press law satisfactory to France, which would not at the same time shield Naples, Austria and Rome; for if the Piedmontese prosecutors were to be appealed to whenever one of these hostile governments was attacked, there would be constant turmoil, with the possibility of grave complications. Above all, Cavour had no intention of preventing the journalists in Piedmont, so long as they could be kept within the bounds of diplomatic "correctness," from criticizing these enemies of Italy. It was just and reasonable, therefore, he said, in interpreting the law, to treat France as the most favored nation.⁵⁷ He ordered a round-up of the conspirators at Genoa, and the expulsion of the most violent; he caused Hodges, an English Mazzinian, to be arrested at Nice;

⁵⁵ Mazade, 202.

⁵⁶ *Politique*, 271; C. to E. d'Azeglio, Jan. —, 1858.

⁵⁷ *Lettere*, vi, 149-51.

and in other ways he showed his willingness to be complaisant. But he yielded nothing essential; ⁵⁸ freedom of speech and right of asylum should stand in Piedmont as long as he was the Prime Minister.

Cavour also improved this crisis by again calling attention to the intolerable condition of the Papal States. He begged Walewski to reflect that the assassins and conspirators whose deeds and plans horrified Europe were not Piedmontese, but natives of the other Italian provinces. Peculiarly monstrous was the Pope's despotism. If Walewski wished to root out conspiracy, let him help to remove the conditions which made it inevitable. Cavour even went so far as to address to Cardinal Antonelli a despatch, in which he brusquely asserted that the methods employed under his Eminence's direction were unfair and impolitic. It was unfair to ship persons whom the Cardinal wished to get rid of across the border with a passport good only for exit: for this procedure dumped upon Piedmont large numbers of Romans who had no means of livelihood and who were not charged with any crime: the King's government could not undertake to support them or pay their passage to America. It was impolitic, because many of the exiles were forced straight into the ranks of the Revolution. Cavour intimated that if this practice continued, he would send Papal subjects back to the Papal frontier.⁵⁹ Cardinal Antonelli took no steps to correct this abuse: since his purpose was to embarrass Piedmont by every means in his power, he doubtless chuckled at being officially informed that his policy of unloading Papal suspects and criminals on Piedmont was accomplishing

⁵⁸ Mayor, 591. "The Piedmontese press is bad: so be it! But this press has not hindered either Azeglio or Cavour from following during nine years the same political line, ■ fact which is without example in Europe. Whilst in Piedmont there has been not a single real ministerial crisis, there have been 20 in Spain, three in Belgium, four in England, and even a certain number in states which are not constitutional. Such ■ stability proves that the liberty of the press does not exert a dangerous influence." C. to Villamarina, Oct. 27, 1857.

⁵⁹ *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 401; 661-63 for text of despatch. "The person exiled on suspicion, or for questionable conduct," C. wrote, "is not always corrupt or indis-
solubly bound to the revolutionary sects. Were he kept at home under surveillance, and punished when there were need, he might mend his ways; or, at least, he would not become a very dangerous man. But sent instead into exile, irritated by illegal measures, forced to live beyond the pale of respectable society, and often without means of subsistence, he necessarily forms relations with revolutionary promoters. Hence it is easy for them to get round him, to seduce him, to enroll him in their sects. Thus in brief time the disciple becomes ■ sectary, and sometimes a very dangerous sectary." *Ibid*, 662.

some of the harm he desired. But Cavour's despatch, communicated to all friendly governments, did not increase the general respect for the Papal administration.

While these events were going forward, Orsini and his confederates were approaching their ordeal. Before his execution on March 13, the unflinching Romagnole had the satisfaction of knowing that his bombs had overturned Palmerston's ministry in England, reduced France to a state of siege, terrified Belgium and Switzerland into gagging the press, and put the stability of Liberalism in Piedmont to the proof. But, in his last days he showed that his intent had been genuinely patriotic. The publication of his first letter to the Emperor produced an immense effect in Piedmont. The King was much troubled by it. Cavour declared that it set Orsini on a pedestal from which he could not be taken down. Worse still, it would popularize the idea of regicide. Walewski had been clamoring for Piedmont to punish the apologists of regicide, and here was the Emperor helping to place a martyr's crown on an assassin.⁶⁰ Later, when Cavour received from Paris a copy of Orsini's second letter and will, with the Imperial request to print them, he consented to do so, but he bade Villamarina to warn Walewski that this would greatly irritate Austria, and with reason, and that France would be equally implicated with Piedmont in the publication.⁶¹ On inserting the papers in the official *Gazette*, Cavour prefixed a brief note⁶² stating that they had been received from trustworthy sources, that it was reassuring to observe how Orsini, on the brink of the grave, recognized the Emperor as propitious to Italy, that Orsini condemned the execrable crime into which he was tempted by love of country pushed to the height of delirium, and that he pointed out to the youth of Italy the true course they must follow in order to win back for their country the position that belonged to her.⁶³ In this way, Cavour designed to convert the glorification of

⁶⁰ *Lettere*, vi, 196-97; C. to Villamarina, March 4, 1858.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, ii, 540; C. to Villamarina, March 31, 1858.

⁶² Napoleon had prefixed this note, probably by himself, to the documents: "May Italian patriots be well persuaded that it is not by crimes which all civilized societies reprobate that they will accomplish their laudable purpose, and that to conspire against the life of the only foreign sovereign who cherishes sentiments of sympathy for their ills, and who alone can do something to help unhappy Italy, is to conspire against their own country." *Stor. Doc.*, vii, 404.

⁶³ Text in *Gazzetta Piemontese*, March 31, 1858; reprinted in *Stor. Doc.*, vii, 403-04.

Orsini, which Napoleon had connived at, into a weapon against the violent Reds, with whom Orsini had consorted. On the publication of the letter, Austria complained, as Cavour had predicted; but France merely replied that she had to humor an ally who had been useful to her in the recent war in the East.⁶⁴

As a result of ten weeks of unrelaxed tension, Cavour had not only warded off the very grave international perils which Orsini's attempt caused, but had made what capital he could for Piedmont, the standard-bearer of national aspirations. Orsini, who came to slay Napoleon, learned to regard him as Italy's most probable helper. The Party of Revolution was still more discredited by this futile crime. Victor Emanuel had shown himself every inch a king: a common necessity had drawn him and Cavour together, after their stormy relations during the previous autumn. But now Cavour had to persuade Parliament, composed of the largest number of hostile deputies he had ever faced, to pass the press and jury bills that he offered as a sop to France. Far from making light of the risks,⁶⁵ he thought his defeat so probable that he discussed what should be done next, and concluded that if Massimo d'Azeglio could not form a ministry, the King would be forced either to summon Revel, which would mean reaction, or to dissolve the Chamber, "a very dangerous expedient." "The Right," he wrote on March 15, "behaves in an ignoble fashion, and the Left in an absurd fashion."⁶⁶ Still, Right and Left and all other assailants of the Ministry had much justification, on the surface at least, for their action. Granted that Party government warrants taking advantages for the sake of Party rather than of Country, — because partisans assume that, in the long run, Party's principles coincide with Country's welfare, — Cavour's opponents could not well let slip this opportunity to put their Party, were its color Black, Red, or mottled, in the saddle. And even his friends could not very cheerfully vote for a measure which seemed to contradict his well-known principles.

The bill which Deforesta, Minister of Justice, brought in, proposed to punish conspirators against the life of foreign sover-

⁶⁴ Despatches of April 6, May 3, and May 6, 1858; *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 404-05.

⁶⁵ *Lettere*, II, 535, 537; VI, 186, 190, 203, 210.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 537; C. to E. d'Azeglio.

eigns, by imprisonment up to a maximum of ten years' penal servitude; to impose a fine and imprisonment on persons guilty of publishing a defense of regicide: and so to reorganize the drawing of juries, that all eligible voters should be liable to jury service. From the entire tale of electors a commission was to choose, twice a year, a list of 200, who were to be drawn by lot during the succeeding half year.⁶⁷

The debate transcended the particular question at issue. Each speaker digressed from it to criticize the general crisis. Solaro della Margherita, appearing as the defender of freedom of the press, — a rôle in which he caused much amusement, — deplored Piedmont's subservience to a foreign monarch. Farini, Cavour's ever-faithful squire, started a laugh against Solaro by quoting from his book the startling maxim: "A king cannot be killed unjustly, if he abuses the royal power."⁶⁸ For the inveterate champion of Absolutism to loom up as the apologist of regicide, might well bring a beam of mirth into the gloomiest Chamber. Brofferio attacked the bill in his habitual Catonian vein, which was losing its power not merely to persuade, but even to cause a passing thrill. Men tire of hearing Liberty, Truth, or the Ten Commandments defended on general grounds which nobody disputes, when the precise need is how to make Liberty or Truth prevail in a given concrete case. Rattazzi defended the legality of the bill, and the fact of his support, coming so soon after the Cabinet rupture, counted for more than his argument. Revel announced that he should vote for the measure, although he blamed the government for incapacity which made it necessary to resort to such a remedy. Pareto, who accused the ministers of truckling to France, hinted that, if a law were passed to punish the apologists of regicide, Classic authors, from Tacitus to Alfieri, must needs be proscribed. Buffa replied that if the law were a good law, and necessary, it would be childish to reject it on the ground that its adoption would gratify France. Farini urged international reasons for saving Piedmont by every means possible from being thrown aside into political isolation. Mammiani, the Roman exile who awakened in everybody a feeling of

⁶⁷ Artom-Blanc, II, 31-32, note.

⁶⁸ Solaro della Margherita: *Avvedimenti Politici* (Turin, 1853), 346; quoting St. Thomas Aquinas, the corner-stone of Catholic orthodoxy; *De Regim. Princ.*, lib. I, c. 6.

respect that often deepened into reverence, spoke in praise of Napoleon III, who, he said, whatever his shortcomings might be, had done more for Italy than any other prince. "And were I to tell you," he exclaimed, "that with these very eyes I have seen him take up arms and fight for the national cause, singing hymns to liberty and to the independence of Italy!" The philosophic statesman who seemed too sedate ever to have been a conspirator, — he was one of those men who the younger generation cannot believe were ever young, — Mamiani, who had advised Pius in constitutionalism and was expiating his patriotism in exile, could not have done more to popularize Louis Napoleon than in thus recalling the days when he risked his life in a rising for Italy. Some of his hearers probably remembered that in that rising, the last of the ambitious Carbonaro attempts, the youthful Bonaparte had Felice Orsini's father for a companion.⁶⁹ Mamiani closed his oration by remarking that Napoleon now stood at the parting of the ways, and that Italians ought not to check him from advancing along the road which promised liberation to Italy.

After several other deputies had spoken on one side or another, Cavour, on April 16, rose to present his argument. Judging rightly that the bill would stand or fall, not on its single merits but on its being the symbol of an entire policy, he outlined that policy from the very eve of Novara. What, he asked, had the King's government aimed at? It had aimed at showing the world that Italians could govern themselves; it had aimed at upholding, in the field of diplomacy, the interests of the other parts of Italy. It had put its faith in the efficacy, the immense efficacy, of education. "If modern history proves anything," said Cavour, "it proves that there is no considerable transformation, that no great revolution can be effected in the material order, unless it was prepared in the moral order, in the order of ideas." The fruits of Piedmont's policy were seen in her own expansion, in the regard which the world now paid her, in the recognition of national ideals, in the brightening of patriotic hopes. But Piedmont could not maintain herself unaided. Brofferio had denounced foreign alliances; untaught by the catastrophe of

⁶⁹ It does not appear that Louis Napoleon and the elder Orsini were personally acquainted.

1848, he insisted that Italy could still work out her own salvation. Cavour showed that alliances were indispensable. The duty of the government was to secure the best possible ally — and in France it had such an ally. If any one objected that it was inconsistent for a constitutional monarchy to turn to an imperial despot, Cavour reminded him that the free Swiss sought aid of Louis XI, — that the free Hollanders, hard pressed by Philip II, leagued themselves with “the imperious Elizabeth,” — and that the American colonists besought Louis XVI, the most absolute king in Europe, to come to their rescue.⁷⁰ Brofferio imagined that, were France a republic, it would be proper for Piedmont to appeal to her: Cavour demonstrated that from the earliest times republics have been the most selfish of states. Was it not the French Republic, indeed, which refused succor to Piedmont in 1848, and strangled her sister republic at Rome in 1849? If Brofferio advised waiting till the government in France should change, Cavour must reply that he thought and hoped that the Empire would not fall. There were others who, going farther than Brofferio, insisted that the Revolution ought to be Piedmont’s only ally. “Insensates!” he exclaimed, “if they believe that the Revolution, which would imperil afresh the great principles of the social order, could be favorable to the cause of liberty in Europe. Insensates! who do not see that its effect would be the destruction of every vestige of liberty on the Continent, and a return to the Middle Age! Insensates, but insensates in good faith! who let us know that their aspirations are more revolutionary than patriotic, and that they love the Revolution more than Italy!”

And so he went on, answering, explaining, suggesting, until his hearers perceived that the Deforesta Law was almost insignificant compared with the edifice into which it was to be built. With characteristic frankness, Cavour stated that the reform of the jury system, although it had for several years been seen to be necessary, would not have been pushed at that time, if political exigencies had not required it. Those exigencies were created by the propaganda of Mazzini, who instilled into minds eager

⁷⁰ Cavour caused “general hilarity” by adding: “Was not the dean of American democracy — Franklin — seen mixing in the antechambers of Versailles with the throng of courtiers, in order to propitiate the King? Do Signor Brofferio and his friends wish to be more virtuous or purer than Franklin?”

and unbalanced the evil doctrines of political assassination, and caused Italy to be regarded as the home of sectaries whose principles and deeds set them beyond the pale of civilization. But in denouncing the Prophet of Revolution, Cavour did not forget to arraign those Italian governments which, by their incompetence and inhumanity, drove thousands of their subjects into exile, where they were at the mercy of every wild creed and of every plausible incendiary. Having referred to the threats against Victor Emanuel's life, he closed by announcing that the vote would determine the existence of the Cabinet, since the question at issue was whether or not the Ministers had performed their first duty — which was to preserve the dignity of the nation.

In many respects this speech, which took scarcely an hour in the delivery, is a masterpiece of modern oratory. In it Cavour deals easily with general principles and, like Burke, he illustrates and reinforces his generalizations by holding up some shining example. He replies so straightforwardly to objections, that they seem to have been raised merely to enable him to show that his position is invulnerable. Although he knows well that the fortunes of the Cabinet and his own, and perhaps even the fate of Piedmont and of Italy, are at stake, he speaks with the Olympian poise of a man who feels himself equal to any issue. From first to last he makes in this supreme moment no demagogic appeal. There is no feverish emphasis, no apparent anxiety. Yet, without betraying any personal alarm, he impresses on everyone the alarming gravity of the crisis. Only when he refers to the Party of Assassination, with its whispered threats against even the King, do his words burn. His habitual adversaries on the Right and on the Left — Della Margherita, Revel, Brofferio, Valerio — he treats with his inimitable irony, before which their arguments seem to lose their pertinence and then to shrivel up. His suggestion that Brofferio wished to be more republican than Franklin leaves the orator of the Left naked to ridicule. As usual, Cavour is so candid that his listeners hardly realize how unreservedly he has confided in them.⁷¹ And after half a century his

⁷¹ The *Moniteur* reprinted Cavour's speech in its *unofficial* section: "Here [at Paris] they think it fine," Hübner writes in his diary on April 20; "but I find it very feeble in logic and very imprudent." II, 144. The Austrian Ambassador habitually made the mistake of imagining that by belittling Cavour he disposed of him. It would have been better for Austria if her envoy had seriously tried to form a just estimate of the Piedmontese statesman.

speech stands as the epitome of eight years of Piedmont's history, and as the expression of the ideals which had guided her leaders through the wilderness and were beckoning them to the accomplishment of national independence.

On April 19, the Chamber, by 128 ayes to 29 noes, passed to the second reading of the bill, which it accepted ten days later, after some minor amendments had been adopted, by a majority of 68 (110 ayes, 42 noes). The Senate on June 4 by an almost unanimous vote (50 to 5) made the bill a law. So far as could be foreseen, the reflex danger to Piedmont from Orsini's attempt was disposed of. Cavour had maintained his country's dignity, mollified France, and reformed the jury system. But the most far-reaching outcome of this struggle was the establishing of his personal ascendancy. The Parliament elected in November to destroy him, acknowledged in April that the helm of the nation was safe only in his hands. The opposition of the groups of extremists melted away or was seen to be either factious or visionary.

In resisting French pressure Cavour could not rely, as in times past, on the counterpoise of England. Ever since the English government, following the instructions of the Queen and Prince Consort, had drawn close to Austria, — had indeed, as was believed, signed a secret treaty with Austria, — there was lack of cordiality, if not actual coolness, at the English Foreign Office towards Piedmont. And when Cavour, on disinterested grounds, sided with France and Russia in the settlement of the Danubian snarl, official England grew chilly towards him. So Palmerston and Clarendon in London, and Cavour in Turin, instead of giving mutual support in the common danger, fought the French separately. In his parliamentary test, Palmerston was wrecked, although England repelled the truculent demands from Paris, while Cavour emerged from his stronger than ever. Negotiations with Naples over the *Cagliari* affair served to bring Piedmont and England together, but not without friction. That steamer, which Pisacane seized, and her crew were Piedmontese, but her two engineers were British subjects. The Neapolitan government confiscated the vessel and kept the crew in prison. Malmesbury, the Tory Foreign Secretary who succeeded Clarendon, being reluctantly forced to take the quarrel up, seemed to sympathize with Bomba rather than with the English engineers or with his

Piedmontese partner. He even suggested privately⁷² how the Neapolitans could claim reprisals which would more than offset the demands he was formally pressing. Malmesbury could not be expected to press the claim very heartily, because he started with the assumption, wholly unfounded, that the Piedmontese government knew of Pisacane's project and had abetted it, in the hope that it would lead to a conflict;⁷³ and he actually stated in Parliament (on April 29) that Cavour was now clamoring for damages in order to provoke an Italian war. "The British Government," he informed the Commons, "were thwarting this in every way we [they] possibly could, as, when once a catastrophe of that kind had begun, it would probably become European."⁷⁴ When a British Foreign Secretary was so densely ignorant of the Italian situation as to declare that Cavour was in league with Mazzini, how could he or his followers sympathize with the Italian cause? How he would have raged if an Italian statesman had jauntily declared that the British Government knew of Orsini's plan and encouraged him in it! After interminable palavers, during which Cavour more than once almost lost hold of the slippery and unwilling Malmesbury, Naples settled the affair by the liberation of the *Cagliari* and her crew and the payment of an indemnity.⁷⁵ Malmesbury congratulated himself on having averted, as he supposed, a European war: Cavour saw that he had strengthened Piedmont's standing as the champion of Liberal Italy.

Before the Subalpine Parliament adjourned, Cavour secured its consent to a loan of 40 million lire, ostensibly to provide for deficits due to public works, really to enable Piedmont to carry forward her national policy. The leader of the Left urged the Government to raise money by confiscating ecclesiastical property, but the Prime Minister refused. He argued that it was most

⁷² To Bernstorff, Prussian Minister in London, who promptly imparted the suggestion to Carafa, Neapolitan Minister of Foreign Affairs. *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 422-23. ⁷³ Malmesbury, 423; March 13, 1858. ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 433; April 29, 1858.

⁷⁵ For the Piedmontese version of the tangled negotiations, see *Stor. Doc.*, VII, 408-24; *Politique*, 267, 268, 270, 271, 275, 277, 278, 280, 281, 283-91, 293-97; *Lettère*, VI, *passim* under 1857-58. For the English side, Malmesbury, 424, 425, 426, 429, 430, 431, 433, 438; *Parl. Reports*, 1857-58, LIX, "Naples and Sardinia." On June 13, 1858, C. writes to E. d'Azeglio: "The news of the restitution of the *Cagliari*, and the deliverance of her crew, have caused the liveliest satisfaction here [Turin]."

undesirable that the clergy should depend on the civil authority for their support, and that every wise means should be taken to make priests good citizens by allowing them to hold property and thereby to feel an interest in local affairs and to share in civic and social life.⁷⁶

One man did not remain silent under Cavour's 16th of April speech. Mazzini was lashed by it into a fury extraordinarily vehement, even for him, and he poured out a rejoinder, hissing hot, which cannot be matched in violence by his many other invectives. He has the two-fold purpose of flaying Count Cavour and of blasting root-and-branch the policy and the achievements of Piedmont since 1849. Mazzini opens by saying to Cavour that although he always knew he was a materialistic worshipper of "*acts*," a promoter of *oblique ways*, and averse to liberty, he did not believe him to be a calumniator; but now he has found him out. "Though earlier I did not like you, now I abhor you. Till now you were an enemy merely; now you are basely, indecently an enemy."⁷⁷ Words fail to convey Mazzini's scorn of the evil minister. He goes on to repudiate the charges of assassination and of fomenting anarchy which Cavour made against Young Italy. He calls Cavour a fool and a calumniator for stating that Victor Emanuel's life had been threatened. It would be easy enough to kill the King, but Mazzini had not countenanced regicide, or any killing. The theory of the dagger he again repelled. Only in our party, he declared solemnly, does political morality exist today. And then he reviews Cavour's "hysterical" citations, which he dismisses as lies.

Coming to the present, Mazzini reviles Cavour for trying to provoke the most tremendous civil war Italy ever saw. He lays the blame on Cavour for England's reconciliation to Austria. He arraigns the constitutional minister for seeking his alliances ex-

⁷⁶ See C.'s speeches of May 19 and 20, 1858. "The organization of the Catholic clergy," he said, "if it have a defect, it is that of the meagreness of the bonds which attach the priest to civil society: being separated from his family and forbidden to create another, he is isolated, and hence naturally led to concentrate his affection on the caste to which he belongs. If the priests have property, if they have goods, this constitutes a valid link between them and the civil society amidst which they live: this bond helps to neutralize that tendency which the organization of the discipline of the clergy necessarily stamps upon him." In the House, the loan bill passed, by 97 ayes to 62 nays.

⁷⁷ Mazzini: *Scritti*, x, 42, 43.

clusively among despots — above all, with the “parricide” of the French and Roman republics — and for mutilating the liberties of the State, in order to please the foreigner. And then, Mazzini proceeds to paint the glories which, if Cavour were a real Liberal, he would have achieved during these ten years. Returning to personal denunciation, which he cannot refrain from long, he accuses Cavour of two very grave sins: “You have planted in Piedmont and in Italy a fatal dualism; and you have corrupted our youth by substituting a policy of artifices and lies for the serene, frank, loyal policy of him who desires to rise again.”⁷⁸ “Between you and us, Sir,” he concludes, “an abyss yawns. We represent Italy — you, the aged, covetous, faint-hearted ambition of the House of Savoy! We desire above all National Unity — you, territorial aggrandizement. We believe in the initiative of the people of Italy — you fear it, and rely upon diplomacy and the consent of European governments. We desire that the country when emancipated shall determine its government — you deny national sovereignty and insist on monarchy. We devote ourselves body and soul, to a campaign for freeing Italy — you devote yourself to persecuting us. We adore one faith — the National Faith — and one principle — the popular Republican Principle — you bow the knee to force, to the treaties of 1815, to despotism.”⁷⁹

There is much madness and some method in this letter. In his attempt to discredit Piedmont, in his insinuation that all the seemingly patriotic endeavors are really aimed at aggrandizing the House of Savoy, and that her political friendliness to France is nothing but contemptible servitude, Mazzini is using poisoned darts, which he hopes will rankle and ulcerate. But its very madness condemns it. If nothing else remained, this document would teach posterity that by the year 1858 Mazzini had become an impracticable fanatic. Unreasoning devotion to the letter of his creed left him a follower of the Jesuit, of the Spanish Inquisition, of the slave-holder, of the anarchist, and of all others who, having singled out some formula to represent life in its inexhaustible variety, erect their formula into a fetish. This document is Mazzini's confession that he misread the drift of Piedmontese and Italian evolution after 1849, as completely as he misjudged and

⁷⁸ Mazzini: *Scritti*, 81. ⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 86-87; the letter is printed entire, pp. 42-87.

misinterpreted Cavour. On his side, Cavour unquestionably undervalued Mazzini, and probably misjudged him by assuming that only a wilfully perverse egotist would continue to sacrifice lives and to preach Utopian impossibilities after experience had proved their criminal futility. But Cavour understood the terms on which Italy could be redeemed, and Mazzini did not: that was the real abyss that yawned between them. Neither friend nor foe could persuade Mazzini that "three men and four stones" were not enough; in his propaganda he had reached the stage of monomania.⁸⁰ The publication of this tirade in the *Italia del Popolo* gave an excuse for finally suppressing that journal which, during a feverish life of eight years, had been confiscated one hundred and fifty times.⁸¹ Henceforth, Mazzini issued from London a new organ, *Pensiero ed Azione*, in his effort to hold together the thinning ranks of his disciples.

"Say to M. de Cavour that we shall certainly come to an understanding," was Napoleon's parting word to Della Rocca, in February. During the following months, Cavour had the feeling, though there may have been no written proof, that the Emperor's personal friendship towards Piedmont was as strong as ever. At the end of May, Dr. Conneau flitted through Turin, and privately informed Cavour that the Emperor would be pleased to talk over the affairs of Italy with him, and that a meeting might be arranged, as he expected to pass a month at Plombières, near "our frontier — a geographical blunder which does not lessen the significance of the political hint," Cavour wrote Villamarina. To Dr. Conneau he replied that if he could spare a few days, he should be delighted to visit his Majesty.⁸² Here at last was possibly the turn of fortune which he had been preparing for these many years. But absolute secrecy was obligatory. The Emperor, as usual, intended to conspire and plan, perhaps to act, without consulting his ministers. Ever since Louis Napoleon gained his ascendancy over France, Cavour had looked to him as the most probable rescuer of Italy. For governments, like corporations, have no souls; they can seldom be roused to disin-

⁸⁰ Mazzini seems to have crossed the line beyond which reasoning and evidence produced any longer a normal reaction. Whether this suggests monomania, the psychologist will decide.

⁸¹ Mario: *Mazzini. Lettere*, vi, 130, 153, 161, 187, 273, 276.

⁸² *Lettere*, ii, 557; C. to Villamarina, June 2, 1858.

terested enthusiasm; but Cavour divined in the reticent Bonaparte qualities of a political visionary which might serve the Italian cause.

With the King, of course, he discussed the meeting, but he held the secret from all the ministers except La Marmora. It was necessary to inform Villamarina, because the Emperor might wish to communicate through him with Turin, but in spite of his impatience, Cavour warned Villamarina against attempting to draw a statement from the Emperor.⁸³ He let it be known that he should spend his holidays in Switzerland, as he needed a complete rest after the extraordinary fatigues of the winter and spring. He took care to throw everyone off the scent. Writing to Countess de Circourt, on July 7, he regretted that he must forego the pleasure of seeing her. "If I were to go to France at this moment, when the diplomats are vainly struggling to find a suitable solution for a problem which they have *a priori* rendered insoluble, my trip would give rise to all sorts of comments, which, though without foundation, would not be the less fertile in vexatious difficulties for my country. . . . I shall go to Switzerland to breathe the fresh air of the mountains, far from men who think only of politics. I plan to stop several days at Pressinge, being certain that nobody will suppose that I conspire with my good friends the De La Rives against the world's peace." ⁸⁴

On July 11 Cavour left Turin; inspected the work on the Mt. Cenis tunnel from Culoz to Aix; ⁸⁵ paid an official visit to Chambéry, where, he writes, "nobody hissed me in the streets — I can't expect more"; ⁸⁶ and went on to Geneva. There he found a letter from General Bévillé, "who says that the Emperor will be charmed to see me at Plombières." ⁸⁷ He spent five days among his Genevan friends; was feasted and applauded by the cantonal authorities; ⁸⁸ talked over the French situation with Villamarina

■ *Lettere*, II, 560; C. to Villamarina, June 19, 1858.

⁸⁴ Circourt, 88-89; July 7, 1858.

⁸⁵ "The bridge across the Rhone is a monumental work," he wrote.

⁸⁶ *Lettere*, VI, 251; C. to Santa Rosa, July 13, 1858.

⁸⁷ *Lettere*, II, 562; C. to La Marmora, July 14, 1858. C. to Salmour, July 14, printed in *Corriere della Sera*, Aug. 7, 1908.

⁸⁸ The fugitive Reds at Geneva protested against this reception. "I am glad," C. wrote. "It proves that there is nothing in common between their cause and that which I am trying to make triumph." *Lettere*, VI, 256.

whom he had summoned from Paris; and on the 18th he left for Bâle and Strassburg. To preserve his incognito he had a passport in which he figured as Giuseppe Benso. At nine in the evening of July 20 he and his secretary, Viellot, reached Plombières, the little watering place in the Vosges whose mineral springs have made it a resort since the days of the Romans. Napoleon's presence crowded the town with his retinue and with fashionable visitors. Every hotel was full and Cavour was beginning to think he might have to pass the night in the open, when a pitying landlady found quarters for him in a ramshackle old house. After midnight he was roused by General Bévillé, who, having just learned of his arrival, begged Cavour to go and take his bed. But Cavour declined, and on the following morning, by the Emperor's arrangement, moved into a decent apartment at a pharmacist's. Whether or not he slept after Bévillé left him, we do not know. As on the eve of the Congress of Paris, he felt so intensely the tremendous possibilities almost within grasp that he distrusted his powers. "The drama approaches its solution," he wrote La Marmora. "Pray heaven so to inspire me that I shall not behave like a blockhead in this supreme moment. In spite of my petulance and of my ordinary faith in myself, I am not without grave disquiet."⁸⁹ In confiding to Lanza the secret of his journey, he said that he was going to try to penetrate the Emperor's real designs. "I don't know whether I shall succeed, but at least I shall do my utmost to learn whether peace or war be locked up in his brain."⁹⁰ Cavour never forgot that ostensibly he represented only Piedmont, a state with less than five million inhabitants, while Napoleon reigned over France with more than 35 millions.

It was Wednesday, July 21, 1858. At eleven o'clock Cavour was shown by appointment into the Emperor's cabinet. Napoleon, stouter and ruddier than two years ago, welcomed him with his habitual affability. They wasted little time in general talk. Napoleon opened their conference by stating that he had decided to support Piedmont with all his might in a war against Austria, provided the war were undertaken for a non-revolutionary cause, and could be justified in the eyes of diplomacy and of European public opinion. After reflecting, Cavour suggested

⁸⁹ *Lettere*, II, 562-63; C. to La Marmora, July 14.

⁹⁰ *Ibid*, II, 565; C. to Lanza, July 14.

that Austria's failure to live up to her commercial treaty with Piedmont might serve as a pretext: but Napoleon replied that a commercial question of middling importance ought not to start a war destined to change the map of Europe. Cavour proposed Austria's illegitimate domination in Italy as an excuse for a quarrel: but Napoleon again objected that since the Powers at the Congress of Paris did not regard this grievance as important enough to call for intervention, it could not warrant an appeal to arms now. "And besides," he added, "so long as our troops are at Rome, I can in nowise demand of Austria to withdraw hers from Ancona and Bologna." Napoleon was logical — Cavour admitted it with regret, all the more because he himself had nothing definite to bring forward. He began to feel embarrassed, but Napoleon was not easily turned aside. So they took up the States of Italy one by one, discussed the condition of each, and traveled over the entire Peninsula in search of a pretext for war. In vain. Then, almost unawares, they fixed their attention on Massa and Carrara. "There," writes Cavour, "we discovered what we were hunting for with so much ardor." He described to the Emperor the miseries those provinces were enduring under the Duke of Modena; he showed how easy it would be to provoke a petition from their inhabitants begging Victor Emanuel to take them under his protection; how the King would decline, but warn the Duke to reform; whereupon the Duke, counting upon Austria's support, would send an insulting reply; at which the King would march his troops into Massa. Then — War! As the Duke of Modena was universally hated, Napoleon assumed that this war would be popular, even in England.

"But before we proceed further," said Napoleon, "we must consider two grave difficulties which we shall encounter in Italy — the Pope and the King of Naples. I must deal with them gingerly: the former so as not to rouse against me the Catholics in France, the latter so as to preserve for us the sympathies of Russia, who makes it a sort of point of honor to protect King Ferdinand."

Cavour replied that the French garrison would suffice to maintain the Pope's tranquil possession of Rome, but that, after all, Pius had no right to complain if, after having had due warning and having failed to reform his detestable government, his pro-

vinces should break away from him. As for the King of Naples, it would be better to let him alone unless he took up arms for Austria; but his subjects ought not to be hindered from freeing themselves, if they could, from his paternal despotism.

The Pretext for the war had been found: but what should be its Scope? Both agreed that the Austrians must be expelled from every inch of Italian soil south of the Alps as far east as the Isonzo. Now came the question of Reorganization. After much discussion the two "conspirators" decided that Italy should be constituted as a federation of four states. A new Kingdom of Upper Italy should be assigned to the House of Savoy, and include Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia, the Romagna and the Legations; the Kingdom of Central Italy, comprising Tuscany and the Papal possessions, except the Patrimony of St. Peter, should be awarded to the Duchess of Parma: the Pope should continue to rule undisturbed at Rome, and be the honorary president of the Federation; finally — in the very probable event that Bomba might deem it wise to retire to Austria — the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies might be turned over to Murat.

And now, Napoleon asked, what compensation might he expect for his dynasty and for France? Would Piedmont cede Savoy and Nice? Cavour was too practical a man of business to question the Emperor's claims. Monarchs do not risk their thrones for nothing. Victor Emanuel, he said, recognizes the Principle of Nationality — the principle to which the Italians themselves were appealing, in their struggle for Unity and Independence, — and he could not deny that Savoy ought to go to France. Geographically, it was French; in race, language, interests and customs, it was French. The King would regret to part with the cradle of his ancestors, but he could not refuse. Nice, on the contrary, was Italian; and by the same principle its inhabitants should be allowed to cleave to their kindred. Napoleon stroked his long moustache, — almost the only movement that interrupted his habitual calm, — said that there was some force in this argument, but that these were to him matters of secondary interest which could be settled later.

The main concern was the Means for carrying the war through successfully. Europe must consent to see the Allies defeat Austria and remodel Italy. Napoleon counted on England's neu-

trality; he counted too on the Prince of Prussia's antipathy for Austria to keep Prussia neutral; Russia had repeatedly promised not to thwart Napoleon's projects in Italy. So the political outlook seemed to smile on them. But Napoleon did not underestimate the military strength of Austria, or her endurance. He computed that the Allies would require at least 300,000 men, one third to block Austria's troops in the Italian provinces, while two thirds marched through Carinthia and Styria and, sword in hand, dictated peace at Vienna. Napoleon himself would lead one of the great armies, Victor Emanuel the other. France would furnish 200,000 soldiers, Piedmont 100,000. As for the financial problem, which greatly preoccupied the Emperor, they agreed that France should supply the materials of war and facilitate a loan.

At three in the afternoon the conspirators, having canvassed with business-like thoroughness the vital questions, paused for luncheon. At four they set out "in an elegant phaeton drawn by two American horses which the Emperor drives himself," a single groom following at some distance, out of ear-shot. As soon as they had passed beyond the little town into the beautiful rolling country, — with its wooded roads and the Augrogne winding through the folds of the hills, and with glimpses from time to time of the higher Vosges range, — they resumed their conversation. The Emperor broached the question of marrying his cousin, Prince Napoleon, to Victor Emanuel's oldest daughter, Princess Clotilde. Knowing his sovereign's repugnance to this proposal, Cavour pointed out as delicately as he could, "without wounding," some of the objections. The Princess was too young — she was only fifteen years old in March; and any father would shrink from giving his daughter to a libertine of the Prince's record. The King himself might not be above reproach, but that did not make him less sensitive to safeguard his child's happiness. Napoleon frankly acknowledged that his cousin had many faults, but, after all, he said, "he is much better than his reputation; he is a growler, he loves to contradict, but he has much intelligence, not a little judgment and a very good heart." That this last was true, Cavour wrote to the King, the constancy he had shown towards his friends and his mistress was an unanswerable proof. A heartless man would not have quitted Paris in the midst of the

pleasures of Carnival to pay a farewell visit to Rachel, who was dying at Cannes—and that although he had separated from her four years before.⁹¹ The Emperor did not make the marriage a crucial condition of the alliance, but he evidently set great store by it. Cavour listened sympathetically, disclaimed authority to frame a binding agreement, but went so far as to say that he thought the King had not an “invincible objection,” although he would leave entire liberty of choice to his daughter. Napoleon said that he understood the King’s repugnance to having the Princess marry so young, and he would wait a year, or even longer, if necessary: but he wished to know as soon as possible what to count upon. “Consequently, beg the King to consult his daughter and to let me hear her intentions in a positive manner. If he consents to the marriage, let him fix the date. I demand no other pledges than our word, reciprocally given and received.”

“At that,” Cavour wrote, “we parted. The Emperor, in grasping my hand, dismissed me, saying, ‘Have confidence in me as I have confidence in you.’”

It was seven o’clock. The long summer day was waning when the little Piedmontese returned to his rooms over the apothecary’s shop. By that time, of course, his presence in Plombières had begun to be talked about. To their amusement, during their interview, the Emperor received from Walewski at Paris a telegram announcing Count Cavour’s arrival in Plombières.⁹² This time, at least, the secretive Emperor and the resourceful Statesman had outwitted the inept Foreign Minister. Early the next morning the “dangerous spirit” slipped away unnoticed.

Whoever happened to be Cavour’s companion in the railway carriage that day, never dreamed that the stout little man, with

⁹¹ Rachel died at Cannes on Jan. 5, 1858. Her funeral took place in Paris on Jan. 11. Walewski, who had an engagement at Ferrières on that day wrote James de Rothschild requesting that the hunt be postponed till the next day, in order that he might attend the services for the ‘poor woman whom he had loved and who had borne him a son.’ “Amid other surroundings,” says Hübner, in recording this, “the married man and minister might, perhaps, have found another excuse.” II, 87.

⁹² In his despatch Walewski added: “Your majesty knows my opinion of Cavour. I regard him as a restless, ambitious spirit, and not at all to be relied on in his dealings; I consider him consequently as a man all the more dangerous because he has charm, even brilliancy; and a veritable skill for using all means so as to make them lead to his ends.” Rothan: *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Feb. 1, 1899; p. 766.

the dress of a country lawyer, and the half-shut eyes that nothing escaped, had just been laying plans which, if carried out, would revolutionize Europe. Now he was devouring Buckle's "History of Civilization," which he had picked up on De La Rive's table at Geneva. Cavour had the feline quality peculiar to great genius — the quality of being completely absorbed by the thing at hand, were it work or play. So the tiger may lie for hours motionless, the very embodiment of repose, or in a flash he may rouse himself and pounce, the very embodiment of action. On that Thursday forenoon in July, whenever Cavour was not gazing at the country which flowed past his window, observing its crops and farming methods, the dwellings of its peasants, and its villages, — which were transformed from French into German in the course of the journey, — he took great draughts of Buckle's then startling doctrines. That night he slept at Strassburg, "very well satisfied" with his interview with Napoleon, as he informed La Marmora in a hasty note.⁹³ Thence he went on to Baden, where he met Prince William of Prussia and his diplomatic attendants, who received him with unexpected favor.⁹⁴ He talked with the King of Würtemberg, with the Czar's aunt, Grand Duchess Helena, who confirmed the goodwill felt by Russia for Piedmont, and with Balan, a Russian diplomat, who assured him that in the war with Austria, "if you have on one side a chasseur of Vincennes, you can count on having a soldier of our guard on the other."⁹⁵

Cavour's chief task at Baden was to write for the King a report of the interview. This he did in a forty-page letter, which is one of the landmarks of modern history and a convincing proof of Cavour's power. Whether he narrates or argues, he never uses a word that expresses more or less than he intends. The outlines of the alliance, the plan of the war and the proposed remodeling of Italy, he gives almost without argument, as he and the King have already discussed them: but he devotes more than a third of his letter to persuading the King to consent to Clotilde's marriage. That, he knows, is the point where, if Victor Emanuel

⁹³ *Lettere*, II, 566. ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 584, 585, 587; VI, 259, 262. Massari says that Prince William told "a distinguished diplomat" that Cavour "is not nearly so revolutionary as they try to make him out," and that a Prussian minister said: "Decidedly, Count Cavour has made a conquest of the Prince Regent." *Cavour*, 247. ⁹⁵ *Lettere*, II, 584.

hesitates or refuses, the entire cause may founder. Cavour attempts to smooth over every objection. He paints Prince Napoleon in the most favorable light; he speaks incidentally of the advantage of joining the House of Savoy to one who inherits "the most glorious name of modern times"; he hints that, in case of the Emperor's death, only one life — that of a two-year-old infant — separates Prince Napoleon from the French throne: he shows how much the Prince's wild youth was due to his surroundings and how greatly he has moderated. Cavour lays marked stress on Plon-Plon's loyalty to his friends. "Sire," he says, "the man who in reaching the summit of honor and of fortune does not disavow the friendships he had in the ranks of the defeated, has not a bad heart. The Prince has braved the anger of his Cousin [the Emperor] in order to preserve his old affection; he has never ceded to him on this point, he cedes just as little to-day."

Cavour next takes up the alternatives. There being no unmarried king or heir apparent eligible, a marriage must be sought for Princess Clotilde with some second or third rate prince; but that would not become the daughter of the House of Savoy, with its traditions and its hopes. It may be objected that the proposed union is based on convenience rather than on affection: but Cavour asks whether a love-match is likely to bring more happiness, and as usual, he holds up a concrete illustration to strengthen his suggestion. The King's great-uncle, Victor Emanuel I, had four daughters, "models of grace and virtue." Well, what was the result of their marriages? The first — and she was the happiest — wedded the Duke of Modena, a prince universally detested. The second, who married the abominable Duke of Lucca, was and is as unhappy as one can be in this world. The third's husband was "an impotent and an imbecile," Emperor Ferdinand I, who was forced to abdicate. The fourth, "the charming and perfect Princess Christine," was the first wife of King Bomba, whose vulgarities and ill-treatment brought her "to the grave with the reputation of a saint and a martyr." Nor has the experience of the King's aunt, Princess Philiberte, fettered to the unsavory Count of Syracuse, been more happy. There is a better chance for Princess Clotilde with Prince Napoleon, than with a Lorrainese or a Bourbon.

Cavour insists that if the alliance is to be made between France and Piedmont it shall be made heartily. This could never be were they to fail to satisfy the Emperor Napoleon's dearest personal wish. "If there is one quality which distinguishes the Emperor, it is constancy in his friendships and in his antipathies. He never forgets a service, just as he never forgives an insult. Now we must not deceive ourselves, the refusal to which he would expose himself would be a mortal insult. It would place in the Emperor's Council an implacable enemy. Prince Napoleon, still more *Corsican* than his cousin, would vow mortal hatred against us — and he would have the means to gratify it." In short, Piedmont must enter into the alliance cheerfully and without reserve; to traverse the Emperor's desires, to try to get the best of the bargain, to appear reluctant or ungrateful, may lead to deplorable consequences.⁹⁶

The letter finished, Cavour writes more briefly to La Marmora, to summarize the terms of the agreement, and to urge him to beseech the King "not to place the finest undertaking of modern times in doubt for the sake of some scruples of rancid aristocracy. . . . If the King consents to the marriage, I have the confidence, I will say almost the certitude, that within two years you will enter Vienna at the head of our victorious troops."⁹⁷ The next day Cavour went on to Bâle, thence to Zurich and Coire, and thence to the Luckmanier, which he had long considered the best point for a tunnel between Piedmont and Switzerland.⁹⁸ Torrents interfered, however, with his observation of the route, and he hurried home by way of Arona, reaching Turin on July 31.

He found the capital intensely curious over his interview with Napoleon. Even before his arrival, the *Opinione* discoursed in general terms on the importance of the visit to Plombières, but neither then nor later was any official hint published of the agreement. Although only three or four persons knew Cavour's secret, its purport was surmised, and the surmise passed from mouth to mouth until at last the country came to assume that the

⁹⁶ C.'s letter to V. E., from Baden, July 24, 1858, is the great first-hand testimony on the Plombières meeting. *Lettere*, II, 568-82. ⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 584.

⁹⁸ From Berne, on July 25, he sent Tosi, an employee at the Legation, over the St. Gotthard with a despatch to be given to the King only. *Lettere*, VI, 258, n. 1. For details of the negotiation see also *Centenario*, 7-16.

Emperor had promised to do something for Italy at the proper time. Nothing could be specified, but a new air was stirring. Men felt a strange buoyancy. Throughout Cavour's career he probably never passed more joyful weeks than those after his return from Plombières. He glowed with the satisfaction of having won over the Emperor. The prospect of a still greater achievement, of the redemption of Italy, beckoned him on: the fatigues and crosses and disappointments of the task were still in the future. For the statesman, as for the poet, the divine hours of foresight and of creative planning, transcend all others in personal exaltation. The laurel that crowns the end, while the world stands by and applauds, is as nothing compared to the first flashes of inspiration, when the Poet — the Maker — has revealed to him in his loneliness, the work he has been chosen to create. As Cavour took his daily walk under the arcades of Via di Po, the good people of Turin saw their hopes justified by his beaming smile, and by his unworried manner. That walk of his had become an institution, and his demeanor served as a political barometer. "Excuse me, Madam," said a shopkeeper to a customer: "there's Count Cavour passing: I must see how things are going." Coming back a moment later, he said, "All's well: the Count is in high spirits."

The Agreement at Plombières, like the Treaty of Paris, aimed at overthrowing the principles which the Restoration set up in 1815 and the Holy Alliance erected into a politico-religious system. On Napoleon's side it was preëminently personal. No government trained in parliamentary methods, no ministry in which the ministers were more than the sovereign's mouth-piece, would have been a party to it. Napoleon could pledge France and at the same time persuade himself that what was primarily a selfish or dynastic interest of his was also the interest of France. This plan would substitute French for Austrian primacy in Italy: a successful war, besides shedding lustre on the Empire, would strengthen the Bonaparte dynasty at home and perhaps place one of its scions on the throne of the Two Sicilies. These were reasons enough to account for the Emperor's willingness to leap into so hazardous an enterprise. But other motives were suspected, which may well have had an influence. Napoleon's intimates nearly all testify that they found in him a streak of

idealism which nothing could cancel. He had a keen eye for the main chance, he would sanction the most brutal crimes (witness the massacres of the *Coup d'état*), and then, with amazing inconsistency, he would risk immoderately for what seemed to the world the caprice of a visionary. The truth is that he was a doctrinaire of the less common sort, being intermittently importuned by his principles, as periodic drunkards are by their craving for drink.⁹⁹ The pressure of the moment might thrust other traits to the front and these might dominate for so long a time that men supposed that they were Napoleon's very self; and then the insistence of his ideals would return, and he would try to make them harmonize with the practical, unideal foundations on which his ambition rested. One of his ideals was the triumph of the principle of Nationality; another, the rehabilitation of Italy.

If Louis Napoleon had been born to the throne and had had no dread of being overturned, he might have been a benevolent despot of the type of Leopold II, carrying out his paternal dispensation for the good of his subjects, whether they liked it or not. But he was an imperial waif, blown up to the throne by the tempest of revolution and kept there by clutching now at revolutionary and now at despotic expedients. And the example of the Great Napoleon was always present to him, acting as a visible heredity or hypnotic suggestion. Many of his policies can be explained by reference to that. Napoleon III would redress the failures of Napoleon the Great. He had already humbled Russia; he had conquered England, not by arms but by diplomatic blandishments, making her a prop of his Empire, after the *Coup d'état*, and his ally, in the Crimea; Prussia was still too inconsiderable to be a rival; Austria alone, among the Great Powers which had destroyed the First Emperor, remained for his avenging zeal. But Austria was precisely the Power that was preventing the flowering of the Principle of Nationality in Italy: accordingly, in Italy Napoleon might win a double victory.

These various motives lay stored in Napoleon's will, ready on occasion to assert themselves. That occasion was the recent attempt of Orsini, whose appeals had visibly stirred the Em-

⁹⁹ His early book, *Les Idées Napoléoniennes*, proves that morally and intellectually he was a doctrinaire.

peror. They set vibrating his former allegiance to the Principle of Nationality. They revived in memory his own early plottings for Italy and his detestation of Austria. We need not go so far as writers have gone, and declare that fear for his life wrought the change in him. Perhaps his unfulfilled oath to the Carbonari did haunt him; perhaps he did receive threats of assassination and was unnerved by them: what we know is that he took most to heart Orsini's warning that neither France nor Europe could hope for peace until Italy was emancipated. This warning simply reiterated all that Cavour had been insisting on for years, and the burden of his messages, direct and indirect, to the Tuileries after the 14th of January. 'To get rid of assassins, you must get rid of conspirators; to get rid of conspirators you must remove the conditions which beget, explain, and, in a measure, justify them: these conditions are Austrian domination and the abominable Papal and Bourbon governments. Free Italy from these and she will cease to disturb the tranquillity of Europe.' Orsini's bomb was the fact which served to convince Napoleon that Cavour was right. Orsini's testimony made it only too certain that in the hope that a stroke at Paris would precipitate a revolution in Italy, assassins and conspirators would continue to menace the Emperor and France until Italy was free. So Napoleon's zeal for Nationality, his personal and dynastic considerations, and the apparent advantage of France, coincided to confirm him in his new policy.

For Cavour, the Agreement at Plombières represented what Piedmont would pay an ally to help her liberate the Peninsula. Charles Albert had made the brave declaration that Italy would work out her own salvation; Mazzini had preached that the Italians were more than able to win their independence, and that they must not look abroad for initiative or for aid: but Cavour, seeing things as they were, recognized that a powerful foreign ally was indispensable. Having found this ally in Napoleon, he proposed to gratify him so far as he could without prejudicing the interests of Piedmont and of Italy. He did not intend to substitute French domination for Austrian. He could not pay cash for such services as the Emperor agreed to render—that would be too mercenary a bargain for an idealist enterprise—but he could cede Savoy. So many things besides mere cash-

value go with a province, that the cession would prevent the Emperor from complaining that he had done much and received little in return. But Victor Emanuel and Piedmont, whose very existence was at stake, must be amply compensated; hence the proposed Kingdom of Upper Italy.

Critics who lack the historic sense, literalists who see only the printer's ink and not the idea behind it, point to the Plombières interview to prove that Cavour's interest was Piedmontese and not National. They say that there is no acknowledgment or even hint that Unity was the goal. True enough; but if there had been, Cavour would not have been Cavour, and Italian unity would have been postponed. Had he urged Napoleon to create on the French frontier an Italian Kingdom of twenty-five million inhabitants, and to accept in return the Duchy of Savoy *plus* the satisfaction of having done a noble deed, the Emperor would have driven him to the nearest railway station. Cavour foresaw that if the Austrians were expelled and Victor Emanuel were sovereign from the Alps to the Isonzo, the rest must follow. And so he consented to the establishment of a Central Kingdom, under the Duchess of Parma, and to the enthroning of Murat at Naples. If they did not conform to the Liberal principles, their subjects would quickly overthrow them. Through Liberalism the National Spirit would work with such increasing potency, that despotism at Florence and Naples would only stimulate it.

In the light of romantic love-matches, Cavour's pressure for the marriage of Princess Clotilde to Prince Napoleon seems cold-blooded: but it must be judged historically, and not as an exception to an ideal. In Latin Europe at that time no bourgeois above the grade of grocer expected his daughter to choose her husband; among the upper classes, wealth and position were habitually sought irrespective of the character, or even of the physical soundness, of the prospective son-in-law. Royal families still adhered to the immemorial custom of regarding a marriageable daughter as a political or dynastic asset, to be invested for the benefit of the State. Nor was the youth of the Princess exceptional. Two Bonaparte princesses had recently been wedded when less than sixteen years old, and the marriage of Princess Victoria of England with Prince Frederick of Prussia — where

the bride was barely seventeen — had just been celebrated.¹⁰⁰ Neither custom, therefore, nor what the great majority of the Italian and French deemed the best system of *contracting* matrimony — the term itself speaks volumes — was violated in the least by the proposal to give Princess Clotilde to Plon-Plon. If either had been, however, Cavour would probably have urged the marriage just the same: for he held it inconceivable that in a patriotic crisis, when thousands of men were to lay down their lives on the battlefield, when King and people were to devote their fortunes to the holy cause, the happiness of one girl should block the hopes of a nation. Heroic achievement presupposes self-sacrifice.

¹⁰⁰ Princess Marie, born March 18, 1835, married Count Paolo di Campello, March 2, 1851; Princess Bathilde, born Nov. 26, 1840, married Count Louis de Cambacérès, Oct. 14, 1856; Princess Victoria, born Nov. 21, 1840, was betrothed May 16, 1857.

CHAPTER XX

PREPARING FOR WAR. AUGUST 1858—FEBRUARY 1859

CAVOUR returned to Turin from Plombières with a fivefold task before him. He must make Piedmont ready, force Austria to declare war, hold Napoleon III true to his promise, keep the goodwill of Europe, and secure the coöperation of patriots of all shades throughout the Peninsula. He had need of infinite tact and of not less audacity. He must proceed for the most part so secretly that his lieutenants, though working side by side, should not be aware that he was employing them on the same business. Considering the number of individuals thus engaged, it is astonishing how little leaked out. Cavour held the matter completely under his control, set down nothing on paper that could involve him or the government, disavowed every inexpedient rumor, and beamed on everybody with his inscrutable smile. The press and public inferred that the visit to Plombières was significant, and each organ or person interpreted it according to his bias. The Liberals saw in it the dawn of victory. The Clericals insinuated that Cavour had really gone to offer his submission to Napoleon III, who had formed a league with Austria,¹ and that the Italian policy would trouble them no more. Even Massimo d'Azeglio, who happened to be in one of his periodic sulks towards his "hated rival," wrote confidentially that he had direct information that the interview had given no stimulus to the national cause, and that Cavour had been obliged to beg three times before Napoleon had condescended to see him. "And that is how history is written!" exclaimed the irritated Massimo.²

The chief preparation for Piedmont consisted in strengthening the army, in collecting munitions, and in hurrying forward the fortifications of Alessandria and Casale.³ All this General La

¹ *Opinione*, July 30, 1858.

² *Lettere*, II, 226.

³ La Farina writes, Sept. 1, 1858: "Ieri sono stato all'arsenale, e vi assicuro che mi sono cadute lagrime di tenerezza dagli occhi, quando ho veduto l'immenso materiale di guerra, che si sta apparecchiando." *Epist.*, II, 78.

Marmora directed with vigor. Like McClellan, he was an effective military organizer, a disciplinarian, a trainer of armies, rather than a successful strategist or a winner of battles. The recent loan provided the money necessary for pushing this equipment, which went on so quietly that months elapsed before the country was aware of its extent. To lead public opinion in the desired direction Cavour had only to give a tip to Dina, the able editor of the *Opinione*, or to Castelli, most discreet of confidants and most efficient of go-betweens.

His prime accomplice, however, was La Farina, the third in the trinity of Josephs ⁴ to whom United Italy was to owe an incalculable debt. In those conferences at day-break which he had been holding in Cavour's bedroom for nearly a year, La Farina came to a definite understanding of the Premier's nature and plans. He acknowledged himself fascinated by Cavour's genius, and by the extraordinary keenness of his intellect, his resourcefulness, his suppleness, his unfailing courage, but above all, by Cavour's heart. The two men worked together in perfect harmony, Cavour knowing that he could trust, and La Farina possessed of a wonderful gift of conveying desired instructions without either violating confidences or implicating the Government. Their purpose was to extend the range of the National Society as rapidly as possible, and to transform its members — who all accepted the watchwords "Independence, Unification, House of Savoy!" — into volunteers in the approaching war of independence. By this means, the great restless mass of revolutionists, Republicans and Monarchists alike, would be secured for the National Cause; and they would not only face the Austrian armies in battle but carry on an agitation for Italy in each province of the Centre and of the South. That Cavour himself should control this great throng of patriots while they supposed that they were pursuing their own course, was a masterly achievement. Technically, the Prime Minister of Piedmont had no right to connive at plots in his neighbors' domains; but the Italian situation had reached that pass where neither traditional legality nor international etiquette held any longer. Patriotism, with impassioned vehemence, swept aside the old and set up new standards of its own. Technically, the American patriots of

* Joseph Mazzini, Joseph Garibaldi, Joseph La Farina.

Lexington and Concord ought to have obeyed the established government: technically, Hampden and Cromwell ought never to have risen against Stuart tyranny; technically, every advance of the human race stands condemned by the old order which it assailed and supplanted. But those are the most significant crises in history where a new spirit, untrammelled, powerful and undaunted, impels men to have done with the technical and the traditional—the mere mummies and echoes of earlier ideals—and to live by principles which they see are living. If Austria and Pius, if Bomba and the Archdukes held twenty millions of Italians in bondage against their will, these Italians were justified, by any code which modern civilization has respected, in striving to emancipate themselves.

La Farina and his colleagues performed for the Italian cause a service similar to that which Samuel Adams and the Committees of Correspondence performed in the American Colonies. La Farina was indefatigable. His network of communications stretched into every part of Italy, even to small towns and villages. He wrote letters by scores and by hundreds, and, what was more remarkable, he had a talent for understanding the tone in which to address each of his correspondents: he was intimate, or businesslike, or appealing,⁵ according to the need. And he not only wrote personal letters, but sent printed circulars, edited a newspaper and showered broadsides in large batches. To make this propaganda effective, he arranged further for smuggling his prohibited documents into unredeemed Italy. His frankness equaled that of Cavour himself. As early as July 8, 1858, he wrote Dr. Mazzi, of Sarzana, that the Piedmontese government believed firmly in a not distant war between France and Austria; but that it was for the Italians, by being strong and organized, to bring the war to pass.⁶ After Plombières, he says without hesitation that “next spring the great knot will be cut; and this persuasion of mine rests on facts which it would be the greatest imprudence,— nay, crime — to reveal.”⁷ By the end of October he has elaborated a plan of uprising which Cavour approves.⁸ During the night of April 30, the patriots in Massa and Carrara

⁵ La Farina's businesslike style contrasts with the vagueness or lack of precision of many of his correspondents. I have examined a large collection of their letters in the possession of H. Nelson Gay.

■ La Farina: II. 72.

⁷ *Ibid*, 78–79; to Mazzi, Sept. 7, 1858.

■ On Oct. 19, 1858.

are to revolt, seize the authorities and garrisons, and march over the mountains to capture Parma. If all goes well, they will be in Modena and the Romagna before the Austrians can check them. While Garibaldi commands the main body of insurgents, Ulloa, another veteran of 1848, will lead the attack on Bologna. Piedmontese troops, already billeted along the frontier, will occupy Massa and Carrara, ostensibly to forestall anarchy. A Piedmontese gunboat will steam into Leghorn to prevent Austrian interference, and it is most probable that the Grand Duke, seeing himself cut off from his only support, will abdicate and flee. Meanwhile, the Lombardo-Venetians will have risen; Austria, unable to terrify Piedmont into withdrawing from the Duchies, will declare war, the French armies will come, the third struggle for Italian independence will rage, and the combat will be brief. In his letter of instructions La Farina of course makes no reference to Napoleon's aid, which is tacitly counted upon, but he states minutely the number of muskets, rounds of ammunition and percussion caps that will be needed,⁹ and lays down general rules as to the conduct of insurgent bands. He combined fervor with precision. By his efforts the National Society multiplied rapidly, and, when he had once fired its members with enthusiasm, he had to take care that they did not set off a premature explosion.

The symbol of the union of the Party of Revolution with Piedmont was the compact between Garibaldi and Cavour. The Hero of the Roman Republic, having joined the National Society early in 1857, stood ready at a moment's notice to serve the cause; but it was only after Plombières that Cavour, having begun to lay definite plans, summoned him from Caprera. At Turin the two had a long interview in which Garibaldi was completely won by the Minister,¹⁰ and delighted with the part assigned to himself. Nothing suited him better than the command of a body of volunteers, who, according to his lifelong belief, were always superior to regular troops. Having La Farina's promise that a steamer should be sent post-haste for him in case of need, he returned to Caprera impatient for the call to battle.¹¹

⁹ By March, 8000 muskets, 2000 pistols, 2000 carbines, 5 quintals of lead, and 1,000,000 percussion caps were to be collected. La Farina, II, 85.

¹⁰ "Garibaldi," says his best biographer, Guerzoni, II, 411, "is like a woman in love; when he has once given himself, he gives himself entirely." ¹¹ La Farina, II, 82, 83, 84, 91, 92, 97, 98, 99, 110. Guerzoni, II, 417-19. Pallavicino, II, 411.

While nothing seems more indisputable now than Cavour's alliance with Garibaldi — it being indeed “an immense fact,” on which the achievement of Italian unity hinged — it could not then be avowed without much hesitation; for the Monarchical party in Piedmont balked at the idea of admitting the Republican condottiere into the enterprise, the regular army looked scornfully upon a leader of volunteers, and Napoleon III, sensitive to every reminder that he was the product of a revolution, shrank from being implicated in any way with the most famous of the heroes of the recent revolutions. Cavour, however, having recognized that Garibaldi was indispensable, would not give him up: he simply delayed the announcement of their pact until events should make protests futile.

While La Farina went on, under his guidance, propitiating the Party of Action, Cavour personally made other preparations. He invited Minghetti to confer with him at Turin towards the end of October.¹² “December,” he wrote, “may be too late”; and when they met, Minghetti was astonished at the frankness with which Cavour laid the great project before him. Cavour described Victor Emanuel as being more impatient than himself, and Mazzini as being less redoubtable than the peace-at-any-price Piedmontese, because Garibaldi would draw off most of the Party of Action. Affairs would be so manipulated that Austria would be driven to declare war. As to the result, Cavour was already meditating how to make more out of it for Italy than Napoleon III proposed. A federation, under the presidency of the Pope, would not satisfy him: nothing would satisfy him short of an arrangement which acknowledged the primacy of Piedmont.¹³ A month later, when Odo Russell, the British Minister to Rome, was passing through Turin, Cavour talked to him with equal openness. “On my observing,” Russell wrote, “that Austria had but to play a waiting game to exhaust the already heavily taxed military resources of Piedmont, and that a declaration of war by Piedmont would enlist the sympathies of Europe for Austria rather than for Italy, he replied that he fully agreed with me; but that if, on the contrary, Austria declared war on Piedmont, then public opinion would side with Italy and support the cause of the

¹² *Lettere*, II, 508; C. to Minghetti, Aug. 8, 1858.

¹³ Minghetti, III, 219-25. The interview took place early in November.

weak and oppressed against the strong. On my saying that Austria was scarcely capable of committing so egregious a mistake, Cavour replied, 'But I shall *force her* to declare war against us.' I confess I felt incredulous, but asked when he expected to accomplish so great a wonder of diplomacy? 'About the first week in May,' was his reply. On leaving Cavour I took a note of our conversation. Great was the surprise of Europe when Austria declared war against Piedmont a few days before the time he had specified."¹⁴ To Cesare Giulini and Emilio Dandolo, leaders of the Lombard patriots, whom he summoned to Turin, Cavour spoke with businesslike directness. He showed them the part the Lombardo-Venetians, who had most at stake, ought to play. They must be ready to rise, but not too soon; they must keep up a constant irritation. "Arrange to have us attacked!" he repeated many times. How would it do, he asked, for the Lombard conscripts of the next spring's levy, to desert into Piedmont, where they would be enrolled in the King's army? "Austria will demand their extradition or disarming — I shall refuse; then the Austrian army will invade Piedmont." The Lombard nobles thought the plan feasible, and returned to Milan to communicate Cavour's optimistic views to their countrymen, and to develop the Cavourian policy.¹⁵ This was Cavour's offset to Archduke Maximilian's campaign of blandishment.

Since 1849, it had been accepted as a political axiom that whenever the Italians again rose against Austria the Hungarians would rise too. Cavour accordingly found a way to sound Klapka, who was, after Kossuth, the most influential of the Magyar exiles.¹⁶ But his chief task outside of Italy lay with Napoleon. The Emperor was uncertain; likely to turn to right or left in pursuit of some transient object; reluctant to give the irrevocable command. While his apparently vacillating nature did not prevent him from being tenacious in essentials, yet it caused him to procrastinate or to advance by circuits and zig-zags. For Cavour, launched on this momentous enterprise, a

¹⁴ *Quarterly Review*, July, 1879, p. 129, note. The article is by Sir A. H. Layard.

¹⁵ G. Visconti Venosta, 411-13. "Bisogna essere vissuti a quei tempi, bisogna aver seguiti quei fatti ansiosamente giorno per giorno, per avere la profonda convinzione che Cavour tutto mosse e diresse, e che il grande artefice del nuovo regno d' Italia fù lui," says Visconti Venosta, p. 413. See also Bonfadini, 395-96.

¹⁶ *Lettere*, II, 590-91.

straight course and swift gait were requisite. He sent Nigra, one of his young pupils in diplomacy, to Paris, to watch the Emperor, with whom he communicated through the usual underground channels, and in October he had the Emperor's permission to impart the secret to Villamarina. "You will see," he wrote the Ambassador, "that we are on the eve of the greatest drama of modern times, in which you are cast for a brilliant part, but one full of difficulties. At present you are destined to know everything, but to have the air of knowing nothing."¹⁷

For Napoleon himself, the difficulties of his enterprise now loomed up large and ominous. France had no sentimental reason for risking her men and treasure in Italy. Whatever prestige was to be got from interfering in Italian affairs her occupation of Rome gave; and unless she should receive adequate territorial compensation and victory should be practically certain, she would be rash to attack Austria. Napoleon could not fail to perceive that his personal interests and those of France did not coincide: for however it might strengthen his dynasty to engage in a successful war, France was growing rich and strong in peace. His position bristled with contradictions: he posed as the protector of the Pope, yet he was to appear as the ally of the Pope's chief enemy; he shone as a despot, yet he was going to help the only Liberal monarch outside of England. There were perhaps times during that autumn when he wished that he had not pledged his word; but the probability that Cavour could force Austria to declare war still seemed so remote, that he quickly regained his habitual serenity. The prospect of winning new laurels, of proving himself at last his uncle's peer, dazzled him. He had the scheme constantly in mind. He sent Prince Napoleon to see whether the Czar would take vengeance on his ungrateful Hapsburg neighbor: but Alexander promised nothing definite, although he seemed inclined to offer to hold Germany in check, in case France attacked Austria. When Prince William became Regent of Prussia, Marquis Pepoli, a Napoleonid and a Romagnole patriot, was despatched to Berlin to congratulate him on behalf of both France and Piedmont, and to discover whether Prussia might not join a league against Austria. The Emperor, whom Rouher surprised more than once poring over the map of

¹⁷ *Lettere*, II, 606: C. to Villamarina, Oct. 24, 1858.

Italy, began to drop hints.¹⁸ At Compiègne, in November, he entertained Palmerston and Clarendon¹⁹ and talked to them freely about "cleaning up Italy." Not content with allowing Edmond About to print in the *Moniteur* a series of articles on Papal misgovernment, he caused Montalembert, the most eloquent lay spokesman of French Catholics, to be prosecuted for satirizing the Empire.²⁰ He welcomed Salvagnoli, the restless Florentine lawyer-patriot, who unfolded a bold scheme for creating three kingdoms: leaving the Pope undisturbed in Rome, there would remain Upper Italy for Victor Emanuel, Central Italy for a French prince, and Southern Italy for a ruler to be chosen by England. Such a partition, Salvagnoli argued, would close forever the cavern out of which revolution and war had issued to harm France: for it would give France a devoted ally by whose aid she could dominate the Mediterranean, and it would open the way, if there were need, to Vienna and the Orient.²¹ Cavour's private messages to the Emperor at this time have not been published, but we may suspect that in them the danger from assassins was not forgotten. We do know that Cavour kept telling Napoleon that France and Europe could never have peace until the Italians' just demands were satisfied.

Napoleon's conversations with the English statesmen, quickly reported to the British Ministry²² and to the Queen, caused much anxiety: for they confirmed the presentiment which, for some time, had troubled the Court and the Tory leaders, that Napoleon would be driven to war in order to appease the Chauvinistic fury which he had kindled and encouraged. Official England did not desire any disturbance, least of all a conflict which might result in the aggrandizement of the French Empire. The racial jealousy between the two peoples had not been extinguished by their alliance in the Crimea, nor by the personal friendship of their sovereigns, nor by formal treaties. The English had not forgotten the saucy threats of the French colonels ten months before. War, even if England should escape being involved in it,

¹⁸ Maupas: *Mémoires*, II, 83 n. ¹⁹ Ashley, II, 259. Greville, III, 459-60.

²⁰ After two months, the Clericals forced Napoleon to suppress About's articles. Montalembert was found guilty, sentenced to six months' imprisonment and then ostentatiously granted a pardon, which he rejected.

²¹ *Stor. Doc.*, VIII, 15-16. ²² Clarendon reached London on Nov. 21, and at once talked with Malmesbury. See latter's *Memoirs*, 455.

would seriously interfere with her trade. The recent mutiny in India, which strained her resources to the utmost, increased her desire for peace. She was pledged to befriend, if not to uphold Austria; and as it was evident that Napoleon's plans were leveled at Austria, she had another reason for preventing a clash. Lord Cowley, Ambassador at Paris, was instructed to open Napoleon's eyes. Having heard that Napoleon supposed he could make himself most popular in England by freeing Italy, the Queen²³ instructed Cowley to assure him that this was a great mistake. Early in the autumn, when questioned by Cowley as to the purpose of the undisguised military preparations in France, Napoleon frankly told him that, while he personally desired to maintain the English alliance, the attitude of the English press forced him to be ready for any emergency. His policy, which many criticized as tortuous, was, he said, very simple. France had craved peace on his accession to power, and he gave her peace. When the war in the East broke out, he aimed to make France respected: if other nations gained, France must gain. He had cherished two ideals — the resuscitation of Poland and the amelioration of Italy — because no peace would endure until these were realized. As long as there was hope for Poland, he turned to Austria to bring pressure against Russia: that had failed. Now, having Italy's destiny in view, he drew near to Russia.²⁴ At Windsor, however, Napoleon's coquetting with Russia was attributed to his dread of a coalition of England, Prussia and Austria, which he imagined the Queen's "Uncle Leopold" was arranging. Prince Albert, writing in his usual confidential tone to Baron Stockmar, says: "We are, in fact, on a more friendly footing with Austria than we have been for a long time, simply from the fact that the latter, in the consciousness of her own weakness, shut up as she is between the hostile powers of France and Russia, feels the necessity for attaching herself to England, and for sacrificing to that object some harmless prejudices."²⁵

Two months later, Queen Victoria had become so much alarmed over the news which Cowley sent from Paris that she wrote Malmesbury that whatever could be done to turn Napoleon from his projected war, ought to be done. "If he makes war

■ Martin, iv, 341.

²⁴ *Ibid*, iv, 316.

■ *Ibid*, iv, 319; Albert to Stockmar, Oct. 12, 1858.

in Italy," she remarked, "it must in all probability lead to war with Germany, and if with Germany, will embrace Belgium, and if so must, according to our guarantees, draw us into the quarrel, and France may thus have the whole of Europe against her, as in 1814 and 1815."²⁶ Malmesbury replied that he had undertaken to pacify Napoleon, by suggesting that, if he really wished to better the lot of the Italians, he should join his Catholic brother of Austria — instead of sulking with him — to compel the Pope to improve the government of the States of the Church. This suggestion ignored the fact that Italy's capital grievance was the presence of the Austrians in the Peninsula. Malmesbury informed Queen Victoria that although Count Buol rasped Napoleon by tactless despatches, the latter could not possibly use them as a pretext for war, and that France was making no such military preparations as must precede an Italian campaign.²⁷ Still the Queen clung to her foreboding;²⁸ and the Foreign Office continued to warn Napoleon against committing a great folly.

Napoleon himself dealt in mystification. He talked so pacifically that an experienced diplomat like Cowley believed him.²⁹ Yet to his next caller he might prophesy war. He delighted more than usual in oracular phrases: he was a man of peace, he said, but the treaties must be upheld at any cost; he sympathized with poor Italy, but he was not a revolutionist. Walewski, to whom he had not revealed his plan, spent an uncomfortable autumn trying to explain the Emperor's contradictions. He told Hübner, for instance, that the interview at Plombières was really unimportant; Cavour was getting notoriety out of it in the papers — that was all.³⁰ Napoleon himself assured the Austrian Ambassador that if he wished to pick a quarrel, Austria offered him plenty of reasons for so doing: the fact that he allowed them to slip by, indicated his peaceable purpose.³¹ Plon-Plon, let into the secret early, and always a hater of Austria, spoke out regard-

²⁶ Martin, iv, 342; Queen to Malmesbury, Dec. 9, 1858.

²⁷ Q. V. L., III, 390-91; Malmesbury to the Queen, Dec. 10, 1858.

²⁸ On Dec. 17 she wrote to her "Dearest Uncle" Leopold: "I really *hope* that there is no *real* desire for war in the Emperor's mind; we have also explained to him strongly how *entirely* he would *alienate* us from him if there was any attempt to *disturb standing and binding treaties*." *Ibid.*, III, 391-92.

²⁹ Hübner, II, 239; Dec. 18, 1858.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 210; Aug. 22, 1858.

³¹ *Ibid.*

less alike of the Tuileries and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. His court in the Palais Royal became a factory of indiscretions. On November 23, Walewski calmed the anxiety of several ambassadors by declaring that peace was never better assured. Yet that very evening the *Presse*, Prince Napoleon's organ, published these lines: "We do not love war, and we hope that some day it will disappear from the surface of Europe; but we should like to see one war, and that that one should be directed against Austria."³² The *Patrie*, the mouthpiece of the Emperor, indulged in a similar suggestive outburst. By the simple device of keeping Walewski in the dark, Napoleon helped on the game of cross-purposes.³³ Although Hübner found his post uncomfortable, he was not a man to be bullied. Knowing that what he said would reach the Tuileries, he told Cowley that the Italians would be justified in believing from these utterances of the Parisian press that Napoleon had decided to make war on Austria, but that, if there were risings in Italy, and the Princes appealed to Austria for aid, they should have it, whether France liked it or not.³⁴ At another time, Hübner made it plain that Napoleon was woefully deceived if he supposed Austria would surrender Lombardy as a compensation for the Danubian Principalities; for Austria, he declared solemnly, would stand immutably on the treaties, and would defend her possessions in Italy to the death.³⁵ The newspapers continued to rant: the Viennese press, which for months past had irritated Napoleon, now ranted more loudly. He deemed it wise to insert in the official *Moniteur* a disavowal of one of the furious articles in Plon-Plon's *Presse*. When the stock exchange began to flutter, James de Rothschild, god of finance, felt it to be his duty to advise the Emperor that the journalists' wrangle was upsetting the market. Napoleon protested that he had no intention of bringing about changes in Italy. The market, on this tip, 'closed strong.' But in a few days the *Presse* broke loose again — this time with personal abuse of Emperor Francis Joseph and Archduchess Sophie.

"If things go on thus," Hübner writes in his diary, "my position will become untenable."³⁶ Hübner had to admit, never-

³² *Lettere*, vi, 330; quoting also Darimon's diary. ■ Rothan: *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Feb. 1, 1899, pp. 774-78, gives a good account of the Emperor and Minister at this period.

■ Hübner, II, 233; Nov. 30, 1858.

³⁵ *Ibid*, II, 238; Dec. 14, 1858.

■ *Ibid*, II, 240.

theless, that, in spite of his suggestions, the Austrian press had not been curbed, and that Buol's tone towards France had been uniformly exasperating. Buol acted consistently on the assumption that Austria was a superior state, privileged to go on her way in spite of her neighbors, and that, indeed, it was impudent in them to criticize or to question her. He made the egregious error of supposing that even an Austrian prime minister could dispense with ordinary politeness,³⁷ and if he had wished to be conciliatory, his conciliation would have been mistaken for an affront. Hübner had not recovered from the vilification of the *Presse*, when he received a despatch from Buol bidding him inform the French government that if the Servians, who were undergoing one of their periodic agitations against Turkish barbarity, should attack the Turkish garrison at Belgrade, Austria, on the request of the Turkish commander, would march troops to his assistance. (Dec. 28.) "This is a tile dropt on my head," writes the perplexed Hübner; "and perhaps also on this poor peace, already so sick."³⁸ The next day, Hübner communicated the message to Walewski, who asked why, when the atmosphere was already overcharged with electricity, they should set up their lightning rod, to draw down the current and cause an explosion. On the last day of the year, Walewski by the Emperor's order gave formal warning to Hübner that, if Austria carried out her threat at Belgrade, the Powers would take steps to compel her to respect the Treaty of 1856.³⁹

Amid such uncertainty the year 1858 closed. Italy's redemption seemed still remote. Cavour and his lieutenants were working for it with might and main. Napoleon desired it, but with an intermittent zeal. Official France had not yet got its cue from the Emperor; aristocratic France, bourgeois and banking France, shuddered at the mere whisper of war. Official England, Queen, Prince Consort and Tory Cabinet, were honestly bent on preventing a conflict. Prussia, which had still to grope for four years for a far-sighted statesman, was inclined to play into Austria's hands. Unless the agitation should spread to Poland, Russia would remain neutral, but would piously offer up anti-Austrian prayers. Austria herself, conscious of her superiority,

³⁷ In this respect, he was the opposite of his great predecessor, Metternich.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 241-42.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 242-43.

would neither bend nor budge, but would welcome an occasion for demonstrating once for all her ability to blot out Piedmont, and, with Piedmont, the Italian Question. Europe seemed to be caught in a tangle of cross-purposes.

At one o'clock on Saturday, January 1, 1859, Napoleon held at the Tuileries his customary New Year's reception to the Diplomatic Corps. He said to the Papal Nuncio: ⁴⁰ "I hope that the year which opens will only cement an alliance for the welfare of the peoples and for the peace of Europe." Then, "on passing before me," writes Hübner, "he says in a friendly tone: 'I regret that our relations are not so good as I wish they were, but I beg you to write to Vienna that my personal sentiments for your Emperor are unchanged.' These words are interpreted differently by those of my colleagues who heard them. Cowley sees in them a proof of bad humor; Kisseleff and Hatzfeldt ⁴¹ an amplification of the pacific reply to the Nuncio, and, consequently, the desire to say something agreeable. Lord Chelsea, first secretary of embassy at Paris, has nothing better to do than to run to the Union Club, and to spread there an inexact version of this incident. From that, a universal panic. At the end of the day, Paris is in consternation." ⁴² Within twenty-four hours, the telegraph had spread the report throughout Europe. Every cabinet saw in it an authentic warning. The announcement that Napoleon chatted genially in public with the Austrian Ambassador the next day appeased nobody. There was almost a panic on the Bourse, followed by the official statement that "nothing in the diplomatic relations justified the current fears." ⁴³ France and Europe accepted war as inevitable. And yet, it seems doubtful whether Napoleon meant to disclose his plans so early, because it was obviously for his advantage to keep them secret as long as possible, in order that his preparations could go on undisturbed. He had repeatedly cautioned Cavour against letting their collusion be suspected, ⁴⁴ and though he wrote on New Year's eve to tell Queen Victoria that Prince Napoleon was to marry Princess Clothilde, he treated the affair as having no political significance; as if its purpose were only "to create for the Empress a companionship at once intimate and agreeable." ⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Archbishop Sacconi.

⁴¹ The Russian and Prussian Ambassadors.

⁴² Hübner, II, 244-45.

⁴³ *Moniteur*, Jan. 7, 1859.

⁴⁴ *Lettere*, III, xviii.

⁴⁵ Martin, IV, 343.

Cavour also seems to have been astonished when he read the words addressed to Hübner. "It looks as if the Emperor wants to go ahead!" he exclaimed. Then he set about adjusting his plans to the new schedule. To fix Napoleon's resolution, or at least to get a definite statement of his present purpose, Cavour sent to Paris a draft of the Address from the Throne with which the King was to reopen Parliament on January 10. It came back with most important additions, all pointing towards war. As delivered by Victor Emanuel the speech concluded thus: "*Deputies! Senators! The horizon amid which the New Year rises is not wholly serene; in spite of which you will apply yourself with customary alacrity to your parliamentary labors. Fortified by the experience of the past we resolutely go to meet the eventualities of the future. This future will be happy, with our policy based on justice, love of liberty and of country. Our country, small in territory, won credit in the councils of Europe because it is great through the ideas it represents, the sympathies that it inspires. This condition is not without perils, because while we respect the treaties, we are not insensible to the cry of suffering which is raised towards us from so many parts of Italy. Strong through concord, trusting in our good right, prudent and resolute, we await the decrees of Divine Providence.*" ⁴⁶

As Victor Emanuel uttered these words, Palazzo Madama rang with a storm of applause which was echoed up and down the Peninsula as fast as the telegraph could distribute them. Every patriot felt, every reactionary feared, that they were a declaration of war. Some of the King's phrases — especially the "cry of suffering" — (*grido di dolore*) — became household words. No attempt was made to minimize or to explain away their meaning. "I believe that 'the eventualities of the future' will not keep us waiting long," Cavour wrote Jocteau ⁴⁷ on January 11. "For we have put Austria in an impasse from which she cannot get out without firing off cannon. She has let slip the occasion for making concessions: and the régime of the sabre which she must forcibly adopt cannot last without aggravating it to the

⁴⁶ Text in Zini, II, pt. II, p. 17. I have italicized the passages revised by the Emperor. I have examined the original MS., a facsimile of which is given by Pietro Vayra, *Museo Storico della Casa di Savoia nell'Archivio di Stato in Torino* (Turin: Bocca, 1880). *Centenario*, 27 ff. where there is also a facsimile.

⁴⁷ Piedmontese Minister at Berne.

point of raising a universal cry of reprobation in Europe. War must necessarily spring from such a situation. We must not proclaim it, nor even appear to desire it; but we must show it to be an inevitable consequence of Austria's policy." ⁴⁸ The Lombards went almost wild with joy. At Turin, it seemed as if the enthusiasm of 1848 had returned; but the Piedmontese, like folk who have been burned, were a little circumspect. ⁴⁹

The rumor of a marriage between the King's daughter, Princess Clothilde, and the Emperor's cousin, Prince Napoleon, was accepted as proof positive of a political alliance. ⁵⁰ On January 16 the Prince reached Turin. Two days later he signed a secret treaty with Piedmont. In company with General Niel he inspected arsenals and barracks and reviewed troops, and the General and La Marmora made a study of the Dora Baltea as a possible line of defense in case the Austrians should invade the capital. On January 23 the General, in behalf of the Prince, formally requested the hand of the Princess. True to his word, Victor Emanuel left the decision to his daughter, and she, true to the sense of duty which stamped the House of Savoy, consented. The nobility, however, were so shocked at the sacrifice, that only five court ladies attended the ball given by Cavour in the Prince's honor. The King feared a similar slight at his reception, but the nobles, realizing that their expression of personal chagrin and disapproval might complicate the situation, showed proper respect. After the religious ceremony on January 30, the bridal couple, the King, Cavour and La Marmora went to Genoa. At every point, the population of that restless city hailed Victor Emanuel with delirious affection. They cheered him as "King of Italy"; they cheered for war; they cheered for Italian Independence. He told them that, if grave difficulties should arise — as seemed probable — he relied upon Genoa. He told Sir James Hudson, without reserve, that he thought war inevitable. ⁵¹ The Republican Bertani, who had already divined the true state of affairs, watched these demonstrations with satisfaction. "Cavour," he wrote Panizzi, "is towing with great force the ministry, the aristocracy, Piedmontism and the country into war." ⁵²

⁴⁸ *Lettere*, III, 10–11.

■ C. d'Azeglio, 548.

⁵⁰ Cavour was annoyed by the premature announcement. *Lettere*, III, 16.

⁵¹ *Correspondence*; Hudson to Malmesbury, Feb. 2, 1859.

⁵² Panizzi, p. 284; Bertani to Panizzi, Feb. 1, 1859.

This month of January, which brought the elixir of youth to Piedmont, filled European cabinets with alarm. The plot of the drama was beginning to be surmised even by spectators before the footlights. Cavour, First Conspirator, was moving heaven and earth to provoke a war by the first of May; Napoleon III, Second Conspirator, also desired war, but was undecided as to when and how; England shrank from war on any pretext; Russia would neither abet nor prevent, but would watch to take her profit where she should see it; Prussia and the German States were slow in understanding the situation; Austria, growing more and more puffed up as her position became more dubious, would not have Europe imagine that she could be influenced by international persuasion or would lift her finger except as her own interest dictated. The overt act of war must be made, therefore, either by her or by Cavour; but Cavour would not assume the risk unless he were sure of Napoleon's support; Prince Albert and Queen Victoria resolved to avert the catastrophe.

In Derby and Malmesbury and other members of the Tory ministry, they had willing servants. Palmerston had made England a name to battle with on the Continent; Napoleon desired her alliance; the new Prince Regent of Prussia and some of the German princelings were inclined to follow her lead. It happened, however, that the Queen, Prince Consort and Malmesbury coddled wrong notions on two vital points: they thought that Napoleon was being goaded into war through fear of assassination; and Malmesbury at least knew so little about the real state of parties in Italy, that he regarded the purposes of Cavour and Mazzini as identical. Prince Albert set Cavour down as a third-rate politician, tricky, unscrupulous and unprincipled. Now, it is as indispensable for a statesman to know the character and motives of his opponents, as for a general to know the ability and muster of his adversaries and the country where the campaign is to be fought. The penalty for ignorance and for underestimating your enemy is usually disaster. Prince Albert had about him too much of the German doctrinaire, and Malmesbury was too fine a specimen of the old-fashioned aristocratic Tory, to fit them to cope successfully with a statesman like Cavour, who saw the situation as it really was, day by day, and not as he wished it to be.

The very qualities which made the English the dominant European nation in the nineteenth century, hindered their public men, especially those born in the purple, from understanding other races.⁵³ To be English was to be as unlike Frenchman, German or Italian as possible. The Englishman behaved as if he feared that by adapting himself in the slightest trifle to foreign usage, he would speedily lose his identity. He drank brandy and soda in the tropics, not because it was prudent to do so, but because he drank them in England. His contempt for foreigners made it still harder for him to know them through and through: for human nature responds to sympathy, and not to condescension or to contempt. It no more occurred to John Bull to disguise his consciousness of superiority than it would to a lion moving among the lower animals: why disavow what the Lord chose to make so conspicuous? He carried in his heart three deep-rooted instincts which affected, consciously or unconsciously, his international political calculations. He so hated Popery that the mere rumor that some pious lady had joined the Roman Church or that Dr. Pusey had added an inch to the brim of his shovel-hat, agitated him with visions of the restoration of the Pope's dominion in Britain. Next, he had dreaded, ever since the days of the Camp of Boulogne, the possibility of a French invasion. Lastly, he believed that Russia, with one hand stretched out to snatch Constantinople and the other to seize India, must be incessantly circumvented. Besides taking no pains to conceal his belief in his superiority, John Bull, according to his neighbors, was an expert in cant. He exasperated them by pretending that his political acts were inspired by the most religious motives; conversely, he saw only wickedness in their dealings. If hypocrisy be the tribute vice pays to virtue, French cynics would set down John Bull as the most vice-ridden creature the world had ever seen. He honestly believed that "British Interests" were paramount to the Moral Law and that God was the retired partner in the firm which managed those interests. John Bull's neighbors resented this assumption of superior virtue. They saw him bullying, conquering and sometimes exterminating weaker nations; they believed that

■ Compare two subsequent instances: the attitude of the English upper class towards the United States during the Civil War, and Lord Salisbury's ignorance of American public opinion in 1895.

he went into the Crimean War for motives just as selfish as their own; and when he cast his eyes heavenward and effused on the Christian spirit, they found in Pecksniff, the master-stroke of England's national novelist, a revelation of John Bull's real nature. The portrait that one nation paints of another is likely to appear either a libel or a caricature to the sitter: but it is a document of the first importance to the historian, who needs to know not only what men did, and their motives, but the character and motives which their contemporaries imputed to them. So the aversion which Europe felt for mid-Victorian England was not caused by envy so much as by resentment at the assumption of superior virtue, with superciliousness as its companion. Three centuries earlier the Spaniard had lorded it over the Continent, and his haughtiness was disagreeable to behold; but he did not intensify it by parading, in the midst of his pursuit of wealth and of power, claims to unselfishness.

When, therefore, official England determined to prevent war, Europe argued that it was because she saw no probable profit in it for her, but, on the contrary, the possibility of much loss. Having secured what she wanted by the Crimean War, which denatured the Treaties of 1815, she now insisted that those treaties must be respected. The spectre of a Napoleonic campaign of conquest alarmed her — therefore she turned to Austria; the suspicion that Russia would make a dash on Turkey troubled her — therefore she turned to Austria. To maintain peace, with Austria as the bulwark against these two perils, was accordingly her logical aim; and any war might lead to a general European conflict. England had not yet forgotten the frightful cost of her Crimean enterprise, and she was already straining her inadequate military resources in order to punish her rebels and to solidify her empire in India. The first fever of excitement caused by Napoleon's New Year's Day remarks had not yet subsided, therefore, ere the British Foreign Office began its mission of peace-maker.

On January 10 Malmesbury sent to Cowley at Paris a despatch containing arguments why France should refrain from hostilities. France, he said, having no valid grievance against Austria, must not allow herself to be trapped into war by the guile of a second-rate Power, seeking its own aggrandizement.

Whatever the pretext of a rupture might be, the conflict would soon go beyond pretexts to principles, and then it could not be the wish of the Emperor to appear as the patron of the Revolution. If he intended to remodel Italy, he might indeed violate the Treaties of 1815, but he could not possibly achieve independence and liberty for the Italians; they would, at most, change masters. Europe, conservative Europe, which regarded the treaties as sacred, would be against him; his position must be precarious, it might become untenable. If he wished to reform the governments of the Italian States, England would join him, and doubtless Austria herself would be glad to add her insistence to theirs.⁵⁴ When Cowley read this despatch to Walewski, the latter replied that France would not go to war unless she were provoked, her purpose being to defend the treaties, not to trample them down.⁵⁵ Cowley, suspecting that Walewski might not speak with full authority, had an interview with the Emperor himself, who feigned surprise at the persistent circulation of war rumors. "War," he added, with Delphic gravity, "is not more probable today than it was three months ago. I have neither the desire nor the design of provoking it."⁵⁶ That same day, the French Ambassador in London called on Lord Malmesbury and assured him that there was no likelihood of war "*at present*, because public opinion in France, especially in the large towns, had been so strongly pronounced against it."⁵⁷

To Vienna, Malmesbury wrote that if Austria began a war in Italy it "would soon assume the character of a revolutionary contest." Exiled pretenders would spring up, to endanger the integrity of the Empire. Official England would remain neutral; but Austria must not forget that English public opinion had a "natural tendency to sympathize with Italian nationalities," and that the British Government itself sympathized with them so far as they had just cause of discontent. He advised Austria and France, after evacuating the Papal States, to unite in pressing reforms on the Pope.⁵⁸ To sugar-coat his recommendations, Malmesbury lauded Archduke Maximilian's régime in

⁵⁴ *Correspondence*, 4-6; Malmesbury to Cowley, Jan. 10, 1859.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 12; Cowley to Malmesbury, Jan. 14, 1859.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 20; Cowley to Malmesbury, Jan. 19, 1859.

⁵⁷ Malmesbury, 460. *Q. V. L.*, III, 399.

⁵⁸ *Correspondence*, 7-9; Malmesbury to Loftus, Jan. 12, 1859.

Lombardy. To this sensible counsel, Buol replied with characteristic hauteur that if his lordship wished to preach peace he should address Paris and Turin, and not Vienna, for Austria would not begin war: but she was ready, and if Piedmont were so insane as to attack her, she would quickly overwhelm the Piedmontese army. What Italy needed was not a territorial or political remodeling, but to be purged of her incendiaries.⁵⁹

To Bloomfield at Berlin and to Crampton at St. Petersburg, Malmesbury enclosed copies of these despatches, together with special instructions to urge the Prussian Prince Regent and the Czar to coöperate in preserving peace.⁶⁰ The Czar was polite but non-committal; Prince William was eager, for neither he nor his Minister, Schleinitz, perceived that by taking sides against Austria they could promote Prussia's leadership in Germany. With what seems almost fatuous complaisance they allowed Austria to cajole the secondary German princes into declaring that they should regard an attack on Austria as an attack on the Confederation. The recollection of the First Napoleon's wars of ambition was still so vivid that the Germans dreaded every French military enterprise. "Our bad reputation as conquerors," said Mérimée, "renders our position very difficult."⁶¹

Rightly regarding Turin as the storm-centre, Malmesbury spared no effort to preserve calm there. At the beginning of the year, Hudson reported that the general condition of Italy was worse than it had been three years before, when the Congress of Paris discussed it, and that patriotic exasperation among the Lombards was increasing. Malmesbury instructed Hudson to approach the Piedmontese cordially. In his despatch he praised the little State for its constitutional government, its rapid progress, its wise use of liberty, its enlightenment. Then, in the tone of a strong and opulent gentleman patronizing a worthy child, he went on to warn Piedmont against a war which, if unsuccessful, might literally annihilate her. Even if successful against Austria, she could never hope that the rival Italian princes would permit her to set up a large kingdom at their expense. If she had grievances, let her confide them to England, whose benevolence to-

⁵⁹ *Ib.*, 22-25; Loftus to Malmesbury, Jan. 20, 1859.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 10; Malmesbury to Bloomfield, Jan. 12; to Crampton, Jan. 12; pp. 9-10.

⁶¹ Mérimée, I, 23.

wards Italy could not be doubted. Cavour must have listened to his friend Hudson's reading of this message with as much amusement as Hudson himself: because both of them knew that Malmesbury did not care a fig for Piedmont or Italy, except in so far as trouble on the Peninsula might spread over the Continent and embroil England herself in war. Blessed, indeed, are the peacemakers, but when their motive is selfish, it loses in moral impulse. Cavour genially replied to Hudson that Piedmont had simply followed the path that England had marked out, and that Europe was to blame for rousing the hopes of the Italians and then doing nothing for them. A fortnight earlier, Cavour had told Hudson that "if people expected that Sardinia was going to declare war, they were likely to be disappointed."⁶² Now he made no predictions." Hudson was in a position which required both tact and honor. He was bound to carry out the instructions of his government, not merely perfunctorily, but with the honest purpose of making the British reasons prevail. At the same time, as the most zealous foreign-born friend of Italy in high station, it must have caused him many a pang to be forced to urge upon the Piedmontese Minister views which he knew originated in the ignorance, prejudice or hostility of his superiors. He did his duty so faithfully that Cavour never confounded the official spokesman of the Foreign Office with the enthusiast for Italian independence: nor did Cavour allow his friendship for the man to hamper his own official freedom.

Hudson had recently returned from England ⁶³ with news of the unfriendliness of the upper classes towards Piedmont. Since England had leagued herself with Austria, she discerned only annoyance in Cavour's acts. He displeased her by his decision in the Danubian Question; he irritated her by allowing the Russians to use Villafranca as a coaling station; he gave her no rest by keeping the Italian agitation to the fore: and now he had seduced Napoleon III to become a partner in his schemes. Even the Whigs seemed to have turned against him, and their defection cut Cavour keenly. He said that Palmerston and Russell, in their talk at least, were a hundred times worse than the Tories.⁶⁴

⁶² *Correspondence*, 3.

■ As he had left Turin in half-eclipse, his return seemed for a while doubtful.

■ *Politique*, 301; C. to E. d'Azeglio, Dec. 1, 1858. Salvagnoli had reported to Cavour his interviews with the Whig leaders.

To deal with Malmesbury, whose steady opposition could be counted upon, might be preferable: at any rate, Cavour, while making no advances, would not irritate the Tory chiefs.⁶⁵ Malmesbury himself supposed that Palmerston was behind the Franco-Piedmontese plot, and was using it as a lever for overthrowing the Tories.⁶⁶ The *Morning Post*, which lived by Napoleon's subsidy, had orders to attack Malmesbury on every possible occasion, while it praised the French policy, condemned the Austrians, and extolled the Whigs. Palmerston and Lord John Russell had come to an understanding by which, if they could beat the Derby ministry, they agreed to join in forming a new one. Malmesbury clung with heroic self-righteousness to the belief that John Bull alone was disinterested and virtuous. "The great duty of every honest man," he wrote, "must be to prevent the scourge which two or three unprincipled men would inflict on mankind for their personal profit."⁶⁷ He rejoiced that none of the bankers would subscribe to a new Piedmontese loan — Lafitte told him that London would not take even £2000; he rejoiced that Cavour was "bankrupt and desperate."⁶⁸ Malmesbury lacked at least one attribute of statesmen of the first rank: he believed the testimony which coincided with his wishes rather than with the facts. So he listened thankfully when Lafitte described "Cavour as a desperate adventurer who has ruined his country by his expenses. He says he is ready to go anywhere for a sum to cover his financial bungling, and that if he does not have a war he will be turned out on his budget. He works the Orsini gang by saying, 'Don't be such fools as to kill the only man who can help Italy, but frighten him with it.' Hence the continual terror agitated around the Emperor."⁶⁹ The Piedmontese loan, which the London financiers rejected, was soon afterwards, to Cavour's gratification, oversubscribed by the small bourgeois and country-folk of Piedmont.

At the beginning of February, the situation appeared thus: France would not provoke war, but would support Piedmont if she was attacked; Piedmont gave no pledges, but insisted that

■ *Ibid*, 302 and 309. "All our study should be not to irritate these surly islanders." C. to E. d'Azeglio, Jan. 23, 1859.

⁶⁵ Malmesbury, 460. And yet Malmesbury commended Cowley for offering to submit his views to Palmerston. *Ibid*, 459; Jan. 15, 1859. ⁶⁷ Malmesbury, 459; Jan. 15, 1859. ⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 459. Martin, III, 357. ⁶⁹ Malmesbury, 459.

actual conditions could not long continue; Austria professed not to desire war, but increased her army in Italy and massed troops along the Piedmontese frontier; England would prevent war at all costs; Prussia preferred peace, but reserved her decision; the German Confederation had been captured by Austria; Russia hated Austria, but would not yet promise to join in a campaign against her. A month's diplomatizing had settled nothing: indeed, there was a general presentiment that war could not be averted. Europe listened eagerly for the Sphinx of the Tuileries to speak: and when he spoke, Europe was more perplexed than before. How far Napoleon's fluctuating utterances during this crisis were due to his temperament and how far they were, as the world thought, premeditated, cannot be determined: but, whether planned or not, they served perfectly to keep the public in an ebb-and-flow of uncertainty. While he declared that he loved peace, his preparations for war went on; he disavowed ulterior designs on Austria, but he would not deny his lifelong sympathy for Italy. Not one of his ministers could be sure that he knew the Emperor's real intentions. Prince Napoleon alone unreservedly favored war, and his newspapers kept on causing the public, and especially the bankers, a succession of nervous shocks.

On February 4 appeared an unsigned pamphlet, "The Emperor Napoleon III and Italy," ⁷⁰ which startled Europe. Its writer was Viscount Arthur de La Guéronnière, a facile, clear expositor, who, in this case, held the pen while Napoleon dictated the ideas. The pamphlet, written late in the preceding summer, after the interview at Plombières, had been held back to be printed at a favorable moment. After unfolding Napoleon's political philosophy, it shows the practical steps that must be taken. Modern Europe has to deal with two elements — the Revolution and the Principle of Nationality. The Revolution offers neither sane nor permanent remedies: the Principle of Nationality, on the other hand, may be made the prop of thrones. It will regenerate Italy; it will unite Germany, if Germany wakes up to see that in following Austria she is the accomplice of her own abasement. England, so long their friend, cannot abandon the

⁷⁰ [L. E. Arthur de La Guéronnière] *L'Empereur Napoléon III et l'Italie*. (Paris: Dentu, 1859. 5th edition.)

Italians now; and France, from no selfish motive, is absorbed in their fate. Only by the flowering of the "Italian idea" can the Peninsula be pacified; then at last will Europe enjoy tranquillity. Since Novara, Piedmont has been the land of promise. "There the 'Italian idea' is the passion of King Victor Emanuel, and the banner of the Cabinet presided over by Count Cavour."⁷¹ La Guéronnière exhibits the other states, one by one, only to show them wanting. The centre of evil is Rome, where the mixing of spiritual and temporal régimes results in the corrupting of both. Civil affairs are strangled by medieval canon law: the Pope, however patriotic he once appeared, cannot encourage the National Spirit for fear it may threaten Papal interests; and since he cannot maintain an army of his own — so feeble is his administration, and so hateful to his subjects — he has to rely upon foreign troops. Napoleon has urged reforms upon him, but to no purpose. Were Pius himself eager to cleanse his administration, a heavy hand would check him. Austria cannot consent to reforms in any other section of Italy, because she cannot reform her Lombardo-Venetian provinces. What is to be done? Reforms under the existing conditions are impossible: yet the existing conditions swarm with dangers. Were it not for Austria, the Italians could save themselves by revolution. Europe, responsible for their plight, must come to their rescue, and must apply the obvious remedy — federation. Napoleon finds it as easy as Gioberti did before him, to deduce from Italian history, literature and character, that the only solution is a federated Italy.⁷² Though Austria may object, the public opinion of Europe will overwhelm her.

It has been the fashion to sneer at this pamphlet, but if we judge it by the lucidity with which it presents the Italian situation, we shall not be inclined to undervalue it. The Federal project, which seems visionary now, still seemed feasible to a minority of Republicans and Monarchists then. La Guéronnière put it forward as a feeler, just as he suggested that not war but European public opinion would compel Austria to accede to an arrangement which the peace of mankind required. Far from seeming chimerical to all its readers, many of them hailed the

⁷¹ *Ibid*, 30. ⁷² With equal ease, he cites Henry IV of France and Napoleon I as sponsors of the general plan.

utterance as an inspiration. Men as opposite as the Jesuit, Father Ventura, Conservative Count Sclopis and Moderate Gino Capponi applauded it. Massimo d'Azeglio, at odds with Cavour for a long time, experienced a sudden change of heart, and wrote him that the present duty of every Italian was to support the Cavourian policy.⁷³ The peacemakers, however, vibrated between rage and consternation. Hübner advised Walewski to disavow a document which was equivalent to a declaration of war on Austria.⁷⁴ The English Court party felt that their dread was confirmed. Old Pélistier, the French Ambassador at London, went about in a very undiplomatic flutter making disloyal revelations⁷⁵ and telling Queen Victoria and others that at the first reverse the Napoleonic régime would be done for.⁷⁶ On the very day when the pamphlet appeared the Queen wrote the Emperor a private letter, couched somewhat in the tone of a virtuous sister who desires to reform a profligate brother, and warning him that England could not associate herself with the war project attributed to him.⁷⁷ In opening Parliament on February 3, the Queen declared that "to maintain inviolate the Faith of Public Treaties" was an object of her "unceasing solicitude." This meant that England would stand by the Treaty of 1815, which gave Austria dominion in Italy, and the Treaty of 1856, which pinched Russia in the Orient. Lord Derby upheld the Queen's address by asserting that, even if Italy were relieved of foreigners, internal dissensions would render unity impossible. He could safely brand the Papal States as "the real plague spot"; and having praised Piedmont as a "small but heroic State," that had been "a bright spot" amid the surrounding gloom, he expressed the hope that she would be better advised and abandon the dangerous path she had recently chosen. He also wished that the French Emperor might "continue in that wise and prudent and loyal course" he had hitherto pursued.⁷⁸ Two days later, Cowley telegraphed that Her Majesty's letter, reinforced by her address, and by Lord Derby's speech, had caused a great improvement at Paris.⁷⁹

On February 7 the Emperor opened the Legislative session with a speech so artfully phrased that nobody needed to suspect

⁷³ *Lettere*, III, 394-95. D'Azeglio: *Politique*, 91.

⁷⁴ Hübner, II, 279.

⁷⁵ Malmesbury, 463.

⁷⁶ Martin, IV, 365.

⁷⁷ Martin: IV, 366-68. For Lord Derby's draft, *Q. V. L.*, III, 402-03.

⁷⁸ III Hansard, clii, 3, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48.

⁷⁹ *Q. V. L.*, III, 405.

that he was bent on fighting. Some persons, he said, seemed to have forgotten his moderation; others had forgotten the real power of France. He laid special stress on his excellent relations with England, on the cordiality of Russia, on the mutual goodwill between France and Piedmont. There was much friction, he regretted, with Austria, and the state of Italy was bad, but not necessarily incurable without war. "I shall continue steadfast in the path of right, justice and national honor," he added, dropping into the vein of oracular platitude. Resolved to be "firm but conciliatory," he hoped that peace would not be disturbed.⁸⁰ Each side interpreted his speech according to its prepossessions. In Paris, the pessimists preponderated. In London, Malmesbury and his set took it as evidence that the Emperor had backed out handsomely. "That he *should* back out is the great point." His lordship failed to perceive that statecraft, like the crab, sometimes seems to back out when it is really advancing. Kossuth interpreted the oracle to mean war.⁸¹ Cavour was so little disheartened by it that on February 9 he began the discussion in the Subalpine Parliament of a bill authorizing a loan of 50,000,000 lire.

To follow hour by hour the succession of hopes and fears would be like reading the chart of a fever-and-ague patient. Official England, seconded by unofficial France, kept up a constant pressure on the Emperor. There seems to be no doubt that King Leopold, who suffered from chronic fear lest Napoleon should attempt to swallow Belgium, did his utmost to prejudice his fellow monarchs against the French designs.⁸² In Victoria and Albert he had willing listeners. Among the French themselves, cliques mutually hostile on every other subject united to decry the war. Stockjobbers improved their chance to play at seesaw with the funds. The great bankers were particularly free in criticizing the Emperor. Péreire told him that his speech to Hübner would cost the country a milliard.⁸³ Rothschild transposed the motto, "The Empire is peace," and said to one of the Ministers at a Court Ball, "No peace, no Empire: do you understand?"⁸⁴ On February 16, rumors flew about that Walewski, the

⁸⁰ *Moniteur*, Feb. 8, 1859.

⁸¹ Kossuth: *Souvenirs de Mon Exil*.

⁸² Rothan: *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Feb. 1, 1899, quotes Marquis de Moustier; the latter asserts that Bismarck at St. Petersburg knew of Leopold's intrigues, 761.

■ Martin: iv, 349, n. 2.

⁸⁴ Hübner, II, 273.

champion of peace, had resigned; two days later, Hübner found him, still firmly seated in his office on Quai d'Orsay, and unusually cheerful. The English Foreign Secretary, weary of beating the air, asked Cavour point-blank to state Piedmont's grievances: he hoped at the same time, by inducing the Pope to demand the evacuation of the French and Austrian troops, to remove one of the chief sources of irritation. The Pope made the demand on February 23 and nothing ensued.⁸⁵ The game of cross-purposes went on. Walewski, still ignorant of his master's real policy, whispered to Cowley that he believed the Emperor had so far repented of his war-frenzy, that he would welcome the good offices of England.⁸⁶ On reporting this pleasing news to his chief, Cowley was forthwith summoned to London (Feb. 17). There in conference with Malmesbury and the Prime Minister was drawn up a tentative note containing the following propositions to be submitted to Austria: cessation of French and Austrian intervention in the Papal States; reforms in the Papal government; permanent guarantees of concord between Austria and Piedmont; abrogation or modification of Austria's special treaties with the Duchies.⁸⁷

So Lord Cowley started for Vienna on a mission which was to be 'perfectly confidential and not official.' Emperor Francis Joseph received him politely; Buol himself behaved with unwonted civility. During nearly a fortnight the English envoy heard only complaisant assurances.⁸⁸ Denying that Austria needed to be urged to keep the peace, Buol insisted that, as Piedmont had set Europe in a ferment, it was at Turin and not at Vienna that remonstrances must be made. As to the withdrawal of the French and Austrian garrisons from the Papal States, he had had no official communications, but he ventured to say offhand that it ought to be carried out very gradually in order to give the Pope time to guard against anarchy. When Cowley asked him his opinion as to forming a league of the smaller

⁸⁵ On Feb. 25 the Nuncio at Paris informed Walewski that the Pope had no further need of French troops. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 2, 1859.

⁸⁶ *Correspondence*, 49; Cowley to Malmesbury, Feb. 14, 1859.

⁸⁷ *Stor. Doc.*, VIII, 37; *Correspondence*, 54; Malmesbury to Cowley, Feb. 22, 1859. Besides these official instructions Cowley took a letter from Victoria to Francis Joseph. Martin, IV, 392. For Derby's draft, *Q. V. L.*, III, 411-13. For Francis Joseph's reply, dated March 8, *Lettere*, III, 415-16.

⁸⁸ *Stor. Doc.*, VIII, 38-40.

Italian States and guaranteeing the neutrality of Piedmont, Buol replied that those were matters that required much meditation. He resented the insinuation that Austria opposed reforms, for she had always favored them; what she had opposed was the outrages done to the independence of the smaller States by attempting to force governmental changes upon them.⁸⁹ Although Cowley got no more than courteous words, not one of which, so far as reported, indicated the slightest intention on Austria's part to recede an ell from her stand, he became convinced that she would shrink from war. The Austrian military party, meanwhile, lusted for a fight,⁹⁰ and the Austrian officers in Lombardy bragged openly of their desire to cross the Ticino and chastise Piedmont: Turin, they declared, would be the first stage of their triumphal march to Paris.

England was led to believe that Cowley undertook his mission at the request of Napoleon III, whereas Cowley himself seems to have proposed it. Napoleon certainly gave it his friendliest encouragement, because he never deviated from the policy of appearing to gratify England's every wish. At the end of February he professed to be as eager as ever for peace; but some of his critics suspected that this was merely a ruse for gaining time.⁹¹ He had now reached another of those crises when he seemed willing, under the strain of opposition, to abandon his project. The European press, the French press, the French upper classes, the financiers, the tradesmen, even the army were outspoken against the war. The English despatches dinned warnings into his ears. Walewski and his faction redoubled their efforts to persuade him, by throwing over Prince Napoleon and Cavour, to put an end to the agitation which was imperiling the safety of France and the very existence of the Imperial throne. And apparently they had succeeded, for the *Moniteur* of March 5 published an official disavowal of bellicose intentions. "The Emperor," it said, "*has promised the King of Sardinia to defend him against every aggressive act on the part of Austria; HE HAS PROMISED*

⁸⁹ Martin, iv, 399; Albert to Stockmar. ⁹⁰ Hübner, II, 308; March 3.

⁹¹ Greville, III, 468. "It is revolting to see that the peace of the world and so much of the happiness or misery of mankind depend upon the caprice and will and the selfish objects and motives of a worthless upstart and adventurer, who is destitute of every principle of honor, good faith, or humanity, but who is unfortunately invested with an enormous power for good or evil."

NOTHING MORE, AND WE KNOW THAT HE WILL KEEP HIS WORD.”⁹² Stocks on the Paris Bourse went up.⁹³ Even the pessimistic Hübner saw clear sky ahead. “This is a terrible slap on the nose,” he wrote in his diary, “for Prince Napoleon and M. de Cavour.”⁹⁴ Nearly everybody remarked that the Emperor had come to his senses and backed down. Some of his opponents began to feel pity for him. “He is scourging himself in the face of Europe,” said Thiers to Hübner; “don’t be too hard on him. If you were, public opinion, which is now for you, would turn from you.”⁹⁵ Prince Napoleon resigned in anger his post as Minister for Algeria and the Colonies. Cowley at Vienna took heart. The wary or the suspicious, however, feared that this recession would be followed by a more violent rush towards war. Morny, Persigny, Fleury were uneasy; Fould hoped that Austria would lose no time in coming to a settlement.⁹⁶ The Prince Regent of Prussia wrote the Prince Consort in regard to Napoleon III: “I believe that the saying will again prove true of him: ‘He certainly retreats for the moment, but he never gives up.’”⁹⁷

Cavour watched with increasing anxiety the signs of the Emperor’s defection. In Piedmont, and in the other Italian States, he saw the preparations for the struggle going forward satisfactorily. He never doubted his ability to force Austria to declare war; but the determination of England to preserve peace created, with Napoleon’s shilly-shally, diplomatic difficulties far greater than he had foreseen. By the end of February, 5000 volunteers, mostly Lombards, were enrolled in the Piedmontese army,⁹⁸—a fertile pretext for war, whenever Austria should demand their dismissal. Austria herself, ever since New Year’s Day, had been pouring troops⁹⁹ into Italy. She reinforced the garrisons of Bologna and Ancona, stationed her battalions along the Piedmontese frontier, assembled an army of observation between the Adda and Ticino, and fortified Piacenza.¹⁰⁰ In spite of palpable facts, Buol denied that the garrisons had been strengthened.¹⁰¹

⁹² *Moniteur*, March, 5, 1859.

■ French rentes rose 3 francs 50 c.

⁹⁴ Hübner, II, 310. ⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 311. ■ *Ibid.*, 312–13. ⁹⁷ Martin, IV, 380.

■ *Correspondence*, 70; Hudson to Malmesbury, Feb. 27, 1858.

⁹⁹ 30,000 troops came early in January, according to Hudson’s despatch of Feb. 7; *Ibid.*, 42. ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 61–65; Buol to Apponyi, Feb. 25, 1859. *Die Allgemeine Zeitung* of March 6, states that Piacenza had been put on a war footing with 12,000 men.

¹⁰¹ *Correspondence*, 70.

Austria kept asserting, apparently in good faith, that she neither desired war nor would begin it,¹⁰² but that the alarming rumors, coupled with the military activity of Piedmont and the threatened attack by France, compelled her to be ready. With a show of equal sincerity Cavour kept protesting that Austria's preparations forced Piedmont to arm. Malmesbury having, as he supposed, set in motion pacific trains at Vienna and at Paris, judged the time ripe to apply more pressure at Turin. He therefore instructed Hudson to read to Cavour a despatch in which, after bestowing fatherly advice, he asked what Piedmont's grievances were, any way?¹⁰³ To this reasonable inquiry Cavour replied in a memorandum setting forth afresh the intolerable condition of Italy.

His despatch, dated March 1, is another of the structural documents of the Italian Risorgimento, the sequel to his arraignment of the Papal States and of Naples at the Congress of Paris. In it he publicly puts Austria in the pillory. He sets down grievance on grievance as dispassionately as a physician diagnoses a disease — Italy, the patient, Austria, the disease. While accepting the legality of the Treaties of 1815, he shows first how Austria had overstepped them, and next how they have caused and are perpetuating a condition so shocking that until it shall be removed Europe need not hope for peace. He dissipates the delusion that Archduke Maximilian's régime of blandishments can ever win over the Lombards and Venetians. He insists that the recent Concordat has added Clerical persecution to political tyranny in the Austrian provinces. Mere palliatives, he states inexorably, will work no cure. His facts cannot be controverted.¹⁰⁴

Before receiving this Memorandum, the English Foreign Secretary, heartily sick of the Italian muddle, telegraphed brusquely, "Does Piedmont mean to attack Austria?" Cavour declined to meet that question on any ground, and with reason, Hudson said, because if he attempted to reply, he would be

¹⁰² *Ibid*, 57; Loftus to Malmesbury, Feb. 23, 1859.

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, 68-69; Hudson to Malmesbury, Feb. 18, 1859.

¹⁰⁴ For text, Italian, Zini, II, ii, 47-56; French original and English translation, *Correspondence*, 76-85. Malmesbury dismissed the recommendations of the Memorandum as impracticable. Disappointed that Piedmont refused to disavow any hostile intentions, he contrasted her stubbornness with Buol's willingness to agree that Austria, if properly guaranteed, would not attack Piedmont. *Correspondence*, 85; Malmesbury to Hudson, March 7, 1859.

forced to admit that Piedmont lacked means to declare war.¹⁰⁵ Yet on March 8 Cavour countersigned the royal decree calling the Piedmontese reserves under arms.¹⁰⁶ Did he intend this as retort to Napoleon's apparent recantation in the *Moniteur* of March 5? Victor Emanuel had already¹⁰⁷ written to Napoleon that if he should desert Italy now, Piedmont would suffer a thousand times worse than by the loss of the battle of Novara. "In the face of such an event," said the King, "which I look upon as impossible, nothing would be left me but to follow the example of my father, King Charles Albert, and to lay down a crown which I could no longer wear with honor to myself or with safety to my people. Constrained to renounce the throne of my ancestors, what I owe to myself, to the reputation of my race and to the prosperity of my country, would impose on me the duty of letting the world know the reasons that had driven me to make such a sacrifice."¹⁰⁸ If Napoleon, as the English thought, was going to resort to war as an escape from supposed Carbonari, this letter warned him of the penalty awaiting him in case he betrayed his royal ally. The documents which Victor Emanuel and Cavour could publish would render him forever despicable and fore-sworn — a ruler not to be tolerated by the high-strung French, restless, swift to avenge. Cavour and the King had embarked on a life-or-death venture in which Napoleon was their necessary ally, yet from the very nature of the case they could hold him only by a gentleman's agreement. Their risk was enormous, but the King's threat let him understand that his treachery might be his ruin — a conviction which, much more than dread of assassination, spurred him when he wavered. How Cavour would have extricated Piedmont if the Emperor had died in February or March offers a fine topic for speculation.

¹⁰⁵ *Correspondence*, 71; Hudson to Malmesbury, Feb. 27. Hudson says Piedmont can put only 50,000 men in the field, against Austria's 120,000; only 120 guns to 400; only 6 cavalry regiments to 20. Piedmont's reserve would be used up in one campaign, but Austria could go on recruiting indefinitely from her 40 million subjects. "To declare war upon Austria, is, therefore, simply to bring the Austrians to Turin."

¹⁰⁶ *Lettere*, III, lvii.

¹⁰⁷ Martin, IV, 379. *Lettere*, III, lviii.

¹⁰⁸ *Die Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of Feb. 23 reprinted this letter from the *Kölnischer Zeitung*, to which it was sent on Feb. 18 by a correspondent at Turin. The former journal on March 4 printed a despatch from Turin stating that the letter is declared unauthentic. "By whom?" the editor asks pertinently.

Meanwhile Lord Cowley was pursuing his not very grateful mission at Vienna. From the first, he felt that his business lacked the tangible basis needed in a diplomatic transaction. Austria and France, like incompatible husband and wife, had grown quarrelsome to the verge of blows: when England stepped in to pacify them, each declared that it had not the slightest intention of striking the other. Count Buol assured Lord Cowley that nothing menaced the peace of Italy except the revolutionary ambition of Piedmont; he believed, however, that France intended to make war. Austria would of course ignore reforms or changes which might even seem to be suggested by Piedmont: and, having Germany behind her, she would be foolish not to anticipate France, if France were really in earnest. Austria had been caught unawares in 1848; now she massed her troops on the Piedmontese frontier as a sign that she was ready. Cowley could not condemn this preparedness, although he saw how much it increased the danger of war. He proposed to Lord Malmesbury that the Great Powers should guarantee the neutrality of Piedmont, converting her into a sort of Switzerland, and thereby removing Austria's cause of alarm and allowing Piedmont to progress tranquilly in commerce, industry and inoffensive constitutionalism.¹⁰⁹ On March 10 Cowley left Vienna.

The proposal to reduce Piedmont to a state of political eunuchism had attractions for the British Foreign Secretary, but before he could persuade the other Powers to coöperate, Russia launched the larger project of a European Congress. It was sllily timed, to traverse England's initiative as mediator. Russia made the suggestion, but Napoleon III secretly instigated her to make it. Why? The correspondence has not been published, nor Napoleon's motives avowed. His enemies and doubters thought that he merely wished to gain time:¹¹⁰ others believed that he hoped something would turn up in the Congress to enable him to realize his Italian dreams without the risk of war: others again took this to indicate that he preferred to throw the responsibility on Europe, sure that she could not cope with it; finally, his action might be construed as another proof of his temperamental vacillation. The convening of a congress had a pleasant sound, but

¹⁰⁹ *Correspondence*, 97-99; Cowley to Malmesbury, March 9, 1859.

¹¹⁰ Malmesbury, 470.

what was its purpose? When the envoys of the Powers gathered round their table, and asked each other, "Why are we here?" who could give a satisfactory reply. France, Austria, Piedmont had committed no overt act. France and Austria protested that they did not intend to fight; Piedmont, while avowing that she would not attack, persisted that the condition of Italy was intolerable; but Europe held that if there were any change in the Peninsula, it was for the better and not for the worse, so that Victor Emanuel and the Italians had no new, special grievance. Still, everybody recognized that an explosion was likely and that the Congress must prevent it.

Malmesbury grasped resolutely at Russia's suggestion. The Cabinet on March 19 decided that England would support the plan if the Congress met in a neutral town and limited its discussion to four points: the evacuation of the Papal States by the French and Austrian troops; reforms; the protection of Piedmont from attack by Austria; and the substitution of a plan for the internal security of the small States in place of the Treaties with Austria of 1847.¹¹¹ Cavour knew too well the need of keeping the goodwill of Europe, although he secretly chafed at every occurrence which threatened to postpone or to prevent the war. He accepted the proposal of a Congress, therefore, but he insisted that Piedmont, as one of the parties most nearly concerned, should take part in it.¹¹² This suggestion, so obviously reasonable, proved a firebrand, as Cavour intended it should. Austria announced that she would sit in no Congress with Piedmont, because she had no relations with that country, and could not dignify it by admitting it on a parity with the Great Powers. Buol probably did not relish another face to face debate with the little Piedmontese who had worried him at Paris: and his policy was to treat Piedmont as an outlaw, not to be received in any decent diplomatic circles. He was willing, however, that representatives of the other Italian States should be admitted to answer questions. As they were completely Austrianized, he could have no anxiety as to what they might say. Malmesbury thought that it would be easier to exclude all the Italian States: but Cavour declared that the only hope of a successful issue for the Congress

¹¹¹ *Correspondence*, 106, 108; Malmesbury to Cowley, and to Malakoff. Malmesbury, 469-70. ¹¹² *Politique*, 322; C. to E. d'Azeglio, March 21, 1859.

lay in recognizing Piedmont. "If they do not want us," he wrote to E. d'Azeglio, "it will mean that they intend to keep Italy under the iron yoke which oppresses her." If Napoleon should agree to this, which seemed improbable, he said Italy would fall a prey to the Revolution, the Moderate Party would disappear, the Revolution would spread to France, "which would be governed by a sovereign bereft of his prestige, and there [would] follow a general conflagration, quite otherwise dangerous from that now feared." "Our exclusion," Cavour added, "would render our position clearer and our actions franker. We shall no longer be restrained by the consideration which good treatment merits." In other words, Piedmont herself might throw in her lot with the Revolution against which for ten years she had stood firm. Malmesbury then suggested that the Italian States be invited to send to the Congress envoys with merely consultative powers.¹¹³ The stipulations that no territorial changes should be discussed and that the Treaties of 1815 should be left intact were taken for granted. Russia and Prussia agreed to these general plans; Austria still held out against Piedmont. Nevertheless, the *Moniteur* of March 25 announced that "the Cabinet of Vienna has adhered to the proposition of Russia concerning the reunion of the Congress." The same paper stated: "Count Cavour has left Turin, on his way to Paris at the Emperor's invitation."

A crisis was at hand. Cavour judged that Napoleon was on the point of abandoning Piedmont. Reaching Paris on March 26, he had immediately an audience with the Emperor. What passed between them seems not to have been recorded, but Cavour's task can be surmised: it was to overcome the Emperor's hesitation, the opposition of the Emperor's ministers, the hostility of the nobles and rich bourgeois, the reluctance of the Empress who took her cue from the French prelates, the lukewarmness of the French people, the veto of European diplomacy. One and all declared that there should be no war, and at last Napoleon seemed ready to yield. Over against them stood little Piedmont, with her five million souls, and Cavour her spokesman, who must have told the Emperor in plain terms that she would

¹¹³ Malmesbury, 471 (March 25). Belgium and Holland did this at the Conference of London. *Ibid*, 472.

never consent to be bound by the decisions of a congress from which she was shut out. He must also have rejected the suggestion that Piedmont should disarm, and have reminded the Emperor that the explosion in Italy could not long be held back.¹¹⁴ If that occurred, it might shake the Imperial throne. Knowing Cavour's habit of never wasting ammunition, we cannot doubt that he hinted that, if Piedmont were deserted now, the world should be informed how Napoleon himself had planned the meeting at Plombières, broached the scheme of driving Austria out of Italy, and given signed pledges of his intentions. Napoleon probably parried this half-threat by protesting that he had no thought of breaking his promise, but that it was expedient to humor Europe so far as to consent to the congress, which would certainly turn out abortive. By early summer the war would come; in the interval, France would put her armies into perfect condition. Cavour was not satisfied, but he held himself in, fully aware that though he might coax, urge, persuade and even terrify, he must not exasperate the Autocrat of the Tuileries on whom Italy's salvation depended.

The next two days Napoleon took to his bed, diplomatically indisposed, seeking to brace himself for another interview. Cavour saw Prince Napoleon, the one ardent champion in Paris of the cause of Italy, who seems to have assured him that, in spite of diplomacy and the Emperor, war would come. Walewski, with whom he had an interview which threatened to be stormy, tried to set Piedmont down in her proper place. She had no more reason to feel insulted because she could not sit alongside of the Great Powers, than Holland had, when her envoys were allowed no vote at the Conference of London in 1831. Cavour, who could never entirely disabuse himself of the suspicion that Walewski was playing false to Napoleon's instructions, resented this argument, and remarked that three years before Piedmont sat on equal terms in a Congress which discussed the future of Turkey; was she now to have no voice in a debate which must affect her very existence? Walewski certainly made no headway; neither did Cowley, who, though less brusque than the French Foreign Minister, accused Piedmont of endangering the peace of

¹¹⁴ De La Varenne says that C. showed the Emperor a roster of 31,582 volunteers registered in Piedmont up to March 25. *Chasseurs des Alpes*, 306.

Europe. Cavour replied that on the contrary the responsibility for the Italian ferment must rest on England. It was English statesmen, English parliamentary orators, English diplomats, English writers, who had united for many years past to arouse political passions in the Peninsula. Did not Great Britain encourage Piedmont to offset by a pacific propaganda of moral influences the illegitimate domination of Austria in Italy? But since 1856, England had gone over to Austria. Had the English nation, he asked, ceased to sympathize with the cause of liberty and civilization in Italy? To this Cowley replied that the friendly interest of the Queen's government was shown by its advocacy of a congress in which the welfare of Italy should be considered. If Piedmont would disarm, he added, everything could be happily arranged. To this Cavour returned an irrevocable "No!" To disarm voluntarily would both throw away Piedmont's prestige and bring upon Victor Emanuel and himself accusations of cowardice or of treachery against which they could never stand up. Firm in defending his own position, Cavour still treated Lord Cowley as affably as possible. "Since we must forego the sympathy of the English, we must at least seek to keep their esteem," was the rule he laid down.¹¹⁵

At his apartment in the Hôtel Castiglione, the busy statesman held audiences from half-past five in the morning on. His most picturesque meeting was with Szarady, a Magyar conspirator, who came with Alessandro Bixio. They discussed the possibility of concerting an outbreak in Hungary at the moment when the Italians engaged the Austrians in Italy. Nothing definite could be agreed upon then, but Szarady parted in the friendliest mood, and at once communicated to Kossuth Cavour's advice that he should break with Mazzini. For us, said Cavour, Mazzini is simply a political enemy, whose party we have destroyed; but against the French Emperor, with whom we are working, he is the most ferocious of enemies; he sends assassins almost every three months.¹¹⁶ Cavour had an interview of another kind with Baron James de Rothschild, who tried to pump him on the probability of war. "There are many chances for peace," said Cavour, maliciously, "and — there are many chances for war."

¹¹⁵ *Politique*, 324-25.

¹¹⁶ Kossuth: *Souvenirs de Mon Exil*, quoted in *Lettere*, III, c-cvi.

"Always droll, Count," replied the banker. "Well, Baron," said Cavour, "I'll make a proposition to you. Let's buy shares in the funds together, and play for a rise, — I will resign, and there will be a rise of three francs." "You are too modest, Count," said Rothschild; "you are worth at least six francs."¹¹⁷

That same afternoon (March 29), Cavour went a second time to the Emperor, who took the precaution to keep Walewski in the room. Did he fear that, if left alone with the masterful little Piedmontese, he might be hypnotized into making promises against his will? The conversation developed no surprises. Napoleon seems to have restated his position, but with a little more hopefulness. Cavour strove to impress on both the Emperor and Walewski the possible calamity to the Empire if they should abandon the Italian cause, and he warned them again that Piedmont would neither disarm nor back down. Returning to his hotel he dashed off this brief note to La Marmora: "War inevitable. It will be put back two months at least. It will take place on the Rhine as well as on the Po. In order that the war may have a happy issue for Piedmont and Italy, we must prepare to make the greatest efforts. Drawn into it against their will, the French will never forgive if the largest part of the undertaking falls on their back. Woe unto us if we triumph solely by means of the French. Only by fighting better than they, by putting under arms forces superior to theirs, in the event of a general war, shall we save our country."¹¹⁸

The following day, before leaving Paris, Cavour sent to the Emperor a weighty letter, in which he summed up many of the arguments in their recent conversations. He knew the importance of formulating his policy in such large, clear outlines as would appeal to the Imperial ideologue. With his habitual adroitness he suggested reasons why the policy proposed by Walewski — at which he declared himself "broken-hearted" — would imperil France. "Walewski," he writes, "has decided to ruin us, to force the King to abdicate, me to resign, and to shove Piedmont towards an abyss."¹¹⁹ But whatever may befall Piedmont, the Emperor has gone too far to withdraw: since, by so

¹¹⁷ Massari: *Cavour*, 309-10.

¹¹⁸ *Lettere*, III, 54; C. to La Marmora, Paris, March 29, 1859. Nigra, C.'s secretary, adds: "Count Cavour is not at all satisfied with today's conference with the Emperor and Walewski."

¹¹⁹ *Lettere*, VI, 377.

doing, he would make a mortal enemy of Italy without winning back the trust of Europe, which already knows his purposes. The Emperor certainly gave Cavour no reassuring promises, and the Prime Minister left Paris much disturbed, but not discouraged. To everybody he showed a bold front: "Congress or no congress," he said without reserve, "there will be war." If Piedmont were not admitted to the Congress as an equal, she would take no part in it: and she would not disarm. In view of the actual situation, such a bluff was the best policy, and it had its effect.

Walewski complained to Cowley that Cavour's visit had done great harm; that no argument, no entreaty had moved the stubborn Piedmontese minister.¹²⁰ The Piedmontese Ambassador, returning to London from Paris, confirmed the report of Cavour's intransigence. Upon hearing from Cowley, Malmesbury was thrown almost into a rage. "This is very annoying," he wrote in his diary, "after having done all we could to prevent hostilities."¹²¹ He instructed Cowley "that you might let it be felt by your manner and by *mezze parole* (hints), that if France adopts a course of violence after the language held to you both before and after your Viennese mission, and after encouraging Russia to humbug us into these negotiations for a congress, we shall look upon the whole proceeding as an affront as well as an unwarranted act of political profligacy."¹²² Queen Victoria and Prince Albert divided their righteous indignation between the tricky Emperor and the wicked adventurer. The Prince, revealing, as was his habit, British State secrets to the King of the Belgians, described Austria's course as impeccable.¹²³ "But now comes the difficulty. Cavour refuses absolutely to disarm, and leaves Paris in high wrath, threatening to bring on the war whether people in Paris wish it or not. He holds in his pocket written promises of assistance for war, made at an earlier date, and from these he declines to set the Emperor free. . . . We have just heard that Cavour maintains that the Emperor Napoleon himself chalked out at Plombières the whole plan for organizing the Italian complication, and that he, Cavour, has only been the instrument, which now, however, cannot let itself be sacrificed."¹²⁴ The cur-

¹²⁰ *Correspondence*, 191-92; Cowley to Malmesbury, April 5, 1859.

¹²¹ Malmesbury, 474; April 9.

¹²² *Ibid.*

¹²³ Martin, iv, 416.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 416-17.

rency given to this last assertion may be taken as proof that Cavour himself put it in circulation. Unquestionably, his threat that, if pushed to the wall, he would go to America and publish the documentary evidence of Napoleon's perfidy,¹²⁵ sank deep into Napoleon's mind. This threat, at least, was no bluff. After Cavour's departure, Napoleon realized that he faced the dilemma, War or Dishonor.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ *Politique*, 327, n. 1.

¹²⁶ Greville, III, 479-80, under date April 4, quotes a conversation Clarendon has just had with Marliani, "a Spanish Liberal and friend of Cavour's." "Clarendon asked what would happen if the Emperor proved faithless to him, as he had done to others, and in what position Cavour would find himself." Marliani replied that if the Emperor threw over the Italian cause, "Cavour would resign, the King would abdicate, and the whole correspondence with all the Emperor's letters (of which they had an immense number) would be published and circulated over all Europe. . . . Everything indicates that, whether from fear of this vindictive explosion or because he thinks it his policy, he is hastening his preparations, has renewed his engagements to Cavour, and that he means to go to war as soon as he can." See also *Politique*, 326.

CHAPTER XXI

CAVOUR AGAINST EUROPE. MARCH — APRIL 1859

W^{OE} unto us if we triumph solely by means of the French!" For six months Cavour had been working night and day to prevent that calamity. He knew that men love best that for which they sacrifice themselves most. He meant that Piedmont should do her share. This required a larger army and additional taxes. At first, the preparations went forward as quietly as possible. When Austria, however, unwisely retorted to Napoleon's New Year's Day speech by stationing her troops, rapidly reinforced, along the frontiers of Piedmont, Cavour welcomed the pretext he needed for arming. Finding that the bankers of Paris and London would not lend, he proposed a loan of 50 million francs, for the avowed purpose of defending the country against Austria's attack. Lanza, Minister of Finance, ably supported the bill, although they made it plain that Piedmont would not be the aggressor. Solaro deplored that his country had been degraded to the position of chronic agitator, by 'evoking hopes which had been cherished for eight centuries in vain.' Marquis Costa de Beauregard, steeped in the loyalties and limited by the horizons of the Old Régime, gave warning that Savoy, which he represented, had no interest in the unification of Italy; that on the contrary the Savoyards must take alarm at every expansion of the Italian section of the Kingdom, because their own influence, already small, would be reduced thereby; and he hinted at the probable annexation of Savoy to France as a result of a war. Cavour answered one objection after another, paying particular attention to the coldness of England. The English people, he said, have emancipated the negroes and the Catholics, and they would, in the end, support the cause of Italy, which was not less sacred than that of the blacks. He reproved Costa for fanning internal discord at the moment when the nation ought to stand as a unit against a foreign enemy — a two-edged argument, as useful to demagogues as to patriots. He evaded giving an explicit

statement, except that his purpose was to repel every attack, but not to strike the first blow.

The bill having passed the Chamber and the Senate by large majorities,¹ the Piedmontese themselves immediately subscribed for the loan, and the money was applied to putting the army on a war footing. The reciprocal taunts between Austria and Piedmont worked automatically. The despatch of an army corps into Lombardy served as an excuse for calling out the Piedmontese reserves: the assembling of these reserves led to the massing of another corps on the Ticino. La Marmora directed the regular military preparations, carefully, thoroughly, but too slowly, some of his critics thought. The press, with certain exceptions, upheld the national policy. The upper classes, though hesitant at the outset, grew more enthusiastic in proportion as their confidence increased. The bourgeoisie caught the fever first, and the pouring in of exiles from all parts of Italy kindled the flame. "Is Cavour crazy, or is he not?" Constance d'Azeglio asked, in deep concern, on March 10. "Cavour is perfectly master of the situation,"² she wrote on April 4, just after his return from Paris, when wild rumors were flying about that the patriotic furor was becoming uncontrollable.

Next to European diplomacy, the Party of Action gave Cavour the greatest anxiety. Ever since he took La Farina into his confidence, and tacitly promoted the National Society, he planned to bring under the banner of Piedmont as many former Republicans and Revolutionists and actual Italian patriots as he could. The indefatigable La Farina, working from five in the morning till eleven at night, kept up an immense correspondence, extended the influence of the Society week by week, and encouraged, cautioned, or directed the zeal of a hundred local leaders.³ He never wavered in his assurance that war would come early in the spring. "Do not be scared by conferences or congresses," he wrote to one of his accomplices at Lericci.⁴ He went on with his plans as if the sudden shifts of the diplomats could not affect the result. Soon after the New Year the conviction passed from province to province that the Third War of Liberation was at hand. Emigrants

¹ The Deputies voted Feb. 9, ayes, 116, noes 35; the Senate Feb. 17, ayes, 59, noes, 7. ² C. d'Azeglio, 551, 557.

³ La Varenne: *Chasseurs des Alpes*, states that there were 94 local committees.

⁴ La Farina, II, 132; to F. Bolognini, Feb. 17, 1859.

began again to slip out of Lombardy into Piedmont. Then Lombard conscripts and deserters, escaping from service under Austria, came over to be enrolled in the King's army.⁵ From tens and twenties the quota of daily arrivals soon mounted to hundreds. La Farina gave notice that only young men, of sturdy physique, with military discipline, or at least disciplinable, were desired: for Piedmont ran the risk of being swamped by the hordes of strangers. In order to be diplomatically correct, the government at first treated these fugitive conscripts as political emigrants and interned them: but before many weeks it quietly received them into the regiments which were being brought up to war-strength. All classes swelled the patriotic swarm. Youths of the best blood in Lombardy and Venetia fraternized with zealous artisans, shopkeepers, lawyers and physicians, and with peasants too. "The youngsters quit their families clandestinely, escape on foot, penniless, cross the rivers by swimming or fording," Constance d'Azeglio writes; "there is hardly any water in the Ticino. The customs officers shut their eyes, if they come singly, or decide that it is safer to let them alone if there are many, and they arrive as merry as finches. . . . There are six Viscontis, two Del Vermes, Triulzios, Tavernas, Cicognas, Carcanos . . . the son and the nephew of Sebreghondi, the present podestà [of Milan] and even a chamberlain of the Emperor." "Such a crusade was never seen before.

Austria had good reason to be incensed at this prodigious transaction, but what could Austria do? Extradition would not reach a tithe of the absconders, even if it had been feasible to appeal to the law of extradition. Marshal Gyulai, head of the Austrian army in Italy, could not understand why the Milanese paid heavily to be relieved from military duty at Milan, and then hurried to enlist as soldiers in Piedmont; instinct told him, however, that it was a "very grave symptom."⁷ And although Austrian troops cumbered all the parts of Lombardy, the Lombards indulged in occasional outbursts of audacity. The funeral of Enrico Dandolo, the young hero of 1848, dead of tuberculosis on the eve of national redemption, was attended by 150,000 mourn-

⁵ La Farina, II, 130, 131, 133, *ff.*

⁶ C. d'Azeglio, 553; March 26, and 559, April 10. Bianchi: *Politique*, 314; C. to E. d'Azeglio, March 10, says that 300 Lombards have already arrived.

⁷ C. d'Azeglio, 555; April 3.

ers, eager to bear witness to their patriotism (February 22).⁸ From South of the Po, from Modena and Parma,⁹ from Romagna and Tuscany, recruits poured into Turin, where Lawyer Tecchio received them and distributed them among the military commands. Even Naples and Sicily sent their contingents, though they were small.¹⁰ Special camps were established at Cuneo, Savigliano and other towns. The Piedmontese Army, like the Piedmontese Parliament, was truly national, in that it had representatives from every quarter of Italy.

But the great achievement, the stroke which symbolized the league between Piedmont and the Revolution, the fact which sealed the nationalizing of the war, was the coöperation of Garibaldi. After his visit to Turin in December, he waited impatiently in his island home. La Farina kept in touch with him, warning him especially to be on his guard against Mazzinian seductions. "Be perfectly easy," he replied: "I am confirmed in the spirit of the holy program we have adopted."¹¹ At the end of February, the King summoned him. On March 1 Garibaldi reached the capital, prepared to remain until the hour for action.¹² How to turn his services to the best use, however, was not the least difficult of the Herculean tasks set for Cavour during that season of preparation. Napoleon III, who would have nothing to do with the Revolution, stipulated in his secret treaty that Piedmont should employ no irregular troops. What were the volunteers who soon inundated Piedmont but irregular? Everybody knew that many of them had previously been out-and-out revolutionists. They could, indeed, be enrolled in the regular army, and the earliest batches of them were. But to merge them thus, was to waste whatever symbolic value their service might bring; it would sap their peculiar enthusiasm, and it would give no scope for Garibaldi. The Defender of Rome, the Paladin of Liberty on two continents, the daring and resourceful free-lance was unadapted by training and wholly unfitted by nature to serve in any regular army. He had the temperament of the operatic star who must be humored in his least whim. Let him have his way, and no one else then living could rouse vast

⁸ G. Visconti Venosta, 424-27. Bonafadini: *Mezzo Secolo*, 405-06.

⁹ La Farina, II, 127, reports, on Feb. 12, 460 Modenese "already here."

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 123. ¹¹ *Ibid.*, II, 124; Garibaldi to La Farina, Jan. 30, 1859.

¹² *Ibid.*, II, 136; March 2, 1859.

multitudes to such a pitch of zeal. So Cavour determined on the creation of an independent corps, to be called the Hunters of the Alps, and commanded by the peerless condottiere. The regular army men, from General Alfonso La Marmora down, looked askance at this proposal: and in truth it must always seem illogical to insist in one breath that severe discipline and long drill are indispensable for the making of efficient fighting troops, and in the next to put on a level with the regulars untrained volunteers, who are at best only amateur soldiers. When La Marmora urged technical difficulties, Cavour would not allow them to outweigh the immense political advantages which might flow from organizing Italian patriots under Garibaldi's magic leadership. He carried through parliament a bill to modify the National Guard,¹⁸ and issued (April 6) rules for the Volunteers, and (April 17) for the Hunters of the Alps. Cosenz, Medici and Ardoino were appointed to command the first three regiments of this picturesque corps, which was to go on ahead, Cavour said, and clear the way for the main army, as the pilot fish precedes the whale.

This arrangement, which allowed Garibaldi as much independence as possible and yet held him in restraint, was not the military dictatorship he would have preferred: but he recognized its reasonableness. He chafed more when he learned from the King that the French Emperor was to be an ally. Garibaldi, who never quite outgrew the delusions of his youth, pleaded that the Italians alone, rising to a man under the spell of patriotism, would more than suffice to drive out the Austrians. He hated, and it was natural for him to hate, the wretch who crushed the Roman Republic of 1849; he distrusted, and was justified in distrusting, the sincerity of the perpetrator of the crime of the Second of December. Nevertheless, his common sense told him that if Italy were at war with Austria, his own first duty was to fight for Italy. So he made Italian Unity, under the constitutional régime of Victor Emanuel, his watchword, and set about training his Hunters for the field. He found it easy to deal with the rough and ready King, who was, however, better poised and far more astute than himself; and although he had a lifelong distrust of statecraft, he admired the power, tactfully disguised,

¹⁸ The Deputies voted, ayes 92, noes, 38; the Senate, on Feb. 18, ayes 50, noes 7.

of the Prime Minister, with whom he lived on the friendliest terms. If Garibaldi's alliance with Piedmont was a precious factor in Italy's redemption, we must not forget that it was of even greater importance in his own career. Had he staid outside of the movement against Austria, he would have sunk into the ranks of the unpractical and ineffectual conspirators; Lombardy and the Centre would have been freed without him; the glory of the Sicilian Expedition would never have shone upon him. It was Cavour who divined the expediency of attaching Garibaldi to the Royal cause; Cavour who authorized La Farina to propitiate him; Cavour who, though Napoleon damned and La Marmora scolded, contrived the plan by which his military talents, and his wonderful fascination, would be put to the best use for Italy.

Very different from Garibaldi's was Mazzini's attitude. The most uncompromising moralist can hardly read his diatribes with patience now: for it is only too evident that the modern Jeremiah preferred that Italy should remain in bondage, rather than to see her liberated by anyone except himself and a handful of his loyal fanatics. Having had hints, during the autumn of 1858, of the compact of Plombières, he hoped to develop an uprising, before France and Piedmont could carry out their plan of action. In the interval, he indulged in Cassandra admonitions which, the faithful Saffi admits, were not heeded.¹⁴ Upon reading in the *London Times* the report of the Emperor's remarks to Hübner, he said to Saffi, "The die is cast! We are done for!"¹⁵ That exclamation, in which we detect a mingling of the apostle's grief and the agitator's rage, gives the clue to Mazzini's subsequent course. He must belittle, if he could not blot out Piedmont. So he derided the Liberal policy, denounced Cavour, ridiculed the King. The famous Speech from the Throne of January 10, with its "cry of suffering," which had alarmed the Conservatives of all Europe and set throbbing the hopes of twenty millions of Italians, he dismissed as a poor thing without initiative—a mere "subaltern's communication."¹⁶ Mazzini had two arguments, which he hammered upon impartially. In one, he imputed deceit to Piedmont. Under pretense of freeing Italy, he said, she was really bent on her own aggrandizement. Neither the King nor

¹⁴ Mazzini: *Scritti*, x, xlv.¹⁵ *Ibid.*, lvi.¹⁶ *Ibid.*, liii.

Cavour cared a straw for Italian independence, except in so far as they could make it serve the ambition of the House of Savoy. To Piedmontize Italy would mean no improvement. Cavour, a narrow, sly, unscrupulous politician, posing as a Liberal, had never whispered the word "Unity"; therefore, he must be against it. On the other hand, Mazzini argued that Piedmont was the dupe of Napoleon III. Polluted by his "mercantile policy,"¹⁷ Cavour had secured two allies — but what allies! The French Emperor and the Czar! the enemies of the Roman Republic and of Poland!¹⁸ "L. N. Bonaparte," — as Mazzini, to emphasize his disgust, called him, just as some British historians used to think that by dubbing the Great Napoleon "General Bonaparte" they reduced him to insignificance, — L. N. Bonaparte, while pretending to be Italy's friend, really purposed to set up a French Kingdom in the Peninsula.¹⁹ So Mazzinians would not be satisfied to shout "Out with the Austrians!" but "Out with all foreigners"; "L. N. Bonaparte," Mazzini shrieked, "cannot, without suicide, plant by force of arms in Italy the Liberty which in France he smothers in blood."²⁰ Then the Republican Cassandra remarked sarcastically that Cavour had achieved the apparently impossible feat of creating European sympathy for the cadaverous Austrian Empire: for Austria had been isolated until his wicked policy gave her allies.²¹ An alliance of the Piedmontese monarchy with L. N. Bonaparte must inevitably provoke a European coalition against the true "cause."²²

With a colossal deficiency of humor, Mazzini, the fire-brand, the unyielding zealot, screamed to the Italians, "Stop political feuds!"²³ All that was needed was for the millions who believed in a different plan to come over to him and his shrunken band of disciples, who were burning to expel Austrians and Frenchmen, Pope and Bourbon, and to erect a Republic of Italy. Nothing could be easier. The Italians had merely to set off a general insurrection, and their enemies would fall, surrender, or skulk away. The Glorious Five Days of Milan in 1848 proved that a handful of citizens, with patriotism and courage in their hearts, could sweep before them regiments on regiments of the best soldiers in Europe.²⁴ It was criminal for Cavour to insinuate that

¹⁷ *Scritti*, x, 215.¹⁸ *Ibid*, 189.¹⁹ *Ibid*, 216.²⁰ *Ibid*, 236.²¹ *Ibid*, 221, 222.²² *Ibid*, 237.²³ *Ibid*, 204.²⁴ *Ibid*, 185.

redemption could come only by confronting the Austrian army by a strong coalition of French and Piedmontese armies. "Piedmont," he said, "has but one natural ally — Italy — and but one natural weapon—the Revolution."²⁵ If Europe would leave Italy alone, she would easily settle accounts with her despotic governments and with Austria.²⁶ But Cavour appeals to a foreign helper; and by his immoral policy he substitutes for a second time dynastic cupidity of aggrandizement for the holy National Italian Idea.²⁷ "Make Italy, and we are with you!" exclaims Mazzini,²⁸ with feigned magnanimity which has a comic ring.

Realizing that nine-tenths of his former friends would support Piedmont in the approaching war, he issued a frantic appeal, signed by several score of exiles in England, none of whom had influence, except himself, Saffi, his soft-pedal echo, and Francesco Crispi, an audacious Sicilian whose capacity had not yet been fully tested. His appeal fell on deaf ears. Bertani at Genoa embodied the common sense and practical patriotism of the Party of Action, when he warned Mazzini that it was not possible to attempt to blast their trust in the war and that any Republican who attempted it would call down curses on himself. Bertani urged Mazzini and Cattaneo, for the sake of harmony, to defer their private preferences: but Mazzini could not be moved even by Bertani to depart a hair's breadth from his principles, and Cattaneo, in a letter in which he seemed more concerned to produce elegant periods than to grapple with the immediate crisis, harped on the Milanese Revolution and rode his hobby of Federation.²⁹ From Panizzi, Italy's unofficial ambassador at London, Bertani heard counsel after his own heart. Panizzi frankly admitted that France might prove a dangerous helper — but, he said, "I am more afraid of the Italians than of the French. I fear not only that to our eternal dishonor there will be only a few among the educated persons, and none among the populace to take up arms, but I fear even more lest the customary jealousies, rancors, etc., make them greater enemies towards each other than against the Austrians. One thing is necessary — to drive out the Austrians: this, and nothing else,

■ *Scritti*, x, 242.

■ *Ibid*, 256.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 251.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 242.

■ Mario: *Bertani*, I, 302-08.

is of supreme importance now. To talk of which government will be preferable, so long as the absolute liberation of Italy from the Austrians be not guaranteed by a formal peace, is like thinking about furnishing a house which does not belong to us. . . . For the love of God use your head and your heart to prevent the injury and shame which would befall us, and which has till now degraded us in the eyes of Europe, by conduct which could prove advantageous to our sole, real, irreconcilable foes — the Austrians.”³⁰

Bertani needed no urging. He turned the Party of Action in Piedmont, and its groups elsewhere, to support the war against Austria. He applauded Garibaldi. The Mazzinian tirades, through which rang the confession, “We are done for!” moved him not. Mazzini, whose fondness for baleful predictions increased as his knowledge of the actual situation lessened, was right in foreseeing that his occupation would be gone if Piedmont, with French aid, should liberate Italy. He preached the Republic: but if Italy were freed and united under a constitutional monarchy, the Italians would be too well satisfied to go on striving for a republic. No half a loaf for him: he would have all or nothing. Better, therefore, Austria and the petty despots, whose tyranny would goad the Italians to desperation, out of which the Republic might eventually spring, than the half-way state of Monarchy which would furnish them a bastard freedom, just enough to narcotize their wills into an immoral acquiescence in inferior ideals. Had Mazzini’s fanaticism been less rigid, he would have remembered that so impregnable a Republican patriot as George Washington welcomed the aid of the Absolutist tyrant of France. Extremes meet. Mazzini’s remorseless logic had brought him to the pass where he was as implacable an enemy as the Jesuits to the best hopes of Italy. His final repudiation by the great majority of the men of action, was the fruit of the policy which Piedmont had pursued under Cavour’s guidance since 1852. Mazzinianism had reached the last steps common to the evolution of all human movements — first, incandescent zeal, then, the broadening lava-like flow, then, the final petrification. Petrified religions, institutions, causes, parties are to races and peoples what sclerosis is to individuals.

³⁰ Mario: *Bertani*, I, 310–11; Panizzi to Bertani Feb. 7, 1859.

Every volunteer who deserted from the Austrian provinces, or from the South, or from the Party of Revolution, was a tribute to this policy. The numbers swelled like vernal torrents. Up to March 25 twenty thousand had been registered at the bureaux in Turin and nearly twelve thousand more had been enrolled in the regular army. The little Kingdom was in a fever of patriotic enthusiasm. Lombards, Venetians, Romagnoles, Tuscans, Romans marched shoulder to shoulder and messed together. They naturally irritated Count Buol, who cited them as proof that Piedmont had fallen into the hands of the Revolutionists. Cavour rejoiced. When Malmesbury, inspired by Buol, called his attention to the matter, he reminded the British Foreign Secretary that Piedmont was only following the example of England, which in 1815 organized a camp at Novara for converting Napoleon's soldiers into English legionaries.³¹ But while Cavour exulted at the incoming of the volunteers and at Garibaldi's coöperation, he knew the great risks attaching to them, and he had to devote much energy to prevent an untimely explosion. After his return from Paris, diplomacy busied itself with them in the hope of forcing him to disband them; but he would not even consent to discuss such a proposal. They had trusted in Piedmont's loyalty and Piedmont would stand by them or perish. And so their fate was bound up in that of the little Kingdom itself.

During the first fortnight of April the European Cabinets toiled night and day to find some verbal escape from the deadlock. Cavour refused either to disarm Piedmont or to abandon the Volunteers. Buol spurned the suggestion that Austria should enter the conference so long as Piedmont stood ready to attack her. England's urgency at Turin was politely disregarded; Napoleon had likewise urged in vain, but when England wished him to command and not to advise, he declined. The Austrian and British Ambassadors did not hesitate to express to Walewski surprise, hardly veiling their sarcasm, that his august master, the Emperor, should not put a stop to the bantam strut of his Subalpine protégé. The presence of the Austrian and Piedmontese armies, face to face, with guns loaded, on the frontier, evidently left the maintenance of peace at the mercy of some chance encounter: yet neither would yield. Prussia recommended, there-

³¹ Bianchi: *Politique*, 321; C. to E. d'Azeglio, March, 1859.

fore, that both nations should withdraw their troops to a distance of ten leagues from the border, and Cavour was willing, but Buol refused.³² Then Walewski sounded Austria to know whether, if Napoleon insisted on Piedmont's disarming, Austria would accept the plan of a general disarming. To this Austria consistently replied that, unless Piedmont actually obeyed, the mere fact of the Emperor's making the demand would mean nothing. Austria mobilized more troops; France pushed forward her preparations. Paris pendulated between hopes and dreads. If the Emperor talked to the Russian Ambassador³³ at a party, everyone looked for war; if he talked with Cowley or Pourtalès,³⁴ the watchword was Peace. The Imperial Sphinx seemed to enjoy mystifying the world. "They are always talking about impenetrable depths," said Drouyn de Lhuys of him: "It is a mistake; there are no depths — there is only a surface which changes incessantly."³⁵

Amid this whirlpool of uncertainties, Cavour's resolution was the one fixed rock. Happily for him his great enemy, Austria, unwittingly played into his hands. Austria had logic, common sense, plausibility, tradition — everything except Fate — on her side. By the reconstruction of Europe in 1815 she became mistress of Lombardy and Venetia; by diplomatic encroachments, which none of the Great Powers had prevented, she acquired an influence which amounted almost to a protectorate over the rest of Italy south of the Po. But since 1848 Piedmont had risen to be the champion of constitutional liberty and leader of Italian patriotism. The one danger which Austria feared most was the example of constitutionalism at her very threshold. By threats, by snubs, by irritation, by breaking off diplomatic intercourse, she attempted again and again to drive the tiny Kingdom back into the fold of Reaction. And now, when Piedmont appeared to have captured the French Emperor's support, Austria was shrewd enough to see that she must, at all costs, crush the odious little mischief-maker. With perfect consistency, therefore, Count Buol stipulated that the Treaties of 1815, on which Austria's status in Italy rested, must not be brought into discussion. With equal logic he would not consent to the admission of Piedmont to a conference where the Italian Question could not be ignored. He

³² Hübner, II, 373; April 5. ³³ General Paul Kisseleff. ³⁴ Count Albert de Pourtalès, accredited, March 17, 1859. ³⁵ Hübner, II, 379; April 7.

professed to regard Piedmont as an outlaw, whose case the five Powers should take in hand and settle in the interests of European peace: it would be absurd to invite an outlaw to confer upon his own punishment. Count Buol was right, further, in declaring that there could be no compromise — because, indeed, Austrian Domination and Italian Independence were incompatible. Mask or deflect the issue as diplomats might, that finally lay at the bottom of all the negotiations.

In the immediate affair, Austria prided herself on displaying extraordinary patience. Without provocation from her, the French Emperor had uttered his New Year's threat, which the King of Piedmont followed with an inflammatory speech. In order to let her would-be assailants understand that she was prepared, Austria took the precaution to strengthen her garrisons. Piedmont not only put her forces on a war footing, but equipped large bodies of volunteers, many of whom were deserters from the Austrian army: yet Count Buol, instead of demanding satisfaction at Turin, actually consented, so sincere was his desire for peace, to the convening of a congress, although each day's delay added to the enormous expense of maintaining his army, and gave opportunity to the Prime Minister of Piedmont to vilify and malign him. There could no longer be any doubt that Piedmont's sole motive was selfish aggrandizement. She coveted Lombardy, and therefore she heaped abuse on Austria: but how long would Europe permit such a palpable conspiracy to go on? How long would France, Hübner asked Walewski, suffer Belgium to pursue such a course? "You would stamp on her body, and you would confront whichever of the Great Powers had encouraged her, by letting her hope for its support, to engage in this mad and fatal policy." "That is true," said the French Foreign Minister.³⁶ Not with him, however, but with his master — sphinx, weather-cock, or what you will — lay the decision.

On April 10, Cavour was still valiantly refusing to disarm and still insisting that Piedmont must sit in the Congress as an equal. Just as steadfast on the other side, Austria proposed that all the Italian States, except Piedmont, should be invited to the Congress; but France and England would not agree to this exclusion. Then Austria secretly secured from the rulers of Modena, Parma

³⁶ Hübner, II, 388-89; April 15.

and Tuscany and from the Pope declarations that they desired to have nothing to do with such a conference.³⁷ Pius, whose infallibility did not extend to his memory, rejected the assumption that he could allow foreign Powers to meddle, even by discussion, with his impeccable government, and he expressed to Napoleon III his grief that he, a Catholic, should abet a peace congress proposed by schismatic Russia and Protestant England.³⁸ The Vicar of the Prince of Peace preferred an orthodox war to a peace upheld by heretics. When Prussia suggested that the opposing armies should be withdrawn from the frontier Buol refused point blank.³⁹ So Russia's proposal that the Four Powers should confer without Austria and solve the Italian Question for the good of Europe, met with no favor.⁴⁰ On April 10, Napoleon accepted "in principle" the plan of a general disarmament. Difficulties at once arose: since France claimed to be on a peace footing, who should arrange the details of disarming in Austria and Piedmont? Buol persisted that either Piedmont must disarm first, or the Powers must come to an understanding as to general disarmament before the Congress met: otherwise, Austria would not take part.⁴¹ This gave Lord Malmesbury a rude shock, who wrote privately to Cowley that he was "quite determined to withdraw from this fool's paradise about a congress if we cannot settle the matter on the present basis of a general disarmament." He did not think England ought to risk the public *fiasco* that would follow if, with the Congress in full session, she were refused by Cavour. "England cannot go on running from one to another like an old aunt trying to make up family squabbles, and when I wind up," he adds, "it will be to put the saddle on the right horse. The papers will show that you and I have done our best to prevent a war, and to obtain a congress which nobody but Prussia and ourselves ever intended should take place."⁴²

Malmesbury's patience was giving way. Having long since lost faith in Napoleon's sincerity, he had almost reached the point where he was ready to speak out. On April 12 the Austrian Ambassador, Apponyi, presented to him these alternatives from Buol: Either Piedmont must disarm completely before the meeting

³⁷ *Stor. Doc.*, VIII, 46-48.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 48.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁴⁰ *Correspondence*, 258; Loftus to Malmesbury, April 13, 1859.

⁴¹ Hübner, II, 382. *Correspondence*, 228; Apponyi to Malmesbury, April 12.

⁴² Malmesbury, 475-76; Malmesbury to Cowley, April 11.

of the Congress, and the five Powers must adopt the principle of general disarmament, or, if Piedmont still refused, there should be a general effective disarmament before the Congress convened. "This is our last word," Buol added.⁴³ Malmesbury wrote to Paris that England could not compel Piedmont, but that France and Piedmont might join Austria in announcing officially that they would disarm.⁴⁴ The Emperor replied that he would consent to request Piedmont, on condition that plenipotentiaries from all the Italian States should be admitted to the Congress on an equal footing with those of the Great Powers.⁴⁵ He also made what Malmesbury regarded as "a ridiculous counter-proposition," namely, that "Austria should disarm under a guarantee from France and England that she will not be attacked by Sardinia [Piedmont]." ⁴⁶

At Turin, every hour hurried Cavour towards the catastrophe. The worst of it was that like a gladiator led blindfold into the arena, he did not know what sort of wild beasts or how many were to be let loose upon him. From his side, everything was primed for war, and he hoped that the war would be long and general. Compulsory disarmament at this stage would be ruinous; even a delay might blast the cause beyond repair. He had the military forces of Piedmont, public opinion, patriotism keyed up to the highest pitch. He had the Republicans and Liberals of all Italy ready to spring at a signal from him: but they were growing restless; a chance event might madden them; and if they imputed the delay to his treachery or timidity, like the hounds of Actæon, they might tear him to pieces. If Europe insisted, he must disarm: and Europe was already angry at being thwarted in her desire for peace by a little State of five million souls. Cavour felt that with Villamarina and Nigra at Paris, and his own suggestions brooding in the Emperor's mind, he had taken the utmost precautions possible: but to make a supreme effort to propitiate the English Government he sent Massimo d'Azeglio on a special mission to London. The English, particularly the Court circle, never wavered in their admiration of D'Azeglio, whom they regarded as "the Father of the Italian Question,"

⁴³ *Correspondence*, 228; Apponyi to Malmesbury, April 12.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 231; Malmesbury to Cowley, April 12.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 243; Cowley to Malmesbury, April 15. ⁴⁶ Malmesbury, 476-77.

and as a high-minded statesman, anti-revolutionary in his principles, straightforward in his dealings, the opposite of Cavour, whom the Court and Tory ministers set down as a tricky politician. D'Azeglio's fitness in this crisis was enhanced by the fact that he held views more pacific than Cavour's⁴⁷ and that he was not responsible for the situation. He could be relied upon in all circumstances to uphold the honor of Piedmont. With his usual devotion, he forgot his past differences with Cavour, declaring that the time had come to support and not to criticize the Cavourian policy. He left Turin on April 14. The quickest journey to Paris over the Mont Cenis Pass then required 33 hours. The very afternoon after D'Azeglio's departure, Sackville West, the British Secretary of Legation, waited upon Cavour, and read to him a note urging that Piedmont should yield immediately to the demand to disarm. West concluded with a personal admonition. Still bent on gaining time, Cavour replied that the note differed so widely from a telegram he had received from Paris, that before giving a final answer he must clear up the discrepancy, and confer with the King, who was out of town, and with the members of the Cabinet.⁴⁸ The next day (April 15) West returned in company with the Prussian Minister, Brassier de St. Simon, and urged that Piedmont accept the principle of general disarmament.⁴⁹ "But we must understand what are to be the bases of the Congress," Cavour replied. The Prussian Minister lacked definite instructions on this point, but spoke hopefully. Cavour stated that he had unofficial information of a new proposition from the Emperor which he must wait to have verified.

The news belied his expectations. Walewski, who a little before seemed to encourage Piedmont to protest that, unless she were guaranteed equal representation in the Congress, she would reserve liberty of action, now changed his tone. "The situation is most grave," Villamarina telegraphed; "Walewski, with whom I have just had a very serious interview, urges us 'to accept England's suggestion before Monday.'" ⁵⁰ Cavour realized the danger but he did not feel sure that Walewski spoke for the Emperor. That was Friday, and the following Monday Lord Malmesbury wished to be able to inform Parliament that his

⁴⁷ Bianchi: *Politique*, 331.

⁴⁸ Massari: *Cavour*, 313.

⁴⁸ *Stor. Doc.*, VIII, 59.

⁵⁰ *Lettere*, III, cxvi.

efforts as peace-maker were at last crowned with success. Cavour telegraphed at once to Prince Napoleon: "We will not disarm. Better for us to fall vanquished, arms in hand, than to go down miserably in anarchy, or to see ourselves reduced to maintain public order by the violent means of the King of Naples. Today we possess a moral force which is worth an army; if we lose it, nothing can restore it to us."⁵¹ A few hours later, Prince Napoleon and Nigra, Cavour's most trusty confidant, hurried to the Tuileries. The Emperor received the Prince alone, who came out presently with this message, which Villamarina telegraphed to Turin: "The Emperor counsels us to reply to England that if Piedmont had been admitted to the Congress on the same footing as the Five Great Powers she would have submitted to the same pledges, but, since she is excluded, she must hold herself free from any engagement with anybody."⁵² The Emperor, it will be seen, was resorting to his hide-and-seek expedient. Cavour knew that this was too flimsy a shift to serve much longer, but it justified him in replying to England's demand that although Piedmont could make no promise to disarm, except on the same terms as the Great Powers, she would engage, in the interests of peace, not to mobilize her reserves, or to put her army on a war footing, or to move from her defensive positions, provided that Austria agreed at once to send no more reinforcements into Italy.⁵³ This reply, formally communicated on April 17, was in Malmesbury's hands before he went down to the House of Lords on Monday to make his cheering statement.

But the storm was about to burst — Austria had lost patience. On April 12 Buol sent a despatch to London in which he declared that Piedmont had taken up a position of "permanent aggression against Austria; that until the Treaties of 1815 were torn up Austria was simply acting within her right; and that accordingly she was about to address to the Cabinet of Turin a summons to reduce its army to a peace footing and to disband the free corps and the Italian Volunteers."⁵⁴ Malmesbury, on hearing this despatch, telegraphed Buol that England would disapprove of an ultimatum which failed to state that Austria herself had adhered

⁵¹ *Lettere*, III, 58; C. to Prince Napoleon, April 15, 1859. *Stor. Doc.*, VIII, 60.

⁵² *Lettere*, III, cxviii. *Stor. Doc.*, VIII, 60.

⁵³ *Lettere*, III, cxxiv-cxxv.

⁵⁴ *Correspondence*, 244-46; Buol to Apponyi, April 12, communicated to Malmesbury, April 16.

to the principle of ■ general disarmament.⁵⁶ The next day (April 17) the British Foreign Secretary wrote a private letter to the Austrian Premier suggesting that Austria, France and Piedmont should disarm simultaneously, and that all the Italian states should be invited to the Congress on their footing at Laybach in 1821.⁵⁶ This was positively the last effort that England would make. Like all that had preceded, it was futile. Austria believed, and certainly appearances justified her, that France would continue to shilly-shally until her armies were equipped. Meanwhile Austria was being "bled white." Her pride too resented more and more being held up, criticized, called to account, insulted by her exasperating dwarf neighbor — forty millions dared by five millions. "You ought to summon the Piedmontese to disarm, invade, destroy them, and then declare that you are ready to negotiate in the Congress, whenever and how the Powers desire," said Cowley to Hübner in a moment of unrestraint. "In my opinion," the latter writes in his diary, "that is what we ought to do and what we will do."⁵⁷ From her standpoint, Austria might truly boast of extraordinary forbearance: and she had reached the pass where, although she would not have attacked France if the Piedmontese had not goaded her to desperation, yet she felt quite able to handle the French, and would be glad to cut short her suspense by beginning the war with them. Buol reminded the Great Powers, especially England, that the cause which Austria was defending in the Italian Peninsula concerned Europe, for it was the cause of Europe against Napoleonic ambition. Fifty years before the Powers had united to crush this monster — Napoleonism — which had returned to life and threatened the peace of the Continent.⁵⁸ At Paris meanwhile, the Austrian Ambassador — and doubtless Cowley also — kept picturing to Walewski the almost certain calamity which would overtake the Empire if it plunged into conflict. Old kings, he said, can outlive an unsuccessful war; new kings cannot. If France should fall, she would fall on her feet; but the Elect of the People would rise no more. He must win or perish. But the outcome of the struggle could not affect Francis

■ *Correspondence*, 247; Malmesbury to Loftus, April 16.

■ *Ibid.*, 260; Malmesbury to Loftus, April 18. ⁵⁷ Hübner, II, 395; April 16.

⁵⁸ Hübner, II, 398-401; Buol to Apponyi, April 14.

Joseph either in his dynasty or his own hold on power. "The match is not equal," said Hübner, with the air of a sportsman who wished to appear too honorable to take an advantage of an unwary and handicapped adversary.⁵⁹

At Paris, the 18th of April was a day of conflicting emotions for Napoleon and his advisers, who knew that Austria contemplated sending a summons to Turin, and that Cavour had just replied to England that Piedmont would not disarm. During the night, when it was reported that Austrian troops were being hurried to the front, several French divisions were ordered to Lyons. Hübner and Cowley continued to bombard Walewski with warnings and advice, which Walewski duly repeated at the Tuileries. At length, towards evening, the Emperor ⁶⁰ gave way and stated that France would consent to demand that Piedmont should agree to the principle of disarmament, on condition that England would join France in insisting that the Italian States should be invited to take part in the Congress. Hübner telegraphed the news at once to Buol, adding, "If only we would not delay our summons to the Piedmontese government and our invasion! But alas; we hesitate!" ⁶¹

Throughout that day, Cavour waited anxiously for news. He hoped that Buol, hearing of Piedmont's last refusal, would give the word to attack. At half past one o'clock the next morning, Baron Aymé d'Aquin, the First Secretary of the French Legation, came in hot haste to the Cavour Palace, roused the porter, and was shown at once into the Prime Minister's bedroom. It was no time for ceremony. Cavour, half-dressed, seated on his small iron bed, read the telegram which the Baron handed him. It contained Walewski's demand that Piedmont should consent to disarm immediately. Cavour was terribly agitated. Just at the moment when he was touching victory, this flung him into the abyss. Better than anyone else he realized what the abandonment of Piedmont's enterprise would entail on her, on the King, on Italy. "There is nothing for me to do now," he said to the Secretary, "but to blow out my brains." At six in the morning the French Ambassador came in person. Cavour was more tranquil; at least, he had recovered the power to control

⁵⁹ Hubner, II, 390-92; April 15. ■ *Ibid*, 403-04; April 18. ⁶¹ The Emperor's real purpose appears in his interview with Beust on April 23. Beust, I, 168-74.

his passionate outbursts. He told Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne that, since he could not advise his sovereign to reverse the policy Piedmont had steadfastly pursued, he should resign. The Prince was alarmed, because he knew that Cavour's resignation at that crisis meant disaster.⁶² At eight o'clock Cavour telegraphed to Walewski: "Since France joins England in demanding Piedmont to disarm in advance, the King's government, although foreseeing that this measure may have grievous consequences for the tranquillity of Italy, declares itself disposed to submit." Walewski found the despatch spiteful towards France.⁶³ To friends who called early Cavour said, "We have resisted to the last; now we bow to a demand made to us by all Europe — our honor is safe. Nevertheless, our situation is very grave — not hopeless, but very grave."⁶⁴

Having seen, even amid his agitation, the step to take, he had taken it resolutely. Now a nervous revulsion swept over him. Giving orders that nobody be admitted, he locked himself in his room. Farini and Audinot, two of his trusted followers, were turned away, and fearing the worst, they hurried to Castelli and begged him to interfere. Cavour had many disciples who would gladly have laid down their lives for him, but there was not one for whom he had so much affection as for Michelangelo Castelli. "I got up and without asking more I ran to the Cavour Palace," writes Castelli. "First to meet me was his butler, Martino Tosco, who said with emotion: 'The Count is in his room, alone; he has already burned many papers, and he forbade us to allow anyone to enter, but for Heaven's sake go in at whatever cost.' Having entered the chamber, I found him surrounded by heaps of papers which he had torn up, and in the fireplace many others were burning. He looked at me fixedly and did not speak. Then with entire calm I said: 'I know that nobody was to enter here; but on that very account I have come.' I felt a wrench at my heart, the danger was evident, and with great effort I added: 'Must I believe that Count Cavour intends to desert the field before the battle — that he intends to abandon us all?' And then, overcome by emotion, I burst into sobs. Cavour rose, embraced me convulsively, and, after having paced up and down the room almost beside himself, stopping in front of me, he pronounced

■ Massari: *Cavour*, 314-15. ⁶² *Lettere*, III, cxxix. ⁶⁴ Massari: *Cavour*, 316.

slowly these words: 'Do not be uneasy, we will face everything, and always all of us together.'" ⁶⁵ Castelli felt that the danger point was passed and, leaving Cavour, he hastened to reassure their anxious friends. If ever loyal devotion had its full reward, it was on that day when not cowardice but a terrific nervous tumult threatened to engulf Cavour's reason. ⁶⁶

The 19th of April, 1775, Liberty Day, saw the opening of the American Revolution; in 1859 at Turin it marked a crisis in the struggle for Italian Independence. As the day ran on, Cavour grew calm. His habit of accepting irrevocable facts and of remoulding his plans according to them, reasserted itself. He instinctively looked for any encouraging signs in the actual situation. But the suspense was great. He wrote a last appeal to the Emperor. ⁶⁷ He watched the telegraph, but no cheering message came. During the next day (April 20) although his anxiety was undiminished, he was steadier. He sent to Massimo d'Azeglio a long despatch, which, far from betraying agitation or nervous shock, presents forcibly, compactly, and with perfect lucidity, a review of the three months' transactions. ⁶⁸ Had he died that day, this summary might serve as his apology. He little knew that to Hübner also that 20th of April was "a day of agony"; for the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, like the Piedmontese Premier at Turin, was nearly distracted by the dread that Austria would not declare war.

In the forenoon of the 21st light broke. The legations of Russia, France and England ⁶⁹ sent over to Cavour in quick succession news that Austria had refused every proposal and was hurrying to Turin a demand of instant disarmament. ⁷⁰ The War Party at Vienna had forced Buol's hand. Great rejoicing drove depression out of Cavour's heart. Walewski telegraphed, "Count on our most energetic support." ⁷¹ The following day

⁶⁵ Castelli: *Cavour*, 83; *Ricordi*, 97-98. Castelli mentions Minghetti as being with Farini and Audinot, but Minghetti had not reached Turin.

⁶⁶ Dicey: *Cavour*, 175, who apparently had the story from one of the participants; and yet this same day C. wrote a calm business letter to Corio. *Lettere*, VI, 394. ⁶⁷ *Lettere*, III, 46; despatch to Nigra, March 20; the letter appears never to have been printed. ⁶⁸ *Stor. Doc.*, VIII, 486-89.

⁶⁹ Massari: *Cavour*, 317, says that Sackville West, the British Secretary, was the first to bring official news: at which "there flashed over [Cavour's] face the stormy joy of the great design." Also, C. to Plon-Plon, April 18; *Lettere*, VI, 388-91. ⁷⁰ *Lettere*, III, cxxxii-cxxxv. ⁷¹ Massari: *Cavour*, 317

the *Moniteur* printed an official announcement of Austria's refusal. Having advised Piedmont to reply to the ultimatum by simply repeating that at the request of the Great Powers she had accepted the principle of a general disarmament, Malmesbury frantically tried to persuade Austria to reconsider.

Meanwhile Baron Kellersperg, bearer of Buol's demand,⁷² was journeying towards Turin as fast as post and train could bring him. At noon on April 23 Cavour convened the Chamber of Deputies from their Easter holidays, narrated briefly the course of negotiations, left no doubt as to the imminence of war, and asked for a vote conferring on the King full powers as long as the conflict should last. After a recess, the Chamber reassembled and passed the measure by a majority of 63 out of 134 voting. "Long live the King! Long live *Italy!*" shouted the deputies. Just at that moment Cavour received from a friend who was watching at the station a note, scribbled in haste: "They have come. I have seen them." Cavour hurried out of the hall, saying to his friend, "I am leaving the sitting of the last Piedmontese Chamber; the next will be that of the Kingdom of Italy."⁷³ At quarter past five the Prussian Minister escorted Baron Kellersperg and Count Ceschi di Santa Croce to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where Cavour received them very politely. Kellersperg presented Buol's ultimatum, which, after summing up Austria's grievances, demanded that within three days Piedmont should promise to disarm; otherwise, she would have only herself to blame for the consequences.

Few lovers have ever devoured more eagerly the letters of their beloved than Cavour read that challenge. When he had finished, he took out his watch. It was half past five. "In three days at this hour," he said to the envoy, "you shall have my reply." At the appointed time, he handed Kellersperg a letter⁷⁴ for Buol, adding, "I hope, Baron, that we shall meet again under happier circumstances." When the Austrians had gone, Cavour

⁷² Kellersperg left Vienna during the evening of April 19, ten or twelve hours after Cavour's telegram reached Paris. It seems unlikely that more than ten hours were required to forward the news from Paris to Vienna. Buol declared, however, that Kellersperg had started before the telegram came, and that Austria could not, with dignity, recall him.

⁷³ *Lettere*, III, cxi-cxli; Chiala follows Massari (318-19) almost verbatim.

⁷⁴ Text and English translation of C.'s letter in *Correspondence*, 356-57.

said to his friends waiting anxiously in his antechamber: "*Alea jacta est!* The die is cast! We have made history — now let us go and dine."⁷⁵

England essayed a final effort for peace, by offering to mediate between France and Austria.⁷⁶ Prussia and Russia joined with England in censuring Buol's ultimatum.⁷⁷ Malmesbury pointed out that Buol, in asserting that England had agreed that Piedmont alone should disarm, made a serious misstatement.⁷⁸ Buol was willing to go back to the proposals Cowley had discussed during his mission to Vienna; but Walewski, speaking now for the Emperor and not for himself, said that France must insist that Austria should renounce her special treaties with the small Italian States, withdraw her troops from the left bank of the Po, evacuate Comacchio, Ferrara and Piacenza, and consent to disarm simultaneously with France and Piedmont.⁷⁹ The efforts of the mediators, he told Cowley, would be futile unless Austria accepted everything which she had until then rejected.⁸⁰ This humiliation was too great. Buol's response was to draw up a declaration of war, which the Emperor signed on April 28.⁸¹ The manifesto called upon Germany, as well as the subjects of the Austrian Empire, to uphold by force the justice of Austria's cause.

Cavour expected the Austrian troops to cross the Ticino on April 27, as they would have done if they had been commanded by a competent general; and when, after twenty-four hours, they still showed no sign of moving, Cavour telegraphed to Villamarina that he feared that England was weaving some new intrigue for stopping the war. "Publish at once," he ordered, in "the *Patrie* and the *Nord*, Count Buol's ultimatum and my

⁷⁵ Massari: *Cavour*, 320-21.

⁷⁶ *Correspondence*, 327; Cowley writes to Malmesbury on April 24, that Walewski is conciliatory. The suggestion of mediation seems to have come from Prussia. See Schleinitz's despatch to Bernstorff on April 23. *Correspondence*, 330.

⁷⁷ "It is incomprehensible," says Beust, "how this bold decision could have been so unskilfully carried out as to give the French so much opportunity of appearing at the right moment on the scene of war." Beust, I, 176; Beust to Falkenstein, Paris, April 24, 1859. Beust's private despatches (165-92) should be read in full for sidelights on this diplomatic tangle.

⁷⁸ West said to Cavour on April 24 that Buol had virtually lied. *Correspondence*, 335-36.

⁷⁹ *Stor. Doc.*, VIII, 67. Hübner, II, 423. *Correspondence*, 328, 342, 355. *Lettere*, III, cxlv, cxlviii-cli.

⁸⁰ *Correspondence*, 342; Cowley to Malmesbury, April 26.

⁸¹ English translation of Francis Joseph's manifesto in *Correspondence*, 372-73.

reply.”⁸² The publication had already been made, not to Paris merely, but to Europe. At seven o’clock in the morning of the 29th the first Austrian troops crossed the Ticino.⁸³ The negotiator gave way to the soldier.

In this wise ended, victoriously for Cavour, the most remarkable diplomatic contest of the 19th century. The little spectacled statesman in his office in Piazza di Castello at Turin, had forced the war which Europe vowed should never take place. The paramount factor during these sixteen weeks of devious and insincere transactions, of persuasions, entreaties, threats, commands, was Cavour’s pertinacity. If at any time he had hesitated, there would have been no war: because it was his insistence alone which held Napoleon III up to his engagements. For Napoleon, confronted by the rude risks of war, would have put off or abandoned it. When at the last moment Cavour yielded to the overwhelming pressure of Europe, it was quickly seen that he had already fired a train which Europe could not quench.

In the retrospect the “unheard-of efforts” of Malmesbury, inspired or approved by Prince Albert, seem so worthy that we wonder why they leave us as unthrilled as they left contemporaries uninfluenced. One reason evidently is that we instinctively withhold admiration from men in high station who prove unequal to their task. Malmesbury came dangerously near the truth when he compared England to an old aunt running about trying to patch up family squabbles. The British Foreign Secretary, the Prince Consort and the Tory Court undervalued Cavour’s genius and misjudged his motives. They set him down as a tricky politician, bent merely on adding territory to his sovereign’s kingdom and glory to himself. But that is the defect of the Tory: however patriotic he may be, he is blind to patriotism in others. The Tories of 1775 supposed that the patriotic unrest of the American colonists was only a financial irritation; the Tories of 1859 set down Italian patriotism as a mask for dynastic greed; the Tories of 1862 supposed that the motives which impelled Lincoln and the North to preserve the American Union

⁸² *Lettere*, III, 60; C. to Villamarina, April 28. Villamarina replied: “It is positive; England is making unheard of efforts to hold back Austria’s arm. Last evening Walewski complimented me most highly on your reply to the ultimatum.” *Lettere*, III, 60–61.

⁸³ Hübner, II, 425.

and abolish slavery were purely commercial. Malmesbury so far miscalculated the relative dynamics of Cavour and Napoleon as to declare that "five years ago" Napoleon would have put Cavour in his proper place in five minutes.⁸⁴ That is the penalty of the Conservative, — he cannot understand the ideals which beckon mankind forward. So Malmesbury did not perceive that what gave might to Cavour, what sustained every Italian Liberal, what fortified every Italian conspirator, exile and martyr, was the holy ideal of Liberty. Diplomacy, which deals with known material interests and measures by selfishness as the one stable element of individuals, parties and nations, is baffled in the presence of zealots who have consecrated themselves for life or death to an unselfish principle.

In December, Cavour told Odo Russell that he should force Austria to declare war about the first week in May: he did better than that by more than a week. The humor of the situation struck those who saw that Austria herself, by her declaration, broke through the very Treaties of 1815 which she had made it her business for forty-four years to guard. But her conduct throughout the negotiations was consistent. She could not retain her hold on Italy by compromise: she could not even hope to secure peace by martial law unless she crushed Piedmont; Buol and the Imperial Council saw that clearly enough. But Buol, in essence a rule-of-thumb man, made four capital mistakes: he allowed himself to be lured into putting Lombardy on a war basis twelve weeks too soon, thereby giving color to Cavour's protest that Austria was going to attack Piedmont: he supposed that by bearish manners he could impress the Cabinets of Europe with the dignity and power of the Hapsburg Empire; he assumed too confidently that Europe would humor Austria as the upholder of the Reaction which had its foundation in the Treaties of 1815; and he quite underrated Cavour. This last blunder had no excuse; because twice before, — after the Milanese fiasco in 1853, and at the Congress of Paris in 1856, — Buol had had ample opportunity to test Cavour's mettle. But at the end, the cabal that ruled Francis Joseph launched the ultimatum against Buol's better judgment.⁸⁵ So he, too, was in a way a martyr to the God of Reaction whose aid he had relied upon; and he at once resigned.

⁸⁴ Malmesbury, 471; March 25.

⁸⁵ Friedjung, I, 14.

If we dramatize this amazing diplomatic duel, we shall see Cavour pitted single-handed against three adversaries: Malmesbury, Buol, and Louis Napoleon. By carefully timed nettling, intermitted but never abandoned, he drove Buol to fury; Malmesbury — the spokesman of conventional, let-well-enough-alone, don't-disturb-British-interests standards — he put off politely, but effectively, without a rupture; Napoleon, — blow-hot, blow-cold, slippery, evasive, inscrutable, deterred by all parties in France, dissuaded by Queen and Cabinet in England, — Napoleon he held fast to their compact of Plombières and forced into the field as the champion of Italian Independence.

END OF VOLUME I




ITALY in 1852.

Kingdom of Piedmont in Blue
Unredeemed Italy in White

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